

British Academy Review

UNDERSTANDING PEOPLES, CULTURES, SOCIETIES – PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

BRITISH ACADEMY
**SUMMER
SHOWCASE
2018**

A festival of ideas for curious minds

The long history of working at home ¶ The power of shared reading ¶ Why agriculture is at the root of Syria's problems ¶
David Cannadine and Mary Beard reflect on civilisation(s)

British Academy Review

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The *British Academy Review* contains articles illustrating the wide range of scholarship which the British Academy promotes in its role as the UK's national academy for the humanities and social sciences.

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The British Academy

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
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In this issue

Welcome to this issue of the *British Academy Review*, published on the occasion of our first ‘British Academy Summer Showcase’.

The *British Academy Review* shares the goal of the Showcase, in illustrating the wide range of scholarship which the British Academy promotes in its role as the UK’s national academy for the humanities and social sciences. Several articles in this issue are related to presentations at the Showcase. And through both of these channels, we have a great story to tell.

The articles by President of the British Academy, David Cannadine (page 4), and by Mary Beard (page 9), place the Academy’s disciplines at the heart of all attempts to examine our civilisation(s) and culture(s). And the overview by Chief Executive, Alun Evans, shows our subjects put to work, seeking ways to address the great challenges of our time.

One hundred years ago there were challenges aplenty, as the First World War was still very much in progress with no end in sight. But the two articles ‘From the Archive’ (pages 47 and 49) reveal ways in which Fellows of the British Academy were looking ahead to the possibilities of peace, whenever that might come.

An enduring interest in all human concerns is the strength of the subjects that the Academy represents, and I hope you find much to engage you in this issue.

How are we doing?

Your feedback is important to help us shape future issues of the *British Academy*

Review. To provide reader feedback, please visit www.britishacademy.ac.uk/british-academy-review-feedback

First ever British Academy Summer Showcase

The British Academy’s first ever Summer Showcase, held on 22–23 June 2018, is a free public festival of ideas for curious minds.


The Showcase celebrates and champions work carried out in the Academy’s disciplines – the humanities and social sciences. The 15 thought-provoking exhibits feature research that has been supported through the Academy’s wide range of programmes and activities, and provides visitors with the opportunity to meet the researchers and discuss their ideas. It is aimed at everyone interested in the big issues of the day, or timeless aspects of culture, or simply wants time to think in the Academy’s beautiful building.

Three of the articles in this issue tie in with Showcase exhibits – those by Helen McCarthy (page 19), Jennie Bradbury and Philip Proudfoot (page 35), and John Gordon (page 39).

After the live Showcase itself, information about the researchers and their exhibits can be found via www.britishacademy.ac.uk/summershowcase/2018

Exploring social integration

In the Spring 2018 issue, Professor Dominic Abrams, the British Academy’s Vice-President for Social Sciences, discussed the British Academy’s reports on social integration, published under the title ‘*If you could do one thing...*’. We have been very



pleased to see that the Government’s long-awaited Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper has been informed by our reports. As well as engaging with officials working on the strategy, we have followed up by submitting a response to the Green Paper, pulling together insights from disciplines ranging from anthropology and languages to psychology and geography. Our response has stressed the importance of taking both a multi-dimensional and multilevelled view of integration, and has also proposed some important additional indicators that can be used to measure integration.

Championing study of the humanities and social sciences

In May 2018, the British Academy responded to the Government’s Review of Post-18 education and funding, urging the Government not to prioritise some subjects over others by charging variable



Archbishop Justin Welby (right) in conversation with President of the British Academy, David Cannadine.

levels of tuition fees. The Academy's submission argued that a healthy, prosperous and global Britain needs a diversity of graduates to address future challenges, while highlighting the contribution graduates from the arts, humanities and social sciences make to the UK's culture, economy and international reputation, and in jobs of social importance such as teaching and social work. The Academy points out the lack of strategic oversight and monitoring of provision of different disciplines across the UK higher education sector, and suggests that the national academies are well placed to undertake this function.

Mapping language teaching

The British Academy's submission mentioned above also highlights a growing trend of universities to shrink or close courses in subjects, particularly in the humanities. Languages is an area of especial concern, with at least ten modern languages departments closed and a further nine significantly downsized in the last decade. The Academy is working with a range of partners to promote the value of languages across society, setting out the benefits for business and productivity, diplomacy and defence, research and educational attainment, social cohesion and social mobility, and health and well-being. This work will continue to be a key theme over the coming year, with activity focused on making the case for, and defining the content of, a national strategy to improve the UK's linguistic capacity.

In May 2018, as a pilot project, the British Academy launched an online interactive map providing

for the first time an overview of the provision of Arabic teaching throughout the education system.

Two of the articles in this issue – those by Petros Karatsareas (page 42) and Khadij Gharibi (page 45) – are on the pertinent theme of how knowledge of heritage languages is preserved in immigrant communities.

Archbishop speaks to British Academy

On 31 May 2018, Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury, discussed his recent book *Reimagining Britain: Foundations for Hope*, in conversation with President of the British Academy, Professor Sir David Cannadine. Describing the original motivation for the book, he said: 'It started in a moment of exasperation after the [EU] Referendum – not over the result, which I accepted – but the sense that we had made a huge change in the way we were taking our country. It combined with the most enormous change in the circumstances around our economy, around technology, around biogenetics and many other areas. Climate change was also a contextual issue that was going to change everything. And we appeared to be doing this without that much concentration on what we wanted things to look like in 20 or 30 years time. So it was an aim to contribute to the conversation.' You can see the whole discussion via www.britishacademy.ac.uk/justin-welby-lecture

Investigating English devolution

Since 2016 the British Academy has been investigating devolution in England – initially examining broad issues relating

to the devolution settlements and their implications for England. More recently we have examined devolution in practice, and whether it will affect people's lives in a way they will notice. In May 2018 we launched a publication – *Governing England: Devolution and public services* – which shows that the public has yet to engage fully with devolution in England, but this could change if people can link these reforms to changes to the services or infrastructure they use. Our work indicates that it is not the mayors that will make or break devolution, it is the services that people experience every day: health and social care, skills and infrastructure. Later this summer we will launch further work on public finance and spending in England. And later in 2018 we will launch a large academic publication in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* series: *Governing England: English Identity and Institutions in a Changing UK*.

Record number of Postdoctoral Fellowships awarded to women

The British Academy has been able to award 85 Postdoctoral Fellowships in 2017–18, the most ever in a single round – and two-thirds of them to women. These three-year fellowships are crucial for the early-career development of academics in the humanities and social sciences. Of the 85 awards, 45 are funded through our grant from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS); the other 40 have been made possible through an additional £10 million over four years from the UK government's Global Talent Fund and Rutherford Fund. ■

The British Academy and civilisation(s) – past, present, future

David Cannadine, President of the British Academy, unearths the deep roots of the Academy's new vision

In recent months, there has been considerable public discussion of civilisation – or, more accurately, of civilisations – much of it initiated by two of the British Academy's Fellows, Mary Beard and Simon Schama, whose eponymous television series has rightly attracted

a great deal of attention. What do we mean by civilisations? Is it good enough to say that we can recognise them when we see them? Are they the result of leaps of faith or efforts of will? And what exactly is the nature of their relationships with each other? These are serious and important questions, which the presenters of *Civilisations* certainly raised, but with which very few reviewers of the programmes made any serious effort to engage. A few weeks ago, I hosted a dinner at the Academy, at which Mary Beard eloquently lamented the lack of such a grown-up public discussion (her remarks are published elsewhere in this issue, page 9); and also present was Sir David Attenborough who, as Controller of BBC 2, had commissioned the original

Civilisation, presented by another of our Fellows, Kenneth Clark, which first aired in 1969.¹

Behind this latest engagement with the subject lies the work of the Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington who, in his highly influential publication, *The Clash of Civilizations*,² claimed or warned or lamented or predicted that civilisations could be easily

and precisely defined, that they were largely homogeneous in their structures and characteristics, that their relations with each other were invariably antagonistic, perhaps latently, or perhaps actually, and that as a result they were always likely to go to war. Huntington's thesis, which was often invoked to justify intervention by the Americans and the British in Iraq in 2003, has been subject to many devastating critiques, some more explicit than others, and not least by Fellows of this Academy.

In his *A History of the World in 100 Objects* (2010),³ Neil MacGregor urged that for most of human history, civilisations had been characterised more by overlap, borrowing and conversation than by antagonism, confrontation and conflict. And in *Identity and Violence* (2006) and *The Argumentative Indian* (2005),⁴ Amartya Sen insisted that it was (for example) deeply mistaken to describe India, as Huntington did, as a 'Hindu civilization'. On the contrary, he contended it was a country that, ever since independence from the British in 1947, had been a secular state with a secular constitution, and where there are more Muslims to be found than in any other nation in the world, with the exceptions of Indonesia and Pakistan. And Sen further argued that, in any case, most people think of themselves in many different ways, and as belonging to many different groups, which makes it impossible to assign to them one over-riding, all-encompassing identity called civilisation.

Exactly one hundred years ago, in the spring and summer of 1918, as the First World War entered its final, climacteric phase, but when its outcome was still in doubt, the Fellows of the British Academy were themselves



Sir David Cannadine is Dodge Professor of History at Princeton University. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1999, and became President of the British Academy in July 2017.

1. Kenneth Clark was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1949.

2. Samuel P. Huntington's article 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* (1993), was further developed in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996). The 'Clash of Civilizations' debate is discussed in David Cannadine, *The Undivided Past: History Beyond Our Differences* (2013), Chapter 6, 'Civilization', especially pp. 242–54.


3. Neil MacGregor's *A History of the World in 100 Objects* was broadcast as a BBC Radio 4 series and published as a book, both in 2010. Neil MacGregor was elected an Honorary Fellow of the British Academy in 2000.

4. Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (2006). Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity* (2005). Amartya Sen was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1977.

much concerned with their own version of these issues concerning the nature and relationships of civilisations. As another article in this issue makes plain (page 49), one Fellow, the Revd Professor Canon William Sanday, thought the conflict had been ‘by universal consent, the worst war ever waged by powers calling themselves civilized’, but his plea that Fellows of the Academy should cultivate contacts with a select group of German scholars, who might be willing to work to bring ‘Germany back again into line with the moral conscience of the world’, was ill received. This was partly because there seemed little evidence that the German scholars he named were likely to embrace such friendly and well-disposed opinions, and partly because Sanday’s words could be misconstrued as indicating less than wholehearted support for the continuing British war effort.

One figure who soon distanced himself from Sanday’s remarks was Sir Frederic George Kenyon, the director of the British Museum, who had recently succeeded Viscount Bryce as President of the Academy. ‘It is right’, he urged, ‘to make it plain that British scholars are heart and soul in the war, that their determination is not slackened, because we feel that we, with our allies, are the trustees of civilisation.’ He made the same point even more emphatically in his first presidential address, delivered on 4 July 1918,⁵ when it was still unclear that the allied forces would successfully withstand the most recent German advance. ‘We are’, he concluded, ‘in a particular sense, trustees of a most important part of that civilization which we are fighting to defend ... In serving the Academy, we are serving no narrow cause. We are flying the banner of civilization which, side by side with our allies, we claim the right of serving and of preserving.’

Like all such comments by Presidents of the Academy, my own included, Kenyon’s observations were perforce time-specific and place-bound. The notion that Europe (or, more broadly, ‘the west’) represented the ultimate achievement of civilisation had not only been undermined by the horrors of the First World War, but would be further eroded when the bestialities of the holocaust became plain (thus regarded, German *kultur* was not at all civilised). In 1918, Oswald Spengler lamented and predicted *The Decline of the West*,⁶ soon after, Arnold Toynbee would begin his monumental *A Study of History*,⁷ where he would argue that European civilisation was but one among many, and even Kenneth Clark concluded his account of *Civilisation* by conceding that European culture had lost much of its confidence and



Sir Frederic Kenyon, President of the British Academy, 1917–21.

vitality as a result of the two world wars. Nowadays, and as *Civilisations* has made vividly and visibly plain, we rightly think about and define the subject in very different and much broader ways than Kenyon or Clark did (though in fact Clark was much more sympathetic towards and knowledgeable about civilisations beyond Europe than he was often given credit for).

Yet for all its temporal limitations, there is also much in Kenyon’s presidential address of 1918 that still resonates powerfully, exactly one hundred years on. The Academy, he believed, was and should be ‘the leader and official representative of the studies which come within its sphere’. It must, Kenyon continued, ‘on the one hand, earn the confidence and support of the great constituency which it claims to represent, and, on the other hand, make good its claim in the eyes of government and the country to be regarded as the representative of that constituency.’ He further noted that, with limited state support, ‘one cannot express too warmly the gratitude of the

5. F.G. Kenyon, ‘The Position of an Academy in a Civilized State: Presidential Address’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, [8] (1917–1918), 37–49.

6. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West: Outlines of a Morphology of world history*, 2 volumes (1918–22).

7. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 volumes (1934–61). Arnold Toynbee was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1937.

Academy to the generous benefactors who have chosen this way of demonstrating their sense of the value of intellectual culture, and who have selected the Academy as the medium of their gifts.' But he also urged that 'to advance learning by a wise use of funds committed to its charge, it is evident that [the Academy] requires endowments greatly in excess of those which it at present possesses.'

To be sure, government funding of the Academy has significantly increased since the paltry sums that were only intermittently made available in Kenyon's time, both in terms of our core grant from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), and of the many fellowship schemes and research projects that we oversee and administer on behalf of BEIS and other government departments. But we are already gearing up for the negotiations which will soon take place as the next Spending Review looms, having been brought forward by a year in the recent budget. We remain too dependent on government funding, and we possess an endowment that is still insufficient for our purposes, and which lags far behind those of our sister academies. We rightly prize and jealously safeguard our intellectual independence, but it would be greatly strengthened and enhanced if we could significantly diversify our income streams, and control and command more sustaining resources of our own, and we are devoting a considerable part of our fundraising efforts to achieving that vital goal and essential outcome.

To this end, we are also finalising the Academy's new strategic plan, building on the strategic framework about which my predecessor, Lord Stern, wrote in the summer 2016 issue of the *British Academy Review*.⁸ As the national academy for the humanities and social sciences, which recognises scholarly excellence and celebrates academic distinction across those disciplines, we intend to focus on five priorities: to speak up more effectively in public and to government on behalf of the subjects that we represent; to support and invest as much as we can in the very best researchers and research; to help provide answers to some of the greatest challenges of our time, which need the insights of the humanities and social sciences every bit as much as those of science and technology; to ensure and enhance our sustained international engagement and global collaborations; and to maximise the Academy's assets and resources so as to secure its future on Carlton House Terrace.

In terms of specific objectives, there is nothing in this strategic plan that is particularly novel or especially new: but the aim is to ensure that our efforts are both appropriately focused and well co-ordinated, and to that end we have recently made some changes to the internal staffing structure of the Academy to ensure it is more

closely aligned with our objectives. And there is clearly a great deal of work that needs doing. In the speech that the Prime Minister delivered at Jodrell Bank in May this year, she spoke about the importance of science and technology as the drivers of innovation and economic growth, very much as Harold Wilson did with his 'white heat of technology' speech to the Labour Party conference in 1963. But she did not mention the humanities or social sciences once, even though she herself has a degree in geography, and despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of her cabinet studied arts of humanities subjects, or the social sciences, at university. Nor did she recognise that many of the challenges we now face, from an ageing society to the future of work to the impact of artificial intelligence, require the insights of the humanities and social sciences every bit as much as the expertise of scientists and technologists.

These days, I spend much of my time as President making the case across Whitehall and Westminster for the importance of the humanities and social sciences: some senior civil servants are undoubtedly sympathetic as, in private, is the Prime Minister herself. And it is widely recognised that the Academy's Fellowship represents an extraordinary body of experience, expertise and wisdom across a vast range of human knowledge on which government ought to be more eager to draw, and from which it would greatly benefit. Might we hope that, before another 12 months have elapsed, Theresa May will deliver a complementary speech, from another

appropriately resonant location, extolling the vital importance of the humanities and social sciences for the well-being of our society and nation and, indeed, for the successful working of our economy and our democracy?

Let me end, as I began, with Mary Beard, Simon Schama and Sir Frederic Kenyon. As Beard and Schama both rightly lamented, *Civilisations* did indeed deserve more serious public discussion than it received: for in an age of xenophobic populism, ratcheting up the language of paranoia, hatred and fear, it is vital to be reminded that civilisations and cultures have indeed co-existed and intermingled – and greatly to their benefit. But who, among the commentariat, took any notice? And so, finally, to Sir Frederic Kenyon. During his presidential address of 1918, he urged that the British Academy, along with the Royal Society, should be 'the official representative of learning in the state'. Amen to that. And he went on to proclaim his 'utmost confidence in [the Academy's] future, and in the share which it should take in the intellectual development of the country'. I, too, am very hopeful for the Academy's future, but there is much to do to make that future as confident and certain and commanding as it ought to be. ■

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■
Civilisations and cultures have co-existed and intermingled – greatly to their benefit.

8. Nicholas Stern, 'President's Notes', *British Academy Review*, 28 (Summer 2016), 3–4.

A new age of enlightenment?

Alun Evans, Chief Executive of the British Academy, considers the highlights of 2017–18, and looks ahead



Alun Evans has been Chief Executive of the British Academy since July 2015.

What is the purpose of the British Academy? At a time when trust in so many of our national institutions is at an all-time low, this might be a timely opportunity to reassess our purpose and how well we are delivering it.

Shortly after I became Chief Executive of the British Academy, I wrote that ‘addressing many of the modern-day challenges of modern day society ... requires joined up policy solutions informed by science, the humanities and the social sciences.’

Today – as we face the uncertainty of a post-Brexit Britain – and in a world with many immediate and pressing challenges, I believe that statement is even more true than it was three years ago.

The British Academy is more relevant today than it has been at any time in its history because, for example, Brexit will not be ‘solved’ by a better understanding of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (the ‘STEM’ subjects), important as those disciplines are. It will be solved – if it can be solved at all – by applying the understanding we gain from subjects such as history, philosophy, politics, economics, law and international relations to the challenges ahead. In short, applying the lessons of the disciplines that the British Academy represents and exists to champion.

Elsewhere, in this issue of the *British Academy Review*, our President reflects on the growing contribution of the Academy to our national public discourse and the challenge to make our argument widely heard and understood. I am delighted therefore that, in that context, over the past year, the Academy and our work have gone from strength to strength. Our overall funding has increased. We are now supporting more cutting-edge research – especially by early career researchers – than ever before. And our profile, our reach and our influence have never been higher than it is today.

We are engaging with the Government, and with universities and other stakeholders in all parts of the United Kingdom and around the world. Our voice is listened to – not least in the Brexit debate – and on which we published four high-profile and succinct Brexit briefing papers devoted to the Irish question and the EU/UK border.

Brexit represents one of ‘The most important challenges of our time’ – which was the title of a document I wrote with our former President Lord Stern, and with a Foreword from our current President, published by the Academy in November 2017.¹ Lord Stern and I argued the central importance of investing in the humanities and social sciences, alongside investment in STEM subjects, as an essential prerequisite for sustainable growth in an economy such as the UK’s with some 80 per cent based on the service sector. We argued that ‘public investment in research and development can help leverage private and charitable funding.’ And we urged the Government to ‘to ensure that the industrial strategy incentivises higher levels of collaboration between the whole research base, including the humanities and social sciences’.

So, I was personally very pleased that the Government recently made a public commitment to raise the overall level of public and private investment in research to 2.4 per cent of GDP, with a long-term aspiration to reach 3 per cent. That will be essential to driving innovation and creativity in the post-Brexit world in which our country appears likely to be operating.

Over the past year, the British Academy has contributed some cutting-edge, innovative research and thinking to society and the challenges we face.

- Our work on ‘Governing England’ has looked at the implications of devolution for England.²
- Our joint publication with the Royal Society, following our review of data governance,

1. Alun Evans and Lord Stern of Brentford, ‘The most important challenges of our time: Positioning Britain to succeed and priorities for research and innovation’ (British Academy, November 2017).

2. www.britishacademy.ac.uk/governing-england

has led to the establishment by government of a new body – the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation – devoted to that role.³

- Our publication *The Right Skills: Celebrating skills in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences* has shown the wide economic benefits provided by the skills acquired from the study of non-STEM subjects.⁴
- And the publication of our reports on social integration have been widely welcomed, not least by the local government and communities' ministry.⁵

The British Academy has continued to showcase the value of the humanities and the social sciences via our programme of events, publications and outreach. This included the first President's Lecture in June 2017 with Janet Yellen (Chair of the United States Federal Reserve System), as well as a wide presence at several festivals, including Edinburgh, Hay and the Oxford Literary Festival. We also took part – for the first time – in the Cheltenham Literature Festival, the Ilkley Literature Festival and the York Festival of Ideas.

The Academy has extended its international outreach and took part in an international festival for the first time, with a lecture by Revd Professor Diarmaid MacCulloch Kt FBA at the Jaipur Festival in India. We remain a partner of the Being Human Festival of the Humanities, led by the School of Advanced Study (University of London) and in partnership with the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).

And looking ahead, we will seek to expand our outreach not least by our growing social media presence and via an improved website – which must represent a priority for the Academy over the coming year.

We have played a leading part in providing evidence-based contributions to the Government, and not just the Brexit briefings. As a politically independent Academy, we have also engaged with the main opposition parties. We continue to work closely with the others national Academies to press the case for continued UK involvement in the European research

funding arrangements,⁶ post-Brexit and we were pleased that the Prime Minister recently backed this position.

The British Academy remains a key player in the All European Academies association (ALLEA), and we have provided the chair and led much of ALLEA's work on promoting trust in science and research. More widely, we engage around the world in USA, India, China and Japan and elsewhere – not least via our network of international Corresponding Fellows.

For the Fellowship remains at the heart of the Academy's work. We are fortunate to have such a strong and committed Fellowship in the UK and overseas. This year we will elect a record number of UK Fellows: 52. I hope that we will continue to show an increasing diversity in the background of the Fellowship, in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, subject and geographical spread – but all still elected on the grounds of the overriding criterion of excellence.

This has been the first full year of Professor Sir David Cannadine's presidency. It has been a real personal privilege to work alongside and in support of him. He has shown enormous energy and commitment to his role, building on the achievements of his predecessor, Lord Stern. Under Professor Cannadine's leadership we have engaged strongly with the Government, and with the media, to underline the central importance of the humanities and the social sciences.

The President also referred, in his article, to the importance of securing the future of the British Academy at 10–11 Carlton House Terrace. This will be a personal aim for me, and one that I hope to deliver in the coming year. We are now embarking on a major project to fund, develop and expand our base at 10–11 Carlton House Terrace to ensure it remains the thriving centre of our disciplines, and the hub of intellectual debate and research, for many years to come. I am delighted that it looks – at least at the time of going to print with this issue of the *British Academy Review* – as if we will be successful in that venture.

My job is to lead the executive staff of the Academy – which I am enormously proud to do. We have some wonderful members of staff who work in the Academy in support of our Fellowship.

My vision is to provide a coherent framework for research and innovation which firmly celebrates the humanities and the social sciences and their central relevance and contribution to all we do. It will not only promote a more dynamic and productive economy, but also a more cohesive community. It will shape a future based on evidence, reflection and analysis. And it will offer the potential, I believe, for a new age of enlightenment – and one led by the British Academy. ■



3. *Data Management and use: Governance in the 21st century: A joint report by the British Academy and the Royal Society* (June 2017).

4. *The Right Skills* project is discussed in the Ian Diamond interview published in *British Academy Review*, 31 (Autumn 2017), 11–16.

5. The "If you could do one thing..." reports on social integration are discussed in the Dominic Abrams interview published in *British Academy Review*, 32 (Spring 2018), 3–10.

6. These arguments are presented in *British Academy Review*, 31 (Autumn 2017), in the section on 'European research collaboration and funding: Understanding what's at stake for the future'.

Refining the chemical attraction of humanities scholarship

Mary Beard argues that it is time to stop searching for the eureka moment

A few years ago I was working on a project on Roman laughter. It was an attempt to think about how to explore cultural and historical *difference* through a phenomenon that is often taken as natural. My prime exhibit was a Roman joke-book, compiled in the 4th century AD, with some of the oldest old chestnuts, and shaggiest shaggy dogs in the ancient world. It's a collection that has long been known, was a great favourite in the 18th century,

but hasn't been much worked on recently.

In the course of this project, I went to another university to give a lecture on what insights that joke-book might give us into the culture of Roman laughter. It was a university with a very active communications department and a very winning way with press releases, as I discovered on the train on the way there. Every 10 minutes or so, I got a call on my mobile from some journalist enquiring about the book. These conversations tended to go the same way ... the second or third question being, where had I *found* it. When I answered truthfully that I had

found it in the library, rather than dug it up with my bare hands from the sands of Egypt, interest immediately evaporated. My attempts to explain how it could change our minds about the way laughing and joking worked across time, and how I was looking at it in a radically fresh way, fell on deaf ears. It didn't count as a discovery; it wasn't new.

This little story raises a big point. That is to say, it raises the question of how we explain and discuss what counts as *new* in the arts and humanities – and how, by and large, we are failing to engage a wider public with novelty that doesn't fall into the standard model of often *scientific* 'discovery', but rather with the kind of 'novelty' that is much more about changing ways of seeing things, new connections, new questions, changing interpretations. Now, I say that we are '*by and large, failing*'; there are some glorious exceptions (Melvyn Bragg's *In Our Time* programme must count as one of the best exceptions that we have). And, of course, you sometimes find new interpretative material embedded in television documentaries and such like. But if, for example, you go through the running order of the *Today* programme for a couple of weeks, you'll find that almost every day they



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Mary Beard at the Parthenon in Athens, in the BBC television series *Civilisations*.

have an item on some form of academic scientific ‘advance’ (you know the kind of thing, scientists have discovered that drinking 3 pints of water a day may increase your chances of not dying by 2.9 per cent, or – and this is a real one – researchers have found that using sweets as a reward in young offender institutions improves inmates behaviour). Very rarely is there anything that reflects frontline research in arts and humanities, and almost only when it matches that particular model of *newness* (archaeologists have discovered that Neanderthals are 1 million years older than you never knew they were in the first place, or researchers show that Jane Austen was gay).

The *Today* programme is typical. There is no equivalent for the arts and humanities of Jim Al-Khalili’s *The Life Scientific* (the radio programme which explores the individual human story behind scientific discovery – the nearest we get is *Desert Island Discs*). And in more than a decade of regular publication, my own university’s research showcasing magazine, *Research Horizons*, has rarely featured humanities, and when it has, the subject is usually some version of archaeological discovery, literally dug up from the sands of Egypt, or when you could put the word ‘digital’ in front of it.

Now many of my scientific colleagues, I know, feel very uncomfortable about that ‘eureka’ model that still

underlies how science gets in the news. It’s not how most science is done, and in some respects it’s the model that Al-Khalili is trying to unseat. All the same, it does keep science in the news, and so publicly underlines its *importance* for society at large. The first question I want to throw into the ring is what more could *we* be doing to give a greater sense of contemporary urgency to work in the humanities, perhaps to adjust the standard definition of innovation or novelty that seems to exclude us. This is not just a matter of blaming the media agenda, and ‘news’ culture; I don’t think we in the humanities have got our heads around this one.

It relates to a wider problem, though, about the more general contexts and opportunities we get – or make for ourselves – to discuss the big cultural, literary, historical and artistic issues so central to the Academy. This really struck me in the reaction to our recent TV rebooting of Kenneth Clark’s *Civilisation*. Now I am

not talking about the pluses and minuses of the critical response; there were bad as well as good reviews, and so there should have been (a glorious celebration of world cultures that everyone liked would have been worrying). But what unsettled me was not so much the sloppiness of the commentariat (though I have to say I would like to get Mr Quentin Letts into my living room, sit him

At the end of one episode, I made a big, contentious and intentionally aggressive claim ... I might as well have been talking to myself.

down in front of the television and ask him to show me *where* I say that the Greek sculptor Praxiteles was a rapist, or that prehistoric Mexican sculpture is aesthetically more distinguished than the Greek Apollo Belvedere). My real disappointment was how little media debate the series prompted, beyond the endless column inches spent weighing us up versus the Clark original, usually in Clark's favour. The fact was that the new series was raising issues that couldn't be more pressing in modern global, cultural politics. How do you define civilisation? What happens when you put an 's' on the end of it? What kind of aesthetic judgements are possible across global art (can you usefully compare a prehistoric Mexican head with the Apollo Belvedere anyway)? And what are the politics of our modern attempts to debate 'civilisation' and barbarity? Almost none of those issues were taken up in any wider public discussion.

Now to be fair, this was a case where social media did better than usual. And David Cannadine usefully interrogated the word Civilisation in a great programme on Radio 4 (but that was the BBC valiantly sponsoring debate about itself). Otherwise the big issues were almost entirely ignored. At the end of one episode, I made a big, contentious and intentionally aggressive claim, that 'civilisation was in the end no more than an act of faith'. No objection, no response. I might as well have been talking to myself. Maybe we just didn't hit the spot, we didn't *get* people engaged. But I can't help feeling that – for all its ranting, all its identity politics, all its outrage – modern cultural debate has rather forgotten how to argue constructively and publicly about these big issues which actually lie at the heart of what our British Academy does.

It wasn't always thus. I want to finish on a brighter note, by going back 80 years – to a story focused on James

Frazer, author of *The Golden Bough*, one of the founding Fellows of this Academy, and a now decidedly unfashionable anthropologist. He was not unfashionable in the decade or so before his death in 1941, and his birthday on 1 January was increasingly lavishly celebrated, with some increasingly bizarre spectacles (including one notable operetta based on *The Golden Bough*). Every year newspapers tried to explain to readers why Frazer was so important. My favourite one, though it includes some 'oddities', is this from 1937. It's from the *News Chronicle*, the forerunner of the *Daily Mail*. Frazer, it reads,

has changed the world. He has changed it not as Mussolini has changed it: with coloured shirts and castor oil; nor as Lenin has changed it, boldly emptying out the baby of the humanities with the filthy bath of Tsarism; nor as Hitler with the fanfaronade of physical force. He has changed it by altering the chemical composition of the cultural air that all men breathe ... This quiet sedentary student has a mind similar to the body of Sir Francis Drake, ranging distant countries and bringing back their treasures for his own kind. But Frazer left the past no poorer for his rounds – and the present infinitely richer.

Never mind the contemporary politics, it is something about the 'chemical composition of the cultural air that we all breathe' that we are trying to get across – and to get discussed. ■

This article is based on a speech given by Professor Mary Beard at the British Academy on 15 May 2018.

Optimism bias and climate change

Geoffrey Beattie explains why climate change messages are not getting through



Geoffrey Beattie is Professor of Psychology at Edge Hill University.

How to avoid talking about climate change

Conversations with strangers on buses can be very awkward. It was probably the open notebook that attracted his attention. He kept glancing over at it, surreptitiously at first, and then with longer glances as if he wanted to be seen. The pure white page of the notebook had just two words on it. 'CLIMATE CHANGE!' in big bold pencil. He tutted on his third glance at the page and then started to speak abruptly. 'Well, that's nonsense for a start,' he said. He pointed to the snow

on the street. It was only a fine dusting but it was enough. 'So that's global warming for you,' he said and looked at me to join him in some communal condemnation of this great hoax. 'You don't believe in that rubbish, do you?' His look was accusatory, it demanded an answer. But what was the point in replying?

It seems that climate change like politics, religion and death has entered the domain of topics that are not discussed in polite conversation. There is just too much disagreement that cannot be bridged by polite words.

It wouldn't have felt right talking about the difference between the weather and the climate to that man on the bus, or even trying to empathise with the fact that 'global warming' can be a highly misleading term for many. Some have suggested instead 'climate chaos', which captures better what we are witnessing in terms of more frequent extreme and unpredictable weather patterns. It was also probably not the best time to point out that there is a remarkable scientific consensus on climate change – 'remarkable' because it is rare to see this degree of scientific agreement on anything. Sometimes it's better to stay silent.

Although the role of human activity in the causation of climate change is both 'clear' (and 'growing'), evidence for large-scale behavioural adaptation on the part of the public appears absent.¹ Indeed, there seems to be a monumental disconnect between the scientific evidence for climate change and public perception and action. Research in the UK, for example, suggests that we pay little visual attention to carbon footprint information on products – other features, like price, value, brand etc., are much more immediately salient,² and a 2013 survey by Yale University found that only 63 per cent of Americans 'believe that global warming is happening'. Inter-

1. G. Beattie and L. McGuire, *The Psychology of Climate Change* (Routledge, 2018).

2. G. Beattie, 'How effective is carbon labelling for the consumer?', *Nature Climate Change*, 2 (2012), 214–217.

estingly, this figure had been higher (72 per cent) back in 2008 before the effects of the economic crisis were fully felt. So why is there such a divide in opinions between scientists and the public, and between different sections of the population? Are some people just not seeing the evidence, and if not why?

The psychology of climate change denial

There are some very well-known climate change deniers. Take Donald Trump, for example, distinctive in many ways, not least in terms of underlying personality. One trait may be particularly relevant here – he is an extreme optimist, a core trait for successful entrepreneurs who need to be resilient enough to bounce back after financial setbacks, including bankruptcy in Donald Trump's case.³ Trump declared that he would cancel the Paris Climate Agreement within 100 days of taking office; he signed an executive order in March 2017 which reversed the Clean Power Plan that required states to regulate power plants; he described anthropogenic climate change as 'fake news' and 'fictional'. But in 2017, the Fourth National Climate Assessment Report was also published,⁴ 'the authoritative assessment of the science of climate change' with a focus on the *United States*. Trump had tweeted 'Record low temperatures and massive amounts of snow. Where the hell is GLOBAL WARMING?' 'Right here, right now', was the answer from the Fourth National Climate Assessment Report. This report read 'Global annually averaged surface air temperature has increased by about 1.8° F (1.0° C) over the last 115 years (1901–2016). This period is now the warmest in the history of modern civilization.'

Optimism bias

So why do people, like Donald Trump, not get the message about climate change? Could it be because optimism links to 'optimism bias', where people overestimate the likelihood of positive events happening to them and underestimate the likelihood of negative events. According to Tali Sharot,⁵ around 80 per cent of people suffer from some form of optimism bias in different aspects of their lives – apparently believing that their marriages will work (it's only *other* marriages that fail, they say), their start-up businesses will succeed, and that they will have a long and fulfilling life compared to everyone else. This sort of unrealistic optimism would seem to be somewhat pervasive, affecting not just our personal relationships but also our attitudes to finance, work and health. For example, adolescent smokers are two and a half times more likely than non-smokers to

doubt that they themselves would ever die from smoking even if they smoked for 30 or 40 years. When it comes to smoking or climate change this optimism bias could (and can) have deadly consequences.

Optimism bias appears to be associated with specific cognitive biases in processing relevant information. One study in behavioural neuroscience used Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity as participants estimated their probability of experiencing a range of negative life events, including things like Alzheimer's and burglary.⁶ After each individual trial, participants were then presented with the average probability of that event occurring to someone like them. The researchers found that their participants were significantly more likely to change their estimate *only* if the new information was better than they had originally anticipated. This bias was reflected in their fMRI data in that optimism was related to a reduced level of neural coding of more negative than anticipated information about the future in the critical region of the frontal cortex (right inferior prefrontal gyrus). They also found that those participants highest in dispositional optimism were significantly worse at tracking this new *negative* information in this region, compared to those who were lower in dispositional optimism. In other words, the optimism bias derives partly from a failure to learn systematically from new undesirable information and this bias was most pronounced with those highest in dispositional optimism.

Optimism may be highly advantageous for the individual because it reduces stress and anxiety about the future, and optimists consequently have better immune functioning. Belief in a positive future also encourages individuals (in *some* domains) to behave in ways that can actually contribute to this positive future, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Although underestimating future negative life events can reduce our stress level and add to our longevity, sometimes negative events do need to be considered, otherwise we may be discounting serious risks.

Optimism bias has been found across a range of environmental issues.⁷ A large 18-nation survey demonstrated that individuals believe that across a number of issues they are safer than others living elsewhere and that they are safer than future generations – in other words, they show both a spatial and a temporal bias. Some argue that optimism bias may help explain why we don't do anything about the threat of climate change. It's not personal, it won't affect us, it's others that need worry.

3. F.G. Crane and E.C. Crane, 'Dispositional optimism and entrepreneurial success', *The Psychologist-Manager Journal*, 10 (2007), 13–25.

4. D.J. Wuebbles et al., *Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I* (US Global Change Research Program, Washington DC, 2017).

5. T. Sharot, *Why We're Wired to Look on the Bright Side* (Constable & Robinson, 2012).

6. *Ibid.*

7. R. Gifford et al., 'Temporal pessimism and spatial optimism in environmental assessments: An 18-nation survey', *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 29 (2009), 1–12.

Figure 1. An individual scan path of (a) an optimist and (b) a non-optimist, as they read a climate change article.





Figure 2. A hotspot analysis of eye gaze fixations of a group of (a) optimists and (b) non-optimists reading climate change articles. Greater intensity represents longer fixation durations at specific locations.



Optimism bias and visual attention to climate change messages

However, we took a somewhat different perspective here, by recognising that optimism bias is a form of biased cognition – the *product* of various psychological processes (rather than a process *per se*). So we attempted to determine what processes could potentially contribute to this. There were a few basic questions to begin with. How does optimism *bias* link to dispositional optimism, which is an underlying dimension of personality? Many assume that they are one and the same thing, but conceivably optimism bias could be strongly or weakly associated with underlying dispositional optimism across different domains. And how do optimists maintain their rosy outlook? What mechanisms underpin it? Optimism is characterised by a reduced level of neural coding of undesirable information, but could there be something even more basic than

that? Do optimists quite literally look on the bright side? Do they have an unconscious, automatic attentional bias to positive rather than negative information?

So in this new research funded by the British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grants scheme, we analysed the moment-to-moment gaze fixations of optimists and non-optimists reading climate change articles.⁸ These articles were ‘balanced’ – they contained arguments both *for* climate change (outlining the scientific evidence with the negative consequence spelt out) and *against* climate change (casting doubt on the evidence, and therefore more positive in tone). Figure 1 shows the results for one optimist and one non-optimist. The circles represent individual gaze fixations on words, with larger circles representing longer fixation durations. Lines between circles represent saccadic eye movement behaviour.

8. G. Beattie, M. Marselle, L. McGuire and D. Litchfield, ‘Staying over-optimistic about the future: Uncovering attentional biases to climate change messages’, *Semiotica*, 218 (2017), 21–64.

The overall results were very revealing. There was no significant relationship between dispositional optimism and *number* of individual gaze fixations on the climate change articles, but there was a significant negative correlation between optimism level and average fixation *duration* to arguments *for* climate change only. For optimists, fixation durations were significantly shorter to ‘for’ arguments than to ‘against’ arguments, for non-optimists there was no significant difference. Figure 2 shows that, in addition, higher levels of dispositional optimism were associated with less time overall spent attending to the content of the climate change articles irrespective of argument (‘for’ or ‘against’).

When asked to summarise what they had read, the majority of *non-optimists* framed their recall in terms of the arguments ‘for’ climate change (‘this article is about global warming and how 95% of it is due to human activity’); *optimists*, on the other hand, tended to frame it as a debate between two opposing positions (‘it’s about climate change, about trying to understand what’s happening with the weather and there are different points of view’). Additional research with another set of participants revealed that optimists have a stronger optimism bias when it comes to estimating the probability of climate change affecting them personally. Non-optimists (in the lowest third on dispositional optimism) were twice as likely to think that they would personally be affected by climate change, across a range of questions, than optimists in the top third.

It seems, therefore, that optimists spend less time fixating on arguments *for* climate change than non-optimists, they frame the recall of the overall articles differently to non-optimists, and they feel less personally threatened by climate change. Optimism, as we have seen, may have very positive effects on our lives, because underestimating the likelihood of future negative events can reduce our levels of stress and anxiety about the future and add to our longevity. Many people, it seems, have developed unconscious cognitive strategies rooted

in basic brain functioning that allows them to remain optimistic despite evidence to the contrary. The problem, however, is that some events really do need to be considered with great urgency, and optimism bias can have very significant negative consequences particularly regarding the discounting of serious risk. Climate change is clearly one such risk.

Implications

So what implications are there from this research? Firstly, we can’t assume that people attend to messages about climate change in identical ways. The underlying messages may not get through because of an inherent cognitive bias designed to sustain positive mood, which is particularly prevalent in optimists. It may well not be enough simply to publicise the scientific evidence about climate change without framing it in a more optimistic way to highlight the positive aspects of mitigation strategies. A more positive overall frame about possible solutions should increase both feelings of self-efficacy and visual attention to the underlying message.

Secondly, for the past few decades, we have been striving to train people to be more optimistic because of its health benefits (with this great cultural emphasis on ‘the power of positive thinking’). Some have argued that we have produced a profound socio-psychological change, especially in Western societies, with unrealistic expectations about the future.⁹ They have also argued that it has actually ‘undermined preparedness’ to deal with real threats like global terrorism, financial bubbles, or climate change, with the public having ‘no ability or inclination to imagine the worst’. Optimism can be a very positive thing, but perhaps it has its limits; over-optimism could potentially be very damaging. Maybe, it is time, therefore, to re-evaluate this over-arching desire for promoting positive thinking in all aspects of life. Sometimes we might need some constructive realism instead. This might be especially true when it comes to climate change. ■

9. B. Ehrenreich, *Smile or Die: How Positive Thinking Fooled America and the World* (Granta, 2010).

Contesting #stopIslam: Tensions around hate speech on social media

Elizabeth Poole, Ed de Quincey and Eva Giraud explore the dynamics of a racist hashtag following the Brussels terrorist attack



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Twitter hashtags are used to categorise Tweets: they allow people to search for topics more easily. But they also communicate agendas and mobilise people into like-minded communities, so have become a popular form of politically mediated communication. In this article we show how groups with different politics negotiate the tensions between them through the interactions afforded by Twitter, and we examine the possibilities of challenging hate speech online.

The hashtag #stopIslam appears to be both racially motivated and critical of Islam. It has been used previously, particularly following terror attacks, to vilify Islam and Muslims. However, after the Brussels terror attack, on 22 March 2016, it came to our attention because of the large number of tweets using it to *defend* Islam. This response was also noticed by the mainstream media (CNN, *Daily Express*, *Daily Mirror*, *Washington Post*) who reported on the hashtag trending. These media organisations tended to focus on the ‘counter-narratives’ about Islam reflected in the ‘twittersphere’, which often attempted to negate the relationship between Islam and terrorism. The prominence of these critical responses

to #stopIslam, both on Twitter itself and within the mainstream media, raised questions for us about when and why counter-discourses about Islam and Muslims can gain a presence in the public sphere. We developed a project ‘Who speaks for Muslims?’, funded by a British Academy Small Research Grant, to explore how these Islamophobic messages played out online. Originally formulated to ask questions about self-representation and voice on social media, the issues it raises speak to growing concerns about the rise of right-wing populism, a surge in reports of hate speech, and the use of social media by white supremacist groups.

Media representations of Muslims

It is well-documented in academic research that the media, particularly the UK’s print media, tends towards a negative representation of Muslims. Coverage is dominated by: associations with terrorism, conflict, extremism and violence; a focus on inherent cultural differences; and an overemphasis on religious belief as a causal factor.

It is often suggested that social media offers a space to counter these negative representations, especially given the opportunities for self-representation on this platform. Twitter hashtags such as #notinmyname, which has been used by British Muslims to condemn the activities of ISIS, do get an airing in mainstream media. But positive actions like these are largely drowned out by the sea of negative coverage about Muslims.

The trajectory of the hashtag #stopIslam adds another dimension to the argument. The hashtag seemed to be hi-jacked by activists seeking to counter those dominant

negative discourses about Islam which were circulating both in mainstream media and more vociferously through the #stopIslam hashtag itself. So, looking at the dynamics of counter-narratives *against* #stopIslam offered us the opportunity to explore whether social media presents genuine opportunities for self-representation, or if the counter-narrative is instead dominated by would-be allies, Twitter celebrities and institutions.

Anti-Muslim propaganda on Twitter and the role for the far-right

#stopIslam has been circulated following several recent terror attacks in Europe, from the Paris attack of 2015 to London in 2017. Given this context, we expected to find a preponderance of European far-right voices in the debate. But we were wrong.

Our research instead shows some of the ways that the far-right in the US are using Twitter as a platform for anti-Muslim propaganda. It also revealed how, in the run up to the Presidential election, pro-Trump supporters engaged with Twitter in an attempt to boost the profile and political success of Trump and his political allies.

The hashtag, which peaked on the day of the Brussels attacks, 22 March 2016, 4–7pm, began as an attack on Islam, as one would expect given its name. It was frequently retweeted with similar hashtags such as #islamistheproblem, #bansharia, and #islamkills. However, and more worryingly, these messages were tweeted in relation to US-based right-wing conservative groups on Twitter – such as the Tea Party, CCOT (Conservatives on Twitter), TCOT (Top Conservatives on Twitter) – and in conjunction with hashtags such as #Trump2016 and #wakeupamerica. This anti-Islamic hashtag was combined with anti-Democrat rhetoric in an attempt to bolster Donald Trump's campaign in the Presidential race. Further network analysis demonstrated the inter-connections between these far-right groups, who were actively circulating memes to each other and with some anti-Muslim groups in Europe, such as Geert Wilders and his PVV (Party for Freedom).



The self-penned biographies of tweeters further revealed their politics, featuring the phrases and imagery of the alt-right: pro-life, pro-guns, pro-Israel, anti-feminism, combined with patriotic and Christian symbols. Many of the tweets included memes and links to far-right websites, which were targeted at anyone defending Islam

as part of a strategy to undermine critics of the right using 'evidence' as opposed to 'fake news'.

Counter-discourse: defending Islam

You might ask, what else would you expect from a negative hashtag such as #stopIslam? However, our analysis of the most retweeted tweets (i.e. those that were shared most widely by others) demonstrated a different trend: that the majority of these tweets were actually using the hashtag to counter anti-Muslim hatred. For example, many of the tweets refuted the relationship between Islam and terrorism, and argued that Islam was a religion of peace. There was also a series of memes designed to contest Islamophobic narratives, which began with the phrase 'y'all are tweeting #StopIslam when', and were then followed by a variety of memes about white supremacy. The illustrated tweet was retweeted 6,643 times, compared to the 1,500 times the top anti-Muslim tweet was shared (and that was the only anti-Muslim tweet in the ten most retweeted tweets). Other positive Tweets asked: 'Why is #StopIslam trending? It should be #StopISIS' (shared 3,791 times), and 'StopIslam? Eh, the muslim boys next door bring me tomyam [hot soup] whenever I'm sick. Why would I stop kind souls like them?' (shared 2,500 times).

y'all are tweeting #StopIslam when ...



These messages of solidarity were so prominent initially that they were picked up on by many mainstream news organisations (CNN, *Independent*, and *Washington Post*, for example), which by doing so also shared the counter-narrative itself, defending Muslims from this online attack. The visibility of this counter-narrative echoes the claims of a number of academics that particular uses of Twitter can enable grassroots collectives to change a story that seeks to spread hatred into something much more positive. The success of the counter-narrative seemed to suggest that, because of the particular characteristics of Twitter, people do often stray out of their

'echo chambers' to interact and challenge views they dispute, and the use of hashtags and re-tweeting provides this functionality.

Reverting back to racism


However, the positive voices we identified seem to be quite dispersed (both socially and geographically), as well as short-lived. In our closer qualitative analysis of debates that surrounded individual tweets, we found that far-right activists frequently trolled the accounts of those sharing more positive messages, and responded to counter-narratives with a deluge of anti-Islamic memes. The findings indicate that the strength of this far-right discourse is due to their tightly bound groups that persistently and aggressively attack and bury any counter-narratives that emerge online. While Muslim voices were present in the counter-narrative, tweeters defending Islam were less networked, and most Muslims appeared as commenters, agreeing with favourable tweets before being silenced by the intimidating discourse of the right. As well as being circulated by supportive non-Muslims activists, the counter-discourse was often spread by celebrities and media institutions who were less likely to engage any further in ongoing debates.

Engaging with social media platforms is an important strategy in 'information warfare'.

Another issue facing counter-narratives against hate speech is that of longevity. The 'fightback' lasted only 24 hours after the attack, while the anti-Islamic discourses continued – albeit on a lesser scale. A more recent survey of the hashtag showed how it has reverted back to being wholly negative towards Muslims. Ongoing uses of the hashtag were linked to terrorist attacks in Manchester and London, whilst continuing to be US-based, and combined patriotic imagery and anti-Muslims memes.

The success of these hashtag campaigns, elevating both Trump and far-right groups beyond their core constituencies, showed how integral this identity politics is in contemporary populist movements. Anti-immigration rhetoric has been key to the success of the right across the US and Europe in recent elections, and this research shows how social media is being used aggressively to this effect, undermining any solidarities that arise in response. Since the UK's EU referendum and the US Presidential election, this discourse has increasingly gained prominence in the mainstream: for example, the recent re-tweeting by Trump of anti-Muslim videos by Britain First went one step further in legitimising the racism of a far-right group.

Our 'Who speaks for Muslims?' project provides further evidence for arguments suggesting that social media can no longer be dismissed as trivial and insignificant in politically mediated communications. From an analysis of the tensions between racist and anti-racist activists on Twitter, it is evident that racist discourse can be appropriated, and in these moments 'counter-publics' do form and are able to make their presence felt in the public sphere. However, this appears to be fleeting and short-lived. Although, in the context of this campaign, it seems that progressive politics has something to learn from the right in using these platforms effectively, it is possible that anti-racist activists feel there is nothing to gain by engaging in contentious exchanges with the far-right. In fact, this could well be an active choice to prevent the further circulation of this racist hashtag. However, this project shows how engaging with social media platforms can contribute to the wider dissemination of anti-racist discourse, and is therefore an important strategy for gaining ground in the context of 'information warfare' that we now find ourselves in. ■



Working at home: The key to gender equality?

Helen McCarthy puts home-working in its historical perspective

Today, the number of people in the UK who work regularly from home stands at over 4 million, representing nearly 14 per cent of the total labour-force. This striking statistic conjures a rosy picture of individuals seated at laptops in kitchens, spare bedrooms and garden sheds up and down the country, empowered by new technology and enlightened employers to set their working patterns in line with preferred lifestyles. Home-working is often talked up as an especially attractive option for women,



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who are still more likely than men to be juggling caring commitments with paid employment. Today, organisations which fail to offer this kind of flexibility are regarded as corporate laggards, unlikely to recruit or retain talented workers or to score high on diversity, equality and inclusion. The days of being chained to your desk, it seems, are on the way out.

A complicated past

Yet if home-working points to a brighter future, it also speaks to a complicated past. Before the Industrial Revolution, productive work was overwhelmingly centred on the household. A large proportion of the population lived on the land, cultivating crops and tending livestock either for

the market or for family use. Others were engaged in cottage-based industries such as spinning and weaving, or plied their trades from workshops located in or attached to domestic dwellings. Many married couples ran inns and coffee houses or kept shops, a model of family partnership which persisted well into the Victorian era. In all cases, no line was rigidly drawn between ‘home’ and ‘work’.

The rise of the factory system, however, created a new vision of modernity. It was the power loom and steam engine, rather than the spindle or plough, which were now identified as the source of Britain’s economic pre-eminence. It was through technological innovation in the mill, on the railways and in the shipyard that wealth was created, and it was through conflict on the

shop-floor that new social classes sprang into being and changed the course of history. The home, by contrast, was reimagined as a haven from market forces, a privatised space for recreation, spiritual uplift and the nurturing of children. Integral to this transformed social order was a powerful gender ideology which situated men in the public world of work and women in the domestic sphere, where they tended to their homes and families.

Yet for large numbers of women, the home remained a place for waged as well as unwaged labour. Rising incomes and urbanisation from the mid-19th century created a new demand for cheap consumer goods – everything from clothing and bed-linen to lampshades and umbrella-stands. Recruiting home-workers as a flexible labour-force was a smart business strategy for manufacturers looking to serve this volatile, fluctuating market. Home-work suited many women too, particularly wives who needed to earn but were prevented by household duties from seeking regular employment in a factory. By the 1890s and 1900s, hundreds of thousands of women in places like London, Birmingham, Leeds and Glasgow were sewing shirts, finishing trousers, gluing boxes, mending bags, pulling fur, stitching tennis balls, carding buttons, trimming hats, lacquering pots, polishing furniture and hammering chains in their own homes.

The end of sweated labour?

Some of these home-workers were highly-skilled and earned good wages, but others were in dire poverty and were vulnerable to exploitation by employers. It was this latter group who formed the chief target of Edwardian campaigns against ‘sweating’ – a term given to any form of waged labour in which hours were long, conditions insanitary and pay set too low to support even basic human subsistence. Socialists, trade unionists and progressive liberals condemned home-work as an evil which had no place in a modern civilisation. Women working at home for starvation wages fed ‘parasitic’ industries which thrived, as one agitator put it, ‘with the horrible rapidity and vigour of a poisonous creeper in a South American forest’.



Efforts by middle-class reformers led to Britain's first minimum wage legislation – the Trade Boards Act of 1909 – and to a marked decline in sweated labour in the home. Yet low-paid industrial home-work never disappeared. It was even briefly revived by the government during the Second World War under the pressure of acute labour shortages on the home front. Married women who were unable to take up full-time factory jobs were encouraged to volunteer for 'out-work' in their homes or local village halls, assembling small components for key items of military hardware.

Home-work experienced a major resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s, most notably amongst small suppliers in the clothing industries of London, Yorkshire and the West Midlands. Prominent amongst those moving into new markets for cheap, retail fashion were male entrepreneurs from the Indian south-continent, who often employed women from their own families and migrant communities to sew garments in small workshops or at home. Some of these workers enjoyed using their skills to earn an income in the home, but many others endured conditions which bore striking similarities to the sweated industries of previous decades. They had little control over the quantity and flow of work, finding themselves swamped with rush orders one week and empty-handed the next. Piece-rates were low and home-workers' employment status was ambiguous, with few receiving any holiday entitlement, sick pay or maternity benefit.

Throughout the century, these kinds of home-workers were never the helpless victims that middle-class reformers typically imagined them to be. In 1910, the chain-makers of Cradley Heath made national headlines by going on strike for ten weeks, successfully forcing employers to pay the higher piece-rates agreed under the

Trade Boards Act. In the 1970s, home-workers organised again, aided by trade unionists and feminist activists in places like Hackney, Rochdale and Leicester. They challenged low pay, demanded proper employment rights and experimented with co-operative models of working. These campaigns did not solve every problem, but they proved beyond doubt that home-workers had the capacity to organise and take action against exploitation.

White-collar home-work

'Sweated' labour attracted the most attention from policy-makers, but working at home was embraced by other groups throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, including women of the educated middle and upper classes. Writing for money, for example, was considered to be a 'respectable' occupation for ladies, in part because it was a pastime that could be pursued at a table in the parlour or at a typewriter in the study and did not take women out of their 'proper sphere'. Female doctors frequently established consulting rooms in their own homes. Elizabeth Garrett, the first British-qualified woman to appear on the Medical Register in 1865, ran a private practice at her London home on Upper Berkeley Street. Upon marriage to James Anderson in 1871, she insisted that the couple set up home there in order to minimise any disruption to her professional work. As late as the 1960s and 1970s, women in General Practice ran surgeries inside or next to the family home, while other graduate wives and mothers took up home-based work as proof-readers, translators, indexers, private tutors and music teachers.

Electronic cottages

A new future for the home-working professional appeared on the horizon with the rise of networked per-



sonal computing from the 1970s. Experts predicted that large numbers of office workers would soon be based at remote terminals in ‘electronic cottages’, freed from the grind of the daily commute and gifted with more time to spend with their families. In reality, ‘tele-working’ advanced very slowly, with employers proving reluctant to relinquish direct control over their workforces. Women who succeeded in negotiating home-working arrangements often found these to be far less flexible than the rhetoric suggested. Research showed that white-collar home-workers felt isolated and insecure, and were still spending large portions of their salaries on childcare in order to meet deadlines and attend on-site meetings.

Those opting for self-employment arguably benefited most from the development of new communication technologies. From the mid-1990s, a wave of female entrepreneurs established start-ups from their homes, often having given up high-pressure corporate careers after becoming mothers. These so-called ‘mumpreneurs’ – a term which divides opinion within the female business community – seem to have the best of both worlds, integrating their professional passions with the pleasures of family life. Yet being one’s own boss, as many successful businesswomen point out, can be all-consuming with no structures or boundaries to distinguish ‘work’ time from down-time. The Victorian ideal of the home as a place of rest and recuperation becomes impossible to realise when domestic space is organised around the demands of the job.

These four walls

This is the contemporary dilemma which faces all of us when the walls between ‘work’ and ‘home’ are collapsed. Some early advocates of tele-working envisaged a utopian

future in which the harmonious order of the old household economy would be reconfigured for the post-industrial age. By banishing the mindset of rigid shop-floor discipline and centralised corporate structures, everyone could enjoy a freer, more autonomous existence. This romanticised vision has not materialised, even for the minority of high-earning professionals who have a considerable degree of control over the location and hours of their work. Careers still tend to be made by those who show their faces: at meetings, networking events, drinks after work, and chats around the water-cooler. There is a very real danger that where home-working policies become too strongly branded as a ‘family-friendly’ option for women, gender segregation is further entrenched. Such policies also distract attention from the toxic workplace cultures, inadequate childcare provision and unequal sharing of domestic labour which make home-working attractive to so many women in the first place.

In short, the many faces of women’s home-work remind us that debates about ‘flexibility’ and ‘precarity’ in the contemporary labour market are nothing new. The question of *where* we do our jobs, just like questions of pay, hours and employment rights, has always been an object of political struggle. Far from providing a shelter from battles over the meaning of work, home has been integral to them. ■

These Four Walls, an exhibition created by Helen McCarthy and Leonora Saunders, explores the multiple meanings of women’s home-work through a fusion of historical research and portrait photography. It has been on display at the British Academy’s Summer Showcase, 22–23 June 2018. Share your experiences of working at home using the hashtag #TheseFourWalls.

MARY S. MORGAN

... on the curious uses of models, facts and narratives

Did the career path that you have been on seem like a conceivable possibility when you were growing up?

I don't think I had any notion of a path. I didn't have any particular ambitions, or think of myself as any particular kind of academic. My mother was a librarian. My father worked for Kodak all his life in a research lab. But they both loved music, so it was a very mixed humanities/sciences home life.

After school, I volunteered for a year – this was before gap years were really fashionable. I worked at a Quaker-run school for maladjusted children of high intelligence. Then I went to Manchester University to read American studies, because – like my A-levels in maths, history and English – it offered a bit of everything. But I had a lack of clarity about what I wanted to do, and I dropped out after a term.

After being a temp typist for a long time, I ended up at Citibank as an assistant to the economist – without having any economics myself. I joined the bank at a dramatic moment, when the post-Second World War 'Bretton Woods' financial arrangements finally collapsed. After a couple of years at Citibank, I realised I was not going to get on without a degree in economics, so I began again as a student, at the London School of Economics (LSE). After starting with economics, I switched to a joint degree in economics and economic history, in the first year this joint degree had ever been offered: we had seminars where there were two of us students and five faculty members, which was quite daunting.

Then I went to work at the Bank of England, which is an 'interesting' institution. I was dealing with inward direct investment. After about

six months, they hoicked me into a specialist unit looking at fraud and what would happen if you got rid of the Exchange Control Act. But when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, the whole department was just shut down.

Because I thought there would be no career prospects there, I went back to one of my undergraduate supervisors, David Hendry, Professor of Econometrics, and said, 'I need a job. Any ideas?' He said, 'I need someone who is both an econometrician and a historian to write a history of econometrics before all the first-generation academics die. You can do it.' So, I became an academic almost by accident, or at least because of Mrs T.

You later returned to the LSE, but you have also held a position at the University of Amsterdam.

How did that come about?

The academic space I am interested in is the history and philosophy of economics. It is a very small field and there are almost no jobs specifically in it. Amsterdam had a half-chair in history and philosophy of economics, called the Klant Chair. I was asked if I would be interested, I applied, and was lucky enough to be appointed. This enabled me to create my own research group, and in turn to set up a research group jointly with the philosophy department at LSE. In that little research hub between the two places, we looked at models in economics and in physics, and then measurement in economics and in physics.

You were developing a new approach to scientific models?

The joint work with Margaret Morrison from that research group, *Models as Mediators*,¹ is now seen as creating a new strand.

The extant philosophy of science thought about models in relation to theory: models were ways of capturing the essence of a theory. What we were



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1. Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison (eds), *Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science* (Ideas in Context 52; 1999).

doing in that little research group – and what we did in the volume *Models as Mediators* – was to say, if you look at the way science is practised, you see that scientists treat models as autonomous objects on which they develop arguments. They manipulate them, argue with them, extend them. Models are not in a simple relationship between theory and the world, rather they are at angles to both, so you can use them to interrogate both sides.



Models as Mediators is 20 years old, and you can definitely see now that the project as a whole changed the conversation in the philosophy of science about models. I don't mean that everybody was convinced by it, but it created a big enough presence so that, even if you didn't agree with it, you had to take it into account.

This work was part of a wider move that has been happening toward 'the philosophy of science in practice'. Older-style philosophy of science had the view that the role of philosophers was to figure out how science should work, and therefore create normative rules about how science should prove and confirm things, and what its theories should be like. In the last 15 years, there has been a move towards saying that scientists know things about the world, and the problem for philosophers of science is to figure out how – given that scientists don't quite do what we philosophers thought they should be doing. I am in this camp in saying that scientists are smart, they know things. The question is: how do they get to know things and to understand the stuff they are working with?

What is important about this new appreciation of science?

A better appreciation is quite important. It is useful to figure out why our models in economics do or do not work, how they can work, what they can and cannot teach you.

The econometricians are appreciative, because they believe in the history of their field: they think that the work of long-dead statisticians is still worth reading. They think much more seriously about methodology, and how you should do things at quite an abstract level. Should you start with the general model and break it down to a simple one, or should you start with a simple one and then grow it to be more complicated to fit the world? That is a pretty big difference in how you should do it, but it also has big implications for the kinds of models you end up with, and the extent to which you can understand a particular set of phenomena. This Amsterdam-LSE work on models led me into a much bigger project on modelling in eco-



nomics, which I was lucky enough to have funded by a British Academy Research Readership. This produced a rather too large book, which – to some readers' surprise – contains pictures and cartoons alongside the diagrams and equations.²

Of course, the functions of models in economics may not be the same functions as found for models elsewhere, not least because what counts as a model is different for different fields. There are lab rats, there are architectural models, there are pieces of mathematics. As models, they tend to have different qualities, which affect their functionality in their fields of use.

You had a big Leverhulme Trust/ESRC project on 'How well do "facts" travel?' What was that about?


It was a great team project. I really enjoyed it, because it gave me scope to involve people across a range of subjects – not just in the history, philosophy and sociology of science, but from the humanities: architectural history, archaeology, literature, film, etc.³

'Facts' are understudied, they are taken for granted. It has been pointed out that, if you look at science newspapers, the only time scientists use the word 'fact' is when they add an adjective to it – 'big facts', 'important facts'. That triggered a discussion about distinguishing between lots of little facts and data points, and things that are big and useful enough in their own right.

We used the term 'reliable', rather than 'true': the important part of this character of being fact-like is that a piece of knowledge is reliable enough for you do things with, and that means it needs to maintain a certain amount of stability of content and meaning. This proved a more useful framing than asking whether it is true or false. Only a specialist scientist can say whether a fact about HIV is true or false? *I can't say it is true.* But I can recognise if communities found it reliable. That seems a much more stable thing to be able to do. If a fact is true only in one instance and only

2. Mary S. Morgan, *The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think* (2012).

3. Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan (eds), *How Well Do Facts Travel? The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge* (2011).



MACHINE DESIGNED TO SHOW THE WORKING OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

This 1953 Punch cartoon by Rowland Emmet is a humorous depiction of the hydraulic machine designed by Bill Phillips and Walter Newlyn to model the macroeconomic system. © PUNCH LIMITED.

in 1963, it is not much of a fact. You want knowledge that is reliable enough to act on. We spent a lot of time trying to figure out what we meant by facts 'travelling well'. The fruitful meaning is obvious: other people use them to do something useful with. We thought a lot more about integrity and the importance that a fact remains a fact remains a fact, even if it gets

shaded or rounded off. The facts with most integrity are ones you then completely take for granted, no one knows where they came from.

As another example of how concepts gain momentum, you wrote a paper looking at the concept of the 'glass ceiling' and how that got currency. The question here is: how does the experiential knowledge of people in society – community knowledge – feed into social sciences? There is an intersection between academic social science, human experience, and a bundle of groups in between who have expert knowledge that is not academic but is experiential.

In that paper I tried to give an account of how those different forms of knowledge interact, and how concepts like the glass ceiling are formed in social science and come to be taken as real phenomena in the world, as opposed to figments of someone's imagination. It is understanding and making use of this alignment between the knowledge of the experienced expert and the academic knowledge in social science that make

the study of social scientific concepts so challenging and so interesting.

Your current big project is on narratives and science. Again you say that philosophers of science have tended to ignore the way that scientists use narrative, but the narrative is actually really important.

Our claim is that narratives are important but overlooked.⁴ We think it is fairly widespread for scientists to use narratives within their own community – not for teaching or for popularising – but for their own purposes. But that often disappears

4. Mary S. Morgan and M. Norton Wise (eds), *Narrative in Science* (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A special issue, 62; 2017).

in the written papers. At an economics seminar, an economist might write a model up on the board and then say, 'The story here would be...' It is a very strange construction: 'The story here *would be*.' It is because there is a process: 'If we asked this of the model, what then would the story be?' That all disappears in the printed material of economics, but it is part of the community usage of models and simulations.

Your 2013 Keynes Lecture in Economics addressed that 'what if?' question.⁵

It is exactly that – the 'what if?' question.

But the issue for my current project is whether narratives are more generic. Obviously they come into natural history. Why did the dinosaurs die out? It is a popular question, but one seriously argued about by people in that field. There are various different accounts and, like lots of explanations, they all have narrative structure.

Philosophers of science have thought that narrative is only relevant for history. They think that narrative cannot explain anything in science, because science needs an explanation that is not just a one-off – it has to derive from laws or knowledge of causal relations and be applicable to a set of phenomena within the same range. Historians want to explain particular events and rather think: 'What else would you use? How could you explain anything without a narrative?'

With this new project group of post-docs (funded by the European Research Council), I am trying to get at the core questions. How does narrative work? What forms does narrative take? Is there something different about scientific narratives? Can you use literature terms such as plot, genre, style, in science – can one think of there being a set of scientific plots? (I am a bit agnostic, perhaps on the verge of thinking this isn't terribly useful, but I am waiting to see.)

Beyond that, can we pin down the kinds and sites of science where narratives are being used? And, if they are being used, what function do they play? One postdoc researcher is looking at chemical synthesis. You synthesise something, tell a narrative about that synthesis, and then have a narrative about how else you might produce it: 'maybe, if we did this, this and this, we would also get it.' I have a postdoc who is looking at geological narrative. This could be straightforward – if ever there is a field that is naturally historical it is geology. But do geologists have two or three main narratives and everything is a variation of those, or are all the narratives purpose-built? Biology has some quite good general-level laws; but if you want to explain

anything and get down to particulars, you end up with narrative accounts. And I have a colleague who says we should think of mathematical proofs as narratives. Mathematical proof-making is like a stepwise sequence in which you join up the steps. Each one might be a little narrative, building into a larger narrative. In fact, this is what I found happens in social science case studies: lots of small narrative chunks being fitted together to make a large narrative of society. This narrative science project grew out of my work on case studies, funded with a wonderful grant from a British Academy Wolfson Research Professorship.

There is a great benefit in all of these projects – on models, facts, and narratives – in having a core group of people who are working on different aspects, so that you can develop resources in several different ways.

I think this work on narrative, like the models work, will be a conversation changer. When we first started, people were dismissive of the idea of narrative science, because it was thought to be about popularisation. Now I hear a PhD student saying, 'I cannot think of a scientific concept that is not based on narrative.'

Is the point about narratives just that, because we are human, we need stories to help us understand?


Maybe, but there is some evidence from psychologists that not everyone 'gets' narrative. And there is a lot of knowledge about phenomena in which we make no appeal to narrative – the obvious example being categories and classifications. Scientists can spend a lot of time dividing things in the world into classes, labelling and characterising them. But that is not a narrative way of doing things, because it is dividing and labelling, not bringing elements together and joining them – as narrative does. If we were naturally narrative and only understood things through narrative, we would not 'get' all this classificatory stuff.

A conference held in September 2017 to talk about your work had the title 'Curiosity, Imagination and Surprise'.

They are three good things, aren't they?

For me the important thing is getting interesting questions, ones that haven't been asked before, so that you can open up new spaces. If someone else has already started on a problem, you want to phrase the question in a new way, so that you can think about it in a different way and maybe come at it sideways, from a different angle. That is my advice to all my postdocs: keep asking questions – and don't let your agenda be set by anyone else.

5. Mary S. Morgan, 'What if? Models, fact and fiction in economics', *Journal of the British Academy*, 2 (2014), 231–268. This article discusses the hydraulic machine model depicted in cartoon form on the facing page.



Some volumes in the Proceedings of the British Academy series published in 2017–18.

Then you need curiosity and imagination. The curiosity spurs the imagination to develop possibilities. And you hope you get surprised on the way. You don't want to find exactly what you expect, otherwise you have not learned anything. If you get surprised, you ask more questions, so for me it is a very valuable ambition to be surprised.

You were elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2002. And you have been the Academy's Vice-President for Publications since 2014. Why should the Academy have its own academic publications programme?

The humanities and social sciences have long needed and relied on books that they create, disseminate and argue with. A book enables you to lay out a lot of stuff in a way that relates it all together, giving you depth and breadth. You can't do that in simple forms. You need a complicated and weighty form, and a book is that. If the senior academic society representing our disciplines is not able to produce these kinds of objects out of our own community, we are in a bad shape. And while material should be there digitally on the web, it still needs to be available in physical form too.

One of the ways that we, as a publisher, really add is through the themed volumes of essays in our *Proceedings of the British Academy* series. Our *Proceedings* volumes provide a form of that complexity, depth and breadth, in a way that is not just from a single author. I like to think of them as effectively monographs by many authors. And because we focus on getting the right content in one place, with a good introduction, someone can come to one of those themed *Proceedings* volumes and really get into a topic, subject or space – which they cannot always do with journals, even with their special issues.

And by having both the programme of British Academy Conferences and the academic publications handled by the one committee, we are able to make suggestions at the formation of a conference

which will be really valuable for any subsequent *Proceedings* volume arising from it. You could say we are trying to make the volume a melded, baked cake, not just a set of ingredients. The most wonderful and fun thing about the Publications and Conferences Committee is that everyone takes part in that editorial moulding, and everyone has an interest in making sure the volume introductions are the best possible framing for the collections of essays.

As you come to the end of your term as Vice-President, there is now a big new discussion of whether the rules requiring academic journal articles to be made available 'open access' should be extended to cover academic monographs too. In May 2018, the British Academy issued a position paper on this.⁶ What are the concerns here?

I am amazed at how much more complicated it is for monographs than it is for journals. The sheer variation among publishing houses makes it so much more complex. So too the range of things that academics want to write. Senior academics and junior scholars need lots of different possible places to publish, not least because they come from lots of different fields that require different things from published monographs. One of the big dangers is to imagine that there is one solution, which may have the effect of severely reducing that range of possibilities. Saying that there will be lots of different business models under any new arrangements is not enough. The economic forces may tend to bring down the possibilities of publishing monographs to a smaller number, and create a much more limited set of ways of doing things.

The ecosystem of writing and publishing monographs is very complex, and attempts to fit it into a box are likely to leave out a whole lot you would want to keep if you want to maintain a vibrant level of writing and publishing long-form books. The language of stakeholders is not very helpful here, as it is not one system and there are so many different kinds of agents and actors involved. Instead we need to think of the creation and distribution of long-form books as dependent on an ecosystem of academic authors, publishers, universities, libraries, and the public stake, not just locally but internationally. Any change in one part of this ecosystem is likely to affect the whole terrain.

The British Academy has always supported the principle of extending the access of both specialists and the general public to the fruits of academic research. Finding good ways to extend that access consistent with the continuing health and growth of the ecosystem is a considerable challenge. ■

6. 'Open access and monographs: Where are we now?' A position paper by the British Academy (17 May 2018).

Cities and infrastructures: A view from Kathmandu

Caroline Knowles leads us through a city experiencing radical change



Caroline Knowles is Professor of Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London, and Programme Director of the British Academy's Cities & Infrastructure Programme.

Through the window of a tiny dilapidated taxi from Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu, I watch the city slip by.¹ The road from the airport to my hotel in Durbar Square is strewn with rubbish. Much of it ends up in riverbeds. You can tell a lot about the way a city runs from its rubbish.² Cables are exposed. Pipes run along the surface of the road. They are expensive to bury. Roads are deeply potholed and so the taxi bounces along scraping the bottom. Frequent traffic jams suggest that the roads are not wide enough, or that there are not enough roads. Thousands of motor scooters – the people's transport – fight with buses of different sizes flexibly plying routes across the city. Tangles of electrical wires over-

head within easy reach are casually extended into the homes and businesses they once bypassed. People live in ramshackle dwellings often made from corrugated iron and whatever else comes to hand. Damage from the 2015 earthquake is still visible, and the rebuilding turns the city into a giant building site. People make a living selling food and drinks and other small items along the roadside. Seventy per cent of economically active Nepalese operate in the informal economy. There are not enough formal jobs to go around. People make their own work and their own lives in whatever ways they can.

The challenges of modern cities

Cities are important. They are engines of economic growth, developing modernity, prosperity and widening social inequalities. They function like chaotic junctions routing all kinds of activities and cross currents, in the



View from a taxi window of Kathmandu's precarious infrastructure.

restless movements of people, objects, opportunities, algorithms and materials. Urban footprints extend beyond city boundaries; indeed some cities seem to *have* no boundaries as the connections they route merge into surrounding periurban and suburban areas. Roughly 60 per cent of the world's population now live in cities. The UN predicts dramatic increases in urban populations to over 6 billion by 2045, with spectacularly high rates of growth in the cities of the global south, especially in Africa and Asia, cities like Kathmandu.

1. All the photographs on pages 27 and 30–31 were taken by the author.

2. Caroline Knowles, 'Untangling the Translocal Urban Textures of Trash: plastics and plasticity in Addis Ababa', *Social Anthropology/Anthropology Sociale*, 25:3 (2017), 288–300.

Cities in developing regions face difficult challenges with few resources. Waves of rural to urban migration, urban population growth, displacements resulting from environmental and political upheavals, and the impacts of climate change, mean that the everyday needs of urban citizens in the coming decades will massively exceed the abilities of nation-state and city authorities to provide them. Poverty (a lack of prospects in formal employment and wages that don't meet living costs), struggles to secure adequate housing, water, food, affordable transport, and health care are just some of the everyday difficulties people live with already: difficulties that will magnify as cities grow. The UN admits that managing urban areas is one of the most important development challenges of the 21st century. And urban infrastructure sits at the centre of these challenges.

Infrastructure – the systems that deliver water, energy, health care, circulation in mass transit and roads, broadband, housing and so on – are the vital connective tissues of city life. Populations living in developed cities in the global north pay little attention to infrastructure because it mostly works and much of it is tucked out of sight. In contrast from my taxi window in Kathmandu I glimpse improvised infrastructure in action. The people who make the city run by stitching together inadequate and poorly functioning systems are perhaps urban infrastructure's most vital component. Despite people's ability to improvise and extend the infrastructures available in cities like Kathmandu around their needs, enormous difficulties stand in the path of infrastructure development. These difficulties are compounded in megacities, cities of over 10 million, like San Paulo (12 million), Mumbai (18 million) and Lagos (21 million). Often at breathtaking speed, megacities in the global south expand their footprints into surrounding areas as their populations grow, in part through rural to urban migration. And so city authorities struggle with the logistical, engineering and financial challenges of providing energy, shelter, water, education and health care to the masses.

The British Academy 'Cities & Infrastructure' programme – the reason I am in Nepal – funds 17 interdisciplinary research teams in the UK with local partners – in cities such as Nairobi, Kampala, Kinshasa, Delhi, Accra, Lahore, San Paulo and Medellin, all facing precisely these challenges. The Cities & Infrastructure programme – which is resourced through the UK government's Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) – supports two research projects in Kathmandu, and this article is based on a week spent in Kathmandu with both research teams. It explores my observations and interpretations of their infrastructure research as they share it with me.

While both teams focus on one dimension of infrastructure in the built fabric of the city, other aspects of infrastructure such as water, power, work and sanitation are inevitably interconnected with buildings. This is one

of infrastructure's challenges, when everything needs developing or upgrading at once, and the same streets carry different services often delivered by different agencies with different agendas.

Earthquake

The Kathmandu urban cluster, with a population of roughly 2.5 millions³ is small in comparison to the megacities in which some researchers in the Cities & Infrastructure programme are working. With only 17 per cent of Nepalis living in cities, Nepal is at an early stage in what appears to be an accelerating pace of urbanisation. These factors make it a manageable research laboratory for infrastructure development and experimentation. Kathmandu is also built in an earthquake zone, something its inhabitants are reminded of on a regular basis as their city shifts around them. People remember where they were on 25 April 2015 when an earthquake that measured 7.8 on the Richter scale hit Nepal. With hundreds of aftershocks and another major earthquake on 17 May, it is estimated that around 9,000 people died, many more were injured, and still more traumatised in ways we don't know about. These seismic instabilities compound infrastructure's other difficulties. Along with cities like Mexico City, which straddles an earthquake zone too, seismic safety must be incorporated into building design.

Earthquakes rearrange everything, and in the process expose some of infrastructures' challenges. In Kathmandu on 25 April 2015, many lives were lost and others lay in ruins. Houses, businesses, streets, entire neighbourhoods, and sacred monuments that form the religious heritage of the city, were damaged or reduced to rubble. Local first responders were quickly on the scene pulling people from the rubble, followed by rescue teams from all over the world with special equipment. Those who lay beneath the fallen buildings were the first priority. People ran into open space in case there was further devastation. Few remembered the last major earthquake in 1934.

Among the collapse, the chaos, the widespread disruption and the personal trauma, Kathmandu literally opened up and provided precious glimpses of the city from different angles – from the vantage point of ruin. Opportunities to reimagine and live the city differently – with all that this implies for infrastructure – were the obliquely offered gifts of this terrible tragedy.

A historic opportunity

The earthquake exposed the city's foundations and revealed an earlier urban history than archaeologists had imagined for it. A total of 961 monuments across Nepal were damaged or destroyed. Kathmandu was recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1979, and its ancient monuments have enormous intangible value in the architecture of its inhabitants' everyday lives. The monuments are the focus of daily existence: a place in which to stage life's most important rituals and connect with

3. 2011 Census this is for the whole metropolitan area.

the gods – Hindu and Buddhist – that make sense of the cosmos. Had the monuments not been so extensively damaged and destroyed, archaeologists would not have had an opportunity to look beneath them. The British Academy team concerned with historic infrastructure⁴ got a unique opportunity to ‘look down not up’.⁵ And in so doing they discovered the 8th-century foundations of a city whose origins were widely regarded to date back to the 10th century – a city beneath a city revealing an unimagined early history of urbanism. The team have deepened understanding of the biography of monuments, as one of the project’s local architects put it.⁶

In exposing traces of the city’s earlier-than-imagined origins, the research team have reanimated public interest in the monuments, and sparked a public debate about how relics of the past might live in the present, and have a future in local cosmology and as a resource in developing tourism. Which monuments should be rebuilt and which left so as to expose the city beneath? This and other questions are posed in a series of public exhibitions and most spectacularly in the gallery and museum built in the restored palace treasury. The ‘Resilience in the Rubble Exhibition’, which opened on the third anniversary of the earthquake on 25 April 2018, is in part funded by the British Academy. It displays photographs and recovered artefacts, and invites people to post their experience of the earthquake on the wall.

Prompting individual and collective memory is an opening salvo in promoting a closer alliance between the local people and their spectacular ancient monuments. Might they become involved in routine care and maintenance? How can local artisans play a bigger role in restoration and be properly rewarded for their skill? The master carvers who sculpt the open eyes of the gods must be properly acknowledged and rewarded. This creates tensions with those who favour modern engineering models and methods and low tenders for restoration work.

The earthquake allowed the team to investigate which monuments hold up and why. The strength of earlier restoration work is tested and ways to improve future seismic resilience offered by the team. Sustainability is important. Using traditional materials in restoration means reusing bricks and wood from the rubble, rather than using energy to fashion new materials and dispose of the old. Traditional building techniques favour mud mortar in place of lime and cement, because it is more flexible and thus more resilient. The monuments are thousands of years old and so have survived many earthquakes. But this approach clashes with the



Geotechnical sampling next to the Changu Narayan Temple in Kathmandu’s World Heritage Site. PHOTO: DURHAM UNESCO CHAIR.

modern engineering techniques favoured by most structural engineers, who consider concrete synonymous with strength, and connecting a strong material like cement with a weaker traditional material just causes further damage. Government tendering processes are bureaucratic, slow and must conserve public money: private contractors favour modern methods and profits. Debates about the best way to save the past and face the future rumble on. The earthquake made it possible to learn about what works best, scale it up and roll it out in other cities facing similar disasters.

Building stories

Shifting from the portals connecting heaven and earth to domestic shelter reveals further changes brought by the earthquakes with implications for understanding how infrastructure works in practice, uncovered by the British

4. The team, led by Robin Coningham at Durham University, is developing a methodology to evaluate and improve the seismic safety of Kathmandu’s spectacular antiquities: ‘Reducing disaster risk to life and livelihoods by evaluating the seismic safety of Kathmandu’s historic urban infrastructure’ (www.britishacademy.ac.uk/reducing-disaster-risk-life-and-livelihoods).

5. Robin Coningham, Kosh Prasad Acharya, Christopher Davis, Ram Bahadur Kunwar, Ian Simpson, Anie Joshi and Kai Weise, ‘Resilience within the rubble: reconstructing the Kasthamandap’, *Spaces*, 14:10 (2018).

6. Special thanks are due to Kai Weise for his knowledge and skill and enormous patience and generosity with his time.



This page: Rebuilding work in Kathmandu. Facing page: the rebuilding of one property destabilises the neighbouring property; the tower-like buildings that Kathmandu families live in to maximise the value of a small plot.

Academy ‘self-recovery’ team.⁷ This team is working in Bhaktapur, part of the Kathmandu urban area along the valley from Kathmandu. Collectors of unrecorded stories, the team listens to people telling their earthquake experiences, revealing hopes and fears.⁸ They capture the recent traumatic past and dreams about the future. With little help beyond the immediate rescue operations of international agencies and the slowly unrolling programme of government grants, people are taking the initiative and rebuilding their lives and their homes. There will inevitably be tensions between the short-term response cycle of disaster rescue missions – which have implications for the future – and the careful long-term planning needed to replace damaged infrastructure.

The earthquakes have radically reconstructed streetscapes. Everywhere are piles of rubble, and partially and completely collapsed buildings. There are odd gaps between houses where other houses once stood. Houses are held up with props to prevent further collapse. As houses often lean against each other, there is great potential for disagreement between neighbours over whether and how to rebuild. Improvements by one family can spell disaster for the family next door, as strong repairs in cement further destabilise the building whose occupants are currently unable to repair them. Temporary shelters are still being used three years later. One, built

in bamboo, houses an elderly lady with no one to help her rebuild. She has established a garden around the hut’s perimeter, and calls it her ‘nest’. Some houses are large, shiny and new. Others are half finished but occupied, while families save up to finish putting in doors and windows and add new levels. Some people live in the wreckage in the rubble. The social architectures of the city recreated by the earthquake are legible in these fragmented post-earthquake buildings. The earthquakes may have amplified existing social inequalities and created new ones.

There are new bricks and cement sacks everywhere. The government carted away the old bricks soon after the earthquake and put them in the landfill, precipitously settling any debate that might have ensued about the best way to rebuild. Construction is the dominant activity of the streets and the sounds of hammering and sawing reverberate through the narrow winding streets. The earthquake has turned local people into citizen builders. Women as well as men carry bricks and mix cement. When asked, they reveal quite detailed knowledge of building techniques from watching the ‘masons’ – the skilled bricklayers – work. Some women have developed building skills, and one completely rebuilt her own house using day labourers when she needed to, in the process reworking traditional designs to increase the space and

7. The team, led by John Twigg at the Overseas Development Institute, explores how people self recover and rebuild their lives after the 2015 earthquake: ‘Safer Self Recovery: promoting resilient urban reconstruction after disasters’ (www.britishacademy.ac.uk/safer-self-recovery).

8. Special thanks are due to Holly Schofield and Luisa Miranda Morel of Care International – highly skilled and sensitive researchers – for guiding me through the complexities of the team’s research and for allowing me to observe their interviews.



the light inside. The earthquake has improved popular knowledge of seismology, and how to build in ways that are stronger – in cement and brick – and more resilient to future earthquakes. Unlike the debates over the monuments, in domestic rebuilding there is no appetite for traditional forms of resilience. Government information on better building is filtering through the population through notices, radio broadcasts and pamphlets.

Tall narrow tower-like buildings are families' response to the cost of urban land. As they moved to the city from their farms and villages, where there had been space to spread out and build new dwellings as families grew, they instead had to occupy small plots of land and live literally on top of each other. Government compensation, distributed on the 'one door' principle, has led to disputes within families over distribution of compensation, with some members moving on and rural ancestral land being sold to fund dispersal. Compensation is a highly bureaucratic process. Some people have secured it and others still wait. New building codes requiring better seismic safety may be incompatible with resilience and self-building. The available money (or loans) and the skills of citizen builders circumscribe the quality of rebuilding. Backlogs and delays cause frustration. And compensation claims must be accompanied by proof of formal land title, which, in systems historically evolved through largely informal customary land rights and practices going back centuries, may prove unworkable. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that the city authorities are using the earthquakes to formalise the city and regulate the lives of its citizens.

Earthquakes change everything. Some of these changes enhance the lives and infrastructures lived in cities, and others worsen them. Some changes invoke the past and ask questions about the future. Mass rebuilding of housing of the kind required in earthquake recovery provides a rare opportunity to build dwellings that people want to live in. Large-scale rebuilding provides opportunities to recycle and build sustainably. It provides opportunities to rethink water supplies and storage, or install solar heating. It provides opportunities to take matters into individual family and community hands, and, like the woman who adjusted the design of her house, reimagine living space and the public spaces in between in ways that support the collective life of the streets.

As the UK Overseas Development Institute 'build back better' concept suggests, disasters are opportunities for improvements, and better infrastructure improves city life for residents. In the normal run of things, cities change slowly in piecemeal and ad hoc ways, but disasters provoke widespread change and, sometimes, the resources to implement it. Changes can be tried out, form the basis of experiments in what does and doesn't work, and be moved on to other places if they succeed. Changes can amplify creativity in infrastructure design and implementation, in dialogue with local knowledge and expertise. These are urgent matters demanding solutions. Otherwise the cities in the global south will be still more broken and dysfunctional as they grow, and their people dispossessed of the basic structures that hold everyday life together. ■

America's forgotten empire

Antony Hopkins reminds us that for half a century the United States was a truly 'imperial' power



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
Empire studies are booming. A series of shocks has added impetus to the 'global turn' in history and the social sciences. The traumatic events of 9/11 caused commentators and policy-makers in the West to grapple with hostile and largely unknown supra-national forces. The devastating financial crisis of 2008 shook the comfortable assumption that globalisation would deliver benefits rather than costs. The unanticipated appearance of China as a major world power and a prospective new empire renewed the debate over the rise and fall of great states. In reaching beyond national boundaries, historians have reappraised standard approaches to the great

empires of the past. As the number of books dealing with imperial history has increased during the last decade, so the number of new topics worth studying has shrunk. Yet important omissions can still be found. The history of the empire of islands ruled by the United States is one seemingly obvious subject that has been overlooked.

The United States is often called an empire, though typically the term is used in a very general sense to refer to its position as a leading world power. The problem with the label is that, after 1945, the United States exercised power in ways that were very different from those that characterised the great European empires during the previous three centuries. The US had bases but it did not integrate territories; its motives were strategic rather than political or economic. During the first half of the 20th century, however, the United States possessed a territorial empire in the Pacific and Caribbean. This was the insular empire, which was acquired after a war with Spain in 1898, disposed of following the Second World War, and is now forgotten. The last substantial book on the subject was published in 1962. Research on individual islands has progressed and is now detailed and of high quality. As yet, however, a sense of the totality is missing, as is an understanding of how it might relate to the huge volume of research on British and French colonial rule.

The insular empire was undoubtedly small, both in relation to the United States' mainland and to the vast British and French empires. Nevertheless, in 1940 the United States ruled over 13 inhabited overseas territories, which (with Alaska) contained about 19 million people. Ninety-nine per cent of the total lived in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawai'i. (If Cuba, the clearest example of a protectorate, is added, the total rises to about 23 million.) This was a sizeable number of colonial subjects to govern, and foreign citizens to influence. Other small overseas empires, notably those of Germany and Italy, have their place in surveys of Western imperial history; the US empire deserves to make an appearance too. Moreover, size and significance are poorly correlated. The American Empire had sufficient diversity to make it representative of the Western empires as a whole. Like the European empires, the United States had colonies dominated by white settlers (Hawai'i), colonies where expatriate-owned plantations were common (in Puerto Rico and the protectorate of Cuba), and colonies where export production remained largely in the hands of local people (the Philippines). Far from being either obscure or uniform, or both, the islands were turnstiles of globalisation joining continents, while their diversity made them microcosms of the much larger British and French empires. Accordingly, the evidence can be applied to one of the central questions of US history: was the United States an 'exceptional' nation in its purposes, methods of rule, and outcomes, or were similarities with other Western imperial powers more important than differences?

The insular empire undoubtedly had a number of distinctive features. It consisted of a set of scattered islands which, apart from Hawai'i, were inherited from Spain and contained stocks of Spanish settlers and their descendants. The empire's insular characteristics, however, appear to have had no significant influence on the formulation or implementation of US colonial policy. The Spanish legacy, on the other hand, had an enduring effect on relations between rulers and ruled. No other Western power had inherited the greater part of its empire from another Western power. Nevertheless, though



'I rather like that imported affair.' This 1904 *Puck* cartoon shows President Theodore Roosevelt ignoring the styles of hat worn by past US Presidents Grant, Lincoln and Washington, and instead expressing his preference for the European-style crown labelled 'Imperialism'.

US officials began with the aim of eliminating 'medieval' practices inherited from Spain, they soon recognised the need to adapt them to the priorities of the new empire. Consequently, the legacy from Spain facilitates, rather than invalidates, comparisons with other Western empires. The historical record summarised here suggests that similarities rather than differences emerge from the comparison.

At the beginning of the 20th century, imperial enthusiasts, like Theodore Roosevelt and Albert Beveridge, claimed that the United States would reinvigorate the Western 'civilising mission'. It was then that the United

States launched the first of the nation-building and development programmes it was to repeat after 1945. The experiment, which treated the new empire as a laboratory, was one of the earliest attempts to apply what would later be called modernisation theory. Although subsequent politicians and commentators in the United States became wary of using the term 'empire' and adopted euphemisms, such as 'overseas possessions', instead, the shift in nomenclature did not signify a change in attitudes towards the territories under US rule. It did, however, help to make the empire less visible. It remained present but was unobserved.

The United States and the European empires had a common ideology that validated colonial rule. Racial superiority endowed the white branch of the human race (and especially its Anglo-Saxon, Protestant representatives) the right and duty to spread the 'civilising mission' to less fortunate peoples who required, by definition, a long period of paternal tuition. As Washington's eager new imperialists saw it, American energy, capital and technological wizardry would carry to a successful conclusion the programme that old and increasingly degenerate European powers lacked the vitality to complete. The constitutional basis of US rule was varied and at a times baffling, as it was in the European empires. The United States sported unincorporated states, incorporated states, commonwealths, and protectorates. As in the case of Britain and France, these categories were devised to ensure that the possession of foreign countries could be squared with constitutional theory and practice at home. The management policies derived from assumptions of superiority and claimed legal rights were the same as those found in the European empires. They included a mixture of direct and indirect rule, experiments with policies of assimilation and association, and measures to encourage what was called 'uplift' through Western education and the spread of Christian missions. Similarly, the economic basis of US colonial rule rested on revenues derived principally from the export of raw materials (the most important being sugar) from the colonies in exchange for a variety of manufactures (typically consumer goods).

In principle, the presence of these commonalities is consistent with a record of progress that places the United States ahead of the results achieved by Europe's colonial powers. However, satisfactory estimates of the benefits and costs of colonial rule in the insular empire have yet to be undertaken. The problem is in any case intractable because important variables are unmeasurable. Nevertheless, approximate indications suggest that the performance of the United States fell far short of the aspirations of the founders of the empire and was probably about the same as that of the European empires during the first half of the 20th century.


The ideas were expansive; the commitment was limited. The US Congress quickly lost interest in the possessions it had acclaimed with such enthusiasm in 1898. The new insular empire then became a counter in the political game played between Republicans and Democrats. Without a bipartisan policy towards the empire, the continuity the civilising mission needed was never established. Moreover, Congress had little incentive to give imperial affairs priority over the pressing concerns of domestic voters. It ignored its obligations as much as it could, and refused the funds needed to create a Colonial Office and to finance development plans. Professionally-trained personnel were in short supply; governors were appointed for political reasons, either to be rewarded or exiled; few stayed in the job for more than two or three years. Given that the empire was too

small to be regarded as a matter of national importance, crucial aspects of policy were decided not by the needs of the civilising mission, but by battles between competing lobbies, which fought for supremacy in Washington with their own interests in mind. By the 1930s politicians were keen to offload the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Neither territory had achieved the stated goals of viability and democracy; both had become troublesome and costly.

The insular empire was certainly no more popular among its subjects than were the British and French empires. US troops were not greeted as liberators. Fierce resistance in the Philippines lasted for a decade after the United States declared victory in 1902. Hawai'i, the 'island paradise', experienced massive strikes whenever the sugar industry ran into difficulties, as did Puerto Rico, Spain's former 'Enchanted Isle', while in Cuba cane-burning became a familiar act of last resort. During the troubled 1930s, urban strikes and protests complemented continuing discontent in the rural areas, as they did in the European empires. The assassination of leading officials was contemplated, sometimes attempted, and in at least one case succeeded. In response, the United States cracked down on dissidents with a vigour that equaled the repressive measures adopted in the British and French colonies. The civilising mission had reached the point where it needed secret police aided by networks of spies and informers to keep it on course.

The insular empire came to an end at the same time and for the same reasons as the European empires. The Philippines became independent in 1946; Puerto Rico acquired an ambiguous title, that of a Commonwealth, in 1952; Hawai'i was incorporated as a state in 1959; Cuba broke away in the same year – and has never been forgiven. These events did not signal the end of either US interests or the American presence, but they did open a new chapter in a different story. Shortly afterwards, the history of the insular empire was effectively redacted. In 2011, General Stanley McChrystal, reflecting on his experience commanding coalition forces in Afghanistan, observed ruefully that 'we didn't know enough ... and we had a frighteningly simplistic view of recent history, the last 50 years.' The 'lessons of history', had they been taught, would probably have made much of Greece, Rome, and Britain. A more appropriate syllabus, had it been available, would have focused on the United States' own experience of colonial rule. The salutary record of the insular empire might have given Washington cause to reflect on what Donald Rumsfeld called 'known knowns' before wading into successive quagmires in Asia and the Middle East. ■

American Empire: A Global History, by A.G. Hopkins, has been published in 2018 by Princeton University Press.



Agriculture in the Fertile Crescent, from the deep past to the modern conflict

Jennie Bradbury and Philip Proudfoot reveal how agriculture is at the heart of both strife and heritage in Syria



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Dr Philip Proudfoot is Vice Chancellor's Research Fellow in Global Challenges at Northumbria University.

The Middle East is famed as the birthplace of farming – and agriculture, pastoralism and settlement are tightly interwoven across it. People's livelihoods are dependent on these practices, and the ways in which populations can exploit the land have affected conflict and settlement for thousands of years. These factors also represent some of the most significant threats to the natural and cultural heritage of this region. Amidst on-going conflicts in the area, can an exploration of the agrarian origins of these uprisings lead to a better understanding of the current conflict and the post-conflict future of this region?¹

An agrarian uprising in Syria?

In March 2011 when anti-government protests found footing in Syria, they did not begin in the country's major urban centres of Aleppo or Damascus but in the rural cities, towns and villages of Deir Ezzor, Dara'a, Homs, Hama, and Hasakah. Popular discontent in Syria's agricultural hinterlands was evidently high, yet the bulk of mainstream analysis continues to view the conflict as mostly sectarian (Sunnī versus Shia/Alawī) or political (democracy versus authoritarianism). This has led to peace-building strategies that fixate on the challenges of 'post-conflict governance' (free and fair elections and new constitutions) or future 'sectarian balancing' (fed-


eralism and confessional democracy). What has been sidelined is the collapse of rural livelihoods, leaving the socio-economic grievances that sparked the uprising largely unaddressed.

According to official government statistics, Syrian agriculture employed 19.5 per cent of the country's population in 2005–6; others have estimated a number closer to 40–50 per cent. On the eve of the uprising, the agricultural sector witnessed a significant decrease in rural jobs. According to UN labour force surveys, 460,000 people stopped working in the sector between 2001 and 2007, representing a 33 per cent decrease in jobs. Alongside rural unemployment, a large number of poverty-belts had begun to surround major Syrian cities, composed of displaced farmers seeking work in the city. Such features are a familiar sight across the Middle East, but in Syria they were a relatively recent phenomenon, having sprung up mostly from the mid-2000s onwards. The militarisation of the Syrian uprising has meant that many young men from these rural areas and impoverished slums have become increasingly dependent on the war economy, and therefore appear easy targets for the conflict's Islamist recruitment networks.

Where conflict analysts have admitted agricultural decline and urbanisation were a triggering factor for anti-government resentment, they have tended to allot a disproportionate percentage of blame on 'external environmental factors,' in particular the 2006–2010 drought. However, a number of agronomists have responded that the drought – while doubtless an accelerating factor – must be seen in the context of Syria's increased pace of liberalisation and reform carried out

1. The research behind this article is supported by the Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL). Thanks also go to the EAMENA Project (University of Oxford), SHR Project (Durham University), and the Honor Frost Foundation.

Figure 1. The expansion of settlement around Homs, Syria between 1984 and 2016. TOP: LANDSAT/COPERNICUS DECEMBER 1984. BOTTOM: LANDSAT/COPERNICUS DECEMBER 2016.



under Bashar al-Assad, alongside at least 50 years of water resource mismanagement. Rapid economic liberalisation from the mid-2000s onwards brought rising levels of inequality, as well as the cancellation of input/output agricultural subsidies. Philip Proudfoot’s research has documented how, in this context, Syrian labour migration to Lebanon shifted from a temporary means to make some extra cash, to a survivalist mechanism.

Drought has always been a central feature of the Fertile Crescent’s semi-arid climate. Between 1961 and 2009, Syria experienced nearly 25 years of drought. In 1961, the drought was so severe that 80 per cent of the country’s camel stock was lost, and 50 per cent of sheep stocks. Data from the International Food and Policy Research Institute shows that the frequency of droughts had not increased prior to 2011, but populations in drought-affected areas reported a *perception* that droughts had increased. One explanation for this

is that higher population densities, and the depletion of ground water resources, had made the drought significantly harder to mitigate. Given Syria’s high-levels of rural discontent on the eve of the uprising, it is perhaps surprising that very few major peace-building initiatives have concentrated on the specific development challenges faced by Syria’s rural provinces. The bulk of ongoing NGO and academic-led research focuses around ongoing priorities, such as government-level refugee management, shelter improvement technology, and refugee policy-critique. This risks missing the need to begin immediate planning for post-conflict rural Syria. Indeed, should the country simply return to its pre-war path of high input industrialised farming, poor water management, and unrestricted grazing practices, then a further humanitarian crisis is almost inevitable. In short: this will not produce a socio-political fabric conducive to peace.



Figure 2. Archaeological sites, such as this prehistoric circle in Syria, have been destroyed due to agricultural expansion and the clearance of land for cultivation. TOP: DIGITALGLOBE 13/04/2003. BOTTOM: DIGITALGLOBE 20/08/2010.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization² pinpointed the high degree of wartime damage wrought against Syria's agricultural infrastructure. Nonetheless, it has also been careful to note that agriculture is typically one of the most resilient economic sectors, and with the right support it is able to bounce back from conflict more rapidly than other industries. Experiments carried out by Italian researchers in the Al Talila reserve have shown that in protected enclosures, where livestock grazing was forbidden, vegetation quickly recovered. Enclosed areas became green pastures, while the desert continued to spread outside. As for farming, one of the main issues is Syria's reliance on high-input non-native grains, flood irrigation, and chemical fertilisation. When the government suddenly withdrew subsidisation in the mid-2000s,

many farmers simply found that their land was no longer profitable. These industrial-farming practices contributed toward a growing water deficit of around 3.59 billion cubic meters, which, on the eve of the uprising, was already being compensated through dam reserves. Officially, the UN re-classified Syria as a water-scarce country.

Does agriculture threaten or preserve the past in the Middle East?

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Libya and Yemen, archaeologists and heritage specialists from across the globe have been involved in initiatives to document and safeguard the heritage of this region for the future. This work ranges from the collation of large datasets and websites designed to combat looting and trafficking

2. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Counting the cost: Agriculture in Syria after six years of crisis* (2017).

activities,³ to projects recording previously known and unknown sites, and the different types of disturbances and threats affecting them.⁴ Ongoing archaeological fieldwork projects are now also starting to integrate risk and condition assessments on a much more regular basis. For example, fieldwork in northern Lebanon – funded by the Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL) – has been documenting the condition of rural sites as part of ongoing research.

In Syria, archaeological fieldwork (2007–2010) to the northwest of the modern city of Homs (Syria), carried out as part of the Syrian-British landscape project ‘Settlement and Landscape Development in the Homs Region’, integrated basic information on the preservation of the archaeological sites it was documenting. Since then we have virtually revisited this area, and using historic photographs and satellite imagery, tried to assess the time scale over which sites in this region were destroyed. From this work we estimate that over 60 per cent of the archaeological features that we had identified on satellite imagery from the 1960s and ’70s had been either partly or totally destroyed by 2002.

As opposed to conflict-related activities, the main agent of destruction seems to have been related to the expansion of agriculture. ‘De-rocking’ operations using heavy machinery, often bulldozers, with the intention of increasing the cultivable area, have led to widespread destruction. This type of clearance destroys even substantial surface and sub-surface archaeological features, creating large open fields, bordered by huge basalt boulder field walls. These ‘de-rocking’ initiatives were originally supported by development organisations, and aimed at increasing agricultural productivity. They are widely adopted at a local level, often on a ‘freelance’ basis and with little technical or administrative oversight. The increase in these activities from the 1990s onwards has led to the destruction of hundreds of archaeological sites and features.

Agriculture and pastoralism can affect archaeological sites and features in a variety of different ways. Ploughing, for example, can displace artefacts close to the surface, and also lead to an increase in erosion, as the layer of protective topsoil is removed. The planting of orchards can also damage features or remains close to the surface; trees planted in individual holes can be a metre or so deep. As the trees grow they continue to cause structural damage to both standing and sub-surface remains. Due to population increase, falling water tables and increasing water scarcity, the irrigation networks associated with agricultural systems can also end up affecting huge areas of archaeological remains. Centre pivot irrigation, for example, involves pumping water from up to a depth of 1 kilometre to the surface. Flat circular fields are created, often leading to archaeological sites being cleared away in advance of cultivation. Even the grazing of animals can

threaten archaeological sites, with animals moving and breaking up artefacts close to the surface and damaging standing structures.

Agriculture is, however, not just an agent of destruction. In some cases, small-scale cultivation can protect archaeological sites, or at least prevent sites from being further developed or destroyed due to modern construction and industry.

From the past to the modern conflict

In a post-conflict setting, the need for increased exploitation of the land is very likely to lead to the destruction of hundreds of archaeological sites in the rural zone. Moreover, just as the bulk of research on Syria has yet to grapple with the humanitarian issues likely to emerge from a renewed focus on high-input industrial farming, so the archaeological community, to date, has largely focused on the necessity of post-conflict reconstruction in the major cities and archaeological sites.

Until relatively recently, agricultural events or activities were important social occasions, creating bonds between local communities and the individuals within them. Increased mechanisation of agriculture and rural production from the 1950s onwards in Syria, Lebanon and beyond also meant that many of the traditional practices, such as charcoal production, milling, soap and pottery production, have now almost disappeared. So also have many of the crops and rural products that were once well known from these regions. For example, Syria’s landrace seeds are more environmentally resilient, less water-demanding, and often more nutritious than international imports.

More recently, a form of rural nostalgia has developed in many of these countries. For the urban elites, this has emerged as a desire to return to ‘nature’, with the development of rural initiatives and of biosphere and wildlife reserves in Lebanon, Jordan, and also in Syria prior to the conflict. For displaced rural populations, these memories of the historical practices⁵ speak to a time of peaceful coexistence, more secured livelihoods, and cultural links to past.

Ensuring access to food and resources is going to be a vital part of Syria’s post-conflict future. As our research demonstrates, however, these strategies need to be sustainable. It is perhaps from Syria’s agrarian past that a solution can be found: a vision for the future that emphasises the importance of developing sustainable practices that protect rural livelihoods, but also ensure the survival of the rich cultural and natural heritage of the Middle East. ■

The Council for British Research in the Levant is one of the British International Research Institutes that are supported by the British Academy.

3. Trafficking Culture: researching the global traffic in looted cultural objects (<http://traffickingculture.org>).

4. Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa (<http://eamena.arch.ox.ac.uk>).

5. For example, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXtHomQ_SBw&feature=youtu.be

Literature's lasting impression

John Gordon investigates what makes shared reading so powerful

The importance of shared reading

Most of us remember reading round the class at school, the format commonly used by teachers in primary and secondary schools to present novels to their students. We may recall that the experience defined our attitude to, say, *Great Expectations* or *Of Mice and Men*. The convention has equal power to shape our attitudes to reading fiction



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more broadly, with influence reaching far beyond school, into adult life. A similar format is adopted for specialised literary study in higher education. And its influence can be traced in the organisation of informal public reading groups. My research explores this convention of shared novel reading in each of these settings, seeking to understand its effect on participants and to identify aspects of the format that contribute to a rich, enjoyable and stimulating encounter with literature for everyone involved.

Through my work leading teacher education at the University of East Anglia, I know that teachers of English who are just starting out can find it challenging to guide successfully this shared reading of novels. Skilled, experienced teachers appear to guide such reading intuitively. Their descriptions of 'just reading in class' are understated, disguising the subtleties involved. There has been little research on the practice, and there are no overarching accounts of it to support new teachers in this complex teaching method. Sophisticated teacherly judgement is needed to balance attention to the novel, students' contributions and teacher talk.

My research comes at a time when influential accounts of literature learning play down the central role of pedagogy – the science of teaching. The concepts of 'cultural literacy' and the 'knowledge curriculum', which have shaped government policy, emphasise *content* – the choice of study texts – rather than how they are presented. My research suggests that students consider their encounter with a novel to be as important as the text itself. If handled well by the teacher it can be transformative, and if not it can be very damaging.

My project 'Literature's Lasting Impression' has investigated this convention of literary reading with a focus on two key questions:

- (1) What features of shared novel reading have positive lasting impact?
- (2) How do teachers in schools and universities improve students' literary response?

The research comprised a survey of adults about memories of reading in school, interviews with students and book group members, interviews with teachers about their methods, and observations of shared novel reading in action. This work can help improve teaching so as to nurture positive and lasting reading for pleasure beyond school. The findings have already been shared with teachers of reading, literacy and English – in primary and secondary schools, as well as in higher education – with a focus on applying the research to have an impact, ideally transformative, on students' learning.

Memories of shared reading at school

In both online and face-to-face surveys, the activity of shared novel reading was recognised by the majority of participants as a feature of their education for

reading and literacy while at school. Adults of all generations reported that they had enjoyed reading literature together in class. Such enjoyment was reported from across the decades since the 1950s, representing periods where organisation of schools, teaching styles and curricula had varied. Shared novel reading was confirmed as an enduring convention of literary study in schools.

Where shared novel reading was enjoyed, it was most commonly experienced through reading aloud. The most enjoyable and memorable reported experience was when teachers read aloud to students, typified in this recollection of reading *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* by Mark Twain:

On a regular basis, and I think usually later in the afternoon on a Friday, the head master of our village primary school would read to the whole class. The memory of this still elicits that same warm glow in me all these years later.

The most positive recollections described shared novel reading as a transformative and defining experience, as in this response to reading E.M. Forster's *A Passage to India* at A-level:

I felt like a starving man confronted with a banquet. Those English Literature classes were the most memorable experiences of my education.

The quality of characterisation, and scope for students to identify with protagonists, were also factors making for affecting encounters, though again the mediating skill of the teacher is evident in this account of reading Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*:

I felt like the characters in the book were alive. I was able to access a text that I may not have been able to fully appreciate if I'd attempted it by myself. My English teacher introduced me to literature not just books.

Instances where other students read for the rest of the class were far less favourably recalled. Some recollections of shared reading in class described it as uncomfortable. Comments revealed anxiety about reading, exacerbated by the organisational choices made by teachers:

I never liked to read aloud in class but was happy to read along while others read aloud.

The choice of text selected for study could also have a detrimental impact if its potential to engage students was overlooked. For one survey participant, Thomas Hardy's *The Trumpet Major* had little appeal. Introduced at the wrong time, it has ever since coloured his view of the author:

It was a set book for GCE. It has put me off Hardy ever since. It seemed to relate so little to adolescent male (and probably female) interests.

In other examples, readers felt the style or vocabulary of writing inhibited their enjoyment, especially when the choice of text was ill-matched to their age at the time. Some reported returning to texts they disliked at school, only to enthuse about them in adult life.

Additionally, survey and interview participants often distinguished between reading literature for pleasure and reading 'for exams' in school. One student working through a GCSE course remarked:

The problem is we have to do these books for our final exam. There are no books that we can read purely for the enjoyment of it as a class, to like sort of discuss and find out more about, because I'm sure there are plenty of books out there that not many people understand but that have a really good storyline. But we can't do that because of exams.

If we want formal education to cultivate lifelong enjoyment of reading, it may be useful to allocate more time in secondary education to shared novel reading for its own sake, in addition to considering novels solely as the objects of literary study for formal examination.

Teaching and shared novel reading

Literature's Lasting Impression has also identified significant features of skilled teaching around novels that can inform teacher training and development. The second phase of the research entailed observation, recording and transcription of lessons, seminars and meetings. I analysed transcripts using a technique called 'Conversation Analysis', affording close attention to the structure of conversations, to non-verbal features of speech such as intonation and volume, and to how participants appear to understand the contributions of others. This approach is well-suited to examining how students in a class build a shared interpretation of a text, and to scrutinising the nuances of teachers' expository talk, where emphases, pauses and tone are significant resources for engaging students and guiding their response. I also paid close attention to how teachers framed the presentation of episodes in the narrative of the study text, how they gave cues to support students' understanding of events, and how they dramatised the many voices inherent in a novel, belonging either to narrators or characters. This is skilled work informed not only by lesson planning but also by in-the-moment judgement.

Analysis of the transcripts has helped me identify what appears to be a unique form of narration used by teachers of literature. This form of narration has the study text at its heart, even though students only experience the text across lessons and over several lessons – but always



students recognise fragments of text as quotations without these markers, and how do these teaching practices help or hinder their comprehension and their capacity to analyse texts?

Continuing impact of the research

Shared reading of novels can be a transformative experience, as survey participants confirmed, but only if teachers can skilfully orchestrate students' responses in sympathy with the study text, while balancing reading for pleasure with the critical analysis required of literary study as an academic discipline. The concept of Pedagogic Literary Narration and a recognition of the central role of spoken quotations can inform teacher education and training for literary study, to

mediated by the teacher's presentation and organisation of reading. I have called this activity 'Pedagogic Literary Narration', to highlight the distinctive purpose of this form of narration – to support students' response to the text according to clear learning objectives. It combines efforts to engage students' attention and support their enjoyment of the text, qualities of reading we hope they may experience when reading for pleasure, but it must additionally support them in analysis of the text according to the disciplinary demands of literary study. The two strands are usually concurrent in classroom reading, even as the narrative unfolds for the first time through shared reading.

The transcripts also confirmed the importance of quotations in literary study, typically where teachers or students quote the novel that they are sharing. In schools, attention to quotations in literary teaching is well established through mnemonics to support how students compose analytic writing. PEA, for instance, reminds them to state a 'point' about the text, provide 'evidence' in the form of a quotation, and then to offer 'analysis' of it, ideally with close attention to specific words within it. The role of quotations in conversations around the study texts has not received the same attention in education research and training material as their use in writing. Yet they appear to be a seminal component of classroom talk around literature, to the extent that a third of one teacher's contributions to discussion over six lessons contained spoken quotations. Recognising how, when and why experienced teachers choose to introduce spoken quotations to their comments can benefit and hasten the development of specialist skills for new teachers of literature. I was able to consider to what extent students keep track of discussion or even recognise spoken quotations. The evidence demonstrated that teachers rarely stated 'this is a quotation', and of course spoken quotations are not signalled by quotations marks. How do

develop the subtle skills teachers need to guide shared novel reading with success. We may even find parallels in other disciplines where narrative texts are quoted and discussed, for instance in science, geography or history.

One simple but important finding has been to recognise the potential value of distinguishing between reading for pleasure in schools, and reading for critical analysis of literature. In the public survey and in interviews, many enthusiastic and prolific adult readers described how reading 'for exams' in English Literature deterred them from reading for pleasure in their youth. This suggests a case for ensuring students, especially at secondary school, have space to enjoy stories for their own sake. Many survey participants reported enjoying listening to stories without interruption. It is possible that devoting some time in secondary education to this activity may contribute to a lifelong enjoyment of reading. This challenges the tacit assumption that reading in the context of English Literature study inevitably generates such enthusiasm. It seems that for some readers, the literary-analytic orientation to reading may be to the long-term detriment of reading for pleasure. This is not to deny the value of literary reading, but to recognise that readers in the general public, especially those not continuing with literary study in education beyond the age of 16, placed great value in the shared experience of narratives enjoyed for their own sake. Ultimately, a powerful experience of story, not simply the story itself, seems to shape literature's lasting impression. ■

For an insight into a completely different tradition of teaching, listen to the 'From Our Fellows' podcast by Professor Eleanor Dickey FBA on 'Going to school in ancient Rome'. You can listen to it via www.britishacademy.ac.uk/from-our-fellows.

The fragile future of the Cypriot Greek language in the UK

Petros Karatsareas reveals the difficulties faced by heritage language speakers in London's Greek Cypriot diaspora



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It has become somewhat of a cliché to start an article about multilingualism in the UK by stating that, according to recent surveys, up to 300 languages other than English are spoken by the different ethnolinguistic communities present in the country, especially in big cities like London, Manchester or Birmingham. But what lies underneath the surface of this remarkably diverse linguistic mosaic? How much and how well are these languages spoken? How are they viewed by the people who speak them? How likely are they to be passed on to new generations of speakers? What are the factors

that motivate communities to preserve their heritage languages, and which social dynamics drive multilingual speakers to abandon them and shift to English? In my work, I explore these questions based on my research on London's Greek Cypriot diaspora.

A typical scenario of language shift

The picture that emerges from my research has many things in common with the experiences, both past and present, of many other communities. The UK has historically been the main destination of Cypriot migrants, the majority of whom migrated in the 1950s, when Cyprus was still under British rule, and in the 1960s, immediately after Cyprus became an independent state. Once here, Cypriot migrants established communities in major cities, with the majority of them found today in North London. Naturally, the first migrants brought with them their language, Cypriot Greek, the distinct variety of Greek spoken in Cyprus. English was a second language for this generation, some of whom spoke it well, while others little or even not at all.

In the transition from the first to the second generation, things changed. The children of first-generation

migrants, the so-called second generation, have English as their dominant language. They are native in it, it is the one they use most of the time, and the one they feel more comfortable expressing themselves in. They mostly use Cypriot Greek to communicate with older family members who might not speak English well – most typically their grandparents – or with relatives back in Cyprus. They do value their Cypriot Greek highly as an important aspect of their heritage, and do use it when they want to signal that aspect of their identities. For Marios, one of the people I interviewed as part of my study, Cypriot Greek is 'his language'. He says: 'I do not want to lose Greek, I do not want to lose the fact that I am Cypriot because, if I lose the language, I will not be Cypriot anymore.' But speakers like Marios are not always comfortable speaking Cypriot Greek, because they have received significantly lesser amounts of exposure and input to it compared with English.

By the third generation, the prospects for the maintenance of Cypriot Greek worsen even more, as third-generation speakers grow up with parents who are dominant in English and speak it to them and around them most of the time. It is therefore not surprising that third-generation speakers generally have low proficiency in Cypriot Greek, if they happen to speak it at all. When these speakers have their own children, the fourth generation, Cypriot Greek becomes reduced to something of a family relic, a handful of words that they know and use occasionally in remembrance of their background. This means that Cypriot Greek has died out as a heritage language for these individual speakers and, with increasing numbers of people following the same trajectory, it will soon be in real danger of dying out as a community language, as well. Now replace Cypriot Greek with Urdu, Punjabi, Sylheti, Gujarati, Turkish or any other community language, and you will get a very similar scenario of language shift and loss.

Pressure from without

Community languages are under immense pressure. This comes first and foremost from English, the socially dominant language that affords people who speak it the largest amounts of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital.

When they go to school, British-born children of migrants are very quick to figure out which of their two languages, English or their home language, they are expected to speak if they want to do well in their UK lives. Sooner or later, they are also exposed to what some scholars have described as a hierarchy or pyramid of languages: the notion that some languages are somehow better or more valuable than others. By all accounts, English is always found at the top of the pyramid, whereas home languages are rarely given any value – unless, of course, they happen to be one of the prestigious western European languages like French (but only the type spoken in France), German or Spanish. Teachers will discourage pupils from speaking their home languages at school, and advise parents not to speak their languages to their children, based on ill-informed ideas that this will confuse them or delay their English development.

Second-generation children then begin to use English more. They respond in English when spoken to in the heritage language by their parents, and use it almost exclusively when interacting with their siblings. This is usually the first sign of language shift. When second-generation speakers become parents themselves, their language choices reflect their negative experiences, those of their parents, and the hierarchical views of wider society. Stella, a second-generation heritage speaker of Cypriot Greek, told me in an interview: ‘At our home, we do not speak Greek to our children. This is wrong. I know it is wrong, but they are very young, and I want them to know English well.’

Stella’s worry is unfounded. Children of migrants who are born in the UK, or who arrive at the UK in childhood or even early puberty, grow up to become native or near-native speakers of English. The amounts of exposure to and use of the language in their lives ensure this. It is the heritage languages that lag behind, because they remain confined to the home environment, which is simply not enough for second-generation speakers to develop a full range of competences. Communities have very few means to counteract this. They set up different types of educational initiatives such as complementary schools or heritage language classes with the aim of keeping their languages alive, but the conditions under which these operate (low number of teaching hours, limited funding, lack of support from local, national and home country governments) limit what they can achieve.

Pressure from within

My ongoing study in London’s Greek Cypriot diaspora reveals that English is not the only force to exert pressure on the UK’s community languages. In some cases, a different type of pressure comes from within the communities themselves, and that is the expectation to speak a ‘proper’ or ‘correct’ form of the community language, instead of other forms that are deemed to be ‘improper’ or ‘incorrect’.

In most speech communities, a given variety will be considered proper and correct and will be elevated to the status of standard, while all other varieties – be they defined in terms of geographical or social factors – will be deemed improper, incorrect, and inferior to the standard. Compare, for example, the prestige that Received Pronunciation carries with the strong dislike that the Birmingham accent frequently causes among speakers of British English. Such ideas about linguistic ‘(im)properness’ develop through complex sociohistorical processes and, once established, are typically transmitted to new generations of speakers through education, governmental policy, other institutional systems, and – of course – other speakers.

In Greek-speaking Cyprus, Standard Greek – the type of Greek spoken in Greece – is the official language, the high variety used in education, administration, and formal media. Cypriot Greek, the local vernacular, is the low variety that is acquired naturally as a first language, but which is only accepted in informal, everyday communication. This distribution of interactional domains has

○ Pentadaktylos (literally ‘The five-fingered’), one of the most iconic and traditional Greek Cypriot coffee houses (*kafeneia* in Greek) dotted along north London’s Green Lanes. The name refers to the highest peak on the Kyrenia Mountains in the northern coast of Cyprus. PHOTO: CHRISTOS DANAKIS.



engendered positive attitudes towards Standard Greek, and a mixture of positive and negative attitudes towards Cypriot Greek. Speakers of Cypriot Greek report that they perceive speakers of Standard Greek as more intelligent, more educated, politer and more modern. In contrast, they associate Cypriot Greek with a rural way of life and a low level of education. Some even consider it an ‘incorrect’ language. The educational system of the country plays a key role in sustaining and reinforcing these notions, with teachers actively discouraging the use of Cypriot Greek in the classroom through explicit corrections.

In my research, I find that positive perceptions of Standard Greek, and the mixture of positive and negative perceptions of Cypriot Greek, have been transplanted from Cyprus to London. British-born speakers describe their heritage language using negative labels that are familiar from Cyprus, like *xorkátika* ‘villagey’ and *varetá* ‘heavy’, but also labels that have been borrowed from the way non-standard varieties of English are often described, such as *spazména* ‘broken’ or *slang*. Among some speakers, Cypriot Greek words or sounds are considered improper, incorrect or even lazy (another English stereotype), whereas speaking Standard Greek is viewed as proper and polite. ‘If I’m talking with someone from Greece, I feel that I, too, have to make the effort to be polite and say *ce* [the Standard Greek form for “and”] instead of *te* [the Cypriot Greek form]’, says British-born Elia.

London’s Greek complementary schools play a key role in engendering negative views towards Cypriot Greek. Schools have as their aim to develop the skills of their students in Standard Greek, and only accept this as the variety to be used for teaching and learning, even though it is not part of the students’ backgrounds and linguistic repertoires, which typically include English and Cypriot Greek. Complementary school teachers do not incorporate Cypriot Greek into their teaching, and do not generally provide opportunities for students to use their repertoires fully to develop their skills in language. Instead, they engage in a wide range of practices that make explicit their disapproval of its use by the students, including explicit corrections, recasting and even laughter. Skevi’s experience is particularly telling:

When I was in the first grade, one day I was late and there was no chair for me to sit. I said to the teacher, ‘I don’t have a *tsaéra* [Cypriot Greek for “chair”].’ The teacher gave me a nasty look. She said, ‘What is that?’ ‘Chair’, I said to her, ‘chair’, in English. She said, ‘That’s not a *tsaéra*, that’s a *karékla* [Standard Greek for “chair”].’ Afterwards, I realised that the Cypriot I knew, the Cypriot I had learned, was heavy Cypriot. I realised I did not speak correctly, I spoke in a mistaken way.

Another push towards language shift

It is not at all impossible that the type of interaction that Skevi had with her teacher could happen to a student in

a school in Cyprus. Fortunately, however, this ideology about language standards does not yet seem to have an impact on the vitality of Cypriot Greek in Cyprus, where it remains the language that is naturally acquired by the Greek-speaking population of the island. In the London context, however, these attitudes push British-born speakers towards abandoning Cypriot Greek as a preferred code of communication. Observe that, when faced with her teacher’s lack of communicative co-operativeness triggered by the use of *tsaéra*, Skevi did not offer the Standard Greek word as a solution, as the teacher wanted. She replied in English, and then concluded through self-reflection that the other language of her linguistic repertoire was a mistaken way of speaking.

Another important difference compared with Cyprus that has emerged from my work is that, in London, the use of Cypriot Greek is discouraged even in informal settings such as the home environment. Stella remembers that ‘when my sister and I were young, and someone would come around to visit, we would speak to our parents – you know – with a villagey sort of accent. My mother would say, “That word is not correct”, if we tried to use it. “You must use this word, not that one because that one is villagey.” Chrystalla, a mother, puts it like this: ‘I do not want my children to learn the type of Greek that I speak, because it is not a perfect model. I prefer for them to hear Standard Greek.’ As a result of all this, we now see the first signs of a community-wide preference for the use of Standard Greek in communication even with other members of London’s Greek Cypriot diaspora. In Despoina’s words, ‘I understand both Cypriot Greek and Standard Greek because I learned them at the Greek school but, when I speak, I try to speak the Standard Greek way rather than the Cypriot Greek way.’

It would be tempting to argue that the preference for Standard Greek could eventually displace Cypriot Greek as the community language of London’s Greek Cypriot diaspora. This is highly unlikely, if not completely improbable. British-born Greek Cypriots have minimal exposure to Standard Greek. They do not speak it at their homes and, if they do not go to complementary school, they only get to hear it on television, the radio or online, and even then a lot of them have trouble understanding it. The difficulties they experience when faced with the task of speaking in Standard Greek in public or with a speaker from Greece, and the way they avoid having to find themselves in such situations, are signs of an uneasy relation with that part of their linguistic heritage. What is therefore more probable is that, under continuing pressure from without and within the community, London’s Greek Cypriot diaspora will eventually lose both varieties of Greek in its linguistic repertoire. ■

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Persian language use and maintenance in New Zealand's Iranian diaspora

Khadij Gharibi examines immigrant parents' beliefs and practices in passing on their heritage language to their children

Child: Mummy! Mummy! I want that toy.

Mother: No honey, you've got lots of toys.

Father: I will buy you that if you are nice to granny.

Father (in Persian): Excuse me sir, how much is this?

I was listening to this conversation between a young girl and her Iranian parents in a shopping mall in Shiraz, Iran. They had come to Iran to visit their families, and the young girl could not communicate in Persian. The parents also seemed to have no problem about speaking English to their daughter.

Repeated encounters with young children unable to speak Persian coming to visit relatives in Iran with their parents made me wonder why these Iranian parents did not try to help their children acquire Persian, especially if they wanted them to be able to communicate with their grandparents and other relatives. This pushed me to start research on 'heritage language acquisition and maintenance', in particular on the impact of parental attitudes on Persian acquisition, maintenance and use in New Zealand for Iranian children.

New Zealand has been a destination for Iranian immigrants and refugees.

The New Zealand 2013 census estimated the number of Iranians in the country (informally known as Persian-Kiwis) to be just over 3,000 (less than 1 per cent of the population of New Zealand). However, it is believed that actually around 8,000 Iranian immigrants – with permanent or temporary visas – live in some capacity in New Zealand.

As part of my doctoral research, I examined Iranian parents' attitudes towards their children's heritage language acquisition and maintenance. The participants in my research consisted of 24 parents (mostly mothers) who had been living in New Zealand for between 1 and 30 years, and their 30 Persian-English bilingual children.

My findings reveal that Iranian immigrants in New Zealand have positive beliefs towards their culture and minority language, as well as strong intentions to pass on the heritage language to their children. All the parents believed that it is their responsibility to help their children acquire and preserve proficiency in the heritage language by using it at home. Cultural identity, communication with the extended family, and advantages of bilingualism were the reasons that parents gave for this belief.

Persian is used in all the families as one of the main languages of the home, but the amount of heritage language use differs between and within the families. The majority of the parents use the heritage language as the main language of the home to communicate with their children. Some families specifically have a heritage language-only policy. Where a Persian-only policy has



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been internalised by the children, the children speak in the heritage language with their parents and even with their siblings in the presence of their parents. In other cases, parents have no explicit language policy but have to use Persian as the language of parenting because of their low level of proficiency in English. Their children are aware of their parents' low English proficiency and choose to use their heritage language conversing with them.

There were also parents who believed that their children need to use the majority language in the family context and they give them this sense of freedom to choose the language for communication with family members. In these families, the heritage speakers generally have lower proficiency in Persian as a result of less opportunity to practise it.

Although the Iranian immigrants spend more time with their friends from the home country, it seems that this does not provide the heritage speakers with many opportunities to practise Persian, since the children reportedly converse in English with their co-ethnic peers. Visiting the home country has a fast positive impact on children's Persian proficiency. However, as soon as they return to New Zealand, they usually start to lose the proficiency they developed during their visit.

The majority of the parents faced challenges with family language use when the children started school, because the children tended to use English at home as they did at school with their peers. But an interesting finding of the study was the impact of teachers on heritage language maintenance. The parents stated that they were advised by their children's teachers to keep

using Persian at home, in order to raise their children bilingually. This clearly shows that bilingualism seems to be valued in New Zealand education and society, and highlights the role school teachers can play in promoting heritage language use in immigrant families. It should be mentioned that this is not common, since parents often get told the opposite by teachers, health practitioners etc.

Although parents stated that they would like to pass on the heritage language to their children, they have not always made strong efforts to help their children acquire it. Despite their positive beliefs, parents might not be able to practise regular heritage language use with their children because of their busy schedules or children's resistance. In addition, parents' language beliefs may change during the course of raising their children. Even if they believe they should use their ethnic language at home, they may not continue to do so when their children adopt the habit of using the dominant language after they start schooling, especially if the parents do not have enough time and energy to invest in their family language use.

The UK has been one of the most popular destinations for Iranian immigrants and refugees. As a British Academy Newton International Fellow, I aim to reveal how this UK community invests in their children's heritage language development, in the context of a bigger population of Iranians (compared to New Zealand) and with Persian-language schools available, but possibly in the face of a more negative attitude within society towards raising children bilingually. ■

Bilingualism seems to be valued in New Zealand education and society.

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Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, where the author conducted her research.

The origins of a British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem

On 11 December 1917, the British General Sir Edmund Allenby formally entered Jerusalem following its capture from Turkish forces.

On 13 December, Dr C.F. Burney delivered a public lecture at Burlington House in the British Academy's series of Schweich Lectures on Biblical Archaeology, on the subject of 'Israel's Settlement in Canaan'. The 'large audience' joined the Academy in the idea of sending a telegram to offer Allenby and his 'valiant army, the gallant liberators of the Holy City, profound congratulations on glorious achievement, the realisation of long cherished hopes, fraught with highest possibilities for the future of humanity. We rejoice that this historic triumph will ever be associated with British prowess, and with British ideals of freedom, liberty, and equal rights for races and creeds.'

On 20 December, Allenby telegraphed back. 'The message of congratulation from the British Academy has been received with great pleasure by myself and the force under my command. We are proud to know that we have the approbation of those who represent the highest thought and intellect of the British Empire.'

But aside from this hearty mutual back-slapping and the expression of epic sentiments, British archaeologists were alert to the possibilities for protecting and then investigating the rich archaeological heritage of Palestine that could result from the presence of a British occupying force. On 8 February 1918 the British Academy wrote to the Secretary of State for War in support of a British Museum request that competent archaeologists be attached to the British forces. And the Academy wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour (a founding Fellow of the British Academy), about the need to protect sites in Palestine that might be at risk; and more ambitiously, 'in the event of that country being detached from the Turkish Empire and being placed under some other form of administration, it is highly desirable that provision should be made in advance for dealing with the whole question of archaeological research.' The Academy said that, 'as the official representative of historical, philological and philosophical studies of every kind', it stood ready to act as 'the most convenient channel' for guidance

to Government and for any negotiations with other appropriate academic bodies.



An invitation from the Palestine Exploration Fund

On 11 April 1918, Dr Leonard King, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF), wrote to Gollancz to report that committee's unanimous view that 'the establishment of a British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem is in every way desirable, and that the necessary steps for the foundation of such a School immediately after the War should be taken without delay'. And it was hoped that the Academy would be willing to associate itself with such a proposal.

To get things moving, the PEF committee 'would be glad if the British Academy would be responsible for the organization of the movement' by setting up an organising committee. 'And it is desired that, until the School is established, this Committee should be a British Academy Committee.'

At the meeting of the British Academy's Council on 8 May, it was 'Resolved that the Council approves the idea of the proposed British School of Archaeology at Jerusalem, & appoints the following Fellows to form an Organizing Committee together with an equal number of representatives of the Palestine Exploration Fund & other persons to be added, namely Sir F.G. Kenyon, President, Lord Bryce, Prof. Percy Gardner, Mr. D.G. Hogarth, Prof. Margoliouth, Sir George Adam Smith, Lord Reay, and Prof. I. Gollancz, Sec. of the Academy.' And on 9 May 1918, the PEF Executive Committee drew up quite a detailed 'Draft Scheme' for the proposed School, for the consideration of the organising committee.

On 3 June, *The Times* published a notice on 'Archaeology at Jerusalem: A Proposed British School', announcing that the British Academy had set up the 'Organizing Committee', whose number now also included the Archbishop of Canterbury. The article reported that 'The proposed school would devote itself, both by excavation and surveying, to the furtherance of



Palestinian archaeology in all its branches. In addition to Hebrew and Jewish sites and antiquities, the school would include within its scope the Canaanite, Graeco-Roman, Byzantine, Arab, and Medieval periods.' It went on: 'An essential part of the scheme is that the school should be not only an excavating body, but also a training school for archaeologists.' Contributions were sought to help build up an endowment fund of at least £20,000: the fund treasurer would be Robert Mond (son of Frida Mond, and cousin of Constance Schweich, both of whom had already been generous benefactors to the British Academy).

In an interview published in the *Observer* on 9 June 1918, Gollancz hinted that the geographical range might extend more ambitiously beyond Palestine: 'Mesopotamia, for instance, could be served by the school at Jerusalem. Egypt, too, with the new Cairo-Jerusalem line, is now within easy distance.' And he had no doubt that there would be plenty of potential business for the School: 'for a right understanding of the Bible, scholars will deem irresistible the call to visit the land of the Book.'

The organising committee first met on 6 June, and Sir Frederic Kenyon – who was Director of the British Museum as well as being the Academy's President – was appointed as Chairman. After that, for several months progress on the project was frustratingly slow. But in

February 1919, the first Director of the School was appointed – Professor John Garstang of Liverpool University, described by Kenyon as 'an experienced archaeologist and a very capable organiser' – and he was immediately despatched to Palestine to investigate possibilities and begin negotiations with authorities.¹

There would be many twists and turns before the School had a settled home in Jerusalem – but its journey had begun.²

Celebrations 1919–2019

In 1998, the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem merged with the British Institute at Amman for Archaeology and History, to become the Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL).

To commemorate the centenary of the Jerusalem School's foundation, throughout 2019 the CBRL will hold a series of lectures and events that focus on the historical, social and political significance of the early Mandate period in the region. They will launch this series with the Annual General Meeting lecture on 19 December 2018, entitled 'Lawrence of Arabia: Romantic, Orientalist, and Western cultural artefact', given by the archaeologist Neil Faulkner.

Please visit the CBRL website for further details of their centennial events: www.cbri.org.uk

1. Thanks are owed to Felicity Cobbing of the Palestine Exploration Fund for providing access to the minutes and papers of the organising committee.
2. The early history of the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem can be found in Shimon Gibson, 'British Archaeological Institutions in Mandatory Palestine, 1917–1948', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, 131 (1999), 115–143.

Canon Sanday on 'International scholarship after the war', May 1918



Questions about the appropriate roles and behaviours of academics when nations are embattled were raised in a curious episode in British Academy history one hundred years ago.

In early May 1918, the First World War was still very much in progress – with the Spring Offensive having recently won spectacular successes for the Germans. But thought was already being given to what things could be like after the war, whenever that might be. In British academic circles, the question was being asked of what would be the appropriate stance to take in relation to their German counterparts. The Revd Canon William Sanday, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at the University of Oxford, and a founding Fellow of the British Academy, had been invited by the Academy's President, Sir Frederic Kenyon, to prepare a paper on 'International scholarship after the war',¹ and he presented it at a meeting of the Academy on 9 May 1918.

A question of personal bearing

Sanday described the issue of 'International scholarship after the war' as being 'a question of conduct, of personal relations and personal bearing. It is the question, How are we to behave?'

The nearest analogy would be that of the behaviour of individuals after a serious quarrel, a quarrel in which one of the disputants had right on his side and in which he had great cause to be aggrieved. How would a gentleman behave after such a quarrel had been brought to an end?

Under normal conditions (i.e. in the case of an ordinary war) there would be a period of mutual coolness, of rather severe silence and inaction, of somewhat studied reserve. Each side would probably wait for the other to take the first step.

And the chances are that the first step would be not a big one but a little one. Some small practical point would arise which would have to be settled one way or the other. So relations would begin, and once begun they would continue. The broken thread would be taken up, and not dropped. There would be no eagerness and no haste; it would be a matter of time; decisions would be slowly and gravely taken. Still they would be taken; and one step would lead to another – until in the end a certain amount of cordiality began to enter in. Relations would once more become friendly – and increasingly friendly – by degrees.

Such I suppose is the kind of course that things might take under what I have called normal conditions, i.e. where both parties to the transaction were gentlemen, guided by the code and instincts of gentlemen. All that it would be necessary to do would be to apply these on the larger scale.

However, Sanday went on, the present circumstances were not at all normal. The war 'has been, by universal consent, the worst war ever waged by Powers calling themselves civilized.' Great bitterness had been caused on the British side by the Germans' use of 'what is called by euphemism "unrestricted submarine warfare" and the air-raids and bombing of cities and towns with the destruction of working-class quarters'. And whereas the British retained 'the spirit of chivalry and fair-play' – 'We're sportsmen, whatever else we may be' – Germany 'must be regarded as a State with a stain upon its character, which is not to be washed out in a day.'

1. At the start of his lecture, Sanday thanked Mr Edwyn Bevan for his help in providing him with up-to-date information. During the War, Bevan worked in the department of propaganda and information and in the political intelligence department of the Foreign Office. But he would subsequently pursue his own academic career, as a scholar of Hellenistic history and literature; and he would himself be elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1942.

The Lichnowsky revelations

But Sanday thought there was a glimmer of hope for the future because ‘a new situation has been created by the Lichnowsky revelations.’

Prince Lichnowsky had been the German ambassador to Britain at the outbreak of the war. He had regretted that the conflict had not been prevented; and in 1916 he had privately circulated a pamphlet entitled *My Mission to London, 1912–1914*, in which he criticised the conduct of his own government and contradicted official German claims about British responsibility for causing the war. This document had recently become more widely available in Germany, and also in Britain (in a translation containing a preface by Professor Gilbert Murray, Fellow of the British Academy, a classicist, who as a public intellectual had written much about the war).

For Sanday, ‘The disclosures will act as a touchstone for the moral conscience’ of the German people – ‘but primarily for the conscience of its moral leaders’. And Sanday hoped that distinctions could now be drawn in terms of culpability.

How far are we to hold the German people as a whole, and in particular the learned classes, the thinking classes – the classes corresponding to those which we represent ourselves – responsible for acts and principles of action which are to be referred in the first instance to the German Government and Higher Command. Our concern is especially with the learned classes.

Hope for the future

Looking ahead, ‘There is no doubt that the end of the war must be followed by a great constructive effort all over the world, especially in the fields of law, politics, morals and religion’. And it would be ‘out of the question’, argued Sanday, to boycott the contribution of the distinctive German scholarly mind from these matters of ‘high debate’ – ‘the world as a whole cannot afford to do without it’.

But Sanday had a more immediate and ambitious agenda in mind, in the light of the Lichnowsky revelations, and ‘it is to the scholars that we are now looking’. He picked out for special mention Professor Ernst Troeltsch of Heidelberg, Professor Adolf von Harnack of Berlin, and Professor Friederich Loofs of Halle as scholars capable of writing ‘with weight and breadth of view’.

We ask ourselves, What attitude will men like these assume in the strong new light which has now been thrown upon the events which led up to the war? Will they speak out with frankness and candour and at long last tell their people the truth? It is a great opportunity – the greatest that has ever fallen to a learned class of making itself felt on the course of history since history began. ... The learned class is the proper

guardian of historical truth, the proper exponent of sound doctrine in politics and morals. Now is the time when the German people urgently needs the lead which they are best able to give it. [If the roles were reversed] I have little doubt that members of this Academy would be among the foremost in speaking out and giving a lead to the country; and I believe that, in such a case, the country would follow the lead.

Sanday believed that – apart from the High Command which at that moment would ‘be elated by their recent apparent successes’ – ‘at bottom Germany really wants peace’. And in pursuit of that,

let the learned class take up its parable – this class which has so long been in the background and content simply to follow in the wake of the powers that be. Let it gird itself for this double task: on the one hand, for bringing home to its countrymen the real truth; and on the other hand, for working out the problem which that truth entails. It would be for this class, on behalf of the nation, to make the amends that are due from it, in the first instance by stating the plain unvarnished truth and doing justice at least to the honourable aims of the nation’s adversaries. And then, its next duty would be to work out the problem of bringing Germany back again into line with the moral conscience of the world.

And, Sanday concluded, ‘if the learned and thinking class in Germany sets itself to work out anything like the programme that I have sketched for it, the question as to the relations of International Scholarship after the War will very soon lapse and be forgotten.’

Reaction

The presentation of this paper was reported in *The Times* the following day (10 May). It passed no judgement on Sanday’s argument. But it did report some qualifying remarks by Kenyon, the Academy’s President, who as chair of the meeting had stressed that

the discussion of the subject was not to be taken as a sign of any weakening on the part of British scholars with regard to the war. On behalf of the Academy he could affirm that they believed as firmly as ever in the righteousness of the war, and in the necessity of fighting until an honourable peace was secured. It would be impossible to resume intercourse with German scholars until they had renounced the crimes against civilization which Germany had committed. But if such a change of mind should take place when Germans discovered the truth, British scholars might assist the process of conversion by which alone Germany

could win readmission to the fellowship of civilized nations.²

That same day, another Fellow of the British Academy who had been present at the meeting, Sir William M. Ramsay, fired off a letter to Kenyon. He urged that Sanday's paper should not be published by the Academy. It had been far too remote from its supposed subject matter – 'far too political-moral'. Ramsay also believed 'the purport and tone would offend a very large body of feeling in this country, and I confess that I was in less sympathy with my old friend than I have ever been with anything he has said and printed.' And as for Sanday's hope that the Lichnowsky memorandum would change German public opinion, Ramsay thought that 'really too childlike'.

Indeed, Sanday's hopes seemed to receive a severe blow the very next day (11 May), when *The Times* reported that Professor Troeltsch – in whom Sanday had wished to place such trust – had recently published some very unreconstructed views about the war, suggesting that the German offensive could cause France to be 'over-run and forced into a peace', and England 'driven from the Continent'.

In the following days, *The Times* published criticism of Sanday's position from fellow Oxford professors – on 13 May from J.A. Stewart (moral philosophy) who protested against any talk of peace with 'the professorial agents of the German Government', and on 17 May from C.S. Sherrington (physiology) who recalled a damning conversational exchange with Troeltsch in 1907.

On 13 May, the Foreign Office wrote to the British Academy to ask for a copy of Sanday's text: 'we shall have to decide what line to take about it, and whether it is desirable to lay stress upon it in our Propaganda.' A few days later, having read the paper, the Foreign Office sent its response. The official credits Sanday's 'fine and generous attempt' to appeal to German scholars. But: 'Personally I have little hope of any good effect of such an appeal on the established leaders of German thought; they seem to me to have gone too far to recede.' And there was a danger that it might give the impression that Britain could be looking to negotiate a peace based on the current state of the war, 'and this would give a false idea of the mind of England'.

Conclusion

The British Academy itself was coming to a view as to what to do. On 23 May 1918, former President of the Academy, Lord Reay, sent in his considered opinion. 'It seems to me quite clear that the B.A. should not take any steps *at this present time* to ask German scholars to reconsider their opinions.' One particular reason was that 'in French learned circles it is considered that any contact

with German savants is to be avoided', and any conciliatory initiative 'would be very much resented in France'. In Germany, it would be misinterpreted.

It must be clearly understood that it is Professor Sanday's individual opinion not that of the B.A. and I do not think the Department in charge of propaganda should disseminate it in neutral or belligerent countries. ... I thoroughly appreciate the high motives which inspire Professor Sanday's proposals, but – in their present mood the Germans are unable to grasp our attitude towards our enemies ... We must make it clear to them that all civilised races look with horror on the effects which their Kultur has had.

Kenyon duly wrote to Sanday. On 3 June 1918, a contrite Sanday replied.

I must thank you very sincerely for your most kind and considerate letter. I agree with it entirely & shall be not only willing but more than willing that my paper should not be published at present. Ever since the paper was read I have felt that every thing has been going wrong for me. The very next day after the report appeared in *The Times*, came the summary of Troeltsch's last article, then Sherrington's Notes, & since these successes in France & the detestable bombing of hospitals &c. I'm not a bit of a pacifist really, & I quite agree that the only thing to do is to go on fighting.

I don't think I blame myself much. I might perhaps have known rather more about Troeltsch – but I only said that he was capable of better things ...

Events might have gone in a way in which my paper might perhaps have been of real use. ...

So long as you & others don't think the paper was a discredit to the Academy or to myself, I am well content. But I should rather like it to be kept on record.

And his typed, unpublished text has lain in the Academy's archives ever since.³ ■

'From the Archive' research by Karen Syrett, British Academy Archivist and Librarian.

Text by James Rivington.

2. An undated note in Kenyon's handwriting, possibly a memo for the remarks he gave on this occasion, reveals his evolving thinking. It includes the sentence: 'It is right to make it plain that British scholars are heart and soul in the war, that their determination is not slackened, because we feel that we, with our allies, are the trustees of civilisation.'

3. This brief account is drawn from material in the British Academy's own archives. The episode has been written about elsewhere, including by Mark D. Chapman in his book *Theology at War and Peace: English theology and Germany in the First World War* (2016), Chapter 6, 'The Sanday, Sherrington and Troeltsch affair: Theological relations between England and Germany after the First World War'.



Image: Buxton, PHOTO RICHARD HUBERT SMITH.

Festival time

In Summer 2018, distinguished academics from the Fellowship of the British Academy are travelling to take part in three leading UK festivals – Hay Festival, Buxton International Festival, and Edinburgh International Book Festival.

Hay Festival

In early June, British Academy Fellow Marina Warner took part in a sold-out discussion on the subject of 'Tales of Wonder'. Joining her on the panel were: Jack Zipes, eminent scholar of folklore, fairy tales and children's literature; and Philip Pullman, one of the foremost writers of speculative fiction, and author of *Clockwork*, the *His Dark Materials* trilogy, *La Belle Sauvage* and *Daemon Voices*.

To listen to past Hay Festival events, visit the Hay Player: hayfestival.com/hayplayer (subscription required).

Buxton International Festival

This July, we join forces with Buxton International Festival to create the Perspectives series. Curated by Peter Hennessy FBA, Perspectives will revive the spirit of the revolutionary Georgian Coffee House, exploring the issues of our age with some of Britain's foremost thinkers and commentators.

British Academy Fellows – including Fiona Reynolds and Rosemary Ashton – will join politicians, journalists and other academics to discuss topics ranging from the ethics of modern corporations to the tensions between historical fact and dramatisation.

Buxton International Festival takes place 6–22 July 2018. For more information and to book your tickets, visit: buxtonfestival.co.uk.

Edinburgh International Book Festival

British Academy President David Cannadine will discuss his latest book, *The Victorious Century: The United Kingdom 1800–1906*, at the Edinburgh International Book Festival in August. David's history of Britain under Queen Victoria paints a vivid portrait of a country self-importantly swaggering at the summit of the world, but also dogged by self-doubt.

Edinburgh International Book Festival takes place 11–27 August 2018. David Cannadine will speak on 13 August, 6.45–7.45pm. For more information and to book your tickets, visit: edbookfest.co.uk. ■



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