What’s over the horizon for UK research collaboration in Europe?

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On geese, gold and eggs

Ash Amin

On 6 September 2017, the government announced its intention to negotiate continued membership to EU research funding programmes, allowing UK researchers to have full access to funds and to lead research programmes. This news may not have caused a public stir, but it was received with relief in the UK higher education and research community. But soon there emerged a worry around the paper’s silence over the free movement of people that full access would presume. And in fact, the government has been studiously quiet about this question, putting into doubt the pledge – without mobility, we will only be able to secure third-party access to programmes, and besides, not as programme leaders.

It is vital that the status of full membership of EU research programmes does come to prevail, because so far it has served the UK exceptionally well, across the full range of EU initiatives on offer. This is amply confirmed by a mounting body of evidence, including our new report1 and the articles in this issue of the British Academy Review. The story, for the sciences and the humanities, is one of disproportionately favourable returns to the UK, not just in terms of funding flows, but also leadership of collaborative projects, policy influence, and the steady flow of outstanding European researchers – emergent and established – to UK universities. These are only some of the highlights of full membership.

But lest this begins to sound like a narrow cost-benefit analysis, there is a deeper story to be told, one about how the UK has emerged as a global player in the advancement of ‘frontier’ knowledge. Having sat on an Advanced Grant Panel of the very substantial European Research Council (ERC), I saw first hand that the projects funded after rigorous peer review by leading scholars from all over Europe were exactly like those described in this issue by Professors Diamond, Crouch, Goldhill, Keay and Griffith. They were discovery/blue-sky projects on large questions needing the very best researchers from different countries to come together in interdiscipli-

1. Brexit means...? The British Academy’s Priorities for the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Current Negotiations (British Academy, November 2017).
nary teams. There is no comparable funding mechanism anywhere else, one that bravely chooses to commit large grants to high-risk but high-dividend research that promises to be transformative and of major intellectual and social worth. As Colin Crouch insightfully observes (page 20), Europe has put into place a unique cross-national infrastructure of research support that is not replicated nationally (certainly not in the UK), to enable cross-border research on global issues.

Impressively, the UK has emerged at the helm of ‘frontier’ research, if funding success rates and flows of people are an indicator, and most importantly, with the appropriate infrastructure and incentives in place to facilitate such research, we have gone from strength to strength. The environment in the UK has improved so much that the UK has become a key hub attracting top researchers to work here, including continental winners of ERC grants choosing to bring their projects to the UK owing to the people, working practices and infrastructures on offer. UK science, social science and the humanities, in good measure because of EU research programmes, have raised their capacity to address the deeper unknowns of the world – past, present and future – which require more than bite-size, disciplinary, national applications. We have come to excel in research that is foundational and fundamental, the kind that helps to place countries at the world forefront of creativity and all its societal benefits. There is a lot to thank the EU for.

The mobility question – more precisely anxieties of having European researchers and students amidst us – has to be interpreted in this context. This should not be seen as a question of wanted or unwanted migrants, but a matter of removing barriers to movements and collaborations that enable the highest quality and most necessary research to be undertaken. If national borders get in the way of the geographies that best deliver research excellence, in turn helping the UK to maintain the very fortunate position in the world that it enjoys, then solutions must be found accordingly. The other day I heard the head of a major national research trust say that 30 years ago UK research seemed parochial compared to today, thanks largely to the embedded cosmopolitanism that has been facilitated by EU research opportunities and infrastructures. I agree. Migration anxieties, if they end up hindering full membership of EU research programmes, will fracture a mode of working that has yielded an academic cosmopolitanism in the UK that is enviable.

Why kill off the goose that laid the golden egg? Sustaining participation in EU research programmes poses no threat to the UK developing further international collaborations, as some seem to think. In fact, as Crouch argues, it is the basis for developing new connections, in so far as the EU-supported research environment in the UK has played its part in attracting researchers from India, China, the US and other parts of the world to the UK. If Brexit means the end of European research participation and collaboration, the wider globalism spoken of by the government will be at risk, for there will be no transnational framework for collaborative research, and in the meantime the attractiveness of the UK research base will have waned. Globalism without Europe seems odd in any case, suggesting that ‘Anglosphere’ aspirations premised on renewing old colonial and commonwealth ring truer of old imperial fantasies (which our past dominions will find risible) than of a genuine desire to extend the frames of cosmopolitan belonging that Europe – at least in the research arena – has nurtured. Mycock and Wellings (page 42) are right to be wary of this version of globalism championed by Brexiteers anxious of the charge of nativism.

In place of such ethnocentrism, let us ask how the research excellence that the UK has so arduously built up, with the help of incentives from appropriate EU research funding programmes, can be maintained and protected. Then – as Robert Frost (page 36) reveals for the early moderns, when Europeans got used to making compromises and bargains instead of obsessing with the purities of the unitary state, national or otherwise – we might get past the conundrum of EU membership without mobility. A pragmatic Europe might consider making deals on migration packages spread across a credible time horizon so as to help member and affiliated states to better manage national labour and welfare markets, it might puncture any paranoia about national cultural loss and reduced sovereignty, and it might look to forms of belonging beyond the unitary state. At the charged present time, this kind of thinking seems fanciful. Perhaps so, but this is the kind of switch needed to nurture the republic of letters that helps nations to negotiate turbulent waters.
What are the origins of your interest in history? Was it always inevitable that you would be a historian?
There was nothing inevitable about my becoming an historian, but when I was growing up in Birmingham, I was lucky enough to be taught by an inspiring schoolmaster, called Graham Butler. He captured my imagination for the subject, I applied to read history at Cambridge, and I have been Clio's disciple ever since. But that's only part of the story. The Birmingham into which I had been born was still recognisably Joseph Chamberlain's city, at the centre of which was a wonderful ensemble of 19th-century civic buildings – the Reference Library, the Midland Institute, the Town Hall, the Art Gallery, the Council House and Mason College. This meant that I grew up in what would be in retrospect the last decade of the extended Victorian world, much of which was demolished during the 1960s, as everyone seemed to be talking about building the 'new Birmingham', which was all plate glass and concrete. Yet at just the time that much of the 19th-century infrastructure, and not just of Birmingham but of all our great Victorian cities, was being torn down, the study of 19th-century history began to take off, at the hands of such scholars as Asa Briggs, Robert Blake, Eric Hobsbawm, Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher. This meant that I also grew up in a world where historians of exceptional academic distinction also believed that their subject was an essential part of the nation's public culture, and that their prime task was to write for a broad audience – a view that I wholeheartedly share.

In the 1980s and 1990s, you wrote quite a lot about class – including your 1997 Raleigh Lecture in which you describe different ways of defining class1 – in particular the aristocracy. Where did your interest in aristocrats come from?
It was partly that a great deal of the historical writing produced during the 1960s was devoted to the middle classes (especially by Asa Briggs) and the working classes (most famously in the case of E.P. Thompson). But with the exception of Michael Thompson's pioneering book on English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century, the aristocracy had received far less notice. But my interest in the sub-

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ject was also aroused because Birmingham boasted a very genteel suburb, Edgbaston, much of which was owned by the Calthorpes – an aristocratic family with an estate and a grand house at Elvetham in Hampshire. But that aristocratic way of life was made possible, not by agricultural rentals drawn from the countryside, but by the ground rents drawn from Birmingham, and I was intrigued by what seemed to be that paradox and contradiction. So when I moved on from Cambridge to Oxford, I did my doctoral work on the Calthorpe family and the development of Edgbaston, and that turned out to be a very rewarding subject. And once I had done with them and with that, I also knew that I should try to write a bigger and broader work, exploring how the grandees and gentry across the British Isles had fared across the century from the 1880s to the 1980s. The inspiration for that book also came from Lawrence Stone’s magnum opus on The Crisis of the Aristocracy, partly because I thought it an extraordinary work of scholarship, but also because I took time out from Oxford, while a graduate student, and spent a year working with him at Princeton.

You have now just published Victorious Century, a volume on the 19th century in the Penguin History of Britain series. What was the attraction and challenge of writing that?

At some point during the 1990s (it really was that long ago), Peter Carson, who was then in charge of Penguin Books, decided that it was time to re-do the Pelican History of England, because many of the books in that series were by then getting on for 50 years old, and were beginning to show signs of their age. He asked me to be the General Editor, and I thought I could hardly take that job on without undertaking to do one of the volumes myself. And since I was able to persuade Peter Clarke to do the 20th century, that rather left me with the 19th, which in any case I was only too happy to do. But it took me far longer than ideally it should have done, because other things came up which needed my attention first, such as my biography of the American banker, politician, plutocrat and philanthropist Andrew W. Mellon. Penguin were exceptionally patient and forbearing, and the book was eventually published this September, dedicated to the memories of Asa Briggs and Peter Carson. I was sorry that neither of them had lived long enough to see it appear, but in every other way, the book was enormously enjoyable to write. I wanted to try to catch the many contradictions and paradoxes about the British 19th century: on the one hand a time of progress and plenty and power, but also a time of deep insecurity and constant anxiety. I also wanted to give appropriate attention to Ireland, which is why I began the book, not with the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, which is the conventional starting point for many histories of 19th-century Britain, but with the Act of Union with Ireland in 1800. By starting the book at that time, and with that legislation, I was able to treat the British 19th century in what I like to think is a slightly new way. And for many governments then, Ireland was something of a nightmare, just as Europe has become so for many of their recent successors.

You have written a lot about how history should be done. In a lecture you gave, ‘What is History Now?’, as part of the Academy’s centenary celebrations in 2002, you talked about how, instead of seeing our audience as being either professional or lay, we might consider what Stefan Collini calls the “academic public sphere” which is neither exclusively academic, nor inclusively generalist, but something in between. Is that what you are aiming for?

Yes. Of course, I write for my fellow academics, and *Victorious Century*, like all my books, is heavily and appreciatively indebted to the work of my professional colleagues. But I also write for the undergraduates to whom I have spent much of my life lecturing, who form a large part of that ‘academic public sphere’ when they grow up.

In a British Academy event in March 2016, ‘Does Good Policy-Making Need Historians?’, you discussed your own experiences of trying to influence policy. You contrasted what you thought had been a success, in terms of helping to get the ‘30-year rule’ changed, with the book *The Right Kind of History*, which was not so successful in achieving its aims.

I thought that both the 30-year rule report, most of which I wrote,7 and the book on history and its teaching in schools,8 made their cases with enormous evidential plausibility and argumentative conviction. The case for reducing the period under which most public records were embargoed was a very good one, not least because that was what virtually every other country in the western world had decided to do, which meant that there was no point in the British government trying to hold a line that had already been given up elsewhere. In the case of the teaching of history, it was equally clear that something needed to be done. Across the whole of the 20th century, there had been constant complaints that most people did not know enough history, for the very simple reason that insufficient time was given to it in the classroom, and the subject has never been made compulsory to the age of 16. The big challenge, then was to think of ways of teaching more history, rather than to keep tinkering with the curriculum, which has never been the real problem.

In the case of the 30-year rule, the recommended changes were carried in the so-called ‘wash-up’ legislation passed just before the General Election of 2010, reducing the time that most official documents were embargoed from 30 years to 20. But it was touch and go almost until the last minute, and it was largely thanks to lobbying of MPs and peers by Paul Dacre, who was the chair of our committee, that the necessary legislation was passed. This was a good outcome, but when it came to our recommendations on the teaching of history, we were much less successful. Despite the compelling evidence we had marshalled, the then Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, decided that he would not increase the number of hours assigned to teaching history, nor make it compulsory to 16, but instead he would change the curriculum, thereby doing the very opposite of what we had recommended. I concluded from these two rather different encounters in the corridors of power that, if you wanted to change things, the deployment of persuasive evidence was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of doing so. (Although I still cherish the hope that one day, another Secretary of State for Education will read *The Right Kind of History*, and implement its recommendations rather than do the opposite.)

In October 2014, you became editor of the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (ODNB). Rather like becoming President of the British Academy, this was something I never expected to happen. Like many historians, I had used the ODNB and its predecessor a great deal, so it has been a part of my academic life for a very long time, and I had reviewed the volume that covered the 1960s for the *London Review of Books*. I had also hugely enjoyed producing two entries for the ODNB: on G.M. Trevelyan, about whom I had already written a biography,9 and on Noel Annan, by turns an academic proconsul and a latter-day Whig grandee, as well as being an under-appreciated historian of ideas and institutions. I was also a friend and admirer of Colin Matthew, the founding editor of the ODNB, and his successor, Brian Harrison, both of whom were also Fellows of this Academy and very distinguished historians of modern Britain. Moreover, the British Academy had played a significant role in making the new ODNB possible, particularly through the efforts of Sir Keith Thomas, who was both the chair of the finance

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In your own entry for Margaret Thatcher, which has been separately published in book form, you have not shied away from reaching preliminary judgments about her.

Part of the interest was that it would mean writing the life of someone whose period of power I had myself lived through and could vividly remember, which meant the entry was a piece of contemporary history of the sort I had never written before. I had also reviewed Hugo Young’s splendid biography of Thatcher, which came out when she was still in power, so I already had some preliminary views about how to write a biography of her. And the invitation to write about the 1980s, her decade of power, not so much as personal memory, but rather as a period of historic time, was impossible to resist. Perhaps to the surprise of some readers, the book version begins with an act of homage to another ‘Mrs T’—Mrs Thurman, who was the headmistress of my Birmingham primary school. She was a Conservative, a Christian, and elegantly turned out. She had a very intimidating personality and a terrifying temper. She was a simply brilliant headmistress. In many ways, Mrs Thatcher was Mrs Thurman multiplied by a hundred (or perhaps a thousand), and knowing Mrs Thurman gave me a sort of instinctive feel for Mrs Thatcher, which many academics did not have.

The length that was suggested for the original *ODNB* entry was 25,000 words, but in the end, I needed 33,000 words to get the job done, which makes it the third longest entry after Shakespeare and Queen Elizabeth I, and slightly longer than Churchill’s, which I was slightly sorry about. But even so, it was a challenge to get the proportioning right, in terms of her journey from Grantham to Westminster, from becoming an MP to being elected party leader, then dealing with her three very controversial administrations, then her rather sad decline and afterlife, and then some form of appraisal. There was the challenge of how to strike the right balance between the public and private lives, and there was also the issue of her gender. And since she had relished confrontation, and despised consensus, there was a further challenge in trying to reach some sort of balanced and even-handed verdict. In the concluding section, I tried to present the case that can be made for her— that she was the saviour of Britain, who beat the Argentinians, tamed the unions, pioneered privatisation, fore-saw the end of the Cold War, and raised Anglo-American relations to a level not seen since the days of Roosevelt and Churchill. But I also put the case against, namely that she was a hard-faced, narrow-minded, provincial ideologue, with very little sympathy for the people whose livelihoods were wrecked by de-industrialisation.

10. Sir Keith Thomas was President of the British Academy, 1993–97. Over a number of years, the British Academy provided significant financial support to enable the new Dictionary of National Biography to be undertaken (beginning with £250,000 in 1992–93), and in recognition of this the Academy’s name appears on the title page of the print edition.

who wrecked a civic culture and a sense of national identity, and who was emphatically on the wrong side of history in the case of German re-unification and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Having presented these differing views, I have left it to readers to make up their own minds.

In the concluding session of the Academy’s ‘Govern- ing England’ conference on ‘Devolution and Identity in England’ on 3 July 2017, you had a discussion with Peter Hennessy about English identity in the light of devolution and Brexit. How can historians help provide a narrative of what has been happening at this time of confusing change, when it seems that established certainties are in question?

In one of the lectures I give at Princeton to undergraduates, I make the case that history is the best antidote to the temporal parochialism that assumes that the only time is now, and to the geographical parochialism that assumes that the only place is here. It reminds us that things have not always been as they are now and that they will not stay the same as they are now; and it also reminds us that other people in other places see and do things differently from how we ourselves see and do things. Among many other things, I firmly believe that history provides perspective and proportion, and we could do with rather more of that at the moment than in fact we are getting.

In the specific case of devolution, we should remember that there is nothing absolutely perpetual, preordained or perennial about the United Kingdom as it at present exists. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was only created in 1800, which means it is a less venerable national construct than the United States, and most of Ireland left that Union in the early 1920s. This in turn means that the current constitutional arrangements are just the latest iteration of a union that has constantly evolved and changed over the centuries. And it is the job of historians to point this out: to provide the context in which those in power make and take decisions, in the hope that they will listen, and take and make better decisions as a result.

As for Brexit: we should never forget that one of the reasons for creating what began as the Common Market was to try to ensure that France and Germany would not go to war again, as they had done twice during the first half of the 20th century, and with catastrophic consequences. Since 1945, Europe has not torn itself apart, and the Common market and, subsequently, the EU certainly deserve much of the credit for that. We should also remember that, from a specifically British point of view, joining the Common Market was presented as the solution to problem to which Dean Acheson drew attention, namely that ‘Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role in the world.’ Joining the Common Market, and staying in the EU, was the best deal available for a post-imperial Britain, and it also gave us greater continuing influence in Washington than we otherwise might have had. The danger has to be that all of this will unravel when Brexit happens.

In another line in your ‘What is History Now?’ lecture, you say of historians that ‘We are the sceptics and the disbelievers, constantly in rebellion against the tyranny of present-day opinion.’ That phrase is taken from Freedom and the Historian, Owen Chadwick’s inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History in Cambridge, in the course of which he urged that one of the purposes of studying history is ‘to free us from the tyranny of present-day opinion.’ It’s an earlier version of my point about perspective and proportion. What may seem to us now to be preordained, self-evident and an improvement on everything that has gone before, will not necessarily be seen like that by future generations. Let me give another example. In an interview in connection with his book Man and the Natural World, Keith Thomas ventured the opinion that, at some future date, eating meat might be outlawed, and everyone would become vegetarian, and that in turn would mean that any historical figure who had eaten meat would henceforward get less sympathetic treatment. Put the other way, this would mean that the most esteemed prime minister from earlier times would suddenly become the vegetarian Andrew Bonar Law, who can hardly be said to be in the first rank of British statesmen.

You are now President of the British Academy.

In your address to the Academy’s Annual General Meeting, you pointed out that you will be the Academy’s ‘Brexit President’. What can our disciplines specifically bring to the issues surrounding Brexit?

Part of the difficulty is that we do not quite know what the issues are, beyond the fact that Whitehall and Westminster seem preoccupied with the Brexit negotiations to such an extent that a great deal of routine business is either interminably delayed or not getting done at all. But it is also that the level of discussion of the issues, by both the government
and the opposition, seems to be conducted in an exaggerated, over-simplified, polarised way. Yet the background to Brexit is much more complex than merely the result of a single referendum, and very few of the people who are involved in these negotiations seem aware of that. The most important thing that anyone involved in the Brexit negotiations, or, indeed, anyone who cares about the issue, ought to do, is to read Ian Kershaw’s forthcoming book, Roller-Coaster, which is a brilliant history of Europe from 1930 until our own times. That’s just one example, and in the interests of full disclosure I must declare that the book is the final volume of The Penguin History of Europe of which I am general editor.14 But in any case, Ian’s forthcoming book is just one example of the work that Fellows of the Academy do, as historians, sociologists, lawyers, philosophers, political scientists, and experts in international relations, that offer powerful insights and profound perspectives on the present uncertainties and discontents that Brexit has generated.

There is also a specific set of concerns about higher education, in terms of (for example) the relations between British universities and EU funding sources, and of EU citizens working in Britain and what their future is going to be; and many of these matters are raised by other articles in this issue of the British Academy Review.

But although Brexit is thus a major source of interest and concern for the Academy, and for many reasons, I also think it is very important that during my Presidency, and perhaps even beyond that, we must not allow Brexit to take over the Academy completely, in the way that it seems to be in danger of taking over the whole of British government. Even as these negotiations go on between London and Brussels, towards an outcome that no one can yet safely or certainly predict, we must at the same time continue to keep working at all the other important things that we do. It is going to be a very busy four years.

More generally, you have talked about what the British Academy can do in a more general, public intellectual role. You have quoted Hugh Dalton saying of John Maynard Keynes that he ‘taught us to combine reason with hope’. What is the role of the Academy in espousing values like that?

As my predecessor, Nicholas Stern, has very eloquently stated, we live at present in a deeply vexed nation and a seriously troubled world. He knows that as an economist; I know that as an historian. If we are to have wise and well-informed policies, or wise and well-informed public understanding of the issues, then the humanities and the social sciences have a vital part to play. In a world of fake news, crassly over-simplified binaries, and limited attention spans, we have to do better at proclaiming the values that we stand for, not because they are good for us, but because they are essential for the good of society as a whole. That is the big challenge for the Academy in the current environment – to make a case that is not seen to be self-serving, but is, on the contrary, motivated by a broader concern for the health and well-being of society as a whole. For if we are to deal with the mega-issues that are heading our way so rapidly, from global warming to robotics, ageing societies to artificial intelligence, there needs to be a greater degree of respect for evidence-based learning, for truth, reason and ideas, and a greater eagerness on the part of policy-makers to engage with those who are the experts on these and other subjects of such vital contemporary concern.

You are a longstanding contributor to A Point of View, broadcast on BBC Radio 4. In August 2016, you did another series on Radio 4 – Prime Ministers’ Props. Is the BBC an example of a cultural institution that the British Academy should be doing more with, as a channel for communicating?

I am sure that is right. The BBC is one of the great cultural organisations of this country, and you only have to live and work in a nation that has no BBC, to realise how much it is envied and admired. I am a very strong believer in the Reithian ethos of enlightenment, entertainment and education, and I hope the Academy and the BBC may be able to collaborate to a greater degree than we have managed to achieve thus far. When, as they often are, the Reith Lectures are concerned with the humanities and social sciences, the Academy would be an obvious place to host them. Across the more than hundred years of its existence, the Academy has numbered among its Fellows many of the biggest brains with many of the brightest ideas, who have transformed the ways in which we apprehend and understand the world. What a marvellous
series that would make for Radio 4. And I am eager to discuss the possibility of an annual series of BA/BBC lectures on the humanities or social sciences, like those that the Royal Institution puts on at Christmastime every year for the natural sciences. After all, there are many exceptionally accomplished television performers among our Fellowship. So there are lots of exciting possibilities to explore with the BBC, which would be to our mutual benefit, and I am very eager to be doing so.

Does your own transatlantic perspective, as Dodge Professor of History at Princeton University, give you an enhanced sense of the need and potential to engage with partners abroad?

I have probably spent as much of my professional life working in the United States as in the United Kingdom, and many of the Academy’s Fellows live and work abroad, from Amartya Sen in North America to Ian Donaldson in Australia. And almost all our 300 Corresponding Fellows obviously live abroad, many of them in the United States. This means that, while we are called the British Academy, there is a very real sense that, in terms of our Fellowship, we are actually a global organisation. It’s also the case that our research institutes, in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, are a further indication of our range and reach. And our project on the Future of Corporation, and the successor we are developing on the Futures of Democracy, are explicitly conceived of in global terms. Engaging with our global Fellowship, exploring global issues, and seeking global funding will all be high priorities during my Presidency – and, I hope, beyond.

Following up on the word ‘funding’, how does the British Academy need to be strengthened to be in a fit position to take on the various roles that you are describing for it?

I would not want to suggest that everything comes down to money – least of all in an organisation devoted to the life of the mind and the well-being of society. But money does matter, and although the government treats us generously, it is not a wholly satisfactory position to be as dependent on Whitehall funding as we are. Our independence is an essential part of our reputation, and it would be very good to be able to fortify and consolidate that independence by having a more diverse income stream than we have at the moment.

Raising money for an endowment, which is just about the hardest thing to do, would be a terrifically good thing. And we also need to raise money to buy down and extend the lease of our premises at Carlton House Terrace, which would give us a stronger sense of permanence and free up some of our annual income that at present goes to pay the rent. Those seem to be practical steps we could take, which would strengthen the Academy’s position financially and, as a result, strengthen its independence.

I am hoping to make some progress while I am President, but four years is not a very long time when it comes to raising money, and I am very conscious that all Presidents build on the work of their predecessors. It is a cumulative process, but we have momentum, the trajectory really is onward and upward, and I am eager – and determined – to ensure that that continues.
You studied economics as an undergraduate, then went on to do masters degrees and a doctorate in statistics. Were you always interested in numbers?

I have always been interested in numbers, how they work and how you can have an impact on policy with them.

I was hugely privileged to go to the London School of Economics, which provided a fantastic grounding in statistics, and then to work at St Andrews with Richard Cormack on a problem applying statistics to public policy.

Have there been particular areas of statistics work that have interested you?

My work has been very eclectic. I was enormously lucky in 1980 to get my dream job, to work in the then relatively new Department of Social Statistics at the University of Southampton, because it was the place that was doing social statistics. I was able to work with a group of people who were deeply committed to statistics and to the application of statistics in the social sciences. So, although I started off working on the World Fertility Survey, I also had the opportunity to work around environmental noise, and around social aspects of health – it was just applying statistics in different ways. If there was one focus of my interests, it was definitely demography, which I really enjoyed and where I hope I was able to make some useful contributions around censuses.

I learned very early on – by chance – that the way to maximise the impact of your research is to engage the potential beneficiaries in the work from the start. And I was later much influenced by Andrew Pettigrew’s work on what he calls the ‘co-production of knowledge’. When you do that properly, you improve the research in every way. You get new research questions, and some of those can lead to really exciting blue skies work.

At a British Academy event in 2010,1 you said it was your personal philosophy that ‘no one should take public money to do research unless you are prepared to use the results of that research, where appropriate, to have an impact on the people who paid for it in the first place’.

I absolutely believe that. There is a very important ‘where appropriate’ in that quote. We need...
to continue to do research simply for the advancement of knowledge, and there will be some research where we will have no idea that it is going to have an impact, but it will do a long time later.

But the last 10–15 years have seen an exponential increase not only in the acceptance that it is appropriate and important to spend public money on research, but also in the expectation that, where there is an opportunity for the research to have an impact, one should maximise that. Universities now reward people on the basis of the impact that they have, as well as on the basis of the research itself. The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and now Research England have done a fantastic job in encouraging that pathway – while recognising that, particularly in the social sciences and the humanities, it is not always a linear pathway. The Research Excellence Framework (REF) has helped, and the things that have come from Lord Stern’s review of the REF have expanded and enhanced the way in which we think about impact in a really positive way. So there is a much greater chance that the brilliant research that is done right across the UK will fundamentally have an impact on many of the people who pay for it.

How important is the use of ‘big data’ in transforming the effectiveness of research?

It has been said that the 21st century will be the century of data. What we can do now on a smartphone is just unbelievable compared with what, at the beginning of my career, used to take three days on a mainframe to do. That means we can manipulate data in a way that we could only have dreamed of just a few years ago. And we have data that are available in a much more accessible way than ever before. And finally, we are able to link those data much more smoothly and effectively than we could even 10 years ago. Put all that together and you have an enormous opportunity to do research that understands social phenomena better and has a greater impact than could ever have been achieved before.

I am hugely keen on the potential of administrative data. We do need, though, to recognise the limitations: administrative data have errors associated with them, the linkages will not always be perfect, and the data were not collected at a fine level of granularity for the purpose of research. But, while understanding those limitations, we should make the most use of them.

The enormous opportunity of big data does not take away the need for carefully constructed social surveys with carefully constructed questionnaires, which are addressing really important social phenomena. And we should always remember that we need to ground our research in theory, and to ask questions that properly address the research problem we are looking at.

Quantitative skills have been a particular concern for the British Academy, and you have been chair of the Academy’s High-Level Strategy Group for Quantitative Skills. What is the issue here?

The issue is that we do not have the wide range of skills necessary to be able to maximise the use of big data in the social sciences. What we say is that we need a pyramid of skills. At the top, we need to continue the tradition of the UK having world-class social statisticians – such as Chris Skinner and Harvey Goldstein. Below them, we need a group of analysts who can do the most cutting-edge analysis. And then, below them, we need an entire population of data-literate people, able to interpret and make use of the data we have been talking about – whether in terms of charities making applications for lottery funds, or active citizens being able to drive society properly. So it does not stop in academia, it does not stop in industry, it is an entire population of quantitatively literate people, and we should not stop until we get that.

That pyramid image was very much part of the Count Us In publication that the British Academy launched in June 2015. Do you think that the Academy’s quantitative skills initiatives have had some impact?

The Academy should be very proud of its work in this area. It has enabled us to interact with the Nuffield Foundation’s Q-Step programme, which aims to develop the quantitative skills of social science undergraduates. And we hope for a similar initiative for quantitative skills in the humanities.

And, critically, we have been able to input very positively into Sir Adrian Smith’s review of mathematics education for 16- to 18-year-olds in England, which came out in July. That review has made a lot of important points – about how mathematics should not just be maths for maths’ sake, and that it should link into the social sciences in particular.

I am not going to say we are a long way on the journey. But we are making progress: Q-Step,

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2. For more on the British Academy’s publication Count Us In: Quantitative skills for a new generation, see British Academy Review, 26 (Summer 2015), 17–19.
3. ‘Q-Step: A step-change in quantitative social science skills’, funded by the Nuffield Foundation, the ESRC and HEFCE, was launched in 2013. The programme sought to address a skills deficit problem identified in the British Academy’s 2012 position statement Society Counts: Quantitative Skills in the Social Sciences and Humanities.
Count Us In and the Smith review seem to me to be really important steps on that journey. But we need to be tireless in driving the agenda. There is an enormous opportunity for the British Academy, working with other partners, to push forward the next stage of creating a quantitatively literate society.

And the Academy also has a project on maths anxiety. Too often people say, ‘I can’t do maths’. My experience is that, with support and sympathetic teaching, everybody can get to a reasonable level, and that is what we should be aiming for. We often say ‘maths’ when what we really should be thinking about is numbers, data and the like. The work that we will be reporting in a few months’ time on the reasons for maths anxiety and what you can do about it, work led by the University of Manchester, is going to be really important. And then the Academy will again be able to think how it can have an impact on policy in this area.

We started off talking about your own research. But for many years now, you have been immersed in academic administration and policy. Have you managed to sustain your own research interests?

When I went to the Economic and Social Research Council, it was the crossing of a personal Rubicon in that, in the main, I would no longer do primary research. You don’t spend a long time doing research without enjoying it hugely. But you recognise when you can add value – you hope – in a different way. I keep up with the literature as I can, because I love reading about it. But clearly, over the last 15 years or so, my day job has not been to do research, and it is important to recognise that you do your day job properly. And I am proud of what I have achieved.

From the perspective of all the influential positions you have held, what is your view of the state of social science in this country?

My overall observation is that social science is incredibly strong in the UK, and it is peopled by some fantastic researchers doing fantastic work. In particular, we have improved over the last 15 years or so.

And in the UK we have had pretty good stability of long-term funding for a long time. Despite the financial crisis, we have had, particularly recently, major increases from the
government, as successive prime ministers and chancellors have supported funding. And certainly within the research councils, commitments have been made that are of a decent length – five, seven years – for centres and for programmes. I do think we should be proud of what we do in the UK.

I also have to say that I am excited about the opportunities that we have at the moment through the Global Challenges Research Fund. I am passionate about the role that research can bring in driving development in poor nations, and those Global Challenges involve multidisciplinary work, which quite often cuts across international boundaries. I recently chaired a final selection panel for the British Academy’s Early Childhood Development scheme, and the work we funded was all really interesting, all really important in aiding early child development across a wide range of the lesser developed countries.5

But I am very clear in my mind that we need to be tireless in continuing to make the case for the social sciences – both for the social sciences in their own right, and for the social sciences as complementary to other sciences in addressing some of these great challenges of our time. Too often we forget that it is social sciences that bring ‘the human’ into the overall research endeavour, and understanding the human element is absolutely critical if we are to address challenges such as climate change, global security, or productivity (and to measure productivity properly). We must always be prepared to make that case, powerfully and sensitively. We are not in the business of saying that social sciences are more important than anything else. Quite simply, we have things that we contribute on our own, and things that we contribute in partnership with other sciences. And when you put the whole research ecosystem together, the whole is very much bigger than the sum of the parts, and I would argue that the social sciences are at the intersection of all those pieces.

Brexit is coming down the track. What has our ability to draw on European Union research schemes made possible for social science that might not have been possible otherwise?

Across the great majority of the social sciences the best research is done in teams these days. What the EU funding schemes have enabled us to do brilliantly is to get teams of researchers, across the UK and from different countries, working together seamlessly and easily. Previously, if I wanted to work with someone from Belgium and someone from France, three applications would have had to have gone to three different research funding organisations and you would have had to wait around for the metaphorical equivalent of three crowns to come up on the one-arm bandit to get funded. Now you put together one application, and if it is good enough it gets funded. That has been incredibly positive for the European research endeavour. In my opinion, because knowledge knows no nation state boundaries, we need to continue to be able to build those teams.

My own view is that the UK government wishes that to happen, and when I talk to colleagues in European countries, they want that to happen. It seems to me that we ought to be able to get ourselves into a position where we can continue to have teams working across Europe on important research projects. And it would be great to be able to expand some of those links. The Europeans are talking about bringing the Canadians in. We need to be looking for those opportunities, because the more international opportunities there are for teams to work together the better.

Also, access to international infrastructure is incredibly important. I was privileged to be on one of the very early advisory boards of the European Social Survey and that has been a fantastic pan-European project. Not every country in it is a member of the European Union, but the fact that it is exists and that we are able to understand attitudes contemporaneously in a range of European countries, and hence to understand both the similarities and the differences across nations, is a fantastic opportunity. We need to continue to ensure that, where international infrastructure is needed to take forward research, we do that seamlessly and easily.

We have been incredibly influential in helping to shape EU research programmes, and I very much hope we can maintain as much influence as possible. We have been incredibly influential in helping to shape EU research programmes, and I very much hope that, as we move forward, we will be able to maintain as much influence as is possible. It would be foolish to expect that we could maintain as much influence. But, if we are going to have a bespoke arrangement, then let us sit down and get something that enables us to continue to have some influence. We British are sometimes shy about admitting it, but we are very good at doing and incentivising research.

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5. The British Academy’s Early Childhood Development programme is funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Department for International Development (DFID).
How important is it that academics remain able to work freely across the EU?

We are a global magnet for researchers, because we have good facilities, we have a good research environment – people to talk to, people to work with, great data to work on – and it is incredibly important that we continue to be able to attract the very best talent to the UK to work on important research problems.

At the same time, we need to continue to build our own skill base. In quantitative methods in the social sciences there are very many brilliant Europeans working in the UK, and we need to encourage them. But that should not be an excuse for not building a new generation of brilliant, quantitatively literate social scientists from the UK.

However, it is also absolutely essential that we get as early news as possible on what the position is of those European citizens who are here now, because people are rightly nervous, and anxiety and nervousness cannot be good for advancing people’s careers.

How optimistic are you about the future?

I am a born optimist and I absolutely believe in the power of rational and careful argument, so I remain optimistic that we can get through this.

In terms of research, my ideal for the future would be a global research council, where you can simply apply with whoever you were working with and, on the basis of excellence, you get funded.

But it is also important that we have mechanisms for enabling easy entrance to UK higher education for overseas students, and easy entrance to overseas higher education for UK students. Most universities in the UK will say that they have people from over a hundred nations on campus. Having those people from different nations and cultures interacting, and feeling comfortable working together, has to be good for the long-term future of our world.

You have also been chairing the Academy’s flagship skills project about ‘Celebrating skills in the arts, humanities and social sciences’. People have long been doing degrees in these subjects. Why suddenly now do we have to be making a case for them?

Increasingly in the last few years, we have been aware of the need for skills for the economy. But when people talk about skills, too often they mean ‘STEM’ (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) skills. This is not a competition: we do need more people with STEM skills. But we need to recognise and celebrate that the arts, humanities and social sciences bring with them special skills that are incredibly important for our economy, for industry, for developing social cohesion, and therefore for developing the kind of society that we wish to have.

People studying history or English, for example, will go into a wide range of occupations on the basis of some absolutely brilliant skills that they have imbued. Some of those skills are to do with critical analysis, and really being able to communicate. Some are to do with creativity, and the much more multidimensional nature of communication that the humanities and social sciences can bring. Some of them are to do with the ability to understand cultural heterogeneity, and the study of a language within its culture: it is so much better to have a cadre of people who have studied French culture as well as being able to speak the French language. These things are really important, and we need to demonstrate the advantage that people with those degrees have.

Secondly, in England in particular, we are at a time when people are paying significant amounts of money for a university degree, and sometimes they need to reflect on what they will get from their degree. So it is only right and proper that we are more aware of what skill sets they will get, and that we are good at explaining this. That is not being defensive. We should be on the front foot in saying: “This is what you get from a degree in the arts, humanities and social sciences, and this is why you will be able to take the next stage of your life..."
in a more effective way as a result of that studying. That is being absolutely proud of what we offer and what we contribute to the wider society.

Thirdly, it is important that we work with employers to assess what skills employers need from their graduates, and are then able to make cases for putting some of the skill sets that are wanted into the study of the humanities. For example, quantitative methods and languages, both of which we have already talked about, are important areas, and we need to be able to say that it is good for people to develop those kinds of skills in their courses.

The final thing I would say is that it seems to me quite likely that people in the arts, humanities and social sciences often study across a much wider breadth, for example through joint honours. In a world in which interdisciplinary work is so important, this is something that the study of our disciplines often brings to the table.

It has been a real pleasure to chair this project. The evidence-gathering has been inspirational. Our subjects are brilliant, but we do not always demonstrate how important they are. I very much hope that the British Academy’s report, which is being launched at the House of Lords on 27 November 2017, will make a contribution to continuing to raise the profile of the humanities and social sciences.

Do we need to make sure that government remains aware of the need for these skills as it considers its industrial strategy?

Absolutely. Industrial strategy is about place: well, how can you really understand place without social sciences? The industrial strategy is sometimes about the development of new technologies: but how can you do that without properly studied design? The industrial strategy is about people, about communities: so you need to bring ‘the human’ into all those dimensions. I am a huge supporter of the industrial strategy, but I would submit that it cannot be successful without a real contribution from the arts, humanities and the social sciences. We need to articulate very clearly what our contribution can be for each of the ten pillars of the industrial strategy.

Again, this is not about our disciplines versus others. It is about a team working together for the UK.

You suggested that there might be wider social well-being benefits.

Economies can only work properly in societies that are functioning, and societies function because of the effectiveness of civil society, because of the contribution being made by active citizens to that society, and because the public sector, the third sector and the private sector are working together in an effective way. There is a critical role for the social sciences in providing the skills needed to have a socially cohesive society, working effectively together for the well-being and health of everybody, and with a minimal level of inequality.

You recently completed your term of service as chair of the British Academy’s Audit Committee. In what state of health is the Academy?

I think the Academy is in good shape, I really do. As chair of the Audit Committee I have been very impressed by the proportionate approach to risk that has been taken. I chaired the audit through much of the discussion about the refurbishment of the Academy’s premises in Carlton House Terrace: it was great to see that undertaken so professionally and effectively. It has also been a time of expansion – for example through the Global Challenges Research Fund – and again it was very important to me to see the Academy put in place the right processes so that the public can have confidence in the way their money is being spent.
Why Brexit matters for the humanities and social sciences

Ash Amin and Philip Lewis explain the issues – and what the British Academy advocates

A fundamental mission of the British Academy is to deliver global leadership for the humanities and social sciences, and support the global republic of letters. The Academy was established over a century ago for the express purpose of ensuring that UK academic engagement in what were then referred to as the ‘philosophico-historical sciences’ was represented in international forums – particularly, at that time, in Europe. Many things have changed since the Academy’s foundation, but our profound commitment to international endeavour, to European co-operation, to furthering international and European research collaboration, international relations and to pursuing evidence-based international policy-making remain essential to our raison d’être. This always will be the case, because exchange, discussion, debate, co-operation and partnership in the humanities and social sciences are by their very essence collaborative, curiosity-seeking enterprises that flow wherever the mind takes you.

The referendum outcome in June 2016 is undoubtedly a challenge for the humanities and social sciences. UK research excellence draws on collaboration with colleagues in other EU member states, and the UK requires this to retain its excellence. Sixty per cent of the UK’s internationally co-authored research papers are with EU partners. Seven of the UK’s top 10 – and 13 of our top 20 – most collaborated with nations are other EU member states. As Colin Crouch illuminates in his article (page 20), knowledge knows no boundaries, and the particular dense network the EU provides is of exceptional value and, if lost, it would not be offset elsewhere. EU research collaboration has also helped develop UK leadership in a number of fields, such as the European Social Survey headquartered at City University London which Ian Diamond refers to in this issue (page 14).

British Academy engagement

Over many years prior to the referendum, the British Academy has diligently built up a track record of working with sister European academies to inform and influence EU research and innovation Framework Programmes, under a series of British Academy Foreign Secretaries, including Duncan Gallie and Helen Wallace, as well as John Bell, the Academy’s Europe Working Group Chair. For example, through the All European Academies and our chairmanship of its Social Sciences & Humanities Working Group, when ‘Horizon 2020’ was being developed we brought Commissioner Geoghegan-Quinn to the Academy, where she announced that a sixth societal challenge focused strongly on the humanities and social sciences would be put forward in Horizon 2020 in order to respond to our concerns at their absence in initial proposals.¹

¹ The text of Máire Geoghegan-Quinn’s address at the British Academy on 10 November 2011, on ‘The future of social sciences and humanities in Horizon 2020’, can be read in British Academy Review, 19 (January 2012), 20–23.
In May 2017, the British Academy published a set of essays on European Union and Disunion: Reflections on European Identity, edited by Ash Amin and Philip Lewis. More on this project, which the British Academy is pursuing with sister European academies, can be found via www.britishacademy.ac.uk/european-union-and-disunion

This expertise and experience is essential now as the British Academy navigates the post-referendum landscape. John Bell chairs the All European Academies’ Framework Programme 9 Working Group, which just this summer set out a vision for the next EU research and innovation programme in 2021. The Academy intends to play as full a part as it is able to do so in the years ahead, working with counterparts elsewhere in the EU and the UK, to continue to raise the importance of EU research collaboration and mobility in the humanities and social sciences.

The British Academy, of course, must also attend to the challenges that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU poses for the humanities and social sciences. The Academy has been advocating that the result of the referendum puts at risk the UK’s world-leading research excellence in the humanities and social sciences. Scholarship and research flourish in long-term stable and interconnected frameworks that support people, collaboration, resources and regulation. EU membership has provided such frameworks for the humanities and social sciences.

• our ability to attract an international talent pool through our open labour market;
• working and competing with the best in the EU;
• having a single regulatory framework that we have helped shape in the EU; and
• winning increasing EU funding – through models of funding not available in the UK.

Our top priority for the negotiations is to ensure that the excellence and value of UK-based research, researchers and students in the humanities and social sciences are recognised and supported in the various agreements that will be required during and after the Article 50 process. The UK is currently a world-leading research player in the humanities and social sciences. These disciplines are vital for our future; and the academic communities working in these disciplines deserve the government’s recognition and support. The government should bear in mind the contribution of the humanities and social sciences in an economy that is more than three-quarters services-, professions- and crafts-oriented.

Research
UK-based researchers in the humanities and social sciences, who include many colleagues from other EU countries and further afield, have been exceptionally successful in competitive EU research programmes which have no current counterparts here in the UK. These researchers have won more than 33 per cent of all funding in the humanities and social sciences granted by the European Research Council (ERC) – the flagship European fundamental research funder. In comparison, the life sciences and physical sciences have won less than 20 per cent. This record shows that the humanities and social sciences are an area of strength for the UK. ERC funding won by UK-based researchers in the humanities and social sciences is equivalent to 24 per cent of the average combined budgets of the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council and the Arts and Humanities Research Council. As Simon Goldhill (page 22), Simon Keay (page 18) and Rachel Griffith (page 32) illustrate in different ways, the fundamental research funding of the ERC has proven transformational to UK-based researchers in building cross-disciplinary and cross-national research teams in a way that is not currently replicable in the UK. Its loss would be deeply problematic for the continued success for the humanities and social sciences in the UK, and the British Academy has called for the UK’s full participation to be sustained.

More broadly, 13 out of the top 15 disciplines with the highest amount of funding from ‘EU government bodies’ as a total proportion of that discipline’s funding are in the arts, humanities and social sciences. This indicates the success of these disciplines in winning diverse sources of internationally competitive funding. It is vital that comparable funding with comparable characteris-
tistics be continued, in order to sustain the world-leading role of the UK’s researchers in the humanities and social sciences. Simon Keay clearly exemplifies the concerns of those in archaeology about any disruption to EU research funding and the forms of such funding with their inherent collaborative nature and mobility – in which respect Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions have been especially important – and in which the Academy has pressed for continued full UK participation.

**Mobility**
As regards mobility, the humanities and social sciences attract a broad range of academics and students internationally, including from the EU. Six out of the top 10 disciplines with the highest proportions of non-UK EU staff are in the humanities and social sciences. Six out of the top seven disciplines with the highest proportion of non-UK EU undergraduates are in the humanities and social sciences as well. These figures indicate the importance of EU nationals to the humanities and the social sciences in the UK; they show how embedded this diverse academic workforce and student body is in the UK; and they demonstrate the current attractiveness of the humanities and social sciences to researchers and students from the EU. Disruption to this attractiveness is a threat to the continued excellence of the UK in these disciplines, as competitor countries look to attract the world-leading academics, and their next generation, currently based in, or considering coming to, the UK.

Providing a right to remain indefinitely and continuation of the current rights of staff and their dependants employed in the UK at the time of UK withdrawal are central to preserve the competitive position of UK humanities and social sciences. In particular it is necessary to safeguard the concerns of staff, students and their dependants on the island of Ireland given the characteristics of the border. Nearly a quarter (24.6 per cent) of staff at Northern Ireland higher education institutions are non-UK EU nationals (the highest proportion anywhere in the UK), and they play a vital part in sustaining higher education and research there, as Anne Fuchs describes in her article (page 25). The British Academy has worked very closely with the Royal Irish Academy both before and after the referendum on a series of activities, including an initial series of briefings published in October 2017 that have focused on the land border, the Common Travel Area, and the Good Friday Agreement and rights. The British Academy has also focused attention on the European Convention on Human Rights, publishing in 2016 a series of papers on the implications of any change in the UK’s relationship with that Convention for the devolved nations and the UK’s international obligations.

**New report**
The British Academy has frequently been making the case for the humanities and social sciences in public and in private. We have just set out in a new report what is at stake for the humanities and social sciences as the UK withdraws from the EU in a more fulsome way than we can do here. To be clear, there is action required by the government still, and we have set out a series of priorities for the government to achieve. If such action is not forthcoming, the reputation and excellence of the humanities and social sciences in the UK as a world-leading research environment, destination of choice for talented researchers, and a top research collaborator will be weakened.

We urge the government to maintain and build the UK’s research collaboration in the humanities and social sciences with our closest partners in Europe, such as through world-leading mechanisms like the European Research Council, which will require the closest achievable association to current and future EU Framework Programmes. We look for certainty and long-term stability from the government to ensure the foundational frameworks of collaboration, people, resources and regulation for the excellence of the humanities and social sciences can be sustained. Without these guarantees, the contribution of the humanities and social sciences to the UK’s economic competitiveness, social well-being, and research creativity will be placed at risk.

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5. More on international mobility can be found in *The role of international collaboration and mobility in research: Findings from a qualitative and quantitative study with Fellows and grant recipients of the Royal Society, British Academy, Royal Academy of Engineering and the Academy of Medical Sciences* (March 2017).


8. Brexit means…? The British Academy’s Priorities for the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Current Negotiations (British Academy, November 2017).
Knowledge beyond frontiers

Colin Crouch argues that withdrawal from Europe’s research inner circle will be a net loss

Knowledge knows no national boundaries, but is a seamless web. For a good illustration we need look no further than the names of the scientists who made such major contributions to the development of electricity that their names have been used for various measures of it: Watt (British), Ampère (French), Ohm (German), Volta (Italian). National science communities did not produce national kinds of electricity. There are no national periodic tables in chemistry; Carl Linnaeus did not produce a classification of plant species for Swedes alone.

The same is only slightly less true of the social sciences. Although some social science research concentrates on phenomena within individual nation states, a good deal of it is comparative. But even single-country studies draw on theories and concepts developed by researchers from a diversity of national backgrounds and capable, with suitable adjustment for context, to be applied more generally.

National traditions might seem to be stronger in the humanities, where specificity of cultural contexts looms larger, and research often concentrates on those contexts in historical and literary study. But this does not mean that only scholars from a particular culture can study it effectively. This is pre-eminently the case with the study of ancient societies, but it is not limited to that. To take just one of a thousand examples, the most important biography of Gustav Mahler was by a Frenchman, Henry-Louis de la Grange, the English translation of his four-volume work by Oxford University Press having been highly successful.

Even cultural production itself is not always national, and the joining of different traditions can prove as successful as it is in the natural sciences. Look no further than Le nozze di Figaro: French play, set in Spain; Austro-German composer, Italian librettist.

International research, national perspectives

Despite all this, research in the natural and social sciences and in the humanities, and cultural production, depend heavily on national funding bodies or on private foundations that usually have a clear national base. Naturally, the suppliers of funds, especially public ones, want reassurance that some national objective – such as economic productivity, national cultural life, even tourism – will be aided by the fruits of academic research and cultural creativity. But if they mean this in the sense of specifically or exclusively national objectives, then they are using the same erroneous mind-set that treats the economy in general as a global race, implying a zero-sum game between national economies.

One of the main attractions of a capitalist economy is that it can be a positive sum: everyone can gain from trade, the growing prosperity of any one society being a source of opportunities for the prosperity of others. Of course, individual economies can do better or worse, and government action to support infrastructure or provide skilled workforces can help firms based in the countries concerned to thrive. If such support is lacking, or poorly designed, firms will go under. Firms compete; governments (and other non-market institutions like foundations) do not. They can be the source of assistance for inter-firm competition, but their actions are likely to enrich the general environment, from which not only national firms benefit. The situation is very different when governments help national firms through subsidies and other forms of protection. These actions are seriously zero-sum, probably in the end negative-sum. That is why international trade agreements ban protectionist measures, but wisely leave measures to improve infrastructure, including human infrastructure, alone.
Support for research and scholarship are examples of this kind of infrastructure spending, not of protectionism. Their contribution can help national firms and other institutions, but cannot be ‘trapped’ at the national level. And this is to everyone’s eventual benefit.

I have here used arguments narrowly linked to economic outcomes, but the same ones work if you look more generally at the contributions made to less easily measurable cultural infrastructure. For example, it should not be a problem for the British government if some German and American scholars are found taking advantage of the British School at Rome. If everyone contributes to facilities of this kind, everyone gains. British scholars will be found in similar US and German institutions. There is no need to count specific national costs and benefits.

The only exception comes when the government of a particular country fails to contribute something to the general pot, while still expecting their academics to dip their spoons into the soup made by others. That justifies retaliatory action.

Barring such exceptions, there are often greater gains to be had from facilitating interaction among scholars from different national backgrounds than from intensifying it within a country. Bringing persons or things from different origins together is at the heart of innovation, as studies of entrepreneurship have long testified. California does not contain so many leading research institutes because the state’s high-school system is so strong – far from it. Those institutes have worked hard to bring talent together from around the world, enabling researchers with American, European, Indian, Brazilian, Chinese and many other backgrounds to bring their different perspectives to shared puzzles.

Access to European funding post-Brexit

This is the perspective through which the impact on British researchers and scholars of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union – and therefore from its research funding system – should be viewed. There is of course a very important straightforward argument to be made about quantities of funds, and doubts whether promises by the UK government to make good any deficits could be expected to last once the furore over Brexit had died down. But at a deeper level, the issue concerns the value-added of the contacts and collaborations that are facilitated by working with researchers from other countries on EU-funded projects.

Of course, British scholars work with American, French, Japanese, Indian and many other partners through a mass of networks and funding systems that are nothing to do with the EU. However, the EU’s arrangements form a particularly dense network, where funding rules give us very strong incentives to extend those ranges of contacts beyond our usual comfort zones. Some years ago I took over the task of preparing a proposal to the EU’s Framework Programme 7 (FP7) on behalf of a cross-national group of researchers. The group was almost entirely north-west European. I moved east and south, finding appropriate colleagues in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Spain. This not only helped secure the funding, it gave us all new insights, perspectives and colleagues.

The usual riposte is made to this by the advocates of the UK’s reduction of its relationships with people in the rest of Europe (which is what Brexit means): ‘You can now find colleagues throughout the whole world, instead of being limited to Europe!’ But these opportunities have always been there. EU membership has not inhibited them, and withdrawal from it will produce no increase in them, unless the government has serious plans to realise its dreams of an ‘Anglosphere’ by funding creation of a research community of specifically Anglophone countries. Research collaborations are no more zero-sum than economic innovation. Working with European colleagues would only crowd out opportunities for working with colleagues around the rest of the world if the supply of international research funding resources outstripped demand for them. This is not the case.

The withdrawal of British scholars from the inner circle of European research networks and funding opportunities simply removes a particularly rich source of collaboration opportunities without replacing them with anything else. This is a net loss.

As I noted above: science is global, while its funding is often national. This discontinuity does not destroy the cross-national collaboration that enriches research and scholarship, but it does not help it. In that context, the unique world-regional institutions that comprise the EU represent a major step to bridging the gap. The FP7 research group that I led also included a team from Canada. The EU’s research funding does not try to seal Europeans off from the rest of the world; rather, it encourages external partnerships of this kind as part of its contribution to the construction of a truly global research community. But such external partners – who will soon include the British – are in an outside track, unable to bid for funds or take the lead in projects themselves. The citizens of EU member states represent an internal community, tied to each other through many bonds. These enable their joint activities to be particularly strong, but able and willing to reach out with thinner bonds to others.

In her speech to the 2016 Conservative Party conference, the prime minister, Theresa May, famously attacked those who aspired to be ‘citizens of the world’. They were, she said, citizens of nowhere. Criticism of her remarks concentrated on their resemblance to Stalin’s notorious ‘rootless cosmopolitans’, a term used mainly to stigmatise Jews. But the prime minister’s comments deserved closer attention. It was odd that, in a speech devoted to attacking supporters of the UK’s membership of the EU, it was aspiring ‘global’ citizens she criticised, not European ones. This was especially odd given that she was launching the concept of ‘Global Britain’ to replace the idea of the UK as an EU member. Perhaps the reason was that the EU does constitute, albeit weakly, a form of...
citizenship for the citizens of its member states. As such, Europeans have rights and obligations in relationship to each other that are not shared by the residents of third countries. They contribute to common funds, accept the movement of persons, goods and services from each other, accept regulations jointly made with each other. In return they receive help with infrastructure projects, can live and work in each other’s countries easily, and enjoy various opportunities for jointly funded cultural and scientific activities. It is a unique cross-national community, providing a rich structure of networks that help bridge that gap between the nations from which we come and the global humanity to which we aspire to contribute. For researchers and scholars the richness and unique quality are particularly clear. Once Brexit comes, we in Britain will be outside it. Nothing will replace it.

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When I speak in America and elsewhere about the benefits of interdisciplinary collaborative work in the humanities and social sciences, it gives me a certain frisson when I declare that Europe is currently at least 20 years ahead in research in this area. The reason for this has been, simply enough, the funding models put in place over recent decades.

The first example I give is from personal experience, a project that I have been running for the last five years, which is called ‘The Bible and Antiquity in Nineteenth-Century Culture’. My team has been investigating the two most important paradigms of the past for Victorian society and how they interrelate in 19th-century thinking: namely the past of classical antiquity, and the past of the biblical tradition. One icon of such thinking is Matthew Arnold’s celebrated and hugely influential opposition of Hebraism and Hellenism as ways of understanding contemporary culture. But the interconnections of Greece and Rome and the Bible go deeply into almost all aspects of Victorian cultural analysis and self-understanding. And it is a regrettable irony of modern disciplinary formation that these two areas of scholarly understanding are the fields where most modern scholars of Victorian culture are least well trained, both in familiarity with Greek, Latin or the literature and history of antiquity, and in familiarity with biblical narratives and, as importantly, the theological arguments that underpin their understanding.

The project has five professors working on it, but has also been able to hire six postdoctoral fellows each for five years. The team includes art historians, classical scholars, historians, theologians, literary scholars, philologists. The work is integrally interdisciplinary, and
the questions it seeks to answer could be broached only by such a collaborative, multi-trained and multi-skilled team. It is simply inconceivable that any American institution, for example, would currently consider investing $2.5 million – the cost of this project – in any such enterprise. It should be noted too that, although it would be easy enough (because correct) to argue that our inability to understand this Victorian historicism grounds our own deeply self-serving misrecognitions of how we fit into history (our own sense of modernity), this project is nonetheless research without a directed instrumental agenda.

When I talk about this, I can see my audience enviously and incredulously calculating the gulf between their models of research, which often privilege competition for short-term leave for individual academics to sit on their own in a room and write, and the long-term major investment in a project where collaboration and interdisciplinarity are a structural part of its working practice. Such financial opportunities empower scholars in Europe to undertake work of a reach and, we hope, significance denied to the lone scholar.

Of course it is necessary to recognise that lone scholars will always have their place and importance, and support for them will remain a pressing need. But there is considerable value, it seems to me, in celebrating what has been achieved in a moderately short time in Europe. The European Research Council (ERC), followed by the research councils in the United Kingdom (and in many other countries in Europe), have learned from laboratory models in the sciences, and have developed funding models for the humanities that encourage such big thinking. ‘The Bible and Antiquity’ was funded by an ERC Advanced Grant, and without such a grant scheme the project would not have been conceptualised as it was, and would not have been achievable in the way it was.

The benefits to British universities

In the last 15 years, British universities have been the most successful in capturing such European grants, somewhat to the chagrin of some of our European friends. But if you look at the passports of the principal investigators of such grants, especially at the Starter and Consolidator levels, a different picture emerges. Then the grants are more evenly distributed between nationalities. That is, many French, German, Italian, Spanish scholars are coming to Britain to undertake their research projects in British universities. Again, the prime cause for this is readily available. The infrastructure of British universities, and its research environment, carefully if bumptiously, has been the dominant versions of political rhetoric across Britain and Europe.

The threats to British universities

One potential result of Britain removing itself from the European Union could be the violent disruption of the trajectories I have been outlining. It is possible to conceive that the British government will both prevent British universities from applying for ERC and other European research grants, and hinder the easy movement of academics between universities in Britain and Europe. As our colleagues in Europe have frequently pointed out in head-shaking bafflement, this act of self-destruction seems impossible to justify on financial or intellectual grounds.

Universities are international organisations that attract the best scholars they can
We should indeed be clear what such a change will entail. There will be a gradual – not instant – diminution of Britain’s leading role in academic research. The loss of finance (and it would be very unwise to assume that the government will make available the money no longer coming from Europe) will affect the infrastructure and research environment as much as it will prevent the actual projects taking place. The increasing separation from European projects will also diminish Britain’s research potential. It will become much harder to maintain the hard-won barrier between university research agendas and government policy for research, as multiple sources for research funding become centralised and structured by an aggressive and short-term instrumentality.

Arguing the case
Yet it is still possible – I am always a cup-half-full person – to strive to find a route through the threat. We need to make the case, with as much energy and drive as we can muster, to maintain our ability to apply for European funding, both on the inevitably necessary financial grounds, and on the harder but more satisfying intellectual grounds of what it enables us to do, and how important it is for us to do it. It is crucial for the long-term success of the universities in Britain, and all that follows from such success.

For us to be able to apply for such grants, the movement of academics is crucial. It is clear that the movement of students has already become a serious and explicit political issue. No doubt this is being worked on through all the usual channels to find a solution that recognises that foreign students are not migrant workers or immigrants, but are important factors in forming and maintaining our long-term financial and political relations with other countries. But also, to head off increasingly difficult conditions for academics visiting Britain, we need to be pro-active in ensuring that the movement of academics can be made easy in practice and politically acceptable to our European colleagues as well as our own government.

We should eagerly strive to maintain our integrated ties with European research institutions and with European research funding and its models for collaborative interdisciplinary research. We should do so not because of any conservative resistance to change, but because of a passionate desire to continue the trajectory of change the modern university is on, in response to changing political circumstances and changing needs and opportunities. How a university is to relate to society is a question too complex and too important to be left to the vagaries of the sort of political posturing which have so distorted the public debates about Brexit. It is good to see the British Academy arguing in public and in private, strongly and coherently, for why our research ties with Europe matter so much.
Borders, Brexit and the Irish Academic Community

Anne Fuchs reports on the reaction in Ireland to the implications of Brexit

In the autumn of 1989 I was part of the worldwide television audience that watched the fall of the Berlin Wall with astonished incredulity. I had grown up in postwar West Germany with the conviction that the Berlin Wall, and the division of the country and of Europe, were the forever-cemented historical outcome of National Socialism and of the Second World War. The historic events of 1989 then taught me the lesson that history is contingent and unpredictable.

In 1992 I travelled for the first time from Dublin to Northern Ireland. I crossed a border that, with its watchtowers, checkpoints and armed police on the Northern side, appeared grotesquely obsolete: it reminded me of the former German-German border. The historic signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 then brought those ugly structures down, and through their disappearance it seemed that Ireland and Europe had finally entered a new borderless age of openness, free mobility and integration.

My professional career exemplifies the benefits of free movement as enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In 1989 I moved from Germany to work in England, then to Ireland, on to Scotland, from there to England, and finally, in the historic political year of 2016, back to Ireland – where my grand tour of the British Isles came to an end.

A new hard border in Ireland?
The Brexit referendum has put the issue of borders back on the agenda, so creating serious problems for the Irish economy, and potentially for the precarious peace in Northern Ireland. The idea that a new border could hack through the island in two years time is an appalling and, indeed, preposterous prospect for all citizens, North and South. Even though the UK government and the EU have repeatedly stated that the preservation of the Common Travel Area, which predates the EU, is a shared objective, it is quite unclear how this can be achieved. There is no evidence that the traffic of people and goods between Northern Ireland and the Republic can be monitored by technology alone. The only land border with the EU is approximately 500 kilometres long and contains a myriad of small roads, intersecting the border area. This is a potential terrain for traffickers and smugglers of deregulated goods that do not meet the high EU safety and quality standards. The problem of the Northern Irish border is compounded by the UK government’s pledge to break with the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Withdrawal from the single market,
the customs union and the jurisdiction of the ECJ would make default to a hard border most likely.

Brexit also threatens the EU programmes in support of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Between 1995 and 2013 three PEACE programmes received €1.3 billion European funding for a wide range of projects, including community building across the religious divide, support for victims and survivors of political violence, and urban regeneration. PEACE IV was launched in 2016 and will run until 2020 with a further investment of €270 million: this programme especially targets children and young people through educational activities and community development.¹

Impact on higher education sector
Besides potentially jeopardising the all-Ireland economy and the peace dividend, the spectre of new borders and boundaries, visible or invisible, also poses a significant challenge for the Irish higher education sector, which shares with the UK a similar research ecology and culture. The UK is the single most important partner for Ireland on EU grants. It also ranks first in co-authored publications, and it is an important destination for early-career researchers, postdoctoral fellows and academic staff. Longstanding channels of collaboration include external examinerships, joint conferences and membership of editorial boards, bi-national professional organisations, and fully-fledged Horizon 2020-funded research programmes.² North/South research collaborations in particular are dependent on EU funding: in the period between January 2014 and October 2016, €63.4 million funding was won in Horizon 2020 for joint North/South projects. The Northern slice of EU funding constitutes more than half of all Northern Irish funding awards in that period. It is inconceivable that the UK government will make up this shortfall, should the UK exit from the EU funding framework.

Royal Irish Academy survey
The Royal Irish Academy (RIA) has therefore set up a Brexit Taskforce to consider ‘how the higher education sector can best address the implications of the UK’s exit from the EU and identify potential sector strategic priorities for Ireland’s Brexit negotiators.’ The RIA is an all-island body and as such in a unique position to represent the interests of the entire academic community.

In response to Brexit-related risks and opportunities, the Taskforce has identified three strategic priorities for the Irish government:
• Additional investment in Ireland’s higher education and research ecosystem to attract the very best international academic and research talent.
• Enhanced strategies to build the international, outward facing reputation of Ireland’s higher education system.
• Mechanisms to secure future Ireland-Northern Ireland-Britain co-operation for the purposes of higher education, training and research rec-

¹ For further information see ‘Northern Ireland PEACE Programme’ (European Parliament Fact Sheets on the European Union, 5.1.9).
² For a detailed breakdown of figures relating to research links between HEIs in Ireland and the UK, see Alun Jones and Liam Cleere, ‘The educational turbulence of Brexit’, Education Matters (2017, in press).
ognising the sector’s achievements in building strong all-island co-operation.³

In preparation of its report, the RIA Taskforce carried out a comprehensive empirical survey of the academic community, North and South.⁴ Participants were asked to rate their agreement with a series of statements on the impact of Brexit on higher education, research and innovation. This survey generated 390 responses with a fairly even split between Northern and Southern respondents and a balance between the sciences and the HSS subjects. Some key outcomes of the all-island survey can be summarised as follows:

• 79 per cent of all respondents agree that collaboration with the UK is significant for their respective discipline or field.
• 96 per cent of all respondents evaluated the impact of Brexit on the Northern Irish higher education sector as negative. There is little variation between Northern and Southern respondents.
• 77 per cent of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed that Brexit would have a negative impact on the future of North/South collaborations in the medium to long term.
• 75 per cent of northern respondents believe that the impact of Brexit will be negative for higher education in Ireland, North and South.
• 41 per cent of southern respondents believe that Brexit may create new opportunities for the higher education sector in the South. Comments suggest that the Republic could become an attractive destination for EU researchers and international students who had been planning to move to the UK prior to Brexit. Further potential benefits identified by respondents include enhanced competitiveness in Horizon 2020 bids, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, and Erasmus+ bids.

Our survey also asked about specific measures that could support international research collaborations, both North and South.

The respondents in the Republic of Ireland identified the following priorities: improvement of foreign language provision in Irish higher education institutions, in support of Ireland’s ambition to deepen its ties with existing and new EU partners; the creation of incentives to attract excellent researchers and international students who may wish to carry out research in an EU country with English as a first language; immediate increase in funding for PhD studentships, postdoctoral fellowships, and international research collaborations; retention of staff and student mobility along the N/S and E/W axes. It seems that respondents from the Republic are seeking a silver lining in the Brexit clouds.

Respondents in the North are understandably very concerned to protect the status quo: they prioritised the retention of existing funding mechanisms, arrangements for N/S collaboration and access to the major EU funding frameworks. Northern respondents frequently raised concerns about the impact of Brexit on student fees and student mobility.

The academic community, as well as the citizens of Ireland, North and South, are united in emphatically supporting free movement and an open border. The citizens of the island of Ireland did not vote for Brexit, but they are likely to feel the repercussions for generations to come, whether the border is visible or not.⁵

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³ See the forthcoming Advice Paper: ‘Research and Higher Education on the Island of Ireland after Brexit: A Paper by the RIA Brexit Taskforce’.
⁴ For further details see ‘Royal Irish Academy Brexit Taskforce Survey Results: Impacts and Opportunities for Higher Education and Research on the Island of Ireland post Brexit’ (Survey Results Analysis no. 1, July 2017).
Connectivity – in the Roman Mediterranean, and in archaeological research

Simon Keay discusses the implications of Brexit for major collaborative archaeology

Roman Mediterranean ports

One of the questions that has long fascinated me is how to explain the scale and extent of Roman commerce across the Mediterranean during the first two centuries AD. This is a big issue that has a particular resonance for the fractured Mediterranean of today. It helps us to understand how Rome was able to sustain its dominance over the peoples surrounding the whole of the Mediterranean basin for a period of c. 450 years. One of the keys to answering this question is a better understanding of the many ports that thronged the shores of the Mediterranean, the networks of connectivity between them, and the ways in which Rome refocused them upon its own priorities and interests.

My research interest over the last 12 years has been primarily upon Portus, the maritime port of Imperial Rome, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and undertaken in collaboration with the Archaeological Superintendancy (Soprintendenze) for Rome, the British School at Rome and a range of partners in the UK and beyond. More recently, however, I have broadened the scale of my enquiry to encompass the ports of the Roman Mediterranean in an ambitious project funded by the European Research Council (ERC). This is an interdisciplinary initiative that has been funded to the tune of €2.5 million over a five year period (2014–2019). Only the ERC offers funding at the level and of the kind that makes possible projects of this scale and ambition.

The Roman ports project has involved active fieldwork at seven ports of different size and location across the Mediterranean (Turkey, Tunisia, Italy, Spain, Greece and France), in collaboration with research institutions across the European Union and beyond. It has also funded analyses of archaeological, geo-archaeological, textual and epigraphic evidence, and is drawing upon key advances in archaeological computing, to focus upon the functions, capacities and connections between Mediterranean ports, and their relationships to Rome. Fieldwork highlights include discovering the mole of the harbour...
basin established by Claudius at Portus, the monumental harbour façade and outer harbour at Ephesus, discovering the harbour sediments of Puteoli (Pozzuoli) at a depth of c. 21 metres below modern sea level, and the boundaries of the harbour of ancient Tarraco (Tarragona).

We are transforming our understanding of the capacities and duration of the harbours of Ephesus, Puteoli, Tarraco and Narbo (Narbonne), by adapting and developing a ‘Palaeoenvironmental Age Depth Model’ for ports which makes it possible gauge and compare the harbour potential of buried harbours within set chronological parameters, and by re-assessing ancient references to many Mediterranean ports and the organisation of commercial activities within them. We are also gaining a better understanding of the key roles played by city authorities in their management, and learning that Imperial involvement in their development and maintenance was the exception and not the rule. Other project work is showing that Roman ports were not simply functional units, but that their layouts also encode key clues about cultural, religious and ideological practices of communities on the liminal boundary of land and sea, and that this was implicit in how the Romans chose to represent them in images and reliefs. But perhaps our greatest knowledge advance has been to move on from the view that ports should be viewed as discrete and self-evident nodes. While they were indeed places at which navigational and commercial facilities, commercial infrastructure, political authority and religious sanction intersected, they cannot be properly isolated from the many smaller anchorages, road-stations, coastal baths, maritime villae and beaches peppering the shores of the Mediterranean; their activities were fundamental to their commercial success. In short, we are arguing for a more deconstructed view of ports that plays well to the diffuse geographical realities of the micro-regions of the Mediterranean.

The ongoing success of the research has relied upon a core team of British academic staff and postdoctoral fellows and PhD students from Spain and France based at Southampton, working in close collaboration with a French co-director and geo-archaeologist at Lyon, together with talented colleagues with different archaeological, scientific and historical skills from elsewhere in the UK, Italy, France, Spain, Germany and Austria, as well as co-operation with authorities in Turkey and Tunisia. This broad range of active pan-European and interdisciplinary collaboration has generated the synergies necessary to answer the questions that the project has posed, promoted valuable knowledge between project partners, and enriched the experiences of the project postdoctoral fellows and PhD students.

Engagement of UK universities with the ERC

UK-based academic archaeologists have been very successful in winning ERC grant competitions since their inception in 2007; this needs to be seen against the broader background, with the UK winning €2.4 billion – c. 22 per cent of all ERC funding from 2007 to 2015. Most archaeology grants have been won by Oxford (9), followed by Cambridge (7), University College London (3), York (4), Exeter (3), Warwick (2), and one each for Belfast, Bradford, Bristol, Cardiff, East Anglia, Edinburgh, Kent, Leicester, Manchester, Reading, Sheffield and Southampton (see Table 1). The ERC offers awards at three levels. The Starter Grants have a maximum value of €1.5 million for up to 3 years, and are for excellent young academics who are between 2 and 7 years on from the award of their doctorate, and at a stage in their careers when they are starting their own independent research team or programme. The Consolidator Grants, which are up to €4 million over 5 years, have been awarded to excellent young academics between 7 and 12 years after completion of their doctorate, while they are still consolidating their own research team or programme. Lastly, there are the Advanced Grants, which are awarded to excellent senior academics – up to a total of €2.5 million per project over 5 years. All of these blue skies awards have allowed academics to develop methodologically innovative and interdisciplinary projects that address the larger questions that simply cannot be addressed by grants from Research Councils UK (RCUK) funding schemes, whose maximum value is c. €1 million, which makes it challenging to sustain large-scale fieldwork projects or laboratory analysis. Similarly, the Natural Environment Research Council’s funding for science-based archaeology has been relatively small-scale, leaving a gap for funding large-scale projects here too. Constraints such as these have helped make ERC grants very attractive.

These projects have addressed thematic archaeological questions, and are helping to advance the boundaries of understanding in ways that are beyond the scope of standard UK research grants. European and world prehistory has been particularly well-served. For example, an Advanced Grant project based at Cambridge is focusing upon the significance of East Africa in the evolution of human diversity. It is building upon recent genetic and DNA studies about the distribution of African humans out of Africa and their evolutionary development, and is undertaking an extensive programme of fieldwork at early human sites in East Africa in order to increase the fossil record, and to better understand changes in human behaviour in the area leading to the dispersals. There have also been a number of projects that have focused upon later, historical periods. For example, a Starting Grant at the University of East Anglia has funded excavations and surveys undertaken in conjunction with analyses of the historical evidence in the Dalilons area of Nigeria between 1200 and 1850. The aim has been to study cultural affiliations in an area rich in population movements, in
order to understand whether ‘empire’ is a useful concept for our understanding of its political structure.

My own experience tells me that the experience of holding an ERC grant will have a profound impact upon the institutions where the projects have been focused, leading to the development of new areas of specialisation, new interdisciplinary directions, and enhanced connections with European and world colleagues.

The future post-Brexit
The ERC was a part of the EU’s ‘Framework Programme’ from 2007 to 2013, and since then has formed part of the ‘Excellent Science’ pillar of the Horizon 2020 programme. These grants awarded to UK researchers are a litmus test of the great success that UK-based archaeologists have had in winning a range of research funds from the EU in recent years. They are also an index of what will be lost if the UK withdraws from the scheme, both in terms of archaeology as a discipline and the universities where the departments are based. It will be all the greater if we also bear in mind the other schemes within the ‘Excellent Science’ pillar in which archaeologists have performed well, including the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions. Nor should one forget their successes in other relevant Horizon 2020 sections, such as ‘Societal Challenges’, ‘Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation’, ‘Science with and for Society’ and the cross-cutting activities, or indeed the other funding programmes outside the Framework Programme. Unfortunately, there are no easily obtainable figures for these.

While the success of archaeologists in EU funding competitions is to be celebrated, there is also a darker side. Archaeology departments at UK higher education institutions have demonstrated a growing dependency upon EU funding since 2007, and since 2013–14 have received more from this source than from UK government funding.

3. UK researchers in general have won some £1.3 billion, c. 20.5 per cent of all funds from this pillar.
sources, including RCUK sources. In the context of the uncertainties in the UK funding landscape that will follow the next Comprehensive Spending Review, the loss of funding from the ERC coupled with access to the Framework 9 research programme that will replace Horizon 2020 in 2021 will inflict serious damage upon archaeological research in the UK.

This will make it much harder for UK archaeologists to tackle the big questions, work with European colleagues, and develop the kinds of ties and synergies that have been enriching our research base over the last few years. And this will make it harder for us to participate in global scientific networks, since we will be increasingly seen as the poor partner, with a narrow national remit. Even if the UK decides to continue to contribute to the ERC post-Brexit, or is successful in benefiting from it by means of some kind of associated arrangement, its success may be stymied by the UK Government’s myopic proposals for reducing immigration from the EU, cutting off UK projects from valuable synergies from EU academics. That in turn will make the UK less attractive to researchers from other parts of the world, and weaken the excellence of UK research generally.

**Why this matters**

The devaluation of UK archaeological research internationally in this way, and the shortfall in its funding, comes at a difficult time for archaeology in the UK. While archaeologists are very successful in winning UK research funds as well as those from the EU, and are thus very valuable to the deans of the universities in which they are situated, student recruitment at undergraduate level has been through a lean period, putting departments under considerable pressure, and raising questions about viability in some cases. This has been exacerbated by an increasingly large number of providers and a dwindling pool of students. All of this means that fewer archaeologists are graduating at a time when their future contribution to major infrastructure projects, such as HS2, and work in the heritage industry has much to offer to the cultural life and prosperity of the UK.

Against this background, the likely loss of European funding will further imperil the future health of archaeology in the UK. One can only hope that the Government will see the sense in continuing to pay into the ERC scheme, so that UK archaeologists can continue to collaborate with EU colleagues by means of the ERC within Framework 9, and to permit researchers and postgraduate students from the EU to continue to come and work with us in the UK. Much has been made of the £100 million Rutherford Fund announced by the Government in July 2017 to attract highly skilled early career and senior researchers to the UK post-Brexit from the developed and emerging research powerhouses such as Brazil and India. But there seems to be little sense in this if free movement is not permitted, and collaboration with the colleagues who have helped make the ERC projects as world-leaders in terms of vision, synergies and distinctiveness is shut out.

On 6 September 2017, the UK Government published a position paper on continued research co-operation post-Brexit in which it recognises that ‘it is crucial that we maintain collaboration with our European partners after we leave’, and that it is prepared to negotiate continued membership of the EU research funding bodies, and keen to participate in Framework 9. Whether this actually happens remains to be seen, but for the sake of future UK science and research more generally, one sincerely hopes that it does.

### European Research Council grants awarded to UK universities since 2007

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<tr>
<th>University</th>
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Source: European Research Council.

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4. The role of EU funding in UK research and innovation (Technopolis, May 2017). This report was commissioned by the Academy of Medical Sciences, the British Academy, the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society.
5. This is discussed in Reflections on Archaeology (British Academy, March 2017), pp. 6–7, 42–3.
7. ‘Science paper sets out UK plan to remain in EU projects’, Financial Times (4 September 2017).
Food choices and public policy

Rachel Griffith explains the significance of her research, which was funded through the European Research Council.

Policies to reduce purchases of unhealthy foods
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980, and that most of the world’s population now live in countries where obesity and being overweight are responsible for more deaths than being underweight. Governments around the world are grappling with how to tackle rising rates of obesity and non-communicable disease, and a range of policies have been implemented with this in mind, including taxes on soft drinks or other foods, labels to inform consumers about the nutritional content of products, encouraging the reformulation of food products, and restrictions to advertising junk foods.

These policies aim to reduce the amount of unhealthy foods that people purchase, and ultimately to improve health outcomes and reduce long-run inequalities in health, social and economic outcomes. In order to understand the impacts of these policies and their effectiveness in meeting the aims of policy, an important first step is to understand how they change the choices that individuals and households make over the foods they purchase. We can then map how changes in food choices lead to changes in health outcomes and consider the implications for long-term inequalities.

In order to understand how policies affect individual choices, it is important to capture how a change in price, information or advertising will lead people to switch between a large number of food products. Policies may affect products that seem similar in different ways, and products may differ in their nutritional characteristics.

Understanding how policy affects individual’s food purchase choices
Our research uses detailed data on all of the food purchases made by over 25,000 households over several years to estimate the impact that policies have on food choices. The funding that we had for this work through a European Research Council Advanced Grant was crucial in several ways. First, the work represented a new direction for the research team. This required an investment of time and resources by all of the researchers, and we could only do this because we knew that we had a sizeable chunk of long-term funding. Second, the work was risky in that social science researchers had only limited experience with these data, and ERC grants are designed explicitly to fund high-risk but potentially high-return research.

A particularly tricky issue is how to get at the causal effects of a change in policy. For example, if a tax on soda was introduced at the same time as the Brexit trade...
negotiations were resulting in large fluctuations in the exchange rate of the pound, then it would be important that we were able to distinguish the effects of the tax from the potentially confounding movements in prices due to changes in the exchange rate.

Policy attention has focused on ‘junk foods’ – foods that are high in calories, salt, sugar and fat, and low in fibre, proteins and vitamin. Food consumed at home accounts for the largest share of calories for most individuals. However, fast food, drinks and snacks are important contributors to sugar consumption, particularly for children and adolescents. Decisions over which fast foods, drinks and snacks to purchase are typically made in an environment where the item is for immediate consumption. These are situations in which temptation is likely to play an important role, with individuals who have self-control problems being more likely to make poor food choices, potentially exacerbated by the possible addictive nature of sugar.

The psychology and economics literatures have pointed to poverty potentially being causally related to self-control problems. The stress and cognitive loads of being in poverty mean that people might have less capacity for decision making, and are more likely to make decisions that underweight the future consequences of their choices, which they later regret. This can have long-term implications for well-being, since poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self-control.

In our work we are trying to study the importance of these effects, in order to understand better not only whether particular policies work, but also why they work, and who the policies are most effective at targeting. This helps us to design better policies.

An example, which I will discuss further below, is a recent paper in which we estimate how individual’s purchases of crisps are affected by advertising. We use the estimates to simulate the impact of banning advertising, considering both the consumer response and what would happen if firms changed their prices.2

The impact of advertising in junk food markets

Junk food markets, such as those for confectionery, soft drinks and crisps, share common features. They tend to be dominated by a small number of firms, selling multiple brands, and advertising their products heavily. Policy organisations, including WHO, have called for restrictions on advertising junk food, in the expectation that less junk food advertising will translate into less junk food purchased. However, this will depend on the ways in which advertising affects consumer choice, and how firms respond to an advertising ban. For example, advertising of a particular brand might make individuals more likely to purchase that brand and less likely to purchase other similar brands, but alternatively it could also encourage them to purchase other similar brands; the overall effect of advertising could be to increase the total amount purchased or to shrink the size of the market depending on the size of these effects. The overall effect will also depend on a number of other factors, including whether advertising makes individuals more or less sensitive to price, and whether firms that manufacture and sell junk foods respond to a restriction by, for example, lowering prices.

Economists have long been interested in the mechanism through which advertising affects consumer choice. There are three broad traditions: advertising may play a persuasive role in altering consumer tastes; it may play an informative role in conveying information to consumers about a product’s existence, price or quality; it might directly provide the individual with benefits from purchasing the product. These alternative views have different positive and normative implications.

Theories in which advertising is ‘persuasive’ suggest that advertising will make individuals less responsive to price, and will distort their decision-making so that they pay less attention to some characteristics, potentially including the nutritional characteristics. Theories in which advertising is ‘informative’ suggest that advertising helps consumers find information, such as price, that might otherwise be costly for them to obtain. The ‘complementary’ view of advertising highlights how advertising can enhance the value of a product, for example, by enhancing the social prestige associated with its consumption.

In order to assess the impact of a ban on advertising on individuals’ food choices it is important that we use a model that can accommodate all the ways that advertising might affect the choices individuals make. We can do this while remaining agnostic about how advertising affects the value that the individual places on purchasing a product – for example, we can allow advertising to have persuasive and complementary effects on choices. However, in order to make statements about the impact on consumer welfare we need to take a stance on the effects of advertising – we explain why below.

Estimating the effects of advertising on individuals’ choices

We study purchases of crisps in the UK. In order to obtain robust empirical estimates of the causal effects of advertising on individuals’ choices we exploit variation in the extent to which individuals were exposed to advertising of crisps over time. We use variation that is due to the time and station that different brands of crisp were advertised, and the TV viewing behaviour of individuals. The fact that we observe the same individuals over time

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making repeated decisions (what is called longitudinal or panel data) helps us to control for a number of potentially confounding factors.

We allow for the possibility that advertising affects the choices that individuals make now and in the future. People are not likely to instantly forget an advert they see, so this is potentially important (and turns out to be important empirically). However, it makes modelling the way that firms might respond considerably more difficult, since the choice that a firm makes over advertising today will affect its profits today and in the future and also affect the profits of other firms in the market. This means that, when firms choose their advertising strategies, they play a complicated dynamic game. However, we are in luck, since our interest is in assessing the impacts of a ban on advertising, which conveniently means that we do not need to worry about the precise details of firm advertising choices, because the ban sets advertising to zero, so all these dynamic effects go away. We model firm’s decisions over prices. If advertising was banned there is no reason to think that firms would keep the prices of their products the same, and there are many reasons to think that the best price they could charge would differ compared to when they are allowed to advertise. These are what economists call strategic responses for firms.

Our estimates show that advertising does have important effects on the choices that individuals make. Advertising lowers the willingness of consumers to pay for more healthy crisp products. It also lowers their price sensitivity and encourages people to switch to larger pack sizes. Our estimates suggest that advertising has both predatory effects, meaning that the advertising of some brands leads to individuals being less likely to purchase other brands, and co-operative effects, meaning that the advertising of some brands leads to an increase in purchases of other brands. Overall the effect of advertising is to expand the size of the market.

Our model implies that the impact of a ban on advertising if the manufacturers and retailers of crisps kept prices at their existing level would be a 15 per cent reduc-
tion in the total quantity of crisps purchased, leading to similar reductions in calories, saturated fat and salt from crisps. These health gains would be partially mitigated by people switching to other junk food (confectionery, for example) – indeed, we found that individuals would be more likely to switch to other junk foods than towards healthy snacks.

**Firms’ responses to offset the effects of a ban**

Our model implies that the manufacturers and retailers would face incentives to change prices following an advertising ban. Advertising makes consumers less responsive to changes in prices, so that a ban on advertising would make them more sensitive to prices. Firms would therefore want to set lower prices than when they could also advertise. This is intuitive: banning competition in advertising leads to more intense competition in prices.

The response of firms to the ban acts to offset the reduction in purchases of crisps that results directly from the absence of advertising. Our model suggests that prices in the market would fall by 4 per cent on average, and therefore the overall effect (in equilibrium) of an advertising ban would be a reduction in purchases of crisps of only around 10 per cent – i.e. about two-thirds of the reduction we would expect if prices did not change.

**Conclusions**

Our study shows that banning the advertising of crisps would lead to a reduction in purchases of crisps, and presumably to health gains through lower consumption. These health gains would be limited for two reasons. First, some firms would respond to the ban by lowering prices, which leads to an offsetting increase in purchases of crisps. Second, some consumers would substitute to other junk foods.

Our analysis relies on carefully modelling the channels by which advertising can influence consumer demands. To take the analysis further and to make statements about the overall effect on welfare, we need to be more precise about whether advertising is persuasive, informative or complementary. We are not able to distinguish between these effects, but Figure 1 shows some examples of recent advertisements for crisps which should enable the reader to form their own view.

Some economists have argued that advertising provides environmental cues that lead consumers to behave like non-standard decision-makers and that ‘choices made in the presence of those cues are therefore predicated on improperly processed information, and welfare evaluations should be guided by choices made under other conditions.’ If we agree with this view that advertising for crisps is persuasive, then banning advertising would improve consumer welfare for two reasons. Banning advertising would remove a distortion to decision-making, and would also lower prices. The ban would also reduce firms’ profits. The welfare gain by consumers would be greater than the reduction in firms’ profits resulting from the ban. Of course, the long-run welfare impacts of a ban on advertising of junk foods would also depend on the impact that reductions in purchases had on health outcomes and the implications this had for long-term outcomes and inequalities in health, social and economic outcomes, as well as future savings of the public cost of healthcare.

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Unions, nations and states: A historical perspective

Robert Frost encourages us to look beyond our preoccupations with the United Kingdom and the European Union, and suggests that we can learn much from looking at political unions in the past.

We are currently obsessed with unions. In its 2014 referendum Scotland opted to remain within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In 2016 the United Kingdom opted by a much smaller majority to leave the European Union. In both cases the referendum campaigns aroused deep and atavistic passions on all sides, and the wounds inflicted are still raw. In Scotland, many ‘Yes’ supporters focus their political hopes on a second referendum and dream of overturning the 2014 result. In the United Kingdom, passions remain equally high among the supporters of ‘Remain’, who claim that the electorate was misled, and demand a soft Brexit, or a rerun of the referendum, and supporters of Brexit, who accuse Remainers of contempt for democracy and insist that the United Kingdom remove itself as rapidly as possible from Europe in order to restore sovereignty and control. Passions run high elsewhere. I write this piece in the aftermath of the Catalan independence referendum: the media is full of images of violence and intransigence on both sides, as a state whose origins lie in a union first established in 1469 faces the most uncertain of futures. It has not been a good year for unions.

Unions and historians

Unions matter. Yet there are problems in studying them as a historical phenomenon. These arise from the fact that the principal object of study for historians of politics and political scientists is the beast known variously as the modern state, the unitary state, or the nation state. Joseph Strayer claims that as early as 1300 ‘it was evident that the dominant political form in Western Europe was going to be the sovereign state’. Peter Alter has declared that, ‘Since ... 1789, the nation-state has become the sole legitimating principle of the order of states.’

Since 1789, the idea that the nation state is the natural unit of politics has appealed to many for very good reasons. For historians, the territorial nation state forms a convenient object of study. Territorial states have borders; nations have histories that can be imagined and projected backwards. Historians can chart the process...
of state-building; the construction of bureaucracies; the establishment of a national army; the development of national consciousness. All of these phenomena can be modelled, measured and charted. Most importantly, the national story resonates at a popular level. The nation forms; it fights; its children die for freedom and independence. Stories are woven of heroism against the odds and statues are raised to national heroes: William Wallace; Robert the Bruce; Garibaldi; Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

Few statues are raised to the makers of unions. If they are, they are erected for the elite, not the people. Crowds do not gather annually in Thionville, Luxemburg and Brussels at the feet of the statues of Robert Schuman, the Luxemburg-born French prime minister who helped launch the forerunner of the EU, as Scottish Nationalists gather annually to celebrate and commemorate at the feet of the huge statue of William Wallace overlooking Union Terrace Gardens in Aberdeen, where I live and work. At the other end of the gardens runs Union Street, Aberdeen's main thoroughfare, the building of which nearly bankrupted the city, and whose name was chosen to celebrate not the Anglo-Scottish union, but the Anglo-Irish union of 1800. Yet such celebrations of union are rare. The history of unions does not make good television, as the history of war and national struggle makes good television. It is a history of dull negotiations conducted by largely forgotten politicians; of dusty treaties with countless clauses in unreadable handwriting.

Moreover, unions disrupt and complicate the national story. If, as Hegel claimed, ‘a nation with no state formation (a mere nation) has, strictly speaking, no history – like the nations that existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of savagery’, then those who compromise national statehood by negotiating unions become villains expelled from the nationalist pantheon. In 1922 the Irish nationalist Michael Collins paid with his life for signing the 1921 Anglo-Irish treaty which, in the eyes of his nationalist assassin, compromised the cause of Irish independence and Irish nationhood by accepting partition and a continuing link with Great Britain. Similarly, the members of the Scottish parliament who voted for the union treaty of 1707 – the treaty that created Great Britain – have gone down in history in the words of Robert Burns as ‘a parcel of rogues in a nation’, who were ‘bought and sold for English gold’.

Yet as the German scholar Georg Jellinek pointed out as late as 1881, throughout history the unitary nation state had been and still was the exception, not the norm. Woodrow Wilson’s 1917 call for national self-determination led to the break-up of three great European empires, but even in 1920 the League of Nations was founded by 32 states, of which several, despite its name, were not nation states at all. The United Nations now comprises 193 states, many of them nation states, and nationalists from stateless nations, such as the Kurds, Catalans or Scots, campaign to join them, agreeing with Hegel that only statehood can confer the title of true nation upon them. Yet in the past it was different. While many of the states that existed in 1882 were empires rather than unions, as Jellinek pointed out, political unions were very common in European history. In recent years, thanks to the work of scholars like John Elliott and Helli Koenigsberger, historians have written much about composite states in late medieval and early modern Europe, recognising that most polities were what Strayer had called ‘mosaic states’, in which monarchs ruled over various dominions, each essentially separate, with their own laws, customs, and relationship to their monarch.

The intricate web of dynastic marriages and the high death-rate among royal children ensured that many kingdoms and principalities were brought together by marriage. Yet historians have generally been dismissive with regard to personal unions, which are usually regarded as not being proper unions at all, since they were accidental creations that, for the most part, by entrenching particularism and provincialism, seemed like obstacles to the onward march of the unitary state. Historians and political scientists interested in pre-modern unions usually ignore them, only taking an interest in unions considered to be ‘proto-federal’, such as Switzerland and the Dutch Republic. Murray Forsyth even excluded the United Kingdom from his 1981 study of comparative unions, since it could not be deemed a federal union.

Only Jellinek includes personal unions in his comprehensive typology of political unions. As he points out, although many were short-lived, some personal unions, over time, deepened and grew into a closer relationship, despite considerable resistance from some quarters, to become real or – in Jellinek’s terms – juridical unions: that is unions formed by foundation treaties which regulated the relationship and established varying degrees of institutional union. This is because, however separate the constituent parts of personal unions wished to remain, it was often difficult to do so. Formal institutions of government – state institutions – might remain separate, but the royal court was frequently a common, transnational institution in which power was brokered, cultural influences given play, and individuals from the monarch’s several dominions mingled. Foreign policy was generally conducted in common. Legal systems had to take account of the problem of property ownership. Inevitably

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cases arose which undermined attempts to ban outsiders from acquiring property in the other realm, not least because nobilities who met at court intermarried, and monarchs frequently granted their associates office or lands across the union. In England, there was powerful resistance to James I’s 1604 proposal for a closer union to the English parliament, but a few years later the case of Robert Calvin, who was born in Scotland in 1606 and inherited land in England shortly after his birth, led to a 1608 judgement establishing that all Scots born after the 1603 union – the so-called postnati – were thereby deemed to be English subjects, and were entitled to the protection of English common law, which extended to property, but not to Scots born before 1603. Calvin was allowed to inherit. His case demonstrated that it was not always possible to maintain complete separation within a personal union, however carefully the peoples of both kingdoms sought to do so.

Despite the interest in composite states, however, for most historians the development of the unitary state remains central to the modernisation story. Yet the idea of an abstract state in which legal sovereignty was invested only emerged – and then gradually – from the second half of the 16th century, despite Strayer’s projecting it back to 1500. The frequent assumption that unions were part of the process of state-building on the part of monarchs rests on shaky foundations. They could be, but such attempts frequently failed, as James I’s attempt to create a British state failed: he might call himself James I of Great Britain, but his subjects continued to regard him as James VI of Scotland and I of England.

Unions that did become closer, as the British union did a century later, often did so for practical and pragmatic reasons, as was the case in the 1707 union of the parliaments, formed against the backdrop of a succession crisis during a war with France, which did indeed create a unitary British state, into which Scotland and England – although not yet Ireland – were incorporated; Wales had already been incorporated into England in the 1530s. Yet attention on the development of the British state should not deflect attention from the way in which the union, and its own laws, its own legal system, its own education system, and its own church. Whatever one thinks of the union, its institutions provided a framework in which Scottish identity could remain separate, and could grow and develop.

Spain, where Catalonia, along with the rest of the crown of Aragon (of which it was a part), was integrated into a unitary Spanish state in 1714, followed a slightly different path. Spain remained a union. Although Catalonia has enjoyed considerable autonomy in recent years, its opposition to the new Bourbon dynasty during the War of the Spanish Succession meant that – unlike the Basque Provinces and Navarre, which had backed the Bourbons (and unlike Scotland within the British union) – it was, like the rest of the crown of Aragon, stripped of most of its traditional laws and liberties between 1707 and 1716. Thus, while the Scots have a perfect right to call themselves a nation within the loose unwritten British constitution, article 2 of the Spanish constitution declares that it is founded on the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards’ (indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles). Catalonia is merely one of 17 regions (regiones), and the Catalans one of the ‘nationalities’ (nacionalidades) granted autonomy within the unitary nation state. This may seem a trivial difference, but symbols and words matter. The Anglo-Scottish union of 1707 was based on an agreed treaty, and the unwritten British constitution is flexible enough to allow the renegotiation of relations between the nations of the United Kingdom, as occurred in 1997 when Scotland acquired – or regained – its own parliament. These differences help explain the different trajectories of the debates on Catalan and Scottish independence: the Spanish government and courts are constrained by a rigid constitution that enshrines the idea of an indivisible and unitary nation state. What room does that leave for the union of 17 autonomous regions that is still the formal basis of that unitary state?

**The Polish-Lithuanian union**

I am interested in another union, one of the longest-lasting in European history, but one which is largely forgotten outside eastern Europe. The union between the kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Lithuania lasted 409 years: it was only in 1913 that it was surpassed for longevity by the Anglo-Scottish union. Like the Anglo-Scottish union, it developed considerably over time. It began in 1386, four years after the death of Louis, king of Hungary and Poland, when the pagan grand duke Jogaila of Lithuania fulfilled a promise made six months earlier to accept Catholic baptism for himself and his Lithuanian subjects. In return, he was elected to the Polish throne and married Louis’ 14-year-old daughter Jadwiga, herself elected queen of Poland in 1384.

With Louis’ death, the short-lived Polish-Hungarian union ended; with the marriage, a remarkable union

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6. I am grateful to Sir John Elliott FBA for his help and guidance with regard to the Catalan situation. His book Scotland and Catalonia will be published by Yale University Press in 2018.

began. All the textbooks claim that it was a personal union, yet although there was little integration in the union’s early years, it was very different to most personal unions, as it was established – like the Kalmar Union which united the three Scandinavian kingdoms between 1397 and 1523 – by a series of union treaties, which embodied a vision of union that went far beyond the person of the monarch.

For although it was launched by what amounted to a pre-nuptial pact between two dynasties, there was another party to the agreement, signed at Krewo, in what is now Belarus, in August 1385: representatives of the Polish community of the realm, the communitas regni, which had already fought a successful battle to prevent their monarchs alienating the territory of the Polish crown as they saw fit. Jogaila – or Władysław Jagiełło as he became on his baptism – promised this community of the realm that on his marriage to Jadwiga he would ‘join’ Lithuania to Poland. The Latin word used was *applicare*. Historians have spilt oceans of ink arguing what *applicare* meant in practice, but its very vagueness was, perhaps, the point. Historians, especially legal historians, like precision, but for the parties to a compromise, precision can be dangerous and room for flexible interpretation an advantage.

It is clear, however, that leading Polish politicians considered that Jagiello had agreed to incorporate Lithuania into the kingdom of Poland. Led by Jagiello’s cousin Vytautas, however, the Lithuanians objected to this interpretation, claiming that the union was formed by a brotherhood between two peoples, a union *aeque principaliter*, to use the contemporary canon law concept: a union between equal partners, who remained separate, yet banded together for common purposes.

The union survived despite this fundamental disagreement over its nature, but there were frequent bitter arguments, most notably over the election of the common monarch. Renaissance republicanism provided the formula that broke the deadlock. The Polish political system was built from the bottom up: from the mid 15th century, the key institutions were district and provincial dietines (sejmiks), which elected delegates to a central parliament, the sejm. From 1505, the king could make no new law without the consent of the sejm. As wealthy Poles and a smaller, though growing, number of wealthy Lithuanians travelled to northern Italy for their education from the late 15th century, they imbibed the values of Renaissance humanism, and in particular the republican thought of Florence and the republic of Venice, whose university of Padua was particularly popular.

From the 1550s, there was increasing pressure from the Poles for closer union in the context of the renewal of Lithuania’s wars against Muscovy, which had cost the grand duchy one third of its territory between 1492 and 1533, and a growing proportion of whose cost was now borne by Poland. The Poles were willing to vote taxes to support the war, but demanded more control, through a central union parliament, of the union’s common foreign policy. The grand duchy’s narrow elite resisted, but there was pressure in the 1560s from the lesser Lithuanian nobility – who paid taxes to sustain the war and had to serve in the army – for closer union. In 1566 the Polish system of local sejmiks was extended into Lithuania; in 1569, at a turbulent sejm in Lublin, the definitive union treaty was agreed.

The Lublin act of union represented a victory for the Lithuanians. For the key clause stated:

That the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania already form one indivisible and uniform body and are not distinct, but compose one common Republic, which has been constituted and formed into one people out of two states and two nations.

This was a remarkable declaration. The act, written in Polish, not Latin, used *paniство*, the modern Polish word for state, in a way that is recognisably modern. Yet its aim was not to create a union state, but a republic that encompassed two different states and – in a notably radical formulation – was formed by two different nations coming together into one ‘people’ – *populus* to use the contemporary Latin term – that is, a civic nation of citizens that could encompass separate nations. The Lithuanians had won the argument, and the formula recognised the equal status and parity of esteem they had craved for so long, with all the necessary attributes of statehood: their own government ministers, their own army, and their own legal system.

Thus, although at first sight the Polish-Lithuanian union seems to parallel the course of the British union, in moving, as the textbooks state, from a loose personal union to form the only other full parliamentary union of the early modern period, the two unions were fundamentally different. The British union of 1707 fits easily into the paradigm of state-building, since it created one British state, ruled from Westminster, in addition to one common parliament. Perhaps that is why British euro sceptics associate European federalism with direct rule from Brussels: a union can only lead, they think, to a unitary state. Yet the Polish-Lithuanian union was very different: it created a common *Republic*, conceived as an Aristotelian polity – a community of citizens, not an
abstract Hobbesian Leviathan – and was based on the Renaissance vision of the self-governing republic.

The concept of the union-republic ended the argument about the nature of the union, and the 1569 settlement was never challenged again. But the problem of how the republic was to be governed by its elected kings within a system that embodied the republican concept of self-government in the local and provincial sejmiks was never satisfactorily solved. And there was the separate problem that there were other nations in the union: Prussians and Livonians of German culture, many of them Lutherans, and the orthodox, east-slavic Ruthenians, the ancestors of Belarusians and Ukrainians, who formed a large majority of the grand duchy’s inhabitants until 1569. The widespread adoption of the Polish language by this multinational elite, and the increasing identification of the citizen people as a Catholic people brought problems that led to the outbreak of the great Cossack revolt in the republic’s Ukrainian lands in 1648. Exclusion or relegation to the status of second-class citizens are never good principles for republics to follow.

The Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth of the two nations, as it was called, was perfectly capable of defending itself down to 1648, although it always struggled to develop a coherent theory as to how the republic should be governed. Executive responsibility lay with a king elected by the whole citizen body. Kings, seeking to assert their authority, were accused of thereby planning to destroy the republic by introducing absolute monarchy, and the commonwealth’s ability to defend itself was compromised by the resultant political crises. By the 18th century, its open consensual system was manipulated by its neighbours, above all by Russia, whose rulers interfered directly to promote political anarchy. Rulers of Russia have a long history of defending and exploiting for their own ends the liberties of other peoples – liberties that they refuse to extend to their own subjects.

The partition of Poland-Lithuania at the end of the 18th century has long been presented as the inevitable outcome of a failed state. Its disappearance explains why – beyond the partitions – the history of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth has been largely forgotten in the west. Yet the republic had, for its citizens, been a considerable success. It had fashioned a real political community whose members fought for its restoration after it was destroyed without their consent: Prussia, Austria and Russia did not bother with referenda.

Lessons for today
Poland-Lithuania’s story demonstrates that a history of European politics focused narrowly on the story of the rise of the modern state fails to take full account of the complexity of late-medieval and early modern politics. The obsession with the state also makes it harder to understand and resolve the dilemmas faced in the early 21st century. The destructive wars of the last century, and the poisonous rise of radical nationalism have caused many to wonder if the nation state is, after all, an entirely healthy political organism. The power of the modern state allied to radical nationalism allowed Hitler to lay...
waste a continent. It was in reaction to this disaster that the European project was launched by Schuman and his allies after 1945.

Europe has struggled ever since to define what kind of union it wishes to build. A study of early modern unions might help. Every union in late medieval and early modern Europe was different. Unions were pragmatic arrangements, built on bargains and compromises, not empires acquired by conquest and suppression. Those who formed them did not think in terms of indivisible state or national sovereignty, and were not obsessed with uniformity or rationality. Scholars endlessly study their foundation treaties, but union was a process not a moment. Unions grew and changed constantly, as the Polish-Lithuanian and British unions adapted to changing circumstances, seeking to provide a framework in which neighbours could collaborate rather than fight, and regulate their relations through laws that applied across the union.

Unions can form one unitary state, as established in the United Kingdom in 1707 and 1800, but – as the history of Britain’s relations with Ireland, and the UK’s relations with Europe indicate – the concentration of power can cause problems. Much of the British opposition to the European Union stems precisely from the impatience of Jean-Claude Juncker and some – though by no means all – European politicians to hurry along the path to a unitary European state. Yet the European union does not need to hurtle or even creep towards such a destination. Unions can, as the past shows, be highly flexible, and it is likely that any future European state will fall far short of the highly centralised system of Brexiteer mythology: states themselves come in many forms.

A significant proportion of ‘Yes’ voters in Scotland in 2014 were actually supporters of what was termed Devolution Max, a system that would see most powers devolved to Edinburgh, but some retained in London for the UK within a redesigned union. Yet, as many commentators on all sides pointed out during the campaign, the ‘No’ campaigners in Scotland failed to produce a clear vision of how a reformed British union might look, campaigning relentlessly on the economic case for union and largely ignoring the big question of how British identity might be reconfigured for a new century. This failure led many Scots who were not necessarily natural supporters of full independence to conclude that they might, actually, be better apart. Yet many among those who voted ‘No’ wonder how the disproportionate political and economic power of England, so dominant on this small island, might harm Scottish interests when no longer constrained by the bonds of union. The unitary state has many advantages, especially in time of war, but as both the British and Spanish examples demonstrate, the concentration of power brings problems in the regions, provinces and former kingdoms that it embraces.

There is a strong sense among supporters of unions that, in a rapidly globalising world, the nation state may well be limited in what it can achieve, and that co-operation is essential for economic prosperity and international peace. Both Scottish nationalists and Brexiteers call for more control over their own affairs; their opponents worry that, in a globalised world of powerful transnational corporations and institutions, that sense of control may prove illusory. If unions are to flourish, however, they need to develop a different sense of what their purpose is, and cease to present the alternatives in terms of a stark dichotomy between national independence and the unitary state. Leviathan still casts a long shadow as the British government tries to negotiate its way out of one union, while struggling to preserve a different kind of union. Whether it can succeed in either aim remains to be seen. More consideration of why and how unions have been created in the past might help all sides in the debate. The unitary state was never the only political game in town.
The Anglosphere: Past, present and future

Andrew Mycock and Ben Wellings discuss the renewed aspirations for greater collaboration among the ‘English-speaking peoples’, and the likelihood of their success.

Since the late 1990s, a small but influential group of Eurosceptic politicians and public commentators from across the English-speaking world have argued that the Anglosphere, incorporating the ‘core states’ of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, could provide an alternative form of international orientation if the United Kingdom were to leave the European Union.

Brexit has thrust this idea into the centre of British politics. It is currently helping to shape the UK’s relationship with the EU and the rest of the world. For its supporters, the Anglosphere encompasses an extensive, but ill-defined, Anglophonic community bonded by a shared language and associated forms of literature, culture, sport, media and familial ties, as well as the mutual commemoration of past and present military conflicts, and ascription to a ‘civilisational’ heritage founded on the values, beliefs and practices of free-market economics and liberal democracy. In short, the Anglosphere appears to be a better ‘fit’ for English-speaking countries when compared to regional forms of integration, not least in Britain’s case, the European Union.

Past

Although the term ‘Anglosphere’ is a recent addition to the vocabulary of British foreign relations, interest in Anglosphere transnationalism is not new. According to Srdjan Vucetic, the word itself was first recorded in 1995. The origins of the Anglosphere are located in the late 19th century when imperial federation was proposed as a response to the growing political instability within the British Empire and growing competition from external rivals, including the United States. In a brief period from the early 1880s until the First World War, advocates argued for the establishment of a transnational union of the ‘Mother Country’ and its settler Dominions peopled by those of common British ‘stock’.

The proposition of a ‘Greater Britain’ was critically undermined however by the reluctance of many within the British imperial metropole to cede significant powers to the settler colonies or relinquish colonial possessions. Ambiguities persisted amongst its proponents as to the membership of an imperial federation beyond Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Some sought some to include Fiji, the West Indies, and even India and the United States within this new organisation of ‘English-speaking’ peoples. Support for imperial federation receded after the First World War, which encouraged the intensification of autonomous Dominion nationalisms and initiated the slow disintegration of the British Empire. The Second World War accelerated this change. The ‘New Commonwealth’ governments that emerged during the post-Second World War period...
of decolonisation rejected the racialised parameters of ‘Greater Britain’. Finally, the UK’s accession to the European Communities appeared to signal the end of the British Empire as an important component of the international order.

Yet the concept of the ‘English-speaking peoples’ was not universally rejected as a meaningful geopolitical and transnational community, either in the UK or across the Anglophone world. The Anglosphere was advanced as an idea by an influential international alliance of predominantly conservative politicians, commentators and public intellectuals who shared an insurgent ideological and geopolitical agenda that informed ambitions for an alternative world order. The most prominent of these advocates has been American businessman James C. Bennett, who argues that shared history, culture, and language means the Anglosphere is uniquely placed to exploit the technological, social and economic opportunities of the 21st century. Anglo-American historian Robert Conquest suggested that a future Anglosphere union should be ‘weaker than a federation, but stronger than an alliance’.

**Present**

The emergence of a right-wing Euroscepticism in the UK from the early 1990s encouraged and required a renaissance of Anglospherism as an alternative to membership of the European Union. Political attention intensified when the Conservatives came to power as part of a coalition government in 2010. Leading figures, notably Foreign Secretary William Hague and London Mayor Boris Johnson, sought to exemplify the potential of the Anglosphere as a counterweight to Europe by seeking to intensify links with conservative-led governments amongst Britain’s ‘traditional allies’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand to complement and enhance the UK’s relations with the EU and its other member-states.

Pushing this foreign policy realignment was the domestic electoral success of the UK Independence Party from 2009. Euro-rejectionists like UKIP leader Nigel Farage went further, invoking the economic potential of the Anglosphere as an alternative to the membership of the EU. During the Brexit referendum, senior Conservatives who were aligned with the ‘Leave’ campaign – notably Michael Gove, Daniel Hannan and David Davis – also made explicit reference to the potential of the Anglosphere. Thus the Anglosphere provided a point of commonality amongst those campaigning for Brexit.

The political appeal of the Anglosphere to British Brexiteers is both ideological and geopolitical. Proponents argue that the Anglosphere will afford opportunities to reject European social democratic values and norms – large welfare states, strong trade unions and high taxation – in favour of shared ascription to the tenets of neoliberalism or ‘Anglobalisation’, and the shared values of liberal interventionism. Geopolitically, the Anglosphere’s supporters seek to re-establish and re-intensify Britain’s economic and political links with former colonies, Dominions and other non-European states.

Such aspirations rest on long-standing co-operation during the 19th and 20th centuries. One of the core elements of Anglosphere is the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing network, a multilateral treaty for joint SIGINT co-operation signed in 1947 which binds the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Such military links are supplemented by at least 23 formal policy links between these five states and an unknown number of informal networks that exist between political parties, think-tanks and other vested interests within the core Anglosphere.

The result of the EU referendum has seen ‘Anglospherism’ shift from aspirational advocacy on the fringes of the right to the centre of British politics, as the UK government has sought to re-imagine existing diplomatic, trade and security relationships. In her Lancaster House address in January 2017, Theresa May argued that a ‘profoundly internationalist’ post-EU ‘Global Britain’

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should draw on its distinctive national history and culture to ‘build relationships with old friends and new allies alike’. Her desire to reaffirm and strengthen ties with such ‘old friends’ has focused on the belief that a series of trade deals could be quickly concluded across the ‘Anglosphere’ once the UK leaves the EU.

To this end, senior government figures made high-profile visits to Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as well as India (sometimes included amongst Anglosphere states). During a visit to the United States in January 2017, May and President Trump declared a shared commitment to reframe the ‘special relationship’ after Brexit. They emphasised that stronger ties would be founded ‘on the bonds of history, of family, kinship and common interests’.

**Future**

There is evidence that the Anglosphere resonates with the British public, especially ‘Leave’ voters. Yet there are significant barriers to realising the Anglosphere vision. There was and remains a lack of agreement regarding the constituent states of Anglosphere. Many of the most vocal proponents have sought to frame the Anglosphere around a network of core constituent ‘Crown countries’ that comprise of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK (or ‘CANZUK’). Others, notably Liam Fox, sought to frame the Anglosphere in terms of a new Anglo-American alliance re-asserting its global dominance. Outside of these so-called ‘core’ Anglophone states, it remains unclear what place there is in the Anglosphere for states such as India, Ireland, Singapore or South Africa.

The immediate diplomatic goal for UK-based Anglophilers as the UK exits the EU is to line up new free-trade agreements to soften the economic rupture as and when the UK leaves the Single Market. To this end, UK government ministers have stressed that Australia, Canada and New Zealand are (all) ‘at the front of the queue’ once Brexit is realised and any transitional phase has passed.

Some have questioned the professed benefits of new trade deals across the Anglosphere. At a conference exploring ‘The Anglosphere and its Others’ held at the British Academy in June 2017, Professor John Ravenhill and Professor Geoff Heubner noted that Brexit went against the global trend of the regional integration of national economies. With regards to the economic potential of the Anglosphere, Ravenhill and Heubner noted that ‘geography trumps history’. The challenge for the UK government, they concluded, is not to agree ‘better’ free-trade agreements with core Anglosphere states, but simply to replicate the terms and number of existing deals the UK enjoyed as a member of the EU.

For many British proponents, greater engagement with the Anglosphere is congruent with a desire to rejuvenate the Commonwealth through the development of trade links with emerging economic ‘powerhouses’, particularly India. Such intentions reveal, however, historical and contemporary complexities, both in geopolitical relations between the core Anglosphere states, and in the pervasive resonance of the issues of racism and neocolonialism across other parts of the former British Empire. The UK government’s trade mission to India in November 2016 revealed the tensions around establishing new trading relationships and any reciprocal movement of labour that such agreements might entail.

Conversely, some Commonwealth leaders have expressed doubts regarding the possibility that new trade deals with the UK could have a detrimental impact on their own economies, stimulating memories of the exploitative nature of empire. For some, the post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ vision is akin to ‘Empire 2.0’. Indian MP Shashi Tharoor has argued that the post-Brexit UK government appears to suffer from a nostalgia-infused post-imperial ‘amnesia’ that negates engaging with its post-colonial responsibilities. British historian, David Olusoga, conurs, noting that plans for Britain’s post-Brexit trading relationship with the Commonwealth are informed by a nostalgic yearning for wealth and global influence which is more akin to a ‘neo-colonial fantasy’.

Advocates of the Anglosphere appear to blend imperial nostalgia with historical myopia in their projection of an overly positive and largely uncritical view of the legacies of the British colonial past. Yet it is the memory of empire and the relationship of nationalism to it that presents one of the major barriers to the Anglosphere vision. British Anglosphere advocates stress the importance of a common past with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. However, shared sentiment amongst the populations of the Anglosphere states that they were ‘made in England’ has diminished and fractured considerably in the wake of successive waves of immigration. Moreover, intensely national conversations about questions of citizenship, identity and community rarely invoke Anglosphere links, particularly in their consideration of the devastating impact of colonisation and settlement on indigenous populations.

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6. The British Academy Conference on ‘The Anglosphere and its Others: The “English-speaking Peoples” in a Changing World Order’, held on 15–16 June 2017, was convened by Professor Michael Kenny, Dr Andrew Mycock and Dr Ben Wellings.


Conclusion

The future of the Anglosphere will succeed or flounder on the fragile and precarious grip on power of Theresa May’s minority government. The possibility of a future Labour government under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn could encourage a very different Anglosphere; one based on humanitarianism, diplomacy and co-operation, yet rejecting the Anglosphere’s ‘liberal interventionism’ strongly associated with Tony Blair’s period in office.

This noted, the dominant form of Anglospherism in the UK remains strongly associated with antipathy towards the EU. But British proponents are guilty of prioritising British national self-interest while overlooking the diverse geopolitical and economic interests of the other Anglosphere states. Ultimately it is unlikely that political elites in Canberra, Ottawa or Wellington will risk damaging current or developing trade relations with the EU by prioritising trade deals with the UK.

This does not mean a post-Brexit intensification of the Anglosphere will materialise once the terms of the UK’s departure from the EU are agreed. Certainly it is likely that the UK government will prioritise a series of bilateral trade deals across the Anglosphere – in part through economic necessity, but also to legitimate Brexit to domestic businesses and voters. Moreover, counter-terrorism will continue to legitimate and strengthen ties between the ‘Five Eyes’ states. However, distinctive regional contexts and economic interests, together with a shared ascription to the defence of national sovereignty, will encourage pragmatism and stymie calls by Anglospherists for closer political ties.

This noted, the UK needs friends, and therein lies the appeal of the Anglosphere amongst Brexiteers. The Anglosphere is an idea with a long provenance in British politics. But although it is currently enjoying another moment in the sun, its future is less clear. Anglosphere proponents see a ‘move forward into broad, sunlit uplands’, but it may yet be ‘one with Nineveh and Tyre’.

From the East Midlands to the Middle East

Gordon Campbell talks to the British Academy Review about supporting higher education in Iraq and Syria

‘The first thing they teach you is first aid,’ says Professor Gordon Campbell, a Fellow of the British Academy. ‘I remember reaching into my trauma pack and pulling out a tampon. I said, “I must have a woman’s pack by mistake,” but the instructor told me, “No, that’s for bullet wounds. It absorbs the blood.” The second part is weapons training. If you’re kidnapped by people with AK47s, you need to know how to use them in case you get your hands on one. The third part is what to do if you’re travelling in convoy and gunmen attack. Then there’s the kidnap training…’

Professor Campbell is Fellow in Renaissance Studies at the University of Leicester. He is a general editor of Oxford University Press’s The Complete Works of John Milton, and is editor of The Oxford Illustrated History of the Renaissance (to be published in 2018). So, at first glance, his name isn’t exactly one you’d think of putting forward for hostile environment training. Except it ought to be, because Campbell has spent the last 30 years flying in and out of the Middle East to help support and improve the region’s higher education sector.

Between 2009 and 2011, he worked on the Development Partnerships in Higher Education scheme for Iraq, during which time he started and became the first chairman of the British Universities Iraq Consortium (BUIC). The scheme, which was funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), sought to support Iraqi academics who were in post in Iraqi universities. ‘I was interested in infrastructure and keeping people in place,’ Campbell explains. ‘The gist of the scheme was that the Iraqi universities would send senior administrators, typically deputy registrars, to the UK and we would embed them for a couple of weeks with their British opposite numbers to help them understand how British universities worked, and then they’d return to Iraq.’

How did someone lecturing in Renaissance Studies wind up doing this kind of work? ‘By accident!’ he says. I initially travelled for the University of Leicester to the Far East, the Indian sub-continent and sub-Saharan Africa to conduct recruitment and contract negotiation. I helped to start a campus in Malaysia in the mid 80s, I’ve travelled for the British Council, and I’ve also worked for the Foreign Office for a unit called Engaging with the Islamic World (EIW). So, it all just sort of happened. There was no plan. I think careers are only planned in retrospect.’

Professor Campbell first travelled to the Middle East 30 years ago, and has since witnessed some of the most violent periods in the region’s history, including in Lebanon, where he went to establish a distance learning programme for teachers during the Lebanese Civil War in the late 1980s, and in the Palestinian territories. ‘I worked in East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the First Intifada, trying to provide education for Palestinians at a time when the Israelis had shut down the schools and universities in the occupied territories. I was
there when it started in December 1987. That was my first experience of tear gas and small arms fire, though I wasn’t in any danger.’

Clearly, the turbulence of the Middle East does little to dissuade Campbell from working there, but what about the politics? ‘It’s hard to keep absolutely clean hands in many parts of the world, not just the Middle East, and I’ve worked with tyrannical regimes in the past. The principle in diplomacy is that with countries like that you support the good guys and just deal with the bad guys when you have to. Supporting democratic impulses is a good thing, even if it’s in the context of a dictatorship.’

In fact, Campbell says, academics have a special role to play. ‘I’ve worked in Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and British academics can be useful in such places, partly because we can talk. When governments fall out with each other, the two groups of people who can keep conversations going are sportspersons and academics. We can talk to anyone and we do. I’m eager that government think of that willingness for academics to be – not so much a hidden channel – rather a channel that remains open when things are tough on the diplomatic front.’

As an example of how academics can help open up dialogue, Campbell cites his work in the 1990s in Saudi Arabia, where he and colleagues from other British universities started a women’s PhD programme at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah. The women, he explains, would visit British universities to complete their PhD and then return to Saudi Arabia to implement their learning. ‘Some of them did marvellous things,’ he says. ‘For instance, one of the graduates in psychology went back and put on a conference on child abuse in Saudi Arabia. This was an absolutely forbidden topic – in fact, the official line was that it didn’t exist. But these women were able to start a conversation about it.’ He adds, ‘I’m particularly keen on women’s programmes because the evidence is that women are the most likely force for change. Empowering women is also the best antidote to radicalisation.’

Professor Campbell is passionate about the role academia has to play not just in supporting higher education abroad, but also in helping to tackle the many challenges facing the world today, such as Islamic extremism. ‘The treatment of any problem can only begin when you understand it, and academics are the ones who are best placed to understand. Social scientists have extraordinarily profound understandings of behaviour, not least of radicalism – while the humanities can help with the history of Islam and radicalisation. We have huge amounts to contribute, not just by issuing public reports – although those are helpful – but by actually engaging with government and offering advice.’

It is evident when speaking to Campbell that his interest in the Middle East is not simply based on a desire to improve higher education in the region. There is also a genuine affection for what he regards as ‘a misrepresented part of the world’.

‘I’m often struck by the hospitality, by the kindness of strangers, when travelling,’ he says. ‘For example, you could be travelling on a bus – and this has happened to me – in Iran or the Gulf or wherever and people will just insist on giving you food. I’ve even had to fend off invitations to have dinner with people in their homes. And when you break down by the side of the road with a puncture or whatever, people immediately stop to offer assistance.

‘There really is something about the sheer embracing warmth of the Islamic world. It sounds like a trivial thing but it’s not. It’s a generosity of spirit that I continue to value.’

As for the future, Campbell wants to go to Syria, where he hopes the British government will establish a scheme similar to the one he worked on in Iraq, though the logistics – as you might expect – are currently making things difficult. ‘Unfortunately,’ he says, ‘the infrastructure just isn’t there. In Syria the problem is in finding an organisation that represents the whole country and, so far, I haven’t been able to do it.’

When would he like to go? ‘I’d be happy to go now, but I may not be the best person for the job. You can go to Damascus and Latakia – they’re safe enough. I mean, you have to have close protection but that’s alright. What you can’t do though is get to the North, so my view is that it’s probably too soon to go right now. The timing will be determined by Foreign Office advice. But I’d like to see some sort of plan that is already in place and take advice from people on the ground on whether anything can be done.

‘It was different in Iraq because we had the convenience of having an army there. I went in with the army and stayed in a safe and comfortable freight container in the embassy. But, at present, we have no embassy in Damascus and we’re without a diplomatic presence or a military presence – at least one on the ground – so there isn’t the infrastructure to act now. But there will be eventually, and I want to be ready.’

Gordon Campbell was speaking to Joe Christmas.
From Grexit to Brexit: A view from Athens

John Bennet, Director of the British School at Athens, reflects on two different paths taken

Sunday 5 July 2015: a referendum is held in Greece on whether to accept the latest bail-out terms offered by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Turnout was 62.5 per cent and, in the wee hours of the following morning, the vote to reject announced as 61.3 per cent. Although not explicitly a vote whether to remain within the EU, the implication of a no-vote was that Greece would leave the Eurozone; there would be a Grexit.

Thursday 23 June 2016: a referendum is held in the UK on whether the UK should remain in the EU. The result was much closer than the Greek poll: 51.9 per cent ‘Leave’ and 48.1 per cent ‘Remain’, turnout 72 per cent. Both polls delivered essentially the same result, yet, only a week later, the SYRIZA-led government of Greece accepted an even more stringent set of measures and, despite real fears of Grexit, Greece remains part of the EU and of the Eurozone. Politicians in the UK, on the other hand, took the referendum result as a mandate to initiate the process to leave the EU, and Article 50 was formally invoked on 29 March 2017.

Two referendums, each delivering the same result; one not leading to Grexit, the other triggering Brexit. One could argue, however, that the Greek vote was a vote of confidence in its government, allowing it to continue to negotiate, while the UK vote was against government, making any appearance of going against the popular will (however narrow the margin) politically inconceivable. Two years later, after a third bailout, there are a few encouraging signs and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has announced that 2017 will be the last full year of austerity for Greece. In relation to Brexit, uncertainty seems to be the word of the moment.

As Director of the British School at Athens (BSA), based in central Athens, I am regularly asked about Brexit. Probably the most consistent reaction is perplexity: why would the UK, absent the severe pressures Greece was experiencing in 2015, actively choose to leave the EU, especially when Greece had made the same choice in extremis, but had thought better of it? Beyond that perplexity, however, lies a fear that links fostered and nurtured while both countries were within the EU, will weaken as the UK seeks other partners in the new post-Brexit world sketched by (some) UK politicians.

While my own experience lies only in the research and higher education sectors, I would like to hope that those fears are misplaced.

The BSA has existed and operated in Greece since 1886 – over 130 years – and still occupies the same location, then on the margins of the city, now effectively in its centre. The BSA’s foundation reflected the strong ties between Greece and the UK, partly forged during Greece’s struggle for independence earlier that century, but mainly through a mutual interest in the study of all
Aspects of Hellenism: ancient, medieval and modern. For example, early researchers at the BSA explored the remains of Byzantine buildings with reference to the Arts and Crafts movement, described the lives of mobile herders in (what is now, but was not then) northern Greece, documented the dialects of spoken modern Greek, and examined Christian practices within the Ottoman Empire in its last days. Archaeological research, too, was (and remains) a strong and distinguished component in the BSA’s overall portfolio of activities.

These research strands were established long before the UK joined the EU. Membership has undoubtedly brought many benefits, not least in the form of EU funding for research, particularly in archaeological research (as Simon Keay writes elsewhere in this issue). EU funding has supported BSA-sponsored projects too, such as the recently completed AGRICURB project that examined the origins of agriculture across western Asia and Europe, drawing on active fieldwork and legacy data from BSA research. A few days ago, we were joined at the BSA by a Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow, who will spend two years based in the BSA’s Fitch Laboratory, a leading centre for science-based archaeology, partner itself in many projects with EU-based institutions. The potential for UK-based researchers to win such grants in the future is currently uncertain. Loss of this funding entirely would clearly have a negative impact on UK research, since its existence is a strong element in the bilateral research collaborations between UK-based and Greek institutions that the BSA exists to foster.

But what of the next generations of researchers? Greek students have been major consumers of the opportunities offered by UK higher education institutions, and many of them have engaged with the BSA before, during and after their time in the UK. While the financial pressures of the so-called ‘crisis’ in Greece have understandably dampened those numbers, another crucial element in ensuring that bilateral research continues to grow and develop is to encourage new generations to access these opportunities. Future fee regimes for EU-based students seeking to come to the UK should be set at appropriate levels that encourage, rather than discourage future applicants. An example from personal experience: I currently work in an institution where the Assistant Director and the Curator of our satellite research centre in Knossos both earned doctorates in the UK, while the Director of our laboratory completed a post-doctoral fellowship there; all three are Greek nationals. My own university department in the UK has placed at least three former doctoral students from Greece in universities in the past 10 years, while many more of our postgraduate-taught students from Greece have continued their careers there.

Certainty remains in short supply. Although the UK may separate from the EU as a collective on or after 29 March 2019, it is inconceivable that bilateral collaborations and partnerships with colleagues and institutions here in Greece nurtured by the BSA over 130+ years should be jeopardised as a consequence. Indeed institutions like the BSA that continue to operate within member countries of the EU are best placed to continue to foster high-quality research links/partnerships in the humanities and social sciences, whatever form Brexit eventually takes – soft, hard, short-lived or prolonged.

The British School at Athens has recently published Archaeology Behind the Battle Lines: The Macedonian Campaign (1915–19) and its Legacy, edited by Andrew Shapland and Evangelia Stefani (Routledge, 2017). The cover photograph shows the discovery by Scots Fusiliers of a 2nd-century AD honorary inscription, now on display in the Thessaloniki Museum.
AND THE WINNERS ARE...

Telling it like it is

At its Prizes and Medals Ceremony on 27 September 2017, the British Academy presented awards to celebrate excellence in a wide range of achievements across the humanities and social sciences. The *British Academy Review* spoke to two of the winners about their work.

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**Kayleigh Garthwaite**

Dr Kayleigh Garthwaite is a Birmingham Fellow in the Department of Social Policy, Sociology and Criminology at the University of Birmingham. Her research covers foodbanks, ethnography and welfare reform. She has been awarded the Peter Townsend Prize for her book *Hunger Pains: Life inside foodbank Britain* (Policy Press, 2016). Dr Garthwaite has drawn on over 18 months’ experience as a volunteer and researcher at a Trussell Trust foodbank in Stockton-on-Tees to explore the issues of poverty and inequality, welfare reform and austerity in the UK.

My initial motivation was to challenge the prejudice and stereotypes surrounding foodbanks. After I had spent nearly two and a half years interviewing people at the foodbank and getting to know their stories, one thing was clear: that people were keen to push against that prejudice. They wanted people, particularly politicians, to know what their lives were really like, and they would often ask me if the prejudice would change after the book.

There are a lot of misconceptions surrounding why people use foodbanks. For instance, a lot of the people who use them are in work. And people think you can just turn up to foodbanks and use them; but actually with Trussell Trust foodbanks, you need a voucher from a referring care professional such as a GP or social worker, and it’s time-limited support, so people aren’t able to rely on foodbanks indefinitely.

So that’s one of the reasons I wrote the book in the way that I did: to attract a wider audience and challenge those stereotypes.

**Originally, I had no intention of writing a book.** I initially set out to do ethnographic research as part of a five-year project I was working on. Actually the foodbank was only what I did on my Friday mornings. The rest of the week I spent in some of the most deprived places in Stockton-on-Tees, investigating health inequalities. But over the course of time, with the stories people were telling me, it became clear that I had so much data, it would have been a shame to just write academic papers that other academics might or might not read. So I decided to put everything into a book.

**I took quite an unstructured approach to my work, especially with the ethnographic research.** I met a lot of people at the foodbank to begin with, and just sat and listened to them. I think a lot of people were just happy that someone had taken an interest in them and why they were there. If they go to the citizen’s advice bureau to get a voucher for the foodbank, they have to be in and out – it’s quite a quick, frantic process. Whereas I would sit there for as long as they wanted, and listen. Sometimes it would be for an hour and...
Having written the book, my own views on foodbanks are still mixed. Being a volunteer at a foodbank, you feel like you're part of the problem, because foodbanks are tackling the symptom, not the cause. As long as foodbanks are there, it feels as though the government has less incentive actually to deal with why people are using them in the first place. So, there is a bit of a tension there, especially from a critical, academic perspective. And, going forward with universal credit and further changes to the welfare system, it just feels like foodbanks are here to stay.

Hunger Pains has had quite a big impact so far and hopefully will continue to do so. I managed to take the book to Westminster, where we had a launch last year with cross-party representation, despite it being only a few days after the Brexit referendum. I’ve also been invited to quite a lot of non-academic events, such as bookshop events, sixth-form talks, dinner groups and church groups, to help spread the book’s findings. So hopefully it’s having some sort of impact.

Politicians and policy-makers have been in touch to discuss my work and its implications. I’ve been contacted by a number of politicians from different parties to provide key findings and policy briefings based on the book’s messages, and I’m hoping to meet up as well with some MPs in the coming weeks to try and again push the book’s findings at a crucial time, as we assess the impact of universal credit. I think this is a really important time to try and affect some change.

Looking forward, I plan to conduct similar research into foodbank culture overseas. I want to do some comparative research looking at America and Canada because they’re much further on in the foodbank system than we are. I’d quite like to look at whether the UK has now reached that institutionalisation of foodbanks; whether we can come away from it or whether they’re here to stay.

The Peter Townsend Prize was established in 2011 in commemoration of Professor Peter Townsend FBA (1928–2009), one of the most distinguished global figures in contemporary social policy and sociology, who made an immeasurable contribution to policy-making in the areas of poverty and inequality.
they’ll tell me about other psychologists who are doing interesting research. And I do lots of public events and people on panels tell me about the research they’re doing. Sometimes the producers joke, ‘We need to send Claudia to more things’, just to get more ideas. People trust that we’ll cover their research properly, so we have a big advantage there.

People often think we’ll run out of ideas, but that is never an issue. We’re always cursing at the end of each series that we don’t have enough time and there’s more we want to do.

*All in the Mind was way ahead of its time.* In 1988, it was the world’s first programme about psychology and mental health, and it’s still the longest-running show on the subject. Now, there’s a lot more about mental health on radio and TV, which I think is great. So I think the programme has had a real impact.

I’d love it if policy-makers were more tuned in to psychology. You’ll always see an economist on a committee, but it’s much rarer to see a psychologist. Yet there’s so much relevant research from psychology that could be informing policy. To be fair, I think that policy-makers often don’t know where to get that research. So psychologists need to get it out to them in another way. Sometimes, though, you’ll hear someone say they heard something on our programme and it influenced a particular policy, and that’s really lovely – it’s amazing.

The President’s Medal rewards outstanding service to the cause of the humanities and social sciences. It covers a broad range of activities, including insightful journalism contributing to public understanding, use of research in policy-making, and public leadership.

President’s Medals were awarded to four other recipients this year: Professor James Stevens Curl (University of Ulster), for his contribution to the study of the History of Architecture in Britain and Ireland; Katie Mitchell OBE, for her work to enhance the presentation of classic and contemporary theatre and opera through innovative new production; Professor Helga Nowotny (ETH, Zurich), for her contribution to the founding and shaping of the European Research Council, and positively influencing the shape of research funding and research policy in the UK and Europe; and Jimmy Wales, for facilitating the spread of information via his work creating and developing Wikipedia, the world’s largest free online encyclopedia.
Understanding global culture – and ourselves

Nayef Al-Rodhan, the sponsor of the Nayef Al-Rodhan Prize for Global Cultural Understanding, explains to the British Academy Review why we need to understand the interconnectedness of human cultures and the neuro-philosophical underpinnings of our human interactions.

You say that, according to neuroscientific evidence, humans are emotional, amoral and egoistic. Can you explain that a bit more?

Basically, we are more emotional than rational. Our moral compass is malleable and, for most of us most of the time, our morality is governed primarily by our perceived emotional self-interest.

Evidence also suggests that emotions are part and parcel of our most rational ideas. This means that, at best, we are amoral beings, and that our circumstances – from parenting, to school, to societal constraints and cultural frameworks – heavily influence where we lie on the Gaussian curve of morality. We must never be complacent about the virtues of human nature, in that the most sensible and moral of us can and may, under certain circumstances, engage in acts that are unthinkable.

You argue for a greater appreciation of the interconnectedness of all human cultures, ultimately constituting one collective human civilisation. Why is it important to understand that?

This was always important and useful for human progress, peace and prosperity. But in our globalised world of instant connectivity and deepening inter-dependence, it is imperative to understand, acknowledge and embrace the historical fact that all cultures have borrowed from each other and that no culture exists ex nihilo. This is critical for global peace and security: cultural frameworks are highly emotional enterprises, and reflect self-image and self-worth; and thus any hint of disrespect or denigration will result in a reflexive reaction of defensive postures, which is counterproductive to national and international peace and security.

What role does the concept of ‘dignity’ play in helping us to frame appropriate structures for global understanding and co-operation?

Dignity in my view is far more critical to human nature, sustainable peace and security, and social harmony than...
just political freedom. You can be free politically, yet have a dignity-deficit and be alienated and disenfranchised, even in mature democracies. What I mean by dignity is much more than the absence of humiliation. It includes nine dignity needs that correspond to those three facets of human nature we mentioned earlier – emotionality, amorality and egoism. These nine dignity needs are: reason, security, human rights, accountability, transparency, justice, opportunity, innovation and inclusiveness.

How can we combat the increased fear of ‘the other’ which is evident in the politics of so many countries at the moment?

In an article of mine on ‘Us versus Them’, I explained the neuro-philosophical underpinnings of divisive politics and the concept of ‘the other’. It turns out that our brains recognise who is different (out-group versus in-group) within 170 milliseconds. This was an evolutionary advantage that helped mankind survive for thousands of years. But in our connected world this can be a problem.

These are the primordial predilections that divisive leaders on the fringes of society employ to divide people for political gains that are self-serving, short-sighted and harmful to the national interest.

The good news is that what happens after the 170 milliseconds in which we have recognised someone as different is a learnt process. This means that the more that respect for diversity can be made inclusive and responsible – through education, the media, popular culture, and politics – the more successful, peaceful and prosperous societies will become.

This year’s Nayef Al-Rodhan Prize for Global Cultural Understanding has just been awarded to Professor Timothy Garton Ash for his book Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World. What does this book bring to the debate?

Tim is a great scholar who has written a great book on a critical topic: free speech. I fully agree that free speech is a right that must be defended.

But in my view, there is no such thing as absolute free speech that must be defended at all cost. It is critical that free speech must be distinguished from hate speech, repellent speech, offensive speech or divisive speech, especially when it comes to emotional issues like race or religion, because these are highly emotional enterprises that are tied to self-worth and one’s respectful place in society. In this, I agree with Glen Greenwald’s views that there must be limits to offensive and repellent free speech.

I also think that with freedom comes responsibility on the part of the speaker, and that the state should protect social harmony and civil liberties. We should be responsible defenders of free speech, while not being too dogmatic and binary in permitting divisive speech in the name of free speech, regardless of the consequences.

In most cases, it is not too difficult to distinguish between what is responsible free speech and what is irresponsible free speech. The former must be defended, while the latter must be scrutinised. And there will be middle ground that must be reached and tailored to each situation while promoting the public good at all times.
Language as a reflection of society: Examples from Palestinian Arabic

Uri Horesh explains how social forces change language

When we learn languages at school, even our own native language, the rules of grammar that we are taught may seem rigid and permanent. However, while languages do of course have rules and grammars, the study of linguistics is based on the premise that these rules actually emerge from people’s everyday use of language, rather than being imposed by authors of textbooks and teachers. Consider the oft-recited ‘rule’ of English that forbids ending a sentence with a preposition, a rule many English speakers seldom adhere to (pun intended).

Since the 1960s, a subfield of linguistics, sociolinguistics, has been examining language with three extra insights in mind. The first is that many grammatical rules are variable rules. This is to say that not all members of a speech community speak the same all of the time, and even individual speakers say the same things differently in different situations and to different people. The second insight follows from the first, namely that language changes over time. Today’s speakers of English do not speak like their predecessors in the 16th century. And in most families, people of different generations exhibit different features in their language that distinguish, say, grandparents from their grandchildren. The third is that in addition to language-internal factors – some sounds and words are ‘easier’ to pronounce than others – there are social factors as well that shape the way our grammars are constructed.

It is this third insight that I wish to illustrate. In my work, currently supported by a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship, I study the effects of social forces on the grammar of Palestinian Arabic. In particular, I have identified three such forces, which are likely to (and in some cases, are proven to) have an effect on variation amongst speakers of the language:

• contact between speakers of different languages
• religious affiliation
• urbanisation

Language contact
Among the speakers of Palestinian Arabic, nearly 2 million are citizens of Israel. Inevitably, the majority of them are bilingual, speaking Hebrew in addition to their native Arabic. I conducted a study in Jaffa, a highly mixed Arab-Jewish town, focusing on the phonology of Arabic – that is, the sound system and pronunciation of the language. My results reveal that several changes in these speakers’ phonology are significantly tied to the degree of contact these Arabic speakers have with Hebrew speakers. Of particular interest here are the Arabic consonants that linguists refer to as pharyngeals. These sounds do not occur in English, and are often referred to in non-specialist parlance as gutturals because they are produced in the nether areas of our vocal tracts.

School years form a crucial time period in people’s lives, during which they learn, among other things, how to interact verbally with their peers. For each of the speakers in my sample I chose to examine the language in which they were taught in primary and secondary
schools. It was not surprising to discover that speakers who had been taught in Hebrew-speaking schools – if only for a portion of their educational career – showed a higher tendency to weaken their pronunciation of the pharyngeals. This can easily be explained as a result of the influence of their second language, Modern Hebrew, on their pronunciation of their native Palestinian Arabic. Although Hebrew originally had pharyngeal consonants similar to those found in Arabic, Modern Hebrew has mostly lost the pharyngeal pronunciation of consonants – with the exception of certain speakers of Middle Eastern and North African descent, for whom relics of pharyngeality still exist.

In my current study, I am extending the geographical range of localities from which I draw my speaker sample to include towns and villages further north, where Arabic-speaking Palestinians reside in de facto segregated communities. While these Arabic speakers do often interact with Hebrew speakers in other domains of life – such as work, commerce and higher education – they do not live amongst Hebrew speakers, and therefore contact between the two languages is significantly reduced for them compared to the Jaffa sample. In a preliminary study, in which I compared the Jaffa speakers to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and Ramallah, both in the West Bank, where contact with Hebrew is even more limited than in segregated communities in Israel, significant differences emerged between the two groups. These differences were apparent both in their use of pharyngeal consonants, and in other domains of language, such as the use of Hebrew loanwords and syntactic constructions that are typical of Hebrew, but not of Arabic. What I expect to unearth in the near future is whether bilingual speakers belonging to different communities within Israel also differ in similar ways.

Religious affiliation

A good number of previous studies have linked religion with dialect variation in Arabic. In Iraq, for example, the linguist Haim Blanc noted over 50 years ago that Muslim, Christian and Jewish Baghdadis spoke different dialects, divided along religious lines. Professor Clive Holes FBA has found similar patterns with linguistic practices distinguishing between Shi’i and Sunni speakers – both Muslim groups – in Bahrain.

While Jews (predominantly speakers of Hebrew) do not generally live in the four communities I have begun examining recently – Nazareth, Umm Al-Fahm, Kufur Yasif, and Mghar – we do find different constellations of religious groups in each location. Nazareth is a historically Christian-Palestinian city, though Muslims comprise a majority of its residents nowadays. Umm Al-Fahm has been, and remains, a Muslim-Palestinian community. Kufur Yasif has an interesting mix of a Christian majority, a significant Muslim minority, and a small yet culturally significant group of members of the Druze religious community. In Mghar, Druze form roughly half of the population, with the remaining half split almost evenly between Muslims and Christians.

In my ongoing study in these four Palestinian communities, I am now examining the linguistic divide along religious lines, which manifests itself in several domains of language, such as phonology and lexicon. Interestingly, Christians residing in Galilee, even in relatively small, rural communities, tend to sound ‘urban’. What constitutes this urban-seeming flavour of Christian Palestinian Arabic is described in detail in the next section. It has to do predominantly with the rearrangement of the sound inventory of these speakers’ dialects. Rural Christian Palestinians tend to have fewer phonemes – or distinctive sounds – than rural Muslim Palestinians. For example, in rural Muslim and Druze speech (which is linguistically more representative of older varieties of Arabic), the words thaani ‘second’ and tamir ‘date’ (the fruit) begin with different sounds. Christian speakers from rural areas will usually pronounce both words with an initial [t] sound: taani, tamir.

This divide along religious lines is somewhat puzzling. Its historical origin is unclear, and there is emerging evidence that it is not as clear-cut as previously believed. Data I recently collected in the Christian-majority vil-

1. This was also noted by Blanc in another study of his, focusing on the dialects of northern Palestine.
lage of Kufur Yasif show that veteran Muslim and Druze speakers in the village actually do share many phonological features with their Christian counterparts. It is mostly newcomers to the village, who happen to be Muslims, whose speech patterns differ from the old Kufur Yasif norm, which may have mistakenly been attributed to Christians only.

Urbanisation

Arabic dialects often exhibit different patterns for urban versus rural dialects. A number of villages in Palestine have expanded and become regional urban centres in recent decades, and in my current project I am examining the effect of this process on the urbanisation of the dialects spoken there as well.

If we look again at the various field sites mentioned above, we see that they differ not only in their religious make-up, but also in their population sizes and municipal statuses (Table 1). Nazareth used to be the only Palestinian community since the establishment of Israel as an independent state in 1948 to have the status of a city. In 1985, Umm Al-Fahm became the first Palestinian village to be formally upgraded from the lesser status of ‘local council’ to that of a city (several others have since followed suit). Kufur Yasif and Mghar are still small and rural enough to have maintained the status of local council.

Since population size is the predominant criterion used by the Israeli ministry of the interior to determine municipal status, it is not unlikely that Mghar will soon be declared a city as well, despite its rural nature and both its physical and societal structures. By the same token, it may be argued that life in Umm Al-Fahm is more like that in a village, albeit a very large one. In fact, some of my interviewees have said just that, not only in Umm Al-Fahm, but even in Nazareth. Although Nazareth is known to have been an urban centre since at least the early 12th century (it was established as a Catholic diocese in 1108), several residents there have told me that it is more a conglomeration of villages than one cohesive city. But the truth of the matter is that each of the two cities has both urban and rural characteristics. Alongside independent houses densely lined up in steep, narrow alleys, are several wide streets and thoroughfares within the city limits. Nazareth has long been a centre for commerce, banking and government services. As one enters Umm Al-Fahm from the main road, one immediately encounters multiple restaurants (frequented by Palestinians and Jewish Israelis alike), industrial zones, shopping centres and government offices.

Then we have the linguistic evidence. Traditionally, Nazarenes have spoken a dialect that is in line with other major Mediterranean cities of the Levant, such as Haifa and Jaffa in Palestine, Beirut in neighbouring Lebanon, and Damascus in Syria. This includes such features as merging interdental consonants (such as the ‘th’ in English ‘this’ and ‘three’) with their dental counterparts (d and t respectively); and the pronunciation of historical /q/, originally a somewhat deeper [k]-like sound, as a glottal stop (like the ‘t’ in many informal British pronunciations of ‘water’ – wa’eh). On the other hand, Umm Al-Fahm’s traditional dialect has the interdents intact, /q/ is pronounced [k], and /k/ in turn is pronounced like ‘ch’ in English ‘child’.

However, language, as we now know, changes with time. And this is governed, as we also know, by both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Druze</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kufur Yasif</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm Al-Fahm</td>
<td>City (since 1985)</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mghar</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
linguistic and social constraints. New data from Umm Al-Fahm show that younger speakers (born from around 1975 onward) rarely, if ever, pronounce ‘ch’. So words like kef ‘how’ is not pronounced by youngsters as it is by (some) older speakers. As with the Jaffa case described earlier, education plays a role here too. I interviewed an older Umm Al-Fahm man (born 1936) with only a partial primary education. He exhibits this and other traditional features of the dialect, much more than his younger, more educated counterparts. But even this man is shifting gradually towards the ‘new’ pronunciation, which resembles that of nearby urban dialects.

In the Northern village of Kufur Yasif, we see a different aspect of the urban/rural dichotomy. On the one hand, this relatively small village has traditionally had an ‘urban-sounding’ dialect, whose phonology is much more like that of Nazareth than that of Umm Al-Fahm. This is probably attributable to the preponderance of Christians in the village, who have been long known to differ in their speech from Muslim and Druze neighbours. On the other hand, Kufur Yasif retains some archaic lexical items, which used to be prevalent in the Levant, specifically in the Horan region of north-central Jordan and southern Syria, but have all but disappeared east and north of the border. One such word is šélè (also šélè šélè) ‘not at all’, which is ubiquitous in today’s Kufur Yasif dialect (in fact, it is present in virtually all of the interviews I have conducted in the village).

**Society and language change**

Sociolinguists argue both that societal forces affect the way we speak, and that variation in speech can be indicative of trends in social structure, attitude and behaviour.

In the narrow case described above, we can see both elements of this. On the one hand, we see that factors like religion, urbanisation and contact with speakers of other languages and dialects have dictated, or at least contributed to, the various manifestations of speech patterns in Palestinian Arabic. The flipside of this is that we may take the linguistic data at face value, and deduce from it what it means to pronounce a particular sound in a specific way. In other words, while, for instance, pronouncing a [ch] sound is associated with an older, less-educated, rural speaker (probably Muslim), the apparent reversal of this historic process, whereby the historically older [k] is pronounced, carries a meaning of its own, signalling to the hearer that the speaker is (probably) younger, more educated and more attuned to processes of urbanisation, despite hailing from the same village-cum-city as the speaker who pronounces [ch].

Consider a similar feature of British English. Words like ‘cut’ and ‘cup’ are pronounced in different ways in Britain. For some speakers, ‘cut’ rhymes with ‘put’. These are usually people who grew up roughly from Birmingham northward. For southern English speakers (and also, for example, Canadian and American speakers of English), ‘cut’ and ‘cup’ are pronounced with a different vowel than ‘put’ and ‘foot’. It is safe to assume that most Britons will identify a northerner by the sound of their speech. This has, in fact, much to do with this very phenomenon (though there are others, of course). But what happens when a northerner is made aware of this feature of their accent, for instance upon taking a job in London or Cambridge? In many cases, this northerner may try to sound ‘less northern’. Sometimes, speakers know what it is about their accent that makes them sound ‘other’, and adjust their speech accordingly. But often people just think they know what they ‘need’ to change, and in fact do an inadequate job of adjusting to their new environment.

And of course this isn’t specific to Arabic or English. Similar stories can be told about virtually any language, at least the languages that have been thoroughly studied in this kind of framework. There has been much discussion in the media about the ‘decay’ of this or that language, or of language in general. But what really happens is that language naturally changes over time – sometimes within very short periods of time. And this happens either due to language-internal forces, or due to social forces, such as wanting to sound more like a particular group of speakers, or wanting to sound less like one’s original speech community. Many times, however, it’s not a matter of either/or, but rather of intricate combinations of linguistic and extralinguistic factors.

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The Postdoctoral Fellowship scheme is the British Academy’s flagship funding programme for early career researchers, and is one of the most prestigious and sought-after of its type anywhere in the world.

In October 2017, the Government announced that it will be allocating a further £10 million from its Global Talent Fund to the British Academy to support 40 more British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowships, taking the number we can support starting this year from 45 to 85. Alun Evans, the Academy’s Chief Executive, said: ‘This is tremendous news and shows the confidence that the Government has in the Academy to deliver excellent, cutting-edge research in the humanities and the social sciences.’
In 1917, the British Academy – established by Royal Charter in 1902 – was still evolving its customs and practices. In the autumn of that year, the idea of setting up a 'Dining Club' for Fellows of the British Academy was explored. On 24 September 1917, the Academy’s Secretary, Israel Gollancz, sent out a circular inviting Fellows to attend the inaugural dinner on Wednesday 10 October 1917 at Princes’ Hotel in Piccadilly. The cost quoted was 10s 6d a head (excluding wine).

Many of the Fellows who replied to Gollancz felt that the dining club was an excellent idea. The historian T.F. Tout was enthusiastic, as he thought that it would 'make the B.A. more alive'. Others approved of the idea in principle, but were unable to attend due to prior engagements or poor health. F.J. Haverfield, a professor of ancient history, wrote: 'I wish I could come, but I fear that my doctor will dislike it, or, at any rate, he will confine my meat and drink at it to toast and water!' Several Fellows thought that the price of the dinner was too high. The economist H.S. Foxwell suggested that the Café Royal in Regent Street might be a cheaper option, although he acknowledged it was 'now a little out of fashion'. W.M. Ramsay wrote from Edinburgh: 'I dislike the idea of wasting 10/6 on a dinner, and all the more as all the public dinners in London I ever was at were so intolerably bad.' For the classicist Gilbert Murray the extravagance had a moral dimension: 'my democratic conscience would feel a little uncomfortable at the proposed feast'.

Many Fellows questioned the wisdom of embarking on dining of this kind during wartime. Reginald Poole’s letter was typical of many received: 'While I am in entire agreement as to the proposed plan for establishing a British Academy club in the future, I am bound to say that the present does not seem to me to be a suitable time for starting it.' The philosopher James Ward wrote: 'After thinking the matter over and discussing it with others I have come to the conclusion that the time is inopportune.' The timing was indeed bad. On the night of 24 September (the very day on which the Dining Club invitation had been sent out) there was a bombing raid on London, the first of a flurry of night-time bombing attacks by the Germans towards the end of that month. Londoners were sent scurrying to sleep in the Underground stations. Cambridge-based archaeologist William Ridgeway wished the club well but said, 'I have no inclination to go to town when air raids are of nightly occurrence.' And George Prothero was another Fellow who cited the 'raid' as a disincentive.

In the end, out of a total Fellowship of 98, only 10 Fellows actually attended the dinner (Percy Gardner had to cancel at the last moment due to a family bereavement). Although a third of the Fellowship had expressed some sympathy for the idea, the Dining Club does not appear to have had any further outings.

It wasn’t until 1956 that the tradition of a British Academy Annual Dinner finally took off. These occasions were initially funded by the lawyer A.L. Goodhart, who was elected to the Fellowship in 1952, and who was inspired by the great success of the Academy’s 50th Anniversary Dinner in that very year.1

1. For an account of the election to Honorary Fellowship of Winston Churchill in connection with the 50th Anniversary Dinner in 1952, see ‘Winston Churchill and the British Academy’, British Academy Review, 20 (Summer 2012), 45–47.

'From the Archive’ research by Karen Syrett, British Academy Archivist and Librarian.
‘It is a crucial time for us to be asking questions and starting national conversations about how different identities can be embedded in a cohesive society.’
David Cannadine, President, British Academy

Identities and belonging

Societal challenges have brought issues of identity and belonging to the fore. Drawing on new research and key thinking, we discuss who we are, how we fit in, and where we belong in a changing world.

Events will take place throughout 2018 in London and around the UK, and will include:

**Friday 12 January 2018, The British Museum**
The power of belief: Can religion be separated from politics?
Panel discussion
Presented in collaboration with the British Museum and FT Weekend.

**Thursday 22 February 2018, Queen’s University Belfast**
QUB Global Challenges Debate: Human rights in an age of Trump and Brexit
Debate
Organised in partnership with Queen’s University Belfast.

**Tuesday 27 February 2018, Bangor University**
A million Welsh speakers by 2050?
Panel discussion
Organised in partnership with the Learned Society of Wales and Bangor University. This is a bilingual event and will be delivered in Welsh and English.

**Tuesday 6 March 2018, The British Academy**
Research Spotlight: Who speaks for Muslims?
Panel discussion

You can find out more, and listen to a range of topical talks and discussions, via britishacademy.ac.uk/identities
What’s over the horizon for UK research collaboration in Europe?

Meet the new President: David Cannadine

History lessons from Robert Frost about unions, nations and states

The lure of the Anglosphere

Ian Diamond on the skills we need