


PLATE XX



MAX GLUCKMAN

## MAX GLUCKMAN

1911-1975

**B**Y the death of Max Gluckman on 13 April 1975, in hospital in Jerusalem, social anthropology lost an outstanding figure. A South African who always retained an intense interest in his native country, he soon transcended its bounds, and ultimately assumed British nationality. From field studies in Zululand he moved to research in Barotseland, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and to directorship of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. Drawn from there he occupied posts of increasing importance in Britain for nearly thirty years. For much of this period he had a deep academic and personal connection with Israel. Other visits abroad, notably to the United States, gave evidence of and reinforced his international reputation. He published much ethnographical and theoretical work of prime significance in his subject, and successfully interested scholars in other disciplines in it. For several generations of younger colleagues and students he was an inspiration in their general intellectual development as well as in the planning of their field research and interpretation of the results.

Max Gluckman was born on 26 January 1911 in Johannesburg, the son of Emanuel and Kate Gluckman, of Russian-Jewish extraction. His early education was local, from 1919 to 1927 at King Edward VII School (one of the better public, i.e. government, schools), and from 1927 to 1934 at the University of the Witwatersrand where he held a Johannesburg municipal scholarship. Initially at the university he studied law. He had a great admiration for his father, who had a legal practice. (Emanuel Gluckman also had a deep appreciation of literature, and Max himself loved to read aloud, from Kipling, Swinburne, and Browning to *The Golden Bough*.) Almost accidentally, in his second year he was attracted by a course in social anthropology given by Mrs. Winifred Hoernlé, whose husband's lectures in philosophy he had been following. He found the new subject enthralling. Mrs. Hoernlé had been greatly influenced by Radcliffe-Brown when the latter was Professor of Social Anthropology in Cape Town in 1920-6, and his stimulus was renewed personally when Gluckman was at Oxford a decade later. Gluckman studied for a year also under Isaac Schapera,

who was acting-lecturer in Johannesburg while Mrs. Hoernlé was on sabbatical leave in 1930. Thus began a lasting association of mutual interest in political and legal anthropology, to which each contributed in complementary ways. In 1930 Gluckman took an ordinary B.A., including social anthropology and logic; in 1934 he took B.A. with first-class honours in social anthropology. During this whole period he led a very active life outside the classroom. Full of vitality and a natural athlete, he became a dedicated Rover Scout; he represented his university in cricket, football, and golf; he was a fast, sometimes reckless but skilful driver of cars over rough country roads; he was an ardent university debater and organizer. (Throughout his life he kept up an addiction to physical exercise.) With his usual energy he continued to read law during his undergraduate period. But though he passed the LL.B. preliminary and intermediate examinations he did not complete the final stage. The reason was that because of his fine scholastic and athletic record, and his work as a student leader, he had been selected as a Rhodes Scholar from the Transvaal to go to Oxford. His period there at Exeter College with R. R. Marett and E. Evans-Pritchard was important for his later development; it resulted immediately in his D.Phil. for a thesis entitled 'The Realm of the Supernatural among the South-eastern Bantu'.

From handling literary sources Gluckman now turned to field research. On a preliminary field trip organized by Schapera he had made some study of Tswana stellar concepts. But at Johannesburg he had also studied Zulu with Professor Doke, and though he did not have a very good ear for languages he mastered the intricacies of Zulu and was not shy of speaking it. He now spent two years in Zululand on a grant from the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research (Carnegie Fund) of the Union of South Africa Department of Education. This may have helped to set the pattern for much of his future presentation of problems of social and cultural change. He was impressed by the necessity of considering elements of the plural society in the context of the total system, in which the political dominance of one sector—in this case the whites—deeply affected what was ordinarily thought of as tribal behaviour. Despite radical opposition in some spheres the different elements were forced to interact and co-operate in other spheres. Gluckman was always apt to highlight an issue. Considering his previous training it is hard to take literally his statement that 'when I went to study modern political and economic

organization in Zululand, in 1936, I knew something about brachycephaly and the *coup-de-poing*: I knew virtually nothing about sociology or political science'. But certainly his analyses of the Zulu polity, while they followed general lines already laid down by Schapera, Monica Hunter (Wilson), and other observers of the Bantu social scene, were conspicuous for their freshness and vigour. His exposition of how Zulu chiefs and their king, while often caught in dilemmas of divided allegiance or interest, were still basic symbols of Zulu traditions and values; of how an opposition between Zulu chief and government magistrate, with its shifts in balance according to situation, was the dominant characteristic of the political system; of how tribal loyalties and faction fights were yielding in some contexts to a growing Zulu nationalism, was an early model of dynamic analysis.

If Zululand brought Gluckman face to face with African realities his second period in Oxford (a continuation of his Rhodes Scholarship) in 1938–9 was critical for his scholarly career. Then he came into contact not only once more with Meyer Fortes and Edward Evans-Pritchard, but also with A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. These men opened up for him new intellectual vistas, and with each he remained in scholarly communion and loyal friendship. He attended too some of Malinowski's seminars in London, but his intellectual and personal allegiances then kept him at some distance from the theoretical position he encountered there. After doing some tutoring at the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford, Gluckman accepted appointment at the Rhodes–Livingstone Institute of Social Studies in British Central Africa, in 1939. Three years later, after the resignation of the Director of the Institute, the gifted Godfrey Wilson, Gluckman himself became Director. By then the impact of the war was being felt in Africa. Gluckman first had wished to enlist in the armed forces—he resigned his research post to do so, but rejoined the Institute when apparently he was advised that he could be more effective locally in a civil capacity. In 1940 he joined the local Defence Force, but as scientific personnel he was placed on the reserve list and was not taken for military service. The upshot was that he was able to continue his field research in Barotseland.

Meanwhile his personal circumstances had changed. In 1938, on a skiing holiday he met Mary Brignoli, daughter of an Italian lawyer and an English mother. They married in 1939. Mary had worked originally as an interpreter, but gave this up

on her marriage. However, she aided her husband substantially with his anthropological studies, in the intervals of family responsibilities—they had three sons. In Barotseland she learnt Lozi and collected data especially from women. Later she acted as Max's research assistant, pursuing points in English history when he was making comparisons between Barotse and English law, and examining Human Relations Area Files for data on such questions as stability of marriage over a range of societies.

In Barotseland the Gluckmans lived in an enlarged Barotse hut, with mud walls and floor. They began with an interpreter until Max, particularly, became fluent in Lozi. In Zululand Gluckman had lived with a Zulu family, and had a 'black father and mother' to whom he was much attached. In those days, before the more formal aspects of *apartheid*, he could sit beside the campfire when on tour, and join in dancing and beer-drinking, in the relatively egalitarian Zulu society. The Lozi were more hierarchical, and Gluckman as a white man was assigned to the top rank of the society, and hence barred from dancing. (Beer-drinking had been forbidden by the mission, though it still took place in secret.) He could observe the social behaviour of the Lozi freely, but his active participation was much more limited than among the Zulu. Moreover, because of the social distance between Africans and whites, Lozi did not call at the Gluckmans' house in the evenings, which were accordingly spent in arranging material on field cards—of a type adapted from those advocated by Beatrice Webb—and typing up field notes. These restrictions on social intercourse were a matter of great regret to Gluckman. However, later, when he and other field workers were living in tents, they spent the evenings sitting round the fire talking with Lozi. Moreover, since the Lozi were a tolerant people he was allowed to witness their rituals, and he did make some offerings at pagan shrines. (He once confessed to colleagues, though, that religion was a blank spot with him and he found this a drawback in the field.) In one respect Gluckman was better placed than the Lozi for field research: he was allowed to enter the initiation lodges of the Wiko immigrants into Barotseland, whereas the Lozi could not. In all, Gluckman carried out field research in Barotseland in 1940, 1942, 1944, 1945, and 1947. This virtually ended his own actual fieldwork, except for a month or so again in 1965. It is the impression of some of his colleagues that Gluckman did not always enjoy fieldwork and

that his quick impatient mind found some of its aspects irksome—though it is generally agreed that his enthusiasm for the field and respect for ethnographic data did much to promote and stimulate the field research of others. In any case, his opposition to South African racial segregation kept him away from Zululand, and his support of African opposition to the short-lived Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland led to his being banned from returning to Barotseland until the emergence of the new African republic of Zambia. By then he had found new interests.

During his period as Director of the Rhodes–Livingstone Institute Gluckman spent much time in Livingstone, the former territorial capital, where many branches of government still had their offices. There he stimulated a number of government officers to write non-technical articles for publication in the Institute's journal. His closest association was probably with members of the agricultural department with whom he carried out fieldwork in 1945. He developed a plan for expansion of the research of the Institute, financed by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, and trained the new research officers who began to arrive soon after the end of the war. He kept in touch with them by correspondence, by visits to them, and by central conferences. A main focus was on investigation of the impact of economic change on societies of central Africa, both in the rural areas and in the mining towns—where Godfrey Wilson and his wife Monica had already pioneered urban research. From all this some notable studies were produced.

But in 1947 Gluckman took up a post as University Lecturer in Social Anthropology at Oxford. Radcliffe-Brown had retired, Evans-Pritchard had succeeded him in 1946, and had recruited Fortes as Reader in Social Anthropology. It was a powerful combination—of Africanist expertise from several major quarters, of theoretical skill in social, political, and ritual fields, and of common commitment to what then was known broadly as a structuralist position. But it also bore the seeds of dissolution. Given such intellectual strength and such forceful personalities, it was perhaps fortunate that new opportunities soon opened up. In 1950 Fortes was elected to the William Wyse chair in Cambridge, and already in 1949 Gluckman had moved to the Victoria University of Manchester. A readership in social anthropology had been advertised and Gluckman was a strong candidate. Such were his powers of persuasion that, as one of his competitors ruefully reported, he was able at the interview

not only to convince the committee that the importance of their university and of the subject required a chair, but that he should be invited forthwith to occupy it. Whether this account is a slight telescoping of events or not, it was a felicitous appointment for both parties. The university got an energetic, capable, high-powered and highly articulate scholar, able and ready to communicate with students, colleagues, and the public. And Gluckman had a post in which he could develop his talents with great freedom and access to substantial resources. He continued to use Evans-Pritchard's framework of ideas to a considerable extent. But it seems probable that, if only in retrospect, he realized what shadow Evans-Pritchard might have cast over him had he remained at Oxford; there is no doubt that he relished the breadth of advantage that Manchester offered him.

One of his first actions was to secure the line of communication with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. In the field he had devoted great care to the theoretical and practical preparation of his staff for their research. It made good academic sense then that when Gluckman left the Institute for Oxford the trustees decided to send its research officers there for analysis of their field data. It was a stimulating period for them, and some of their results, with those of other anthropologists who had also worked in the region, were published under the editorship of Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman, with the title of *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa*. The book aimed to produce a set of general descriptions of each tribe which could be useful to government officers and also to anthropologists interested in the types of social structure represented. When Gluckman moved to Manchester he was able to develop his relation with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute further. A two-way traffic furnished research officers to the Institute, some Ph.D.s to the research workers, and research fellows and lecturers to the Manchester department. More important to social anthropology, it also produced a series of first-rate monographs in which much novel ethnographic material was handled in a theoretical framework of a dynamic kind. Concentrated on village studies, the central theme was conflict and its resolution, but the same theme was followed through into industrial and urban conditions. Structural cohesion and opposition were examined as cut across by individual and group interests, in contexts of land ownership and other property relations, lineage membership, migration of labour, local leadership, sorcery and witchcraft, and ritual—

to indicate only some of the areas where cross-fertilization of ideas took place under Gluckman's exuberant guidance. If his prefaces to some of these volumes continued in print the critique and exhortations of the seminar no author appeared to object.

Meanwhile the general progress of the department was helped by Gluckman's success in persuading the university to allocate generous funds for inviting outside speakers to the weekly research seminars which he conducted with such zest. His access to Simon Fellowships also allowed him to attract people of distinction for periods of a year or more at a time. It was primarily a graduate department. At Oxford Evans-Pritchard had been unsuccessful in his attempt to establish an honours school in social anthropology. (Perhaps he always doubted the appropriateness of teaching the subject to any but mature students—a view sometimes expressed by the more austere teachers of social sciences though the criteria on which this opinion is based are not always clear.) Possibly with this in mind, Gluckman did not seem to favour a large undergraduate structure. He took a keen interest in all his students, including undergraduates, but for the first ten years after his appointment to the chair the subject was taught to undergraduates only as a service course. Though he was an enthusiastic and good lecturer to large classes it seemed that he himself always preferred the interchange of the small teaching seminar to the impersonality of the large formal lecture. The keynote of the department in those formative years was an intense solidarity, not only in the academic sphere but also in social gatherings and even in collective support for Gluckman's favourite football team, Manchester United. It was an atmosphere which some found restrictive, though all acknowledged its stimulus.

After a decade and a half of vigorous activity the department began to show signs of change. Gluckman had for long been in charge of both sociology and social anthropology, though the latter had been the dominant interest. But though efforts to establish industrial sociology had come to little the main discipline of sociology continued to grow, especially with the appointment of Peter Worsley as professor of sociology in 1964 and of Clyde Mitchell as professor of urban sociology in 1965. Gluckman's attitude towards these developments was hesitant, but reflected his perception of the changed mood of the time—though perhaps he still envisaged social anthropology as playing a central role. By 1970, however, the joint department became



so large and the divergence of interests so great that the two disciplines were separated. By that time Gluckman had other preoccupations. Having given up the headship of the department to his colleague of long-standing, Emrys Peters, in 1971 he resigned from his regular chair to assume a research professorship in the University, a post financed in part by the Nuffield Foundation. The change to a research post fitted in to some extent with his health needs. He had made a good recovery from a heart attack in March 1968, but continued to suffer from other complaints which did affect his way of life. But his intellectual interests too had changed direction.

About 1963 a large sum of money for research into the integration of different communities in Israel had been put at the disposal of his department at Manchester University by the Bernstein Israeli Research Trust. As director of the research project, Max Gluckman (with his wife as assistant and chauffeur) toured Israel to find the most appropriate locations for field investigation. With his characteristic energy, he devoted much time to planning the enterprise, securing research workers and aiding them in their studies. He did no intensive fieldwork himself but enlisted Israeli, British, and American investigators, ten in all. While the field project ended in 1971, published results from this and other associated research in Israel under his supervision are continuing to appear in impressive amount—to mention only studies of kibbutzim, of moshavim, of urban workers, of the aged in Jerusalem, and of groups of settled Bedouin. Much of this work drew on the inspiration of former investigators, particularly perhaps that of the late Yonina Talmon-Garber, but Max Gluckman's unflagging energy and analytical powers provided the impetus and oversight necessary for such a concerted research effort.

Gluckman's interest in Israel as an area of research may have been stimulated by his growing realization of the increasing difficulties for anthropological fieldwork in independent Africa. But his personal involvement with Israel, though it developed later than his African experience, may have had deeper roots. He came from a non-religious background in South Africa, and himself was of fundamentally agnostic temperament. His parents respected Jewish religious custom and had held a Bar-Mitzvah ritual for Max, though perhaps primarily for social reasons. But the secular importance of Israel was very clear for them, and Max himself was proud of being Jewish culturally and socially—though he never acquired any real knowledge of

Hebrew. He had visited Israel in 1936 with his mother—who was one of the founders and leaders of the Zionist movement in South Africa—and he worked for a short time in a kibbutz. From about 1952, after most members of his natal family had migrated there, he visited Israel about a dozen times. He had a close relationship with colleagues in Israeli universities, and at the time of his death he was serving as Lady Davies Distinguished Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. How far his position in the Jewish Diaspora can be related to his theories of conflict resolution is I think an open question—I know of no record of his having ever made such a relationship. But it is tempting to see some parallel between this position and themes of reconciliation between apparently disparate social elements which in various ways were exposed in his thought.

Max Gluckman's academic distinctions were many. He received the Wellcome Medal and the Rivers Memorial Medal from the Royal Anthropological Institute, and an honorary doctorate in social sciences from the Université Libre de Bruxelles. He was a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He became a Fellow of the British Academy in 1968, and in 1974 he delivered the Radcliffe-Brown Lecture at the Academy. He gave the Frazer Lecture at the University of Glasgow in 1952, the Josiah Mason Lectures at the University of Birmingham in 1955, two sets of Munro Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1958 and 1960, and (through some confusion about dates) he gave two Marett Lectures at Exeter College, Oxford, in 1964 and 1965. Abroad, his reputation was marked by his delivery of the Storrs Lectures in jurisprudence at the Yale Law School in 1963, special lectures in Paris at the Sorbonne in 1959 and at Unesco in 1970, and the first Maxwell Cummings Lectures in the humanities and social sciences at McGill University in 1971. In 1957 he was invited to become a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto, but for family reasons did not go; he accepted the renewed invitation in 1967 and 1971–2. He held many professional offices, including chairmanship of the Association of Social Anthropologists from 1962 to 1966. As part of his role in developing African studies he was for over twenty years a member of the Executive Council—and latterly one of the Consultative Directors—of the International African Institute; there he also helped significantly to promote the greater 'Africanization' of the Council. He served on the

Human Sciences Committee of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Social Studies Sub-committee of the University Grants Committee, and the Social Anthropology Committee of the Social Science Research Council. In 1974 he was appointed a member of the new Advisory Committee to the Sports Council. At the time of his death at least two *Festschrift* volumes to honour him were in progress or planned.

Gluckman's scholarly output was great, and of high quality. Though he was sometimes prolix, his work was distinctly original in tone, rich in ethnographic detail but using this to drive home some theoretical point. It was personal, even idiosyncratic in treatment, and sometimes made exaggerated claims, but it was concerned with problems of basic social significance in a robust way. Though quite capable of analysing indigenous cultural concepts abstractly—as his Storrs lectures on *The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence* showed—he based his analysis firmly on a body of data collected by observation and record of vernacular discourse in the field. In this he showed a respect for empirical evidence and a distaste for speculative interpretation which may have alienated him from some of the younger generation of anthropologists interested primarily in structures of a 'cognitive' order. Some controversy about his position arose too through his stand on the question of comparability. On the basis of his studies of African law he argued strongly that because there is something unique about every culture we are not entitled to assume that translation is impossible. The concepts of one society can be validly compared by process of abstraction with those of another. He held that he had demonstrated real similarities in the legal concepts of different African tribal societies, and further between these concepts and those of early Roman and medieval European law. This runs counter to an insistence in much current anthropology on the discussion of particular cultural categories of thought in what purport to be their own terms.

Gluckman was always sensitive to the importance of methodological issues, including the problem of communication between anthropologist and the people whose culture he was studying. One of his colleagues remembers how when Gluckman was directing the Rhodes–Livingstone Institute research he insisted that the field-workers should as far as possible try to explain to the people what they were about. 'This entailed transcribing our genealogical data on to long rolls of tracing paper about a yard wide. Different matrilineages were given distinct colours.

By spreading these charts, some of which were 25 feet long by the time a whole village had been recorded, on the ground in the middle of a village we could hope to convey to our illiterate informants some impression of what we perceived the structure of their community to be. Sometimes this worked, particularly when the colours indicating the matrilineages were in good contrast.' Gluckman's more abstract interest in method emerged in his co-operation at Manchester with economists, political scientists, and philosophers in a multi-disciplinary seminar. It was illustrated by the series of studies by Manchester anthropologists which he and the economist Ely Devons edited under the title of *Closed Systems and Open Minds: The Limits of Naivety in Social Anthropology* (1964). This book, in somewhat polemical terms, considered the nature of the basic assumptions implied by the work of social anthropologists, and included a lengthy examination of how Gluckman saw the relevance of psycho-analytical theory to the anthropological discipline. Gluckman's enthusiastic advocacy of the concept of social network, as used by John Barnes, Elizabeth Bott, and Clyde Mitchell, and of what came to be known as the 'extended case method' of citation of empirical data as used by Victor Turner, though not without flaw, helped to focus attention on more systematic procedures for handling data.

In substance, Gluckman's major intellectual achievements fall broadly under the head of politics, law, and ritual in tribal society—the title of one of his more popular works. In each of these fields he made a pioneering contribution.

In the political field, his main emphasis throughout was on the significance of conflict. He laid out some definitional suggestions to give more precision to this concept, in relation to such terms as struggle, competition, contradiction. But essentially he was concerned not with clashes of personality on the one hand, nor with fundamental discrepancies in the social system on the other, but with oppositions arising from division of loyalties, incompatibility of rights or duties or principles of organization of social affairs. For him conflict could produce changes in the personnel occupying social positions, but not changes in the pattern of such positions. Hence in the political field he devoted much attention to the theory of rebellion, in which the possession of high office is challenged but not the nature of the office itself. He made much of the distinction between rebellion and revolution. His contention, that African tribal society was characterized by rebellion to

secure the symbols of political control, and not by revolution to overthrow the system of political control, was hardly surprising. (By contrast, more startling was Leach's presentation of the apparently paradoxical behaviour of the Kachin, who oscillated between autocratic chieftainship and egalitarian democracy.) Critics have taken issue with Gluckman's repetitive theory of the history of society, with his maintenance in modified form of Radcliffe-Brown's view of social equilibrium, in which conflict ultimately can reinforce social solidarity. They have suggested that in large-scale highly differentiated societies, more complex than the African states Gluckman was describing, conflict could be finally disruptive. Some, to his indignation, argued that he was advancing a psychological, not a sociological view of conflict. He acknowledged some of these criticisms. He frankly withdrew his more extreme formulations about civil war having a function in maintaining the social system. He admitted that in large-scale industrial society conflict was often disintegrative and could lead to revolution. But he stoutly defended his general standpoint. His dogged pursuit of the theme of the endemic nature of conflict in any society—which he claimed he had developed independently of Simmel—undoubtedly stimulated much inquiry into the structural relations between stability and hostility in a variety of social situations. And while his theory of rebellion as a model for African states was parallel to the theory of the feud developed earlier by other anthropologists for African stateless societies, it did focus more attention than hitherto on the political structure of those more complex state units.

One of the more spectacular of Gluckman's analyses of processes of conflict was his examination of the 'rituals of rebellion' of the Zulu and Swazi. The title he gave to these dramatic observances has been suggested by purists to be a misnomer—'symbolic confession of hostility' has been offered as a more appropriate label. But the colourful rites and songs in which the Swazi king is formally warned that people (unspecified) hate him fired the imagination of many anthropologists, and Gluckman's deft elucidation of possible explanations gave rise to a great deal of informative discussion. This was linked with consideration of his general views on ritual. He argued that in most tribal societies interpersonal relations tend to be ritualized in order to avoid the confusion of overlapping ties or roles. Since the same people in face-to-face contact meet one another in different roles on different occasions, this 'multi-

plex' character of their relations is handled by ritual procedures. Symbolic behaviour is then a differentiating mechanism, which facilitates a more effective working of society. Ritual, he argued too, does not merely express social cohesion; it exaggerates the elements of real conflict in social rules but goes on to affirm their unity despite the conflict. Here, as with his theory of rebellion, one can find the notion of catharsis, which he discusses explicitly at some points in his analysis, and which may indicate some influence of Freudian theory on his thinking.

His most enduring work is likely to be his studies in comparative jurisprudence. Here he ventured with conspicuous success into a field which few anthropologists have dared to enter, but where his preliminary legal training gave him some familiarity with at least the basic concepts. The use he made of this was exemplary. For anthropologists his handling of the material from Lozi courts, as regards the judicial task, the nature of evidence, the norm of the 'reasonable man', the importance of obligation, the concept of responsibility, and much more, was novel in substance and often very enlightening in theory. But what was also impressive was the remarkable interest which his ideas attracted from legal colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic. In a foreword to *The Judicial Process among the Barotse* (1955) Sir Arthur Goodhart pointed out that while Malinowski's *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* thirty years earlier had been welcomed by legal philosophers, it gave only an outline of primitive law, whereas Gluckman's book was in effect a case book of 'early law', since it gave in detail the evidence produced at trials and the judgements of the court. It was a 'path-breaking book'. The introduction by another eminent jurist, Professor Charles L. Black Jr. of the Yale Law School, to *The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence*, ten years later, praised this book for its courageous and uncompromising insistence on applying the best modern analyses in jurisprudence to the African material. What seems to have appealed to lawyers as well as anthropologists was the freshness of the examination of legal concepts and the demonstration that an understanding of these requires a knowledge of the social structure and its associated system of production. They may also have been impressed by Gluckman's argument, on which he laid great weight, that high-level ambiguity in legal rules was a necessary feature of law, to be applied by judges to the variable situations of real life.

Gluckman also contributed in various other fields—examining

for instance, problems of the stability of marriage in tribal societies, the nature of moral dilemmas confronting different kinds of kin in classical drama, the functions of gossip and scandal in social relations, and even the effects of crowd reaction on the success of football teams. Though his conclusions were not always novel, and sometimes generated controversy, he brought to each subject a lively inquiring mind which posed questions of significance.

Much of Gluckman's theoretical work stemmed from the roots established in social anthropology by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. Ostensibly, in over-all framework of ideas, he inclined more to the latter. He was particularly harsh on Malinowski's loosely expressed formulations about the place of history in social anthropology, the nature of social change, and the biological conditioning of the human individual. He was also severe on Malinowski's alleged inability to appreciate the full significance of the work of his own pupils and colleagues on problems of law and of economics. Yet the interesting paradox is that at some points Gluckman seemed to be defining himself by reference to Malinowski rather than to Radcliffe-Brown. It was not just that by superficial contrast with Malinowski Gluckman had very successful co-operation with lawyers and economists, and that he made every effort to support and draw out rather than deprecate the findings of his pupils. It was that perhaps from some temperamental affinity in rejection of formalism, he appeared to adopt Malinowski's stance quite positively on some critical issues. In distinction to Radcliffe-Brown, Gluckman was a field-worker of great ability, and he always gave great credit to Malinowski for his invention of a new technique of direct observation of community life. It is true that Gluckman did cite this as an invention by chance, an 'accidental' beginning that 'happened' to a man of Malinowski's genius—ignoring the intellectual preparation by Malinowski for his Trobriand field study. But Gluckman held that one of Malinowski's greatest achievements was to produce a balanced all-round picture of men in tribal society, and that his findings 'burst like a revelation on the intellectual world'. Gluckman accepted a 'loose' concept of law more in keeping with Malinowski's than with Radcliffe-Brown's view, and is said to have had a 'boundless admiration' for *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*. He found Malinowski's account of myth, in which narration of the story was linked with boasting about status, both vivid and cogent, and turned it to account in talking of his own field

experiences. In the handling of seminars, in the personal colour he gave to scientific relationships, and in the attempt to convey to the outside world a 'message' from social anthropology as an aid to thinking about current problems, Gluckman seemed to have a discernible affinity with Malinowski. This is not just my own interpretation. For at least one of Gluckman's colleagues, Malinowski seemed to have had an important part in Gluckman's image of himself—though he might not have admitted this. Certainly it appeared that Gluckman was playing a role through the medium of the Manchester seminar similar to that which Malinowski in his day had played in London.

There is another paradox in Gluckman's scholarly contribution—the almost complete lack of reference to Marxian theory. In his early life, though he was not basically aligned with any ideology, he was certainly familiar with some of Marx's writings, and later he lectured on Engels as a serious thinker. He never concealed his support for some non-establishment causes of radical flavour, especially where injustice to persons seemed to be involved. A version of the dialectic seemed to hover at the back of much of his writing, especially in his insistence on the importance, indeed the endemic nature, of conflict in society. Yet his analyses of conflict were curiously muted, emerging at times in the form of assigning to it a mechanism of social integration not only within groups, but also between them. It is understandable that when a particularly ham-handed action by the Australian Commonwealth Government refused him access to New Guinea, as he was a Visiting Fellow of the Australian National University he behaved with restraint. But one would think that in his theoretical work no canons of politeness or expediency need have held him back from pertinacious scrutiny of Marxian theses. One of the very few published references that he made to Marx was in his illuminating autobiographical introduction to his series of essays on *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (1963). But it concerns not his own general intellectual development or his theoretical framework for social anthropology, but his theory of rebellion. He pointed out how Marx saw rebellions as demonstrations of the need for a fundamental overthrow of the whole social order, but his successors saw them as safety-valves which allowed the capitalist order to reconstitute itself. On the face of it, one might draw the implication that Gluckman's theory of rebellion had more in common with the views of Marxists than with those of Marx. But he seemed content to note that Marx like Aristotle gave



little systematic analysis to the structure of the 'rebellious' system itself. (He argued also that too close scrutiny of early writings might have impeded his own investigations.) Some of this abstention from the use of Marxian theory may have been due to his refusal to speculate in the sphere of what until recently has been regarded as pre-class or non-class society. Some may be due to Gluckman's absorptive powers—of having so early incorporated elements of Marxist thought into his intellectual armoury that he did not regard them as derivative. But it may be too that like many of us intellectuals, he cherished a hope deep down that society will ultimately right itself, and that to recognize conflict and expose its structure may go some way to mitigate it. I think that Gluckman's apparent coyness in writing about Marxism has not been remarked upon publicly before. But in letters to me colleagues have observed that Gluckman was above all an empiricist who looked at what was there and tried to account for it. This took him away from pure Marxism, and in his most creative period, between about 1936 and 1956, although his thought was fundamentally Marxist it was never doctrinaire. Then it combined in a rather curious way a Marxist perspective with a Durkheimian structuralism, and a sort of dialectic between these two strands of his thinking was evident in nearly all his writings—until at least *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (1955). After that, so one interpretation goes, his Marxism began to fade as he became more absorbed into the 'academic establishment' at Manchester. However this be, what his more radical critics may term his 'reformist' attitude increasingly tended to separate him from the more trenchant of modern political anthropologists.

More than many other anthropologists, Max Gluckman merged his personal and his scientific attitudes. He appreciated recognition of his deservedly widely-known contributions, and responded warmly to any tokens of approval. He was very sensitive to criticism. While he could appreciate academic disagreement if he felt there was basic common ground he found it hard to tolerate what he looked upon as disloyalty. In seminars he stood up good-humouredly to assaults by colleagues and pupils upon his ideas, but he was indefatigable in hunting down critics in print. In all this he could expose his own reactions to an uncommon degree, drawing from many readers, almost unwittingly, a sympathetic response. Who but Max could have opened his preface to the new edition of a colleague's book, first published in 1957, with the statement: 'around that year,

there were published by a number of my pupils books which had a great impact in social anthropology', and after listing, very justly, eight of these, continuing: 'and dare I add my own . . . ?' Who else, in an autobiographical introduction, after saying that his ideas about rebellion in African states were 'a new contribution to anthropological theory' would then have gone on to inquire at length why some colleagues and pupils, whom he named, had not referred to these ideas in their own independent analyses on other subjects? Who other than Max could have written with great candour that he was 'naturally pleased' when a distinguished American anthropologist stated in a review that he felt guilty for not having acknowledged the stimulus of Max's treatment of conflict in his own work? Many of us have had similar thoughts but few of us have the courage and simplicity to express them in print. Though such expressions might provoke a wry smile, they helped to endear him to the profession rather than alienate him from it.

The reason is fairly clear. While sensitive to his own image in anthropology, Max Gluckman was most generous in spending himself for others and defending their interests. On all sides it is agreed that not only did he conduct a most stimulating series of seminars but he was also prepared to give immense amounts of time to discussing the work of his pupils and colleagues, finding research funds for them, and helping them outside the academic field. A quality much stressed by his associates has been his creativity in handling field data. His ability by adroit questioning to elicit unsuspected patterns in a field-worker's material made a group soon 'agog with excitement as he showed us how it all fitted together in a meaningful way'. It is true that once Max had developed such a way he was very reluctant to modify it. In his keen perception of the value of the work of his pupils and of his colleagues he tended at times to reinterpret their findings to an overpowering degree, and he did not understand any reservations they may have had on this score. In his enjoyment at being surrounded by congenial company he might behave at times 'like a Lozi Royal with retainers and supporters in attendance'. But such was his infectious enthusiasm and his stimulating theoretical outlook that such foibles were kept in perspective as part of the whole man. Certainly his kindness, his generosity, and his evident sincerity called forth a great deal of affection. He maintained an extensive network of friends, partly by voluminous correspondence, and a constant stream of guests passed through the hospitable Gluckman home near Manchester.

His delight at involvement with the work of others had its drawbacks, as newer styles in anthropology defined themselves by separation from the work of their predecessors. Max found it hard to accept this change in his image from licensed iconoclast to traditionalist icon. At the international meeting of the Association of Social Anthropologists in 1973 he confessed to me, only semi-humorously, that he felt like the classic case of the Nuer in limbo described by Evans-Pritchard. This man, having been absent from his home for many years and lost to sight, had been declared dead. When therefore he finally returned he was not readmitted to the society and wandered about like an embodied ghost. Gluckman's parallel was not a pose, but it was only a phase; he was in fact surrounded by loyal friends and students whose respect he had retained. It has been said that he was a passionate man, who was passionately involved with his students, his colleagues, and his friends. Yet towards the last, it appears, he became serene. Always stoical in respect of physical pain, he now became also not only calm and peaceful but bright and cheering to others too, who were suffering around him. He may have had critics, but he had no enemies. And in the realm of scholarship one may adapt for him the old saying: we may criticize his ideas, but everyone uses them.

*Acknowledgements:* For much biographical detail and illuminating comment on my first draft of this memoir I am greatly indebted to the following: Dr. Elaine Baldwin; Professor John Barnes; Professor Elizabeth Colson; Professor A. L. Epstein; Professor Meyer Fortes; Professor Hilda Kuper; Professor Emanuel Marx; Dr. J. C. Mitchell; Professor E. L. Peters; Dr. Audrey Richards; Professor I. Schapera. My special thanks are due to Mrs. Mary Gluckman, who provided me with basic documents, discussed with me freely many aspects of Max's career, and allowed me to write my own portrayal of him with no more than an occasional correction on a point of fact. If the memoir has any failure in perspective the responsibility is mine alone.

RAYMOND FIRTH