

Preface

SHORTLY BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR, Miss Henriette Hertz made a bequest to the British Academy to found an annual Philosophical Lecture. In 1993, with the idea of making the series more accessible and attractive, the Academy tried out the experiment of putting together three years' lectures to make up a one-day conference devoted to the philosophy of mind. To allow for the discussion which is the lifeblood of any worthwhile philosophical occasion, each lecture was delivered in a highlighted and shortened version on the day, with the full, more thoroughly developed and more detailed treatment saved for its appearance in print. In the same spirit, the lecturers were followed by commentators, making three related symposia. These, edited by Christopher Peacocke, were published as *Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness* (OUP 1994).

The present volume is the outcome of a similar venture on a different theme. A one-day conference on philosophical logic was held at the Academy on 16 March 1996. The Henriette Hertz Lecturers were James Higginbotham, Mark Sainsbury and Timothy Williamson, with David Bostock, J. E. J. Altham and Dorothy Edgington as commentators.

'Philosophical Logic' covers three different genres of work. It has long been used precisely to contrast with 'formal' or 'symbolic' or 'mathematical' logic, and so to cover topics and treatments which could sometimes fall almost as well under the heading of philosophy of language. Then too it can cover non-technical reflections inspired by results in mathematical logic, e.g. the philosophical implications of Gödel's theorem. The third sense of the phrase can be traced to the untimely death in 1969 of Arthur Prior. Through his exertions and example, he had ensured that the meetings and publications promoted by the Association for Symbolic Logic continued to be followed with profit by logicians from philosophical and mathematical circles alike.

Thereafter the meetings were taken over by mathematicians, and the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* became—with occasional gestures to its illustrious past—a vehicle for recursive function theory and the like, now seen as independent disciplines detached from foundational questions. Hence the need to found (1972) the *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, whose title phrase roughly means ‘symbolic logic aimed at those who still think of logic as part of the theory of argument’.

The symposia in this volume nicely exemplify each of the genres covered by its title. Consider first the plausible idea that if meaning is the minimum that must be grasped in order to understand speech, then meaning is specified when speech is reported. What follows from this hypothesis, asks Mark Sainsbury, and how do constraints on reported speech compare with Frege’s ‘modes of presentation’ as a guide to the concept of meaning? Next take second-order logic (*b.* 1879), increasingly seen as a serious rival to its much younger sibling, the (first-order) predicate calculus. Does natural language, asks James Higginbotham, tell for or against second-order logic? For example, should second-order quantification be construed as being merely substitutional in character; and again, is our pervasive plural idiom best represented in second-order terms? Consider finally the fact that two operators may be co-extensive without satisfying the same principles. To take an example provoked by Lucas’s celebrated argument against mechanism, my being a Turing machine *T* need not mean that ‘I can prove that I can prove that *P*’ behaves like ‘*T* can prove that *T* can prove that *P*’. Timothy Williamson explores this phenomenon with a wealth of novel results on systems of bimodal logic (systems containing a pair of independent modalities), both in general and as applied to ‘provability’ operators and to the effect of the operator ‘actually’.

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