Richard Sidney Sayers
1908–1989

Richard Sayers\(^1\) was born in Bury St Edmunds in Suffolk on 11 July 1908. He prided himself in after life on being a Suffolk man and looked forward to retiring to Suffolk. He did in fact move to Long Melford a year or two after his retirement although reluctantly he moved on again later, first to Essex and then to Sussex.

Of the seven children in the family Richard was the fifth. The oldest, a boy, died in infancy. Then came a girl, four boys and another girl. Richard's oldest brother, Frank, worked in Lloyds Bank, whose history Richard subsequently wrote. Another brother became a Squadron-leader in the RAF. Richard was the only one to attend University. His older sister, Margaret, who studied economics at night school and may have kindled his interest in the subject, might also have gone to University but was unable to take up a place at the LSE which she won, along with a gold medal, in a Royal Society of Arts examination.

The family belonged to the lower-ranking part of the professional class, Sayers's father, Sidney James Sayers, describing himself on the birth certificate as County Council Finance Clerk. He had attended night school like his daughter and trained as an accountant, working for 40 years as West Suffolk County Accountant in Shire Hall at Bury. Something of Sayers's father's concern with accounting shows up in his son's precise analysis, in balance sheet terms, of the successive effects of a change in a bank's cash reserves on its lending operations.

Sayers went to a succession of schools in Bury from 1912 to 1926, the

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\(^1\) In preparing this memoir I have drawn heavily on the recollections of Leslie Pressnell and Stuart Wilson and have been greatly assisted by Sayers's daughter, Jennifer, his son, Michael, his sister, Mrs Whitaker, and his younger brother Walter. Others who have provided useful information include Theo Barker, Alan Day, Henry Phelps Brown and the Revd Stella Taylor.
last nine of those years at West Suffolk County School. He was inclined to speak disparagingly of the school although he had been Head Prefect for two years (he retained many of the characteristics of a Head Prefect all his life). He showed no great interest in sport although his older brothers were in the soccer first 11. But when taunted again and again at the age of 14 or 15 with his inability to play football and match their achievements, he rounded on the pack with a tremendous outburst of temper, pledging his selection on merit by a fixed date when he would play and play well. Although he was listened to with scorn and disbelief he abandoned his books, trained regularly and hard, took all the knocks without complaint and was duly selected to play by the date he had set without any favouritism on the part of the selectors. He played in one game with grit and determination, then abandoned football for good, telling the Headmaster the full story and asking that he should never again be selected. 'My studies' he declared 'are more important.'

When it was decided to enter him for Cambridge, the 'local university', he found it necessary to go to a crammer for 'Little-Go' as he had no Latin. He had, however, been able to begin the study of economics in his final year and in the summer of 1926, before he went up to Cambridge, he was already reading Marshall and Taussig in preparation for Part I of the Economics Tripos. In December of the previous year he had sat the Scholarship Examination for Gonville and Caius College and been placed in the Exhibition Class in History. Neither Caius nor St John's (to which he had also applied) could take him before 1927 but he was offered and accepted a place at St Catherine's.

Throughout his life Sayers hesitated between economics and history and the hesitation was evident in his proposed course of study at Cambridge. He had intended to take Part I of the Tripos in Economics and Part II in History but ended by taking both Parts of the Economics Tripos, graduating in 1929 with a First in Part II. Nevertheless he retained his interest in history and his closest associations when on the staff of the LSE were with scholars who showed the same liking for a combination of history and economics: Barrett Whale and T. E. Gregory in pre-war days and T. S. Ashton after the war.

At Cambridge he was tutored by Gerald Shove, now a rather obscure figure but in his day one of the most powerful and original minds in economics. Sayers attended Keynes's lectures at a time when he was lecturing from the proofs of the *Treatise on Money* and was duly awed by the great man who made him a member of his Monday night 'Keynes Club.' In later life, however, he was a follower of Dennis Robertson rather than of Keynes and it was to Robertson that he habitually sent drafts of his work before publication.
During his studies in Cambridge he became attached to an old friend and form-mate from Bury, Millicent Hodson (the school was coeducational) and in September 1930, a year after graduation, they were married in Bury Cathedral. He then embarked on a year of graduate study in Cambridge while his wife taught in a school in Dry Drayton. Later she devoted herself to helping her husband with his writing and bringing up two children, a boy and a girl. Sayers did not involve her much in academic contacts and in post-war years at least, his colleagues hardly ever saw her.

In 1931 he was appointed as an Assistant Lecturer at the LSE where his main duty as to assist Barrett Whale. It was an association to which he looked back with pleasure for ‘the rich and generous source of ideas, inspiration and encouragement’ that Barrett Whale provided and the debt was acknowledged wholeheartedly in successive editions of *Modern Banking*. It was at the LSE that he began to learn about banking, working with Barrett Whale and Gregory and taking part in seminars with a team from the City who later co-operated to produce a very early study of comparative banking in a variety of countries (*Commercial Banking Legislation and Control*, ed. A. M. Allen).

He remained at the LSE for four years before moving to Oxford as a college lecturer, holding appointments at Corpus Christi, Exeter and Pembroke and becoming a Fellow of Pembroke in 1939. He had used his time at the LSE to conduct extensive research on monetary policy before the first world war, making thorough use of money market reports in *The Economist* and *The Statist* but without the access to Bank of England records subsequently accorded to Clapham when preparing his official history of the Bank up to 1914. He had applied, with Gregory’s help, to be allowed to consult the Bank’s records and although Montagu Norman refused, it seems to have been this that put into his head the idea of having an academic like Clapham prepare a history of the Bank for its 250th anniversary in 1944. If so, Sayers played a key part in opening up the archives of the Bank.

*Bank of England Operations 1890–1914*, which was published in 1936 when Sayers was already in Oxford, is not perhaps one of his major works but it established his reputation as a monetary historian. Unfortunately the type of the book was destroyed in wartime bombing and this—and the war itself—limited the attention it received. In the originality and meticulousness of the research, the organization of the material, and the clarity and elegance of the exposition it is a model of its kind. The evidence is carefully marshalled from scattered sources and woven into a clear line of argument with no attempt to claim more than can be demonstrated.

Sayers provided convincing evidence of the wide difference between the conventional view of the working of the pre-war gold standard and the
actual course of events. Instead of a smooth and more or less automatic mechanism of adjustment to balance of payments pressures through variations in Bank Rate, Sayers showed that even in its heyday the international gold standard 'worked under disadvantages of the same kind, though not to the same degree, as [regimes] of post-war years'. With tariffs, war debts, reparations and political insecurity it was 'remarkable that the gold standard ever worked at all' (pp. xx–xxi). 'Even if there was a much smaller supply of internationally mobile funds . . . our fathers and grandfathers must have been less sensitive, less ready to take fright at the succession of shocks which occurred' (p. xxii).

Sayers went on to show what difficulties the Bank of England had in maintaining the convertibility of the currency. It could neither afford large reserves nor was its power over market rates of interest assured. On the contrary it had to resort to all kinds of shifts to bring rates closer to Bank Rate and find other ingenious devices to protect its gold reserves by placing obstacles in the way of withdrawals.

Once in Oxford, Sayes embarked on the more ambitious project of writing a textbook on Modern Banking. First published in 1938, this was and remained the outstanding textbook on banking operations and on the practical and institutional aspects of banking. A strong motive in writing it, he once remarked, was the approaching birth of his first child and the usefulness of additional income; this was by no means the only occasion on which he responded to the prospect of a flow of royalties.

It was written at a time of upheavals both in theory and in economic activity. There was an intense interest in monetary problems and never-ending controversy over the revolutionary new ideas that kept appearing. The Macmillan Committee had issued its Report at the beginning of the decade. Book after book on money and banking by Keynes, Robertson, Hawtrey and other leading economists was published in the next few years. It was no mean task in these circumstances to synthesize and summarize 'current theory' and produce what Sayers described as a 'restatement of ideas which are the subject of agreement among most economists'; the 'restatement' required the same kind of intellectual effort as the works synthesized.

Sayers's aim was to write a textbook on banking that would help honours students 'to understand how this important part of the economic system really works nowadays.' He confined himself largely to English institutions with occasional references to American practice but little on other countries except a chapter on banking in the developing countries. In the first edition he also dealt with the international monetary system, the stock market and the nationalization of the banks but these chapters had largely disappeared by the third edition in 1951.
With Modern Banking Sayers became an internationally recognized economist. The book was for many years the standard work in Britain and indeed in many other countries, ran to seven editions, each largely re-written. The last, in 1967, was said a few years ago to be still in use in India.

Although Sayers made little claim to originality, no good textbook can be a mere summary of other people’s ideas and Modern Banking, which was decidedly a good textbook, gave expression to many original thoughts that are prominent in Sayers’s later writings. By the second page he was already presaging that emphasis on liquidity which some readers of the Radcliffe Report were later to find so baffling. ‘The economic significance of a change in the supply of money’ he maintained, ‘is based on the disturbance of the liquidity-distribution of the public’s assets.’ By page 3 he was explaining how the supply of money can respond to a change in the demand for it, as when an individual is moved to borrow from a bank in order to make an advantageous purchase. Another example occurs in his discussion of the interaction of short and long-term rates of interest. Well before Mr Dalton, he urged that ‘to maximize the effect in pushing up gilt-edged prices ... the banking policy of low short-term rates should be accompanied by propaganda such as we had in 1932’ (p. 155). And finally there is an indication of his later scepticism about monetary policy in his statement that ‘I know of no case in monetary history of a dear money policy alone producing a general deflation of money incomes’: followed within a couple of sentences by the apparently contradictory judgment on Bank Rate that ‘for producing a general revision of money incomes it is a halting, clumsy, indeed a brutal, instrument’ (p. 164).

In the years immediately before the war Sayers became involved in the work of the Oxford Economists’ Research Group which sought to establish empirically whether business men followed the practices which seemed self-evidently rational to economic theorists. Sayers’s part was to prepare a summary of the replies from a large number of business men to enquiries as to their reactions to changes in interest rates when deciding on capital expenditure. In 1951 when this and other papers were reprinted in Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism Sayers contributed a new paper, ‘Business Men and the Terms of Borrowing’ which threw even more doubt on the influence of changes in interest rates in controlling investment.

In wartime Sayers worked in the Ministry of Supply where his duties carried him into the hush-hush area of the atomic bomb. He was concerned with the development of uranium supplies and was one of the negotiating team sent to Washington in 1944. His part in the preparation of a joint report is highly praised by the official historian who tells us that his ‘intellectual powers, and literary ability, allied with tact and good temper,
were largely responsible for setting the pace of the study and for the excellent drafting of the report."

When the war was over he was persuaded by James Meade to join the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office and remained there for two years as a joint Deputy Director alongside Marcus Fleming. While Fleming concentrated largely on external economic policy, Sayers dealt with domestic issues, including the price and investment policy of the nationalized industries (he took a particular interest in transport charges), wage policy (here he laid great stress on education and persuasion much as he had done in relation to long-term interest rates) and industrial policy generally. In the summer of 1947 he was brought in on external economic policy and briefed the Lord President in favour of maximum blocking of sterling balances and full use of IMF facilities. Later in the year he was sent to Paris to help Sir David Waley (not that Waley wanted any help) in discussions on financing arrangements for intra-European trade.

When Sayers joined the Economic Section as Deputy Director he seems to have contemplated a long spell in public service but in 1947 he opted to resume his academic career, accepting appointment as Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics. There he remained until he took early retirement—as he had long intended—in 1968.

He first busied himself with a sketch of the American banking system published in 1948 and the preparation of a new edition (the third) of Modern Banking. Thereafter he turned to the second of his major works—some would say his best—Financial Policy 1939–45. This was a volume in the series of official histories edited by Sir Keith Hancock and perhaps the most difficult and challenging assignment of the entire series. It took over five years to complete, appearing finally in 1956. Sir Wilfrid Eady, who had been Second Secretary in the Treasury in wartime, reviewed it for the Economic Journal and had nothing but praise, calling it ‘an exciting book’. Brian Tew, in a more circumstantial analysis, was even more enthusiastic. ‘The story as it unfolds,’ he wrote, ‘is so fascinating that it deserves to be something of a bestseller.’ But the market for histories of financial policy, however exciting, is a limited one, especially if they cover the ground in detail and are works of scholarship not vulgarization. In comparison with Modern Banking, Financial Policy remained virtually unknown to the professional economist.

It was a study that drew on Sayers’s twin gifts as economist and historian and was written with his customary elegance and lucidity. The story revealed how it was left to a small group of administrators and professional economists in the Treasury to wrestle with momentous issues of the most diverse kind. In telling it, Sayers had two important
advantages. He had unlimited access to the official files and could consult those members of the Treasury team who were still alive. Exceptionally, he was also allowed to let the more prominent members of the group who were wartime recruits and not established civil servants—Keynes, Henderson, Robertson and Catto, for example—emerge from the shadows of anonymity and be named as the authors of contributions to the policy debate. The story could thus be told in full detail and with the added colour and life that personalities lent to it.

It was a story in which it was necessary to be quite clear about the role of finance in a war economy and Sayers made this his starting point. But it was also a story of political pressure: of tensions and their handling; of deciding what policies were feasible and sustainable, not just attractive in economic logic; of finding persuasive arguments and forming sound and convincing judgments about an uncertain future. Sayers dealt with both economic and political issues with great skill and recreated the atmosphere of the wartime Treasury, conveying to the reader the sophistication of the arguments employed, the relief and satisfaction when negotiations were successful, the frustration and disappointment when they failed or were prolonged indefinitely. While the first half of the book on the development of domestic policy gave the impression of successful outcomes, the latter half on external economic policy was in the words of Brian Tew, ‘a depressing chronicle of frustrations.’

The fifties were a highly productive period in Sayers’s life. In addition to Financial Policy he produced two other books: a collection of essays, most of them written in 1955–6, Central Banking after Bagehot, and a full-length study, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking (both published in 1957). The Lloyds study was his favourite book (though not his best) perhaps because it gave full scope to the historian in him to dwell on the personalities of bankers rather than the propositions of economists. He also edited Banking in the British Commonwealth (1952) and (with T. S. Ashton) a collection of reprints of Papers in English Monetary History. A fourth edition of Modern Banking was in the press and appeared in 1958. The spate of books ceased after he was appointed a member of the Radcliffe Committee on the Working of the Monetary System in the spring of 1957. It was the most important assignment in his career and occupied him for over two years.

Sayers played a dominant part in the Committee’s affairs. Since he was the only expert on money and banking on the Committee it was inevitable that he should take the lead in the more technical parts of the Committee’s work. The Chairman, Lord Radcliffe, regarded him as ‘our fast bowler’ and usually brought him on early in the interrogation of witnesses. Some complained afterwards that hardly anybody else put questions to them.
What was less clear was what part he would play in the preparation of the Committee’s Report. Radcliffe offered no guidance as to who should prepare a draft and to Sayers’s embarrassment the secretary, Robert Armstrong, set about the job and was well on the way to completing the draft before anybody knew. Sayers and I saw no possibility of arriving at a satisfactory text by amending the draft and decided that it must be quietly set aside. This could not be done, however, without agreement on alternative arrangements for the preparation of a report. The Chairman wanted to draft the final chapter on the constitutional issues but no other member of the Committee aspired to draft any of the other chapters. Sayers and I, therefore, took on the job and nobody dissented. He concentrated on the central issues of domestic monetary policy and wrote about two-thirds of the whole while I tackled the trimmings: the introduction, the capital market, statistics and international finance.

In the autumn of 1958, in the middle of the Committee’s work, Sayers had an attack of a virus akin to polio (probably Coxsackie virus) in the tongue at the end of a visit to the United States. This affected his speech and made it doubtful whether he would be able to continue on the Committee. Fortunately he recovered sufficiently to rejoin it and to resume drafting. When the Report appeared in the summer of 1959 it was obvious to those in the know that the main ideas in it were his.

This is not the place to re-examine these ideas and the criticisms they encountered. Those who reacted most strongly against the Report were the economists who were later christened ‘monetarists’. They insisted that there was a fundamental difference between money and other financial assets and were highly critical of the Report’s emphasis on liquidity as the appropriate focus of policy. The money supply seemed to them more measurable and less vague than the state of liquidity. These criticisms made little impression on Sayers. The fact that payments are made in money, not in other financial assets that can be readily cashed for money, seemed to him beside the point; and he would have rejected the notion that policy must always bear on measurable quantities like the money supply rather than on confidence, incentives, liquidity, and attitudes that are incapable of precise measurement.

What excited most controversy was the apparent belittling of monetary policy. The Report seemed to some people to be saying that money did not matter. In fact it said no such thing but warned the authorities not to put too much faith in the power of monetary policy. It argued that in dealing with a boom or a slump ‘monetary policy can help but that is all.’ Of course

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2 Infection with Coxsackie virus can produce weakness and paralysis by damaging the muscles (not the nerves as in the case of polio) but the muscles generally recover completely.
if pushed to the extreme of a liquidity crisis, the effect would be dramatic and inescapable. In all other circumstances it was the limitations of monetary policy that Sayers wished to emphasize.

The views he expressed in the Report of the Committee were not a brand new set of ideas flowing from the hearings. On the contrary, many of them—particularly those relating to liquidity—can be found in the papers in Central Banking after Bagehot. The limitations of Bank Rate, the desirability of steady long-term rates and occasional ‘changes of gear’ and the need to operate deliberately on the terms of lending across the whole financial spectrum, are all expounded in that earlier volume.

Sayers was bitterly disappointed by the reception of the Report—‘two years of my life—two years, wasted!’ he once exclaimed. His teaching at the LSE and the seminars he conducted there on Monday evenings, at which leading City figures were often invited to speak, were deeply affected by his reactions to widespread criticism of Radcliffe doctrine.

His disappointment did not prevent a considerable volume of new work in the 1960s and, after his retirement in 1968, in the 1970s. New editions of Modern Banking appeared in 1960, 1964 and 1967—the last of these edited mainly by Roger Bootle. He contributed a study of The Return to Gold in 1925 to the volume of Studies in the Industrial Revolution edited in 1960 by Leslie Pressnell, edited a volume on Banking in Western Europe in 1962 and The Economic Writings of James Pennington in 1963 and delivered the R. C. Mills Lecture in Sydney in 1965 on ‘The vicissitudes of an export economy: Britain since 1880’. Other work followed in 1967–8: a sketch of Economic Change in England 1880–1939 (1967); a contribution to the OECD volume on Fiscal Policy for a Balanced Economy (1968); and a centenary history of Gillett's Discount House, Gillett's in the London Money Market (1968). The last of these followed an earlier work, Gillett's Bankers at Banbury and Oxford, written under his supervision by Miss Audrey Taylor (who had held a temporary fellowship at an Oxford college). It had not been Sayers's intention to write the history of the firm but he decided to do so in honour of a much respected banker when Ronald Gillett, the head of the firm, died prematurely in 1965, shortly after the publication of Miss Taylor's book.

Apart from the histories of Lloyds and Gillett's, Sayers was much in demand as an historian of banking institutions. I can remember being asked about 1970 what the chances were of his accepting an invitation to write a history of the Federal Reserve System but whether he was ever formally approached I cannot say. What he did undertake was the equally demanding task of producing a sequel to Clapham's history of the Bank of England to 1914. This was completed in 1976 in three volumes covering the years from 1890 to 1944. To end in 1944 rather than in 1946 with the
nationalization of the Bank seems rather odd but was presumably intended
to allow the narrative to end with the 250th anniversary of the founda-
tion of the Bank and with the retiral of Montagu Norman from the
Governorship after 20 years.

Sayers took great pains over the work. He made full use of the Bank’s
archives and interviewed many of the leading figures, or their relatives, in
the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany and other
countries. In digging into the Bank’s accounts he was able to use his
mastery of balance-sheet changes, as he had done in the early chapters of
Modern Banking, in order to show how monetary policy worked. The
result was a study on at least the same level of erudition as Clapham’s and
superior in the ease and elegance of its style although some have found it
less readable.

In covering the period between 1890 and 1914 Sayers was returning in
his last book to the subject of his first with the advantage of an insider’s
view of events. This produced no surprises but he was able to avoid a mere
repetition of earlier work and to produce a more authoritative account.

The treatment of the later period after 1914 adds more to what was
previously known in several respects. It gives a fuller picture of the Bank’s
relationship with government, including full details of the conflict with
Cunliffe; of Norman’s part in European reconstruction and other inter-
national dealings of the Bank; and of the Bank’s efforts to assist in
industrial reconstruction in the 1930s. It is true, as Sidney Pollard
maintains in one of the few reviews to appear, that political issues count for
more in this period, not only domestically but internationally. The
struggles in a depressed inter-war economy between the groups asked to
share the burdens of depression are echoed in the struggles between rival
financial groups in Britain, France and Germany over the investment
opportunities associated with reconstruction in countries like Austria and
Hungary. But if Sayers gives limited space to those struggles and to the
political background to them, preferring to concentrate on clarifying
technical detail and the aims and operations of the Bank, this is surely
understandable. In a history that already occupies three volumes it is surely
right to give priority to the outlook and influence of the Bank rather than
stray too far into all the conflicting forces affecting its operations.

The book was highly praised—it was ‘a work that will take its place
among the classics’—but left Sayers himself dissatisfied. He told his sister
that he would never write another book. Nor did he. After 1976 he wrote
very little but did deliver in 1979 the Keynes Lecture to the British
Academy, returning to his favourite topic of Bank Rate in a survey of
‘Bank Rate in the Twentieth Century’.

Sayers was in great demand as an editor and as a consultant on
publications. He was, for example, the 'chief architect' of the *Three Banks Review*, acting as editorial adviser from its launch in 1948 until his retirement 20 years later. He set the pattern of the review, which always carried an historical article, as well as a general economic article and one on a more specific industrial or commercial subject. He brought in many of the contributors, and contributed himself but showed a distinct preference for articles in the areas he prescribed over articles in his own special field of banking and finance, which seldom appeared. As a member of the editorial committee he is said to have been good company, modest about his own work, but firm over any questioning of his proposals on policy or of his editorial standards.

He was also for a time closely associated with the editorial side of *Economica* and was chairman of the British Academy's publications committee from its inception in 1969 until 1974. This was at a time when the finance of academic publications was becoming increasingly costly and difficult and it was necessary to consider subsidies and alternative methods of publication. Sayer's own publishers, like the Academy's were the Oxford University Press to which he acted for many years as a consultant.

Sayers was a superb lecturer, taking immense pains over his lectures and shutting himself up in his room beforehand, virtually to memorize his lecture before delivering it. Both in lectures and in conversation he expressed himself slowly and with deliberation. He was always clear, concise and well within the allotted time. Latterly, however, he lectured less and less and from about 1963 until his retirement in 1968 gave no more than a few lectures each year. His weekly seminars were shared with Roger Alford, Leslie Pressnell, Alan Day and, for a time, Charles Goodhart.

Students stood in awe of him for his eminence and erudition but felt little of the affection some teachers inspire. They were said to scramble at seminars for seats well away from him in case they were easily spotted and obliged to answer awkward questions. He saw each of his students briefly at the beginning and end of term and gave particular attention to any student whom he knew to be in personal difficulties. In the case of an Indian student under stress, for example, he invited him to his home in Sevenoaks for a weekend. But he could also be brutal in his criticism if, for example, he suspected a student of borrowing other people's ideas without acknowledgement. There were occasions on which Sayers's colleagues feared that the victim might commit suicide and hurried to offer reassurance that the violence of the criticism reflected Sayers's ill-health.

Before the war Sayers had been happy to work with Barrett Whale and

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3 His role in that capacity is the subject of a tribute by Donald Fair in the September 1989 issue of *The Royal Bank of Scotland Review*, the successor to the *Three Banks Review*.
to mix with others at the LSE. When he rejoined the staff in 1947 he struck up a close friendship with T. S. Ashton who, like Sayers, combined economics with economic history. Ashton had begun as an economic historian and had been tempted back to Manchester by George Unwin, only to find himself required to teach currency and banking, never economic history. He had been in the Economic History chair at the LSE for three years when Sayers arrived and the two soon discovered their common interests. Sayers became something of a protégé of Ashton who protected him and when necessary would come to his defence.

With other colleagues at the LSE Sayers's relations were less close. He had shown at Oxford a capacity to collaborate in research into business behaviour. But temperamentally he was a loner who preferred to get on with his work without much social activity.

This tendency was accentuated in later life by ill-health: after a mishap on a platform at Leamington Spa station during the war he suffered from a bad back which obliged him to rest for long spells. The trouble continued and he had a bed installed in his room on which he rested. Apparently the 'cushions' between the disks in his spine were disintegrating and medical science had not yet found how to control this complaint. Later, however, Stuart Wilson remembers the emotional occasion when Sayers came back from seeing his doctor who had just told him that he could look forward to a normal life span. Less hopeful expectations may help to account for the pace at which he worked in the early 1950s, turning out a book a year.

When he returned after a summer vacation he once complained to a colleague that he had been unable to get any work done because of back trouble. Another problem was trouble with his throat: he used to say that he could barely last an hour's lecturing because of this. Shortly before he retired he described a visit to a throat specialist who was unable to find the cause of the trouble but called him back as he was leaving and said: 'Let me look at your shirt collar ... Yes, it's much too tight.'

It was a measure of the distance he preserved from his immediate colleagues that only one of them ever visited him at his home and then only in order to drive him to a conference at Nottingham. This was in 1970 when he had already retired and was trying to sell his house. Similarly, he never brought Mrs Sayers to the LSE or spent much time in the SCR or organized any of the tea or sherry parties for students and staff which the LSE encouraged. In the 1950s all the entertainment of money and banking students—especially those from abroad—and most of the visiting academics was undertaken by Stuart Wilson and his wife. There were periods when weeks would go by, nearly a whole term, without his colleagues seeing him. One of them, himself a distinguished monetary historian, cannot recall that Sayers ever dropped into his room about
anything more than once or twice in eight years. It was a cause of general 
astonishment and excitement when he and his wife accepted an invitation 
to the wedding of his secretary, Miss Adamson, in 1959.

Because of his bad back and because also of his immersion in writing 
and research, Sayers's immediate colleagues bore with the infrequency of 
contact with him and his light commitment to teaching in later years. But 
there were times when lack of contact and consultation could land 
colleagues in embarrassing situations out of ignorance and it never made 
for a healthy relationship. In other respects he was extremely conscientious: 
for example, in the keeping of records and preparing annual reports on his 
undergraduates. He took great trouble over his graduate students—most 
of them foreigners—and wrote personal letters of congratulation to all of 
them on graduation.

Sayers was a man of great determination and persistence. From an 
early age he pursued the truth with question after question, maintaining 
that no one could establish it without personally examining all the evidence 
and rejecting hearsay. At the same time he was shy, diffident and 
withdrawn. There was, too, a prickly side to his nature that grew more 
apparent with age and made him at times somewhat autocratic (one 
colleague called him 'The Emperor'). He could be crushing to students, 
colleagues, and even visiting speakers, defending himself on the grounds 
that robust argument is justifiable in academic debate—although the 
victims were not all academic. On the other hand, those of his colleagues 
who visited the United States and Australia were told of a Sayers they had 
ever known—a charming man, good-humoured and good company, and 
one who left behind warm memories and deep admiration. His younger 
brother insists that he had a hidden personality as a loving and caring 
person of whom many who knew him were unaware and cites as an 
example his firm promise in May 1940 to his brother, then a Territorial in a 
front line position on the South Coast, to look after his wife and children 
should he be killed in a German invasion.

He loved children and was sad that he had no grandchildren. He would 
brighten when any of his colleagues mentioned an expected addition to the 
family and welcome an opportunity to meet children brought to the 
School.

He was himself extremely sensitive to criticism and felt that his work 
did not receive all the attention it deserved. The post-Radcliffe years put a 
great strain on him and, in consequence, on his colleagues. He took the 
attacks on the Report very badly and was unable to restrain himself 
at lunches and seminars in encounters even with friendly City critics 
like Wilfred King of The Banker, and W. F. Crick, Midland Bank's 
Economic Adviser, while with others like Victor Morgan, who had
severely criticized the Radcliffe Report in print, he would sit sullen and silent, as once occurred at a seminar organized by the Midland Bank.

Seminars at the LSE suffered in the same way. They were oriented too exclusively to Radcliffe doctrine and contrary approaches were given short shrift. Questions would be put to students, their answers taken but not necessarily debated and there would follow an oracular pronouncement from Sayers. He became unhelpful, too, in offering comment on the work of his colleagues if it diverged from his own views.

Within the LSE Sayers did little to resist the decline of monetary history as a subject of study. This was strange given his dedication to the subject and his plea in 1960 for ‘the systematic study of recent monetary history’ and his lament for its neglect. A history paper had been compulsory in Finals at the LSE but when it was made optional in the 1960s Sayers offered no support for its retention. When taught M.Sc. degrees were introduced in the 1960s he let the old-style written M.Sc. in monetary history go. Thus the place of monetary history in the curriculum was gradually whittled down with the acquiescence of its principal exponent. Few good students went on to post-graduate research and those who wanted to do so might be advised to choose another University for the purpose. This was all very disheartening to Sayers’s immediate colleagues.

In the rise of model-building and econometric analysis, which marked the ‘modernisation’ of economics at the LSE (and elsewhere) in the 1960s, Sayers took no part. His interests were in the functioning of institutions, the framing of policy and the process of change. As a result there were those who came to regard him in the 1960s as one of yesterday’s men and could hardly wait to see him make way for a successor from the econometric generation.

Sayers was a great traveller in and out of term and had a wide range of contacts, particularly with bankers, all over the continent as well as in North America and Australia. This network was of great value to him and to the LSE during his tenure of the chair there. He had some knowledge of European languages, enough at least for reading purposes, but less so for speaking. Frank Paish alleged that after his efforts to lecture in Spanish his Spanish hosts decided that future speakers should be asked to lecture in their native tongues.

Whatever the truth of that story, when he declared his intention to retire early at 60 it was with the intention of teaching foreign languages. As retirement neared, however, he began to have second thoughts, hoping apparently that he might be asked to stay on after all and regretting that

4 Para. 1 of The Return to Gold, 1925.
nobody had done so. No one for that matter consulted him in any way about his eventual successor or even informed him.

Even when his academic career had ended he was tempted to take the Cambridge chair in economic history. David Joslin had succeeded Postan in 1965 but died suddenly of heart attacks in 1970 at the early age of 45. Sayers, then aged 62, seems to have been approached but decided not to take appointment, writing subsequently 'I can see now what a ghastly mistake it would have been.'

Sayers was elected to the British Academy in 1957 and served as Vice-President in 1966–7. He was especially proud of his FBA and liked the letters to be used after his name as evidence of his pride in that honour. In 1960 he served as President of Section F of the British Association. For a time in 1968 he was a part-time member of the Monopolies Commission. He became closely associated with the Economic History Society and was President from 1972–4. A few years earlier he had tried to revive an editorial committee for the *Economic History Review* but without success, one of the editors indicating his unwillingness to edit under supervision.

Sayers was awarded many academic honours. The Universities of Warwick and Kent conferred honorary degrees on him and the University of Cambridge would have like to do so too. He at first agreed but was unable, because of illness, to attend the ceremony and when approached a second time in the following year he for some reason declined the honour. He was, however, an honorary fellow of his old Cambridge college, St Catherine's and an honorary fellow also of the LSE and of the Institute of Bankers. After the publication of *The Bank of England* he was offered, but refused, a Knighthood (on the curious grounds that he could not possibly give an answer within 24 hours).

Music, art and walking were his main non-academic interests. He was an avid concert-goer and after he retired he was able to indulge more fully his interest in listening to music. His letters were full of comments on the London musical scene.

For most of his life, in spite of his back trouble, Sayers was basically a healthy and vigorous man. He enjoyed long walks and even after his hips started bothering him—he suffered latterly from arthritis—he would walk for hours over rough country. According to his daughter, he would climb anything in the Alps that did not require mountaineering equipment. Towards the end of his life, however, various complaints added up and in his last few years he was almost completely immobile.

With his death we have lost an authoritative guide to British banking, the author of a textbook read for a generation in successive editions all over the world, and an outstanding contributor to banking history. More than anyone, he was the source of the doctrines associated with the
Radeliffe Committee. His former pupils came to occupy positions of eminence in many countries and included, it is said, 19 Ministers of Finance.

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