WILLIAM HENRY WALSH

1913–1986

William Henry Walsh was born in Leeds on 10 December 1913. There was nothing in his family background to suggest the academic distinction which he was to achieve. Although his male grandparents, William Walsh and Henry Stephens, had, in their different ways, relatively successful careers, neither had any intellectual pretensions or any interest in their children’s education. As a result his parents were given no serious educational opportunities. His father, Fred Walsh, a charming but easy-going man, attended secondary school for a time, but thereafter was a semi-skilled engineer both before and during the First World War. He later earned his living as a baker, though displaying no aptitude for commerce. Walsh’s mother, May Stephens, left school to become a shop assistant before her marriage. The one general interest his parents shared was in religion, but because his father was a Baptist and his mother a Catholic, he was never baptized in church. Although his later philosophical attitude to religion was ambivalent, he regretted the fact that he had not had a serious religious upbringing, which he regarded as a proper part of general social life, and insisted that his own children be baptized into the Church of England for this reason. His father did have some interest in politics but showed little ability to pursue issues with any subtlety or depth. His parents were neither well educated nor well off, but they were devoted to him and made great sacrifices to support his development when his ability became apparent at school.

Shortly after his birth, the family moved to Baildon, near Bradford, where he began his education. While still at Baildon, he gained a scholarship to Bradford Grammar School which he attended for a year. The family then moved back to Leeds where, to his disappointment, he had to return to elementary school. He soon, however, gained a scholarship to Leeds Grammar School, where he remained for the rest of his pre-university education. The first-class teaching which he received there undoubtedly provided the context and main impetus for the development of his intellectual abilities and the direction of his first ambitions. He loved the school and remained deeply grateful for what it had given him, retaining his connections with it to the end of his life.
and becoming a regular benefactor to it. It was during this period that he acquired the name ‘Richard’, as a consequence of his playing that part in Richard II. This became his normal name to all outside his family, although in later life he came increasingly to dislike it and to prefer the family name, ‘Harry’.

Always particularly interested in classics, he gained a Classical Exhibition at Merton College, Oxford, in 1932, thus beginning a life-long connection with the College. His undergraduate career was highly successful. He was awarded the Gaisford Greek Prose Prize and went on to take Firsts in Classical Moderations in 1934 and Literae Humaniores in 1936, his tutor, the distinguished Hegelian scholar G. R. G. Mure, later describing him as ‘the best all-round Greats man’ he had ever taught. In 1936 he was elected Junior Research Fellow of the College. His tenureship of this post was interrupted by the War, in which he served in the Royal Signals Corps. After his initial training he was transferred to the Cryptography School at Bedford and, finally, to the Foreign Office, at Bletchley Park. In 1946 he returned to Merton to complete the remainder of his Research Fellowship but was soon offered the post of Lecturer in Philosophy at Dundee, then part of the University of St Andrews, on the recommendation of H. J. Paton, the White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. In 1947 Mure became Warden of Merton, and the College immediately invited Walsh back to replace him as Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, a post which he held until 1960, when he was appointed to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh.

His experience at Oxford during the period 1947–60 was in many ways mixed. In 1938 he had married Francis Beatrix Ruth (Trixie) (née Pearson), herself an Exhibitioner in French at St. Hilda’s College. It was a happy marriage and they had three children, all of whom later went on to study at Oxford. He was also greatly attached to Merton as a College, entering into and enjoying very fully collegiate life. His teaching duties were nevertheless excessively heavy—often involving twenty hours a week. In addition he held many offices and sat on many committees, in helping make what is now recognized as a major improvement in the academic standing of the College. These activities ate deeply into his time, although he still managed to produce one book, An Introduction to Philosophy of History, and some fifteen articles in this period.

All this, however, made considerable demands on him which he might have felt less had he not suffered from a growing sense of
academic frustration. To understand this, it is necessary to say a little about the situation of philosophy in Oxford at this time and about Walsh's philosophical apprenticeship under Mure. Mure himself was a man of deep but somewhat dogmatic philosophical convictions. Devoted to Hegel, he tended to look at all philosophical texts in a Hegelian light, concentrating on Plato, Aristotle, Bradley, Hegel himself, and Kant, of whom he was harshly critical, but disregarding Moore, Russell, and almost all subsequent philosophical developments. His own philosophical inclinations were towards the sort of idealism developed by T. H. Green and Bradley, which was increasingly ignored in the thirties. What Walsh derived from Mure was an appreciation of the thought of certain important philosophers, and a sense of the importance of their systems as a whole, rather than of the strength of their arguments, at a time when, under the influence of logical positivism, the history of philosophy was largely neglected and metaphysics was thought not to be a subject. Walsh himself had a much more flexible mind than Mure and was far more catholic in his interests. These quickly extended to include Descartes, Locke, Hume, Russell, and Moore, and he did not share Mure's disregard for ongoing philosophical concerns. Nevertheless, he could not accept the neglect of history of philosophy and of metaphysics which remained dominant in the fifties when linguistic philosophy reached its zenith. He knew and admired the work of some of the foremost linguistic philosophers, particularly that of Ryle and Austin, but was inhibited and depressed by the overwhelming emphasis given to linguistic analysis for its own sake. His own lecture courses and graduate classes in this period, which concentrated on Kant's three Critiques, the nature of categories, types of metaphysical theory, the question of truth in metaphysics and problems in philosophy of history, show how different his interests were from those then prevalent in Oxford.

Although he was relatively little known in Great Britain, he had nevertheless begun to acquire a reputation on the Continent and in the USA, and in the year 1957–8 he was invited to become Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the State University of Ohio. The year there was of great importance to him. It gave him the knowledge that he could develop his interests outside Oxford and it put a halt to his increasing loss of self-confidence. Thus, in 1960, when H. J. Paton recommended that he should apply for the vacant Edinburgh Chair, he was keen to do so.

Walsh held the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh from 1960 until his retirement in 1979, in which period he was one
of the most important influences in the University. His first problem was to improve the structure of the Department itself. When he arrived in Edinburgh there was a Department of Moral Philosophy, headed by his friend, Professor Winston H. F. Barnes, and a separate Department of Logic and Metaphysics. This division was academically unsatisfactory, forcing both students and staff to concentrate too much in one or the other area of philosophy. One of Walsh's first undertakings was, in collaboration with Barnes, to introduce a more flexible structure, integrating the two halves. This enabled staff to teach over the whole range of philosophy and students to grasp the systematic interconnections between different aspects of the subject. A second problem was the almost total neglect of formal logic in the syllabus. Walsh took advantage of the university expansion of the sixties to make appointments to rectify this imbalance. A third change which he introduced was in teaching methods, where more emphasis was laid upon tutorials, to meet the needs of the individual students, than was customary in the Scottish universities. Finally, new programmes of postgraduate work were introduced, and, partly as a consequence of Walsh's own academic reputation, there was a large increase in the number of postgraduate research students. By the end of the decade, Edinburgh had become a leading centre of postgraduate work.

At a personal academic level, Walsh found the change liberating. He was able to teach undergraduates in areas of philosophy which the demands of the syllabus at Oxford had rendered unnecessary, but which he considered to be fundamental. Thus he gave major series of lectures on the history of theories of knowledge and different aspects of the philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Bradley and, in the Department of History, in conjunction with Professor Denys Hay, on History and Theory of History. He loved teaching and he generally managed to fit in about twelve hours a week.

Beyond the Department, his administrative abilities were much appreciated and, through them, his general academic influence grew. Of the many offices which he held, the most important were Dean of the Faculty of Arts, 1966–8, Senate Assessor on the University Court, 1970–3, one of the Curators of Patronage—a body empowered to make recommendations to the Vice-Chancellorship—and, from 1975–9, one of the University's three Vice-Principals.

Despite his heavy academic and administrative commitments, these were years of personal achievement. In addition to over
thirty substantial articles, he wrote three more books—*Metaphysics* (1963), *Hegelian Ethics* (1969), and *Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics* (1976). International recognition came in many ways. He was a member of the Editorial Board of such journals as *Kant-Studien* and *History and Theory*, and was in constant demand as an academic advisor to various publishers. In 1963 he was the Dawes Hicks Lecturer in the British Academy and in 1964–5 he was President of the Aristotelian Society. In 1969 the British Academy elected him to a Fellowship—an honour which both surprised and delighted him. In 1978 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and in the same year the University of Rochester conferred an Honorary Doctorate on him. Throughout these years he was in continuous demand as a speaker at international conferences and as a lecturer in America, where he spent various periods of time, at Dartmouth College in 1965, at the University of Maryland in 1969–70, and, immediately upon his retirement, at the University of Kansas as the Rose Morgan Visiting Professor, 1979–80.

Upon his retirement as Professor Emeritus of the University, he returned to Oxford, as Trixie and he had always intended, where his formal connection with Merton was renewed by his appointment as Fellow Emeritus of the College. In his last years, the pattern of his academic work remained largely as before. He continued to teach and to write and undertook a new book, unfortunately not completed, on the whole of Kant’s philosophy. He helped to found the Hegel Society of Great Britain and in 1985 was elected President of the Society. In 1983 he spent a further period in America, at the University of Carleton, and, in 1985, at a ceremony by which he was much moved, the University of Edinburgh recognized his services both to it and to philosophy by conferring upon him the degree of Doctor of Letters. Towards the end of this period, he wrote a chapter, *The Zenith of Greats*, for the forthcoming nineteenth-century volume of the History of Oxford University.

Although Walsh may have seemed to fulfil the demands of an excessively hard-working life at little personal cost to his health, it had become apparent for some years that this was not so. From 1970 onwards he suffered from a series of more and less serious ailments, which culminated in the onset of Parkinson’s Disease soon after his retirement. Although he made light of this in public, privately it distressed him greatly. In 1985 melanoma of the brain was also diagnosed, and his condition deteriorated rapidly. When he died on 8 April 1986, his family and friends knew that it
released him from a condition in which he would not have wished to continue.

Walsh’s philosophical research was centred in four main areas, metaphysics, history of philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of history, all of which, in the way in which he conceived them, had a bearing on one another and all of which were pursued with remarkable consistency throughout his life. His early writings were on Kant, Hegel, and the role of the intellect in knowledge. These arose from his pre-war postgraduate research on Kant, as did his first book, *Reason and Experience* (1947), which, although not a technical treatise on Kant, he described as a ‘Kantian study’, in so far as its shape was determined by Kant’s problems and proposed solutions. Although an early work, it evinces two permanent features of Walsh’s approach to philosophy—the necessity to distinguish, within the work of a given philosopher, between what is of universal importance and what is of local or specialist interest, and the desire to test the truth of these more important claims. In the case of *Reason and Experience*, this meant first that, although the focus of the book accepted Kant’s way of posing the distinction between reason and experience, considerable space was devoted to examining the distinction as deployed by rationalists and empiricists prior to Kant, and to idealists, such as Hegel and Bradley, who might claim to have transcended it. Secondly, it meant that the book was structured not merely by Kant’s conception of the problem, but by the outcome of Walsh’s own critical assessments of the doctrines discussed. Because of the time at which it was published, the book never had the success it deserved, yet anybody who reads it today cannot fail to be impressed by Walsh’s mastery of the conceptions with which he was dealing and of the philosophers who had developed them. It is worth noting, indeed, that the chapter on Self-Knowledge was republished as recently as 1982 in a collection of essays on Kant, although it represents a view which Walsh himself had abandoned by the time he wrote his book on Kant in 1975.

A major concern of *Reason and Experience* is the problem of the necessity for, and the status of, categories. Walsh supports the Kantian position to the extent that he argues that, without categories, organized knowledge as we have it would be impossible. He does not, however, accept Kant’s account of the necessary rationality of the categories and, in an interesting section, shows the degree to which Hume was forced to ascribe categorical functions to the imagination in order to allow him to separate the subjective from the objective elements in experience.
He does not attribute to Hume the notion of an a priori imagination prescribing to experience principles which originate in human nature, but he notes that such a conception is a logical extension of Hume’s doctrine and one which is at least as arguable as the more rationalist Kantian conception.

The problems of categories, their relation to metaphysics, and their mode of assessment remained among his major preoccupations. They emerged in two important articles, ‘Categories’ in *Kant-Studien* (1954), and ‘True and False in Metaphysics’ in *Filosofia* (1959), written when he was struggling against the prevailing anti-speculative atmosphere of Oxford philosophy. The year at Ohio State University, 1957–8, gave him the freedom further to develop his ideas on these subjects and this culminated in his book, *Metaphysics*, published in 1963 after the move to Edinburgh.

Walsh did not think that metaphysical systems should be immune from criticism or rejection, but he believed that such discussion should be based on an acquaintance with what metaphysicians had said and were trying to do, rather than, as in the case of the anti-metaphysical polemics of the logical positivists, the quotation of some single sentence taken out of context. *Metaphysics* is thus both an interpretation of some of the major historical metaphysical systems, from Plato to Wittgenstein, and an argument as to the value and difficulties of the subject. Walsh’s own viewpoint is always made abundantly clear. He accepts the distinction between transcendent and immanent metaphysics and agrees that some metaphysicians are more appropriately thought of as producing one kind rather than the other. Nevertheless, he argues, even transcendent metaphysicians have shared with immanent metaphysicians a desire to make sense of experience as a whole, so that it is difficult to find any metaphysicians whose thought moves at a completely transcendent level. Walsh’s own sympathies lie clearly with immanent metaphysicians, whom he treats as proposing different sets of categories for providing unitary views of experience. It is typical of his view of philosophy that he refuses to accept the Collingwoodian claim that metaphysicians are merely expressing the basic presuppositions of a given historical culture, insisting, on the contrary, that their claims are always, in principle at least, in competition. This leads to the question how one should decide between different metaphysical systems. Walsh argues that, although deductive and inductive arguments have a place in metaphysical reasoning, metaphysics itself is fundamentally
neither deductive nor inductive, since the metaphysician is advocating the adoption of rules rather than working under them. Metaphysics is thus a matter of trying to explicate a categorical framework which will allow us to view experience systematically or as a whole. The methods of assessment for metaphysics are therefore more like those to be found in literary criticism. Theories can be assessed for consistency and comprehensiveness but behind this there lie also questions of depth, penetration, and insight. Argument can help here but, in the last resort, the only appeal to somebody who finds a metaphysical position unacceptable is to invite him to look again at experience in the light of it. Ultimately, therefore, there is nothing to force us to subscribe to one metaphysical system rather than another, but this is because, when it comes to such fundamental viewpoints as metaphysics offers, 'understanding and experience cannot properly be divorced'. Walsh does not put it in these terms, but his position could be stated by saying that, while metaphysics must satisfy certain necessary conditions, there are no sufficient conditions and, to that extent, each man is his own metaphysician.

Although written to defend metaphysics at a time when it was still largely under attack, the viewpoint of the book would be worthy of discussion under any circumstances. It is a work, indeed, whose time may be said to be still to come, for, although metaphysical problems are now again admitted to be central to philosophy, the problem of the status of metaphysical systems can hardly be said yet to have received much helpful discussion.

As part of his general belief in the importance of metaphysics, Walsh wrote many articles on the viewpoints of philosophers as diverse as Plato, Vico, Hume, Hegel, Bradley and Collingwood. His most consistent subject, however, was Kant. By 1975 he had been teaching Kant for twenty-five years and had published at least a dozen specialist articles on different aspects of Kant's philosophy, acquiring, in the process, an international reputation for his detailed scholarship. A year's sabbatical gave him the opportunity to fulfil a long-standing ambition—to produce a detailed examination of what he took to be the crucial arguments of the Critique of Pure Reason. This was published as Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, a title which Walsh recognized as implying something more limited than what he had undertaken, yet which also indicated what he took to be the key issue underlying the whole work.

Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics is, on any account, a major contribution to Kantian scholarship and has been universally
welcomed as such. It is not so much a complete commentary on the Critique as a selective critical discussion of the meaning and tenability of its central doctrines, involving both close analysis of crucial passages and wide-ranging discussion of the issues which Kant raises. Walsh’s conclusions are, as they surely must be, mixed. He argues that the position adopted in the Aesthetic is untenable in the way stated but that the objectivity of the empirical world, for which Kant tried there to argue, can be established by a theory of judgement which is advanced in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction, according to which ‘nature is not a set of things, public or private; it is a set of facts about which we can all be got to agree’. This agreement is expressed on the basis of judgements which deploy a sensory component which is not purely private, even though it occurs in individuals, and a shared categorical framework. This doctrine about the relation between objectivity, fact and judgement is one which Walsh came increasingly to accept and which he used in later writings. It is unfortunate, however, that he did not elaborate more fully on the nature of the sensory component, for it is obvious, as Walsh points out, that if Kant thinks of this component as purely private, he would have no grounds for accepting that we also have shared judgements. On the other hand, to disregard the philosophical difficulties inherent in the idea of a sensory component which occurs in individuals but which is not purely private seems to produce a verbal rather than a substantial resolution to the difficulty.

With regard to the categorical framework expressed in the shared judgements, Walsh argues that Kant can make out a good case for the interconnectedness of the crucial concepts of substance, causality, and reciprocity. When he comes to the question of the status of the framework, however, the continuity of his thinking with the argument of Metaphysics becomes apparent, for he records it as a matter of regret that Kant never thought of the possibility that we might grasp reality more adequately if we had a better set of categories. ‘Hegelian thoughts of this kind,’ Walsh concludes, ‘were far from his mind.’

A major feature of his interpretation of Kant, both in Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics and in later articles, is the importance which he attaches to the distinction between an intuitive and a discursive understanding, and the connection which Kant forged between this and the noumenon–phenomenon distinction. Kant introduced the notion of an intuitive understanding as a way of indicating the limits of a discursive understanding, such as that
which is analysed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but by linking the former with knowledge of the existence of things-in-themselves, he produced the paradoxical conclusion that we can only know things as appearances. Hegel objected strongly to this conclusion, both on the grounds that to speak of things-in-themselves about which we know nothing is self-contradictory and that to have fixed a limit is already to have transcended it. Walsh accepted that these criticisms needed to be met without abandoning some conception of the unconditioned to make sense of the notion of the conditioned which is central to Kant’s theory of judgement. But he rejected Hegel’s criticisms on the grounds that they turned on the *ad hominem* point that Kant often speaks of the actuality of the unconditioned whereas all that his position requires is the concept of the unconditioned. Given this modification, Walsh argues, Hegel’s first point, while true in itself, misses the mark, while the second criticism is interpreted in such a way as not to prejudice the main claims about the nature of knowledge advanced in the *Critique*.

Walsh’s approach to the problems raised by Kant’s philosophy was affected by a constant meditation, expressed in a series of papers, on Hegel’s relation to Kant. In the end, however, his own metaphysical position remained more Kantian than Hegelian. For, apart from his endorsement of the theory of judgement outlined earlier, which Hegel consistently castigated as ‘subjective’, when he turned to Hegel’s alternative, in which the divorce between the understanding and intuition was supposed to be overcome by the notion of the self-specification of reason in the material world, he found the latter, if not unintelligible, at least not acceptable as an answer to the same problem—a problem which he took to be quite fundamental.

On other matters, however, he found more to admire in Hegel than in Kant. He believed that Hegel, with his sensitivity to the social and historical aspect of the reality in which individuals exist, had a much superior view of the self and, through that, of the nature of morality. Already, in *Metaphysics*, in discussing Bradley’s dictum that ‘[t]he “individual” apart from the community is not anything real’, he had noted that to deal with the moral agent without regard to his national, family, and social ties was to deal with an abstraction. In *Hegelian Ethics* (1969) and in his subsequent article, ‘Pride, Shame and Responsibility’ (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, 1970) this point was picked up and developed. In *Hegelian Ethics* he again contrasted the Kantian and Hegelian points of view. He did not dissent from Kant’s claim that an
agent’s intention was relevant to the morality of an action but he objected that, given the inter-personal validity of moral rules, it could not be all that was involved. A primary part of morality lay in the obligations which were incumbent on an individual in virtue of occupying various overlapping roles in an historical society. Despite this, however, he was dissatisfied with the degree to which Hegel allowed the notion of belonging to a nation or to some of the various collectivities within a nation to determine almost the whole of morality, arguing that this amounted to advocating a ‘closed’ rather than ‘open’ morality, in which moral action could not be actuated by the thought of man as man. He was dissatisfied, moreover, with the easy optimism with which Hegel used his account of history as the progress of consciousness to argue that in clashes between nations the morality of the victor must be superior to that of the vanquished. Walsh saw this as a method of evading rather than resolving the further moral problems which Hegel’s recognition of the diversity of national moralities should have forced upon him.

Philosophy of history was the final area to which he made an ongoing contribution throughout his academic life. History itself had been of interest to him since his undergraduate days and the problem of making sense of history and, more fundamentally, of historical judgement could not fail to attract him when studying such a historically-minded philosopher as Hegel. His book, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (1951), was certainly, in terms of re-issues and translations, the most widely published of his works, as well as being the most influential book in the subject since the War. In the first part of it he dealt with ‘the logic of historical thinking’, covering the topics of explanation, truth and fact, objectivity and, in later editions, historical causation. In the second and shorter part he discussed metaphysical interpretations of history, which purport to find a meaning in history as a whole, such as were propounded by Kant, Herder, and Hegel. This distinction between what has been called ‘analytic’ and ‘speculative’ philosophy of history has come under considerable criticism in recent years, although, it must be said, something akin to it still lies behind many discussions in philosophy of history. It is interesting to note, however, that already, in the first edition of the Introduction, Walsh himself had suggested that the two approaches might not be as distinct as the structure of the book implied. Moreover, what comes out strongly in his discussions of the problems of explanation and of fact and objectivity, is that, even if he was suspicious of large-scale metaphysical interpretations of
history, he was keenly aware of the role—the indispensable role, as he claimed—which metaphysical and moral presuppositions play in historical judgement. Thus in rejecting both the positivist and idealist accounts of historical explanation, he argued that such explanations depend upon generalizations about human nature which include both empirical and a priori elements, corresponding to beliefs about how people do behave and how they ought to behave. This position, he admitted, could lead to scepticism not merely about the validity of historical explanations but about historical facts themselves, since facts are what are stated in judgement, and judgements resting upon different presuppositions will lead to different facts. One solution which he canvassed was that of a radical perspectivism, implying the incommensurability of different ‘facts’. Another was that of an objective historical consciousness achieved by historians reaching agreement in their moral and metaphysical ideas. Failing this outcome, however, which he did not think very probable, the perspectivist theory seemed the most defensible. This was not an answer which contented him, though it sprang from considerations adduced in *Reason and Experience*, and he returned to the problem several times. His final conclusion (in ‘Truth and Fact in History Reconsidered’, *History and Theory*, 1977) drew again upon the theory of judgement propounded in *Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics*. He now formulated a distinction between the judgements which we make as actual thinkers and the ‘ideal form of judgment’, to which we try to make our judgements conform in order that intelligent persons, as such, will accept them. Historical facts would thus be those facts stated by actual judgements which conform to these ideal conditions. Walsh still accepted that, given our inability to prescribe an unarguable metaphysical and moral framework, the fulfilment of these conditions would not be demonstrable, but held that the fact that historians agree over so much in their judgements, is good evidence for accepting that they are, nevertheless, often fulfilled. Beyond this, however, he would not go since, as noted earlier, he always wanted to leave room for an improvement in our metaphysical and moral beliefs, whatever their source.

Walsh was an extremely prolific writer with a very wide range of interests. It is noteworthy, however, that from his earliest writings, he returned again and again to what he took to be the basic problem in philosophy: the status and source of metaphysical belief. He accepted that metaphysical truths could never be demonstrable but to those who would argue that they ought
therefore to be abandoned he could show, as he did in many different areas of knowledge, how the character of knowledge is ineliminably affected by metaphysical and, indeed, moral presuppositions. One could argue about the comparative strengths of different metaphysical frameworks but, because of their non-rational origins, one could never deny the possibility of improvement. To this extent he was always an optimistic philosopher.

Walsh will be remembered as a man of warmth and humanity, with a capacity for making deep and lasting friendships. He had a habit of frowning when concentrating which could make him seem stern and even remote upon first acquaintance but few who knew him longer retained this impression. His willingness to give freely of his time to his students and colleagues at the expense of his own work was much appreciated. He was not, however, endlessly patient and, on occasions, both on university committees and when teaching, could explode in irritation with a healthy deflating effect upon all. He looked at the world and, indeed, himself in a quizzical way and had a nice sense of humour, which often expressed itself in a self-deprecating manner. For relaxation, he enjoyed company—and was a most generous host—reading history and literature, and keeping in touch with sport. He also enjoyed travel, taking seriously Descartes’ remark that ‘to converse with those of other ages and to travel are almost the same thing’, although he had no great facility for speaking foreign languages. One of his most striking characteristics was his humility and genuine modesty about his own attainments. Upon the occasion of the presentation of his Festschrift, what pleased him most was not recognition of his overt academic achievements, but of the self-sacrifices which he had made on behalf of his subject and of academic life in general, in time-consuming but relatively unseen ways—in helping students and colleagues, in advisory work, and in accepting the burdens of high academic administrative office. Only Trixie and he knew what these had really cost, but he was glad that, to some extent at least, they were known to, and appreciated by, others.

Walsh was distinguished both as a philosopher and as a historian of philosophy. It is probably true that, even at the end of his life, his international reputation was still greater than his national reputation, although the more liberal character of British philosophy in the seventies helped to rectify his earlier neglect. There is no doubt, however, that he felt this at a personal level and that he believed that had he begun his philosophical career in a different period he would have earned more recognition at home.
What he perhaps failed to realize was the extent to which others shared his disillusion with the dogmatic and anti-humanist character of logical positivism and the triviality of linguistic philosophy and the degree to which, for those who felt that they also were struggling in an alien climate, his efforts to pursue philosophy as he believed it ought to be pursued were a constant source of support and inspiration.

Leon Pompa

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