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CAPITULUM 29. |
Chapter 29. |
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Discipulus Satis audivi de isto modo errantem de pertinacia convincendi et ideo alium modum expone. |
Student I have heard enough about that way of convicting of pertinacity someone erring, and so explain another way. |
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Magister Duodecimo est quis de pertinacia convincendus si errans contra fidem catholicam correctioni et emendationi illius vel illorum cuius vel quorum interest subicere se recusat. Hoc tali ratione probatur. Ille qui iudicium subterfugit pro nocente debet haberi, teste Bonifacio papa, qui, ut habetur Extra, De praesumptionibus c. Nullus dubitat, ait, "Nullus dubitat quod ita nocens iudicium subterfugit quemadmodum ut absolvatur qui est innocens quaerit." Cui concordat Pelagius papa, qui, ut habetur 11. q. 1. c. Christianis, ait "Qui iudicium refugit apparet eum de iustitia diffisum." Hoc etiam ex auctoritate Bonifatii papae quae ponitur 3. q. 9. c. Decernimus et ex verbis Gregorii quae ponuntur dist. 74. c. Honoratus colligitur evidenter. Errans igitur contra fidem qui iudicium subterfugit pertinax et haereticus est censendus. Qui autem correctioni et emendationi illius vel illorum cuius vel quorum interest subicere se recusat iudicium subterfugit. Ergo pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
Master Someone should be convicted of pertinacity in a twelfth way if he errs against the catholic faith and refuses to submit himself to correction and amendment by that person or persons whose concern it is. This is proved by the following argument. A person who evades judgement ought to be held to be culpable, according to the testimony of Pope Boniface who says, as we find in Extra De presumptionibus, c.[4] Nullus dubitat, "No one doubts that he who is culpable evades judgement, just as he who is innocent seeks it in order to be absolved." [cols.786-7] Pope Pelagius agrees with this when he says, as we find in 11, q. 1, [c.12] Christianis, "It is clear that he who flees judgement has no confidence in his uprightness." [col.903] This is clearly gathered also from the text of Pope Boniface, found in 3, q. 9, c.[10] Decernimus, and from the words of Gregory, found in dist. 74, c. Honoratus. [cols.358-9] Anyone erring against the faith who evades judgement, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical; anyone who refuses to submit himself to the correction and amendment of the person or persons whose concern it is evades judgement; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical. |
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Discipulus Ista ratio videtur procedere de vocato ad iudicium et se per contumaciam absentante; de aliis nihil probare videtur. |
Student That argument seems to be effective for one called to court and absenting himself out of contumacy; it seems to prove nothing about others. |
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Magister Non solum de vocato ad iudicium se per contumaciam absentante sed etiam de impediente ne fiat iudicium, ut dicunt isti, concludit ratio supra dicta, quia sicut ille non est immunis a crimine qui iustitiam fieri nititur impedire, quamvis ad iudicium minime sit vocatus, ut habetur Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. 1 , ita errans contra fidem et ne de errore suo fiat iudicium impediens non potest a crimine excusari. Sed istud crimen non videtur aliud quam pertinacia. Ergo talis est merito pertinax iudicandus. |
Master They say that the above argument is conclusive for someone hindering the making of a judgement, not only for someone called to court and absenting himself out of contumacy. For just as that person who tries to prevent justice being done is not free from reproach even if he has not been called to court, as we find in Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. 1 [quia quaesitum], [col.327] so one who errs against the faith and hinders the passing of judgement on his error can not be excused from reproach. But that reproach seems to be for nothing but pertinacity. Such a person, therefore, should be deservedly judged to be pertinacious. |
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Item errans contra fidem qui non est paratus corrigi nec quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus, ut ex verbis Augustini quae ponuntur 24. q. 3. c. Dixit apostolus colligitur evidenter; sed qui correctioni et emendationi illorum quorum interest subdere se recusat, impediens quoquomodo ne error suus rite et legitime examinetur, quamvis non sit vocatus ad iudicium, non est paratus corrigi nec quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem. Ergo pertinax haereticus est censendus. |
Again, someone erring against the faith who is not ready to be corrected and does not seek the truth with cautious responsibility should be judged to be pertinacious and heretical, as is clearly gathered from the words of Augustine found in 24, q. 3, c. [29] Dixit apostolus (cols.1428-9); but he who refuses to submit himself to correction and amendment by those whose concern it is, and impedes in any way at all the appropriate and legitimate examination of his error, even if he has not been called to court, is not ready to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical. |
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Amplius, ipsa veritate testante, ut habetur Iohannis 3, c. "Qui male agit odit lucem et non venit ad lucem ut non arguantur opera eius." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod qui non venit ad lucem ut non arguantur opera eius male agit. Nam si non male ageret faceret veritatem. Si autem faceret veritatem veniret ad lucem, ibidem veritate dicente, "Qui autem facit veritatem venit ad lucem". Errans ergo contra fidem si non venit ad lucem districti iudicii et clari examinis illorum quorum interest illuminare errantem male agit. Ista autem malicia non est nisi pertinacia. Ergo talis pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
Furthermore, as we find in John 3:[20], the Truth Himself testifies that "He who behaves badly hates the light and avoids it so that his deeds will not be made known." From these words we gather that he who avoids the light so that his deeds will not be known behaves badly. For if he were not behaving badly he would do what is true; if he were to do what is true, however, he would come into the light, as the Truth says in the same place [John 3:21] "He who does what is true comes into the light." If one who errs against the faith does not come into the light of strict judgement and open examination by those whose concern it is to enlighten the erring, therefore, he behaves badly; that badness, however, is nothing but pertinacity; such a person, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Discipulus Per istam rationem apparet quod omnis errans, nisi statim veniat ad lucem petens suam assertionem per illos quorum interest examinari et discuti, est pertinax reputandus. Quod nimis videtur durum quia multos theologos crimine pertinaciae implicaret. |
Student It appears from that argument that everyone who errs should be regarded as pertinacious unless he immediately comes into the light and seeks to have his assertion examined and inquired into by those whose concern it is. This seems too harsh because it would involve many theologians in the charge of pertinacity. |
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Magister Sicut scis praecepta affirmativa obligant semper sed non pro semper. Et ideo errans quamvis teneatur venire ad lucem iusti iudicii non tamen pro omni tempore ad hoc tenetur. Sed non impedire iudicium fieri cum sit negativum pro omni tempore obligat. Et ideo ille dicendus est venire ad lucem qui paratus est venire ad lucem quando expedit et oportet. Et ideo licet non omni tempore veniat ad lucem petendo suam assertionem discuti diligenter non est pertinax reputandus, sed quandocunque ne assertio sua arguatur nititur impedire ne ad examen debitum deducatur est dicendus odire lucem et non venire ad lucem ut non arguatur assertio eius, et ideo tunc est merito pertinax iudicandus. Ex praedictis isti inferre conantur quod si papa aliquam haeresim dogmatisat et impedit generale concilium celebrari ne sua assertio discutiatur pertinax et haereticus est censendus. . |
Master [See Significant Variants, para. 24.] Affirmative precepts are always binding, as you know, but not for always. Although someone who errs is bound to come into the light of a just judgement, therefore, he is nevertheless not bound to this on every occasion. But since "not to prevent judgement being made" is a negative [precept] it is binding on every occasion. He should be said to come into the light, therefore, who is prepared to come into the light when it is appropriate and fitting to do so. And therefore even if he does not on every occasion come into the light by seeking to have his assertion carefully inquired into he should not be regarded as pertinacious; but whenever he tries to prevent his assertion being brought to due examination, lest it be reproved, he should be said to hate the light and not to come into the light lest his assertion be reproved; and he is then, therefore, deservedly judged to be pertinacious. They try to infer from the above that if the pope teaches some heresy as doctrine and prevents the celebrating of a general council lest his assertion be examined, he should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
CAPITULUM 30. |
Chapter 30.
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Discipulus Si aliter potest errans de pertinacia convinci non differas declarare. |
Student Do not hesitate to explain if someone erring can be convicted of pertinacity in another way. |
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Magister Decimotertio potest quis convinci pertinax, ut nonnulli dicunt, si de veritate damnabiliter renuit informari. Ad cuius evidentiam distinguunt dicentes quod aut errantis assertio tanquam haereticalis reprehenditur a peritis et de cuius dogmatisatione scandalum est ortum aut nequaquam reprehenditur a peritis nec de eius dogmatisatione scandalizantur fideles. |
Master Some people say that someone can be convicted as pertinacious in a thirteenth way if he culpably refuses to be instructed about the truth. They make a distinction to explain this, saying that the assertion of someone erring either is censured by the learned as heretical and that a scandal has arisen from its being taught as doctrine, or is not censured by the learned and the faithful are not scandalised by its being taught as doctrine. |
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In secundo casu quamvis interdum de veritate renuens informari apud Deum pertinax et haereticus habeatur, tamen in foro ecclesiae non videtur quod sit haereticus iudicandus, licet postea tanquam haeresis eadem assertio damnaretur. |
Although in the second case the person refusing to be instructed about the truth may sometimes be held by God to be pertinacious and heretical, yet it does not seem that he should be judged to be heretical in the forum of the church, even if that same assertion were later condemned as heretical. |
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In primo casu dicunt quod renuens de veritate informari etiam in foro ecclesiae est pertinax et haereticus reputandus. Quod multis rationibus probare nituntur. Quarum prima est haec. Contra fidem errans qui non est paratus corrigi nec quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus (24. q. 3. c. Dixit apostolus). Qui autem de veritate renuit informari si eius error reprehenditur a peritis non est paratus corrigi nec quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem; ergo pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
In the first case they say that someone refusing to be instructed about the truth should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical even in the forum of the church. They try to prove this with many arguments. The first of them is this. Someone who errs against the faith and is not ready to be corrected and does not seek the truth with cautious responsibility should be judged to be pertinacious and heretical (24, q. 3, c. [28] Dixit apostolus [cols. 1428-9]); he who refuses to be instructed about the truth if his error is censured by the learned, however, is not ready to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical. |
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Discipulus Ista ratio videtur concludere etiam de illo qui de veritate renuit informari cuius opinio non reprehenditur a peritis et de qua opinione nullum scandalum est exortum, quia talis non quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem. |
Student That argument seems to be conclusive also of someone refusing to be instructed about the truth whose opinion is not censured by the learned and about whose opinion no scandal has arisen, because that person is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility. |
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(Fr reads: Discipulus Ista ratio tam bene concluderet, ut videtur, de secundo casu sicut de primo. Omnis taliter errans ut dictum est in casu peccat contra fidem et apud Deum censetur haeretcius; nec apparte unde paratus est corrigi.) |
(Fr reads: Student That argument would be as strongly conclusive, it seems, about the second case as about the first. Everyone erring in the way set out in the example sins against the faith and is considered a heretic by God; and it does not appear from this by whom he is ready to be corrected.) |
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Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod ratio praedicta de tali non concludit quia ille praesumitur paratus corrigi et etiam cauta sollicitudine quaerere veritatem quando non apparet quod damnabiliter negligit corrigi nec apparet quod sui erroris amore omittit quaerere veritatem |
Master The response to this is that that argument is not conclusive about such a person because he is presumed to be ready to be corrected and also to be seeking the truth with cautious responsibility when it is not clear that he is culpably neglecting to be corrected and it is not clear that he is omitting to seek the truth out of love for his error. |
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(Fr reads: Magister Non bene attendisti ad differentiam assignatam inter dictos duos modos. Quamvis enim errans secundo modo quandoque censeatur hereticus apud Deum, non tamen etiam forum ecclesie in quo omnis ille presumitur paratus corrigi ac etiam cauta sollicitudine quaerere veritatem.)
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(Fr reads: Master You have not attended well to the designated difference between those two ways. For even if someone erring in the second way is sometimes considered a heretic before God, yet it is not also so before the forum of the church, where every such person is presumed to be ready to be corrected and also to be seeking the truth with cautious responsibility.) |
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Talis autem est ille de cuius opinione nullum est scandalum exortum nec eius opinio tanquam haereticalis reprehenditur a peritis. De illo autem cuius opinio tamquam haereticalis reprehenditur a peritis et de qua scandalum est exortum si quando oportet et ubi oportet aut sicut oportet non quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem est violenta praesumptio quod nollet veritatem suae opinioni contrariam declarari sed magis vellet opprimi veritatem. Quia si, teste Innocentio papa, ut habetur dist. 83. c. Error, "veritas cum minime defensatur opprimitur", multo magis cum veritas minime quaeritur quando quaeri debet opprimitur. Oppressor autem veritatis catholicae pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
A person about whose opinion no scandal has arisen and whose opinion has not been censured by the learned as heretical is like this. If, however, he whose opinion is censured by the learned as heretical and gives rise to scandal does not seek the truth with cautious responsibility when it is fitting, where it is fitting and as is fitting, there is a violent presumption about him that he refuses to have a truth opposed to his opinion made plain but would prefer the truth to be suppressed. For if, as we find in dist. 83. c.[3] Error, Pope Innocent [III] attests "When the truth is not defended it is suppressed", [col.401] it is much more the case that when the truth is not sought when it ought to be sought it is suppressed. A suppressor of catholic truth, however, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Secunda ratio est haec. Magis vel non minus delinquit qui seipsum cum potest et debet ab errore non revocat quam qui alios cum potest et debet ab errore non revocat. Sed qui alios cum potest et debet ab errore non revocat inter errantes damnabiliter computatur secundum quod sacri canones testantur aperte. Ergo qui seipsum cum potest et debet ab errore non revocat inter errantes damnabiliter numeratur. Sed errans de cuius errore scandalum est exortum et qui tanquam haereticus reprehenditur a peritis si de veritate renuit informari seipsum cum potest et debet ab errore non revocat. Ergo inter errantes damnabiliter est censendus . Talis autem est pertinaciter errans quia errare absque pertinacia errantem non reddit damnabilem. Talis ergo pertinax et haereticus est censendus . |
The second argument is this. He is more, or not less, at fault who does not restrain himself from error when he can and should than he who does not restrain others from error when he can and should; but he who does not restrain others from error when he can and should is counted among those erring culpably, according to what the sacred canons clearly testify; he who does not restrain himself from error when he can and should, therefore, is numbered among those erring culpably; but if an errant from whose error a scandal has arisen and who is censured by the learned as heretical refuses to be instructed about the truth, he is not restraining himself from error when he can and should; he should be considered, therefore, among those erring culpably; such a person is, however, pertinaciously an errant, because to err without pertinacity does not make an errant culpable; such a person, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Tertia ratio est haec. Qui inique opiniones haereticales et impias sapit est pertinax reputandus quia absque pertinacia nemo opiniones impias inique sapit. Qui enim absque pertinacia sapit opiniones impias quamvis sapiat impia non tamen impia inique sapit. Sed errans contra fidem catholicam qui de veritate renuit informari inique impia sapit, teste Leone papa qui ut habetur 24. q. 3. c. Quid autem iniquius ait, "Quid autem iniquius est quam impia sapere et sapientibus doctoribusque non credere. Sed in hanc insipientiam cadunt qui cum ad cognoscendam veritatem aliquo impediuntur obscuro non ad propheticas voces, non ad apostolicas literas, nec ad evangelicas auctoritates, sed ad semetipsos recurrunt." Ex his verbis colligitur quod qui impia sapit et non credit sapientibus nec ad scripturas recurrit autenticas iniquissimus est censendus. Sed qui de veritate renuit informari non credit sapientibus nec ad scripturas recurrit autenticas. Ergo talis iniquissimus et per consequens pertinax est censendus. |
The third argument is this. He who wickedly savours heretical and impious opinions should be regarded as pertinacious because no one wickedly savours impious opinions without pertinacity. For he who savours impious opinions without pertinacity does not savour impious matters wickedly, although he does savour them. But he who errs against the catholic faith and refuses to be instructed about the truth wickedly savours impious matters, as Pope Leo attests when he says, as we find in 24, q. 3, [c.30] Quid autem iniquius, "What is more wicked than to savour impious matters and not to believe those who are wise and more learned? But it is into this madness that they fall who, when they are prevented by some obscurity from learning the truth, have recourse not to prophetic words, nor to apostolic writings, nor to the gospel texts, but to themselves." [col.1429] We gather from these words that he who savours impious matters and neither believes the wise nor has recourse to the scriptures should be considered most wicked. But he who refuses to be instructed about the truth neither believes the wise nor has recourse to authentic scriptures. Such a person should be considered, therefore, most wicked and, consequently, pertinacious. |
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Quarta ratio est haec Qui ideo magister erroris existit quia non vult esse discipulus veritatis est pertinax reputandus. In tali enim ultra ignorantiam intellectus in voluntate malitia invenitur. Ista autem malitia voluntatis vel est pertinacia vel non est sine pertinacia. Sed errans qui cum potest et debet de veritate renuit informari ideo magister erroris existit quia non vult esse discipulus veritatis. Qui enim non vult audire veritatem non vult esse discipulus veritatis. Ergo talis pertinax est censendus. |
The fourth argument is this. He who, because he does not want to be a disciple of truth, is as a result a master of error should be regarded as pertinacious. For in addition to ignorance of understanding a wickedness of will is found in such a person. That wickedness of will, however, either is pertinacity or is not without pertinacity. But an errant who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he can and should be is a master of error because he does not want to be a student of truth. For he who does not want to hear the truth does not want to be a disciple of truth. Such a person should, therefore, be considered pertinacious. |
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(Fr reads: Quarta ratio est haec. Omnis errans qui cum potest et debet renuit informari de veritate est non volens audire veritatem et omnis non volens audire veritatem non est discipulus veritatis. Omnis vero non discipulus veritatis est magister erroris, per decretum positum in ratione tertia precedente immediate et 2. q. 7. Nos. Sed si omnis magister erroris est pertinax et hereticus censendus, ergo de primo ad ultimum omnis errans contra fidem qui cum debet et potest renuit informari de veritate pertinax est et hereticus censendus. Consequentia pro tanto valet in proposito quia ex ea formari possunt plures formae syllogistice in barbara evidentes, iuxta numerum mediorum. |
(Fr has a different fourth argument: The fourth argument is this. Every errant who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he can and should be is someone who does not want to hear the truth; and every one who does not want to hear the truth is not a disciple of truth. Now everyone who is not a disciple of truth is a master of error, from the decretal cited in the immediately preceding third argument and from 2, q. 7, [c.41] Nos. [cols.702-3] But if every master of error should be considered pertinacious and heretical then [considering every step] from the first to the last every errant against the faith who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he ought to be and can be, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. In the present case the consequence is valid as far as it goes, since from it can be formed many evident syllogistic forms in "barbara", depending on the number of middle terms. |
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Prima forma erit ista. Omnis magister erroris est pertinax et hereticus censendus. Sed omnis non discipulus veritatis est magister erroris. Ergo omnis non discipulus veritatis est pertinax et hereticus censendus. |
The first form will be this. Every master of error should be considered pertinacious and heretical; but everyone who is not a disciple of truth is a master of error; everyone who is not a disciple of truth, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Secunda forma erit ista. Omnis non discipulus veritatis est pertinax et hereticus censendus. Sed omnis non volens audire veritatem est non discipulus veritatis. Ergo omnis non volens audire veritatem est pertinax et hereticus censendus. |
The second form will be this. Everyone who is not a disciple of truth should be considered pertinacious and heretical; but everyone who does not want to hear the truth is not a disciple of truth; everyone who does not want to hear the truth, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Tertia forma erit ista. Omnis non volens audire veritatem est pertinax et hereticus censendus. Sed omnis errans contra fidem qui cum debet et potest renuit informari de veritate est non volens audire veritatem. Ergo omnis errans contra fidem qui cum potest et debet renuit informari de veritate est pertinax et hereticus censendus. Quae sit conclusio prima et principaliter intenta bene conclusa et vera si praemisse omnes harum trium formarum verae sunt. |
The third form will be this. Everyone who does not want to hear the truth should be considered pertinacious and heretical; but everyone erring against the faith who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he should be and can be does not want to listen to the truth; everyone erring against the faith who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he can be and ought to be, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. This is the conclusion first and principally aimed at, well concluded and true if all the premises of these three forms are true. |
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Quod facilime videbitur et primum potissime de maiore prime forme, si per erroris magistrum intelligamus habituatum in errore per depositionem cuiuslibet habitus contrarii. Omnis enim talis est pertinax, sicut ex descriptione habitus et pertinaciae deduceretur. Et patet ex alio, quia in omni tali magistro erroris ultra ignorantiam intellectus reperitur malitia in voluntate. Illa autem malitia voluntatis vel est pertinacia vel non est sine pertinacia. |
This [[that they are true]] will be seen very easily, and first and most of all, concerning the major [premise] of the first form, if by master of error we understand one habituated to error by the putting aside of any habit to the contrary. For every such person is pertinacious, as may be deduced from a description of habit and of pertinacity. And it is clear from another [argument], for in every such master of error there is found, besides ignorance of understanding, a wickedness of will. That wickedness of will either is pertinacity or is not without pertinacity. |
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In reliquis vero premissis termini omnes vel sunt privatim vel privative oppositi vel convertibiles seu equipollentes vel modum superiorum vel inferiorum se habentes. Modo quia inter privative opposita, semper supposita constantia substantii et circa substantium aptum natum ac in tempore determinato, nullum cadit medium, sicut ab uno privative oppositorum affirmato ad reliquum negatum et econtra, vel ab affirmatione inferioris convertibilis vel equivalentis ad affirmationem superioris convertibilis vel equivalentis, ac a negatione superioris convertibilis vel equivalentis ad negationem inferioris convertibilis vel equivalentis valet semper consequentia. Item alterum privative oppositorum non negatum de reliquo negato, et negatum de non negato, superius quoque aut convertibile seu equivalens de inferiori convertibili vel equivalenti affirmative atque inferius negatum sicque convertibile aut equivalens de superiori convertibili seu equivalentis negatis semper vere praedicatur.) |
In the remaining premises all the terms are either privatively opposed or are convertible or equivalent or are related as superiors or inferiors. Now because between privative opposites (always supposing constancy of substance and that it concerns an appropriate substance and in a determinate time) no intermediate occurs, just as the consequence is always valid from one of the privative opposites affirmed to the other one negated, and vice versa, or from the affirmation of an inferior, converible or equivalent to the affirmation of the superior, convertible or equivalent, and from the negation of a superior, convertible or equivalent to the negation of the inferior, convertible or equivalent. Also always truly predicated are: one of the privative opposites not negated, of the other negated, and the negated, of the non-negated; also the superior, or convertible or equivalent, of the inferior, or convertible or equivalent affirmatively; and the inferior negated (and thus the convertible or equivalent), of the superior, convertible or equivalent negated.) |
CAPITULUM 31. |
Chapter 31. |
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Discipulus Nunquid est alius modus errantem de pertinacia convincendi. |
Student Is there another way of convicting someone erring of pertinacity? |
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Magister Decimoquarto potest de pertinacia quis convinci si verbis vel factis protestatur se assertionem suam quae est haereticalis minime revocaturum quia talis non est paratus corrigi. Et per consequens pertinax est censendus. |
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity in a fourteenth way if he bears witness in deeds or words that he will not retract an assertion of his which is heretical, because such a person is not ready to be corrected. As a consequence he should be considered pertinacious. |
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Discipulus Dic alium modum. |
Student Tell of another way. |
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Magister Decimoquinto convincitur quis errans de pertinacia et haeretica pravitate si in favorem haereticae pravitatis prohibet legi scripturas catholicas vel prohibet praedicari aut publicari catholicas veritates quia talis est defensor haereticae falsitatis et oppressor catholicae veritatis. |
Master Someone erring is convicted in a fifteenth way of pertinacity and heretical wickedness if he prevents the reading of catholic writings out of partiality to heretical wickedness or prevents the preaching or publication of catholic truths, because such a person is a defender of heretical falsity and a suppressor of catholic truth. |
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Discipulus Estne alius modus convincendi errantem de pertinacia? |
Student Is there another way of convicting an errant of pertinacity? |
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Magister Decimosexto convincitur quis de pertinacia qui in defensionem haereticae pravitatis novos errores fingit et defendit quia talis non est paratus corrigi nec quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem. Ergo pertinax est censendus. |
Master Someone is convicted of pertinacity in a sixteenth way who fabricates and defends new errors in defence of heretical wickedness, because such a person is not ready to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility. He should be considered, therefore, as pertinacious. |
CAPITULUM 32. |
Chapter 32. |
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Discipulus Alium modum vellem audire. |
Student I would like to hear of another way. |
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Magister Decimoseptimo secundum nonnullos potest specialiter papa convinci de pertinacia et haeretica pravitate si errorem contra fidem diffinit solenniter et a Christianis asserit tanquam catholicum esse tenendum. Quod enim talis papa sit haereticus reputandus probatur primo sic. Qui artat alios ad errorem pertinaciter defendendum est pertinax reputandus. Hoc ex superioribus colligitur evidenter. Sed papa solenniter aliquem errorem diffiniens esse catholicum artat christianos quantum in eo est ad errorem pertinaciter defendendum et servandum, quia, sicut constitutio sedis apostolicae legitime facta omnes astringit, ut habetur Extra, De constitutionibus c. ultimo, Quoniam constitutio, ita papa vel gerens se pro papa diffinitive pronuntians haereticam assertionem esse tenendam quantum in ipso est omnes astringit ad eandem assertionem haereticam irrevocabiliter tenendam et defendendam. Ergo pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
Master Some people say that in a seventeenth way the pope especially can be convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness if he solemnly defines an error against the faith and asserts that it should be held by christians as catholic. For that such a pope should be regarded as heretical is proved first as follows. He who constrains others to defend an error pertinaciously should be regarded as pertinacious - we clearly gather this from what was said above. But a pope solemnly defining some error to be catholic constrains christians, as far as in him lies, pertinaciously to defend and preserve an error. For just as a legitimately decreed statute of the apostolic see binds everyone, as we find in the last Chapter of Extra. De constitutionibus, Quoniam constitutio [cols.28-9], so a pope, or one presenting himself as pope, who pronounces definitively that a heretical assertion should be held binds everyone, as much as in him lies, to hold and defend irrevocably that same assertion. Therefore, he should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Secundo sic: ille qui per se vel per alios persequitur, punit vel molestat catholicam veritatem confitentes et pravitatem haereticam detestantes est pertinax et haereticus reputandus. Haec in superioribus est fundata. Papa autem qui solenniter diffinit aliquam assertionem quae est haeretica esse tenendam per se et per alios quantum in ipso est persequitur, punit et molestat catholicam veritatem contrariam defensantes et pravitatem heareticam detestantes, cum quantum in ipso est per suam constitutionem omnes contradicentes reddat anathemate dignos. Nicolao papa in universali synodo residente testante qui, ut habetur 25. q. 2. c. Si quis, ait, "Si quis dogmata, mandata, sanctiones, interdicta vel pro catholica fide decreta vel ecclesiastica disciplina pro correctione imminentium vel futurorum malorum a sedis apostolicae praesule promulgata contempserit anathema sit." Catholicos et contradicentes suae diffinitioni quantum in ipso est subicit multis aliis poenis, quia praeceptis et diffinitionibus apostolicis resistentes poenis variis puniuntur secundum quod ex verbis Gregorii quae ponuntur dist. 12. c. Praeceptis et dist. 19. c. Nulli et ex verbis Adriani papae quae recitantur 25. q. 1. c. Generali et aliis sacris canonibus colligitur evidenter. Per alios etiam contradicentes catholicos quantum in ipso est punit, persequitur et molestat, quia quantum in ipso est inferiores praelatos astringit ut contradicentes suae assertioni omnibus poenis quas praelati debent inobedientibus mandatis apostolicis mandatis infligere plectant. Igitur talis gerens se pro papa pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
[It is proved] second as follows. [See Significant Variants, para. 25.] He who himself or through others persecutes, punishes or molests those confessing catholic truth and denouncing heretical wickedness should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical - this is based on what was said above. A pope who solemnly pronounces that some assertion which is heretical should be held, however, is, as far as in him lies, by himself and through others persecuting, punishing and molesting those defending the opposing catholic truth and those denouncing heretical wickedness, since by his statute he makes all those who contradict him in this respect worthy of anathema. Pope Nicholas attests to this at a sitting of a universal synod when he says, as we find in 25, q. 2, c [18] Si quis, "If anyone defies decrees, mandates, resolutions, interdicts, or pronouncements which have been promulgated by the head of the apostolic see on behalf of catholic faith or ecclesiastical discipline for the correction of imminent or future evils, let him be anathema." [col.1451] As far as in him lies, [such a pope] subjects catholics contradicting his definition to many other penalties too, because those opposing apostolic commands and pronouncements are punished with various penalties, as we clearly gather from the words of Gregory found in dist. 12. c.[2] Preceptis [col.41] and dist. 19. c.[5] Nulli [col.83] and from the words of Pope Hadrian recorded in 25, q. 1, c. [11] Generali [col.1441] and from other sacred canons. As far as in him lies he punishes, persecutes and molests catholics who contradict him by means of others too, because as far as he can he obliges lesser prelates to punish those who contradict his assertion with all the penalties which prelates ought to inflict on those who disobey apostolic commands. Someone like this who presents himself as pope, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Tertio sic: ille errans contra fidem est pertinax et haereticus reputandus qui facto vel verbo protestatur se nolle corrigi per illos quorum interest, quia talis non est paratus corrigi, et per consequens pertinax et haereticus est censendus. Qui autem gerit se pro papa et solenniter haeresim diffinit esse tenendam facto protestatur et etiam verbis se nolle corrigi per concilium generale ad quod tamen spectat et papam de haeresi emendare. Ergo pertinax et haereticus est censendus. Maior est manifesta; minor aperte probatur, quia ex quo quantum in ipso est per constitutionem suam omnes christianos, et per consequens concilium generale cum soli Christiani generali concilio debeant interesse, artat ad suam assertionem tenendam facto protestatur et ostendit quod propter generale concilium non vult suam assertionem revocare. Hoc etiam verbo protestatur cum in fine Bullae dicat nulli licere contraire diffinitis per eum. Talia enim verba vel aequipollentia in fine constitutionum papalium consueverunt poni et subintelliguntur licet non ponantur. Ergo talis pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
[It is proved] third as follows. He who errs against the faith should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical if he bears witness by deed or word that he is not willing to be corrected by those whose concern it is, because such a person is not ready to be corrected and should be considered, as a consequence, pertinacious and heretical. He who presents himself as pope and solemnly pronounces that a heresy should be held, however, bears witness by his act and by his words too that he is not willing to be corrected by a general council, to which it pertains nevertheless to correct even the pope of heresy. Therefore he should be considered pertinacious and heretical. The major [premise] is obvious, the minor is clearly proved. For since, as far as he can, by his statute he constrains all christians - and consequently a general council since only christians ought to be present in a general council - to hold his assertion, he bears witness and shows by deed that he is not willing to retract his assertion because of a general council. He bears witness to this by his word too, when he says at the end of a Bull that no one is permitted to oppose matters defined by him, for it is customary to put such words or their equivalent at the end of papal statutes, and they are tacitly understood even if they are not put there. Therefore such a person should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Quarto sic: qui in aliqua assertione haereticali se firmaverit ultimate pertinax et haereticus est censendus quia talis irrevocabiliter assertionem affirmat haereticam, et per consequens paratus corrigi non existit; sed gerens se pro papa et solleniter assertionem haereticam diffiniens esse tenendam, in eadem assertione per ultimatam deliberationem se firmat. Igitur pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
[It is proved] fourth as follows. [See Significant Variants, para. 26.] Whoever has finally confirmed his [adherence to] some heretical assertion should be considered pertinacious and heretical because such a person is affirming the heretical assertion irrevocably and, consequently, is not ready to be corrected; but in presenting himself as pope and solemnly pronouncing that a heretical assertion should be held, he affirms by this final decree his [adherence] to that assertion. Therefore he should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
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Quinto sic: qui nimis in errore persistit est pertinax; sed talis nimis in errore persistit quia ad diffiniendum errorem esse tenendum nullus potest absque temeritate procedere. Ergo talis pertinax et haereticus est censendus. |
[It is proved] fifth as follows. He who persists too much in an error is pertinacious; but such a person persists too much in an error because no one can proceed to pronounce that an error should be held without being rash; therefore such a person should be considered pertinacious and heretical. |
CAPITULUM 33. |
Chapter 33. |
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Discipulus Tracta alium modum de pertinacia convincendi. |
Student Discuss another way of convicting someone of pertinacity. |
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Magister Decimooctavo de pertinacia et haeretica pravitate potest quis convinci si tali diffinitioni papae consentit consulendo, cooperando, inducendo vel diffiniendum esse taliter asserendo. Hoc tali ratione probatur: facientes et consentientes consimili crimine involvuntur, sicut et eos par poena constringit secundum quod sacri canones asserunt manifeste; sed papa taliter diffiniens assertionem hereticam pro catholica esse tenendam pertinax et hereticus est censendus; ergo et omnes consentientes eidem sunt inter pertinaces et hereticos computandi. |
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness in an eighteenth way if he agrees with such a definition by the pope, by advising, urging, inducing or asserting that it should be defined in that way. This is proved by the following argument: those acting and those agreeing [with them] are involved in a similar charge, just as an equal punishment also binds them, as the sacred canons clearly affirm. But a pope who offers a definition such that a heretical assertion should be held as catholic should be considered pertinacious and heretical. Everyone agreeing with him, therefore, should also be numbered among the pertinacious and heretical. |
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Discipulus Ista ratio pro isto nunc sufficiat. Ideo dic alium modum de pertinacia convincendi. |
Student That argument will be enough for that [position] for the moment. Describe, therefore, another way of convicting of pertinacity. |
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Magister Decimonono est quis pertinax reputandus si, inferior existens summo pontifice, aliquam assertionem hereticam per sententiam diffinitivam determinat esse tenendam, iniungens aliis et imponens quod ipsam sentiant et reputent esse catholicam. Quicumque etiam tali determinationi consenserit est pertinax et hereticus censendus. Hoc ex precedentibus satis apparet, quia, si papa taliter determinans et sibi consentientes sunt pertinaces et heretici reputandi, multo magis inferior papa taliter determinans officium usurpando papale et sibi consentientes sunt pertinaces et heretici iudicandi. |
Master Someone should be regarded as pertinacious in a nineteenth way if, being less than the pope, he prescribes in a definitive statement that some heretical assertion should be held, enjoining and imposing it on others that they should think of it and regard it as catholic. Whoever agrees with such a prescription should also be considered pertinacious and heretical. This is clear enough from what was said above because if a pope who prescribes in this way and those who agree with him should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical, it is much more the case that one who is less than the pope and issues such a prescription, thus usurping the papal office, and those who agree with him should be judged to be pertinacious and heretical. |
CAPITULUM 34. |
Chapter 34. |
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Discipulus Describe alium modum errantem de pertinacia convincendi. |
Student Describe another way of convicting an errant of pertinacity. |
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Magister Vicesimo potest de pertinacia quis convinci si potestatem habens pravitati heretice non resistit. Hoc per sacros canones multipliciter videtur posse probari. Ait enim Innocentius papa, ut habetur dist. 83. c. Error: "Error cui non resistitur approbatur." Qui autem errorem approbat videtur pertinax iudicandus. Ergo qui errori non resistit si potest pertinax est censendus. Item Leo papa, ut habetur Extra, De haereticis, c. Qui alios, ait, "Qui alios cum potest ab errore non revocat seipsum errare demonstrat." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod qui potest haereticos ab errore revocare et non revocat est inter haereticos computandus et per consequens pertinax est censendus. Item Iohannes papa, ut habetur dist. 80 c. Facientis, ait, "Facientis proculdubio culpam habet qui quod potest corrigere negligit emendare." Qui itaque pertinaces haereticos quos potest corrigere negligit emendare pertinacium haereticorum culpam habet et per consequens inter pertinaces haereticos est habendus. |
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity in a twentieth way if he does not resist heretical wickedness though he has the power to do so. This seems to be provable in many ways by the sacred canons. For, as we find in dist 83. c.[3] error, Pope Innocent [III] says: "An error which is not resisted is approved". [col.401] It seems, however, that he who approves an error should be judged to be pertinacious. He who does not resist an error if he can do so, therefore, should be considered pertinacious. Again, as we find in Extra, De hereticis. c.[2] Qui alios, Pope Leo says: "He who does not recall others from error when he can do so shows that he errs himself." [col.1669] From these words we are given to understand that he who can recall heretics from error and does not do so should be numbered among the heretics and, consequently, should be considered pertinacious. Pope John too, as we find in dist. 86. c.[3] facientis, says: "He who neglects to free from error what he can correct has without doubt the fault of the one who acts." [col.408] And so he who neglects to free from error pertinacious heretics whom he can correct has the fault of pertinacious heretics and should be held, as a consequence, to be among the pertinacious heretics. |
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Discipulus Vellem scire an omnes literati sentiant tales esse hereticos. |
Student I want to know whether all the learned think that such people are heretics. |
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Magister Quidam dicunt quod magis proprie debent vocari fautores hereticorum et hereticae pravitatis quam heretici tamen pertinaces secundum eos etiam poterunt appellari quia pertinacia ad plura vitia quam ad heresim se extendit. |
Master Some people say that they should more properly be called favourers of heretics and heretical wickedness rather than heretics, yet they could, according to them, also be called pertinacious because pertinacity extends to more vices than to heresy. |
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[[Fr adds the following, similar to the opening remarks of book 5 in Av et al.: Discipulus: licet mihi bene videatur quod huiusmodi qui cum possunt heretice pravitati non resistunt potius forent hereticorum fautores nuncupandi tamen hic nolo plus de ipsis inquirere Sed postea quando de fautoribus receptatoribus et defensoribus hereticorum tractabimus quamplura de ipsis investigare curabo Fr]] |
[Fr adds: Student Although I see well that those who can, but do not, resist such heretical wickedness should rather be called supporters of heretics, I do not wish to inquire further concerning them. Afterwards, however, when we treat of the supporters, receivers and defenders of heretics I will wish to ask many things about them.] |
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