William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 1, book 4, chapters 25-28

Text and translation by John Scott.

Copyright © 1999, The British Academy

 

 

Capitulum 25

Chapter 25

Discipulus Gestio scire si modus alius assignatur errantem de pertinacia convincendi.

Student I long to know whether another way of convicting of pertinacity someone erring is assigned.

Magister Octavo modo nonnullorum iudicio est quis de pertinacia convincendus, puta si alios ad suum pertinaciter defendendum errorem praeceptis, comminationibus, poenis, promissionibus, iuramentis vel alio quovis modo artare molitur. Quod enim talis pertinax et sit haereticus censendus multis rationibus probare conantur.

Master In the judgement of some there is an eighth way by which someone should be convicted of pertinacity and that is if he endeavours to force others by commands, threats, punishments, promises, oaths or in any other way at all pertinaciously to defend his error. That such a person should be considered pertinacious and a heretic they try to prove by many arguments.

Quarum prima est haec. Non minus delinquit qui alios cogit ad haeresim pertinaciter defendendam quam qui erranti consentit vel non resistit cum possit, quia talis non solum est consentiens et non resistens sed etiam cogens et impellens. Qui autem erranti et haeresim pertinaciter defendenti consentit vel non resistit cum potest consimili crimine irretitur, et per consequens pertinax et haereticus est censendus. Ergo cogens seu compellens alios haeresim pertinaciter defensare est pertinax et haereticus reputandus. Maior est manifesta. Minor sacris canonibus manifeste probatur. Ait enim Isidorus, ut habetur11, q. 3, c. Qui consentit peccantibus, "Alius pater ait, 'Si quis alterius errori consentit, sciat se cum illo simili modo culpabilem iudicandum.'" Et Leo papa, ut habetur Extra, De haereticis, c. Qui alios, ait, "Qui alios cum potest ab errore non revocat seipsum errare demonstrat." Et Innocentius papa, ut habetur dist. 83, c. Error, ait, "Error cui non resistitur approbatur, et veritas, cum minime defensatur, opprimitur." Ex his aliisque quampluribus aperte colligitur quod qui consentit haereticae pravitati inter haereticos computatur. Ergo multo magis qui compellit alios haeresim pertinaciter defensare vel haeresi pertinaciter adhaerere est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus.

This is the first. He who forces others to defend a heresy pertinaciously commits no less a fault than he who agrees with someone who errs or does not oppose him when he can, because that person not only agrees and does not oppose but even forces and insists. He who agrees with or does not oppose when he can someone erring and pertinaciously defending a heresy, however, is entangled in the same crime and should be considered, as a consequence, pertinacious and a heretic. One who forces or compels others pertinaciously to defend a heresy, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic. The major [premise] is obvious. The minor is proved clearly by sacred canons. For, as we find in 11, q. 3, c. Qui consentit peccantibus [col.671] Isidore says "Another father says: 'If anyone agrees with another's error let him know that he is to be judged as culpable in the same way as that other.'" And Pope Leo, as we find in Extra, De haereticis, c. Qui alios [col.778], says, "He who does not call others back from error when he can do so shows that he himself errs." And, as we find in dist. 83, c. Error, Pope Innocent says, "An error which is not opposed is approved, and truth is struck down when it is not defended." [col.293] It is clearly gathered from these and very many others that he who agrees with heretical wickedness is counted among heretics. He who forces others pertinaciously to defend a heresy or pertinaciously to cling to a heresy, therefore, should be judged even more to be pertinacious and a heretic.

Secunda ratio est haec. Non minus peccant qui alios cogunt minis, terroribus, iuramentis vel praeceptis aut comminationibus ad peccatum quam qui mandant aliis aliquod committere crimen. Sed qui mandant aliis aliquod crimen committere consimili crimine involvuntur. Ergo qui cogunt alios ad peccatum quodcunque consimili peccato tenentur et per consequens qui cogunt alios pravitatem haereticam pertinaciter defensare sunt consimili pertinacia irretiti. Maior istius rationis est nota de se. Minor probatur auctoritate Innocentii 3, qui, ut habetur Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Mulieres, ait, "Cum is vere committat cuius auctoritate vel mandato delictum committi probatur". Ergo qui mandant aliis ut crimen committant consimili crimine involvuntur.

A second argument is this. Those who force others into sin by threats, terror, oaths, commands or menaces do not sin any less than those who order others to commit some crime. But those who order others to commit some crime are caught up in the same crime. Those who force others into any sort of sin, therefore, are bound by the same sin and consequently those who force others pertinaciously to defend heretical wickedness are entangled in the same pertinacity. The major [premise] of this argument is self-evident. The minor [premise] is proved by the authority of Innocent III, who says, as we find in Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Mulieres [col.891], "... since he truly commits a crime on whose authority or order it is proved that it was committed." Those who order others to commit a crime, therefore, are caught up in the same crime.

Tertio ratio est haec. Ille dicitur facere qui per alium facit. Unde et ille dicitur occidere vere qui per alium occidit, teste Clemente 3, qui, ut habetur Extra, De clericis pugnantibus in duello, c. Henricus, ait, "Homicidium tam facto quam praecepto sive consilio aut defensione non est dubium perpetrari." Ergo consimiliter ille dicitur haeresim pertinaciter defensare qui per alium haeresim pertinaciter defendit. Sed qui cogit alios haeresim pertinaciter defensare, pertinaciter haeresim defensat per alios. Ergo ipse debet dici haeresis pertinax defensator.

The third argument is this. He is said to do something who does it through another. Thus he is also said truly to kill who kills through another, as Clement III attests, who says, as we find in Extra, De clericis pugnantibus in duello. c. Henricus, [col.805] "There is no doubt that a homicide is perpetrated both by deed and by command, or by advice or in defence." In a similar way, therefore, he is said pertinaciously to defend a heresy who defends a heresy pertinaciously through another. But he who forces others pertinaciously to defend a heresy, pertinaciously defends that heresy through others. He ought to be called, therefore, a pertinacious defender of heresy.

Quarta ratio est haec. Magis dicitur facere cogens quam consulens. Sed ille cuius consilio aliquod crimen committitur dicitur idem crimen committere, teste Augustino, qui, ut habetur De Poenitentia, dist. 1. c. Perniciose, ait, "Se decipiunt qui existimant eos tantum homicidas esse qui manibus hominem occidunt et non potius eos per quorum consilium, fraudem et exhortationem homines extinguuntur. Nam Iudaei Dominum nequaquam propriis manibus occiderunt, sicut scriptum est, 'Nobis non licet interficere quenquam'. Sed tamen illis Domini mors imputatur quia ipsi eum lingua interfecerunt, dicentes, 'Crucifige, crucifige eum'." Ergo multo magis qui cogit alium ut crimen committat idem crimen committit, et ita qui cogit alium haeresim pertinaciter defensare ipse noscitur haeresim pertinaciter defensare.

A fourth argument is this. Someone who forces is said to do [something], more than someone who advises. But he by whose advice some crime is committed is said to commit that same crime, as Augustine attests, saying, as we find in De Poenitentia, dist. 1. c. Perniciose, "They deceive themselves wickedly who think that the only murderers are those who kill a person with their hands, and not, even more, those through whose advice, deceit and encouragement people are killed. For the Jews did not kill the Lord with their own hands, as it is written that `we are not permitted to kill anyone', yet the Lord's death is attributed to them because they killed him with their tongue by saying `Crucify! Crucify him!'" [col.1163] It is much more the case, therefore, that he who forces another to commit a crime, commits that same crime; and so he who forces another pertinaciously to defend a heresy is known pertinaciously to defend that heresy himself.

Quinta ratio est haec. Participantes criminosis in crimine eodem crimine involvuntur; sed qui cogit alios haeresim pertinaciter defensare participat in crimine haeresim pertinaciter defensanti quia impendit ei auxilium et favorem; ergo talis est pertinax reputandus.

The fifth argument is this. Those who share in a crime with criminals are caught up in the same crime; but he who forces others pertinaciously to defend a heresy shares in the crime with the one pertinaciously defending the heresy because he grants him help and support; such a person should be regarded, therefore, as pertinacious.

Sexta ratio est haec. Qui non est paratus corrigi de haeresi quam tenet est pertinax reputandus; sed qui cogit alios ad suam haeresim pertinaciter defendendam non est paratus corrigi; ergo pertinax est censendus.

[See Significant Variants, para. 19.] A sixth argument is this. He who is not ready to be corrected of a heresy he holds should be regarded as pertinacious; but he who forces others pertinaciously to defend his heresy is not ready to be corrected; he should, therefore, be considered pertinacious.

Septima ratio est haec. Qui cogit alios ad haeresim pertinaciter defendendam vult eandem haeresim irrevocabiliter defensari et teneri; talis autem est pertinax; ergo, etc.

A seventh argument is this. He who forces others to defend a heresy pertinaciously wants that heresy to be defended and held irrevocably; such a person is pertinacious, however; therefore, etc.

Discipulus Istae rationes procedunt tantummodo de cogente alios haeresim suam pertinaciter defensare, sed contingit haeresim defensare absque pertinacia. Ergo licet aliquis cogat alios poenis, minis, praeceptis et iuramentis haeresim aliquam defensare, dummodo non cogat eos pertinaciter defensare, non est pertinax nec haereticus reputandus. Quod videtur posse probari tali ratione. Qui cogit alium et non ad peccatum mortale non committit peccatum mortale. Et per consequens non est propter talem coactionem pertinax et haereticus reputandus, cum omnis haereticus in peccato mortali existat. Sed defensare haeresim non est semper peccatum mortale, licet defendere haeresim pertinaciter sit peccatum mortale. Ergo propter talem coactionem non est quis pertinax et haereticus reputandus.

[See Significant Variants, para. 20.] Student Those arguments are valid only of someone forcing others pertinaciously to defend his heresy, but it is possible to defend a heresy without pertinacity. Even if someone forces others by punishments, threats, commands and oaths to defend some heresy, therefore, he should not be regarded as pertinacious or a heretic as long as he does not force them to defend it pertinaciously. This seems provable by the following argument. He who forces another, but not to a mortal sin, does not commit a mortal sin; and, as a consequence, he should not be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic, consequently, on account of this forcing, since every heretic is in mortal sin. But it is not always a mortal sin to defend a heresy, although it is a mortal sin to defend a heresy pertinaciously. No one should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic, therefore, on account of such forcing.

Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod licet posset quis haeresim absque pertinacia defensare, tamen cogens alium absolute haeresim defensare quantum in se est cogit ipsam haeresim pertinaciter defendere, sicut qui cogit alium iurare quod aliquam assertionem quae est haeretica irrevocabiliter et in perpetuum defensabit quantum in eo est cogit ipsam eandem assertionem pertinaciter defensare, licet in potestate ipsius tali modo coacti sit postea eandem haeresim minime defensare, et ideo talis cogens debet reputari pertinax haeresis defensator, licet coacti iurare nolint postea eandem heresim pertinaciter defensare sed volunt venire contra illicitum iuramentum. Cum vero dicis quod qui cogit alium et non ad peccatum mortale non committit peccatum mortale, hoc tibi negatur, quia potest quis peccare mortaliter etiam alium cogendo ad bonum. Nam qui cogit alium vovere castitatem vel paupertatem vel aliquid aliud supererogationis potest peccare mortaliter quia talia suaderi possunt, imperari non possunt. De talibus enim loquens Augustinus dicit quod nemo cogitur legibus bene facere sed male facere prohibetur.

Master The reply to this is that although someone could defend a heresy without pertinacity yet, if he forces another to defend a heresy unrestrictedly, then as far as in him lies he forces that person to defend that heresy pertinaciously, just as he who forces another to swear that he will defend irrevocably and forever some assertion which is heretical forces him as much as he can to defend that assertion pertinaciously even if it is in the power of the one who is so forced not to defend the heresy afterwards. The one so forcing, therefore, ought to be regarded as a pertinacious defender of heresy even if those forced to swear refuse later on to defend that heresy pertinaciously but want to go against their illicit oath. But when you say that he who forces another, but not to a mortal sin, does not commit a mortal sin this is denied because someone can sin mortally even by forcing another to do something good. For he who forces another to make a vow of chastity or poverty or something else which is a supererogation can sin mortally, because such things can be recommended by persuasion, but they can not be ordered. For when he speaks about such matters Augustine says that no one is forced by law to act well but is prohibited from acting badly.

Capitulum 26

Chapter 26

Discipulus Estne alius modus aliquem de pertinacia convincendi?

Student Is there another way of convicting someone of pertinacity?

Magister Nono potest de pertinacia et pravitate haeretica quis convinci si cogit aliquem veritatem catholicam abiurare aut poenis, minis vel praeceptis catholicam veritatem negare compellit. Quod enim cogens alios veritatem quamcunque catholicam abiurare pertinax et haereticus sit censendus ostenditur. Nam qui cogit alium veritatem catholicam abiurare cogit eundem haeresi contrariae irrevocabiliter adhaerere. Talis autem, sicut ex praecedenti capitulo apparet, est pertinax et haereticus. Ergo, etc. Et per eandem rationem ostenditur quod qui cogit alios minis poenis vel praeceptis aliquam veritatem catholicam negare est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus.

Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness in a ninth way if he forces someone to abjure a catholic truth, or by punishments, threats or commands constrains him to deny a catholic truth. For it is shown that someone forcing others to abjure any catholic truth at all should be considered pertinacious and a heretic. For he who forces another to abjure a catholic truth forces that person to cling irrevocably to its opposing heresy; such a person, however, as is clear from the preceding chapter, is pertinacious and a heretic. Therefore, etc. It is also shown by the same argument that he who forces others by threats, penalties or commands to deny some catholic truth should be judged pertinacious and a heretic.

Discipulus Potestne talis compellens per aliquam ignorantiam excusari, puta si credit quod assertio quam cogit alium abiurare vel negare sit haeretica?

Student Can a person of this kind be excused if he compels through some ignorance, if he believes, for instance, that the assertion which he forces the other to abjure or deny is heretical?

Magister Dicitur quod talis per nullam potest ignorantiam excusari, quia nullus valet absque temeritate quomodolibet attentare cogere alium iuramento, poenis, minis vel praeceptis aliquam assertionem abiurare vel negare nisi sit certus certitudine sufficienti quod non est consona veritati. De assertione autem catholica nullus potest certitudinem habere talem quod non est consona catholice veritati. Ergo temerarie cogit alium abiurare vel negare eandem. Temeritas autem in hoc casu pertinaciae aequipollet. Ergo talis est pertinax et haereticus reputandus.

[See Significant Variants, para. 21.] Master It is said that a person of this kind can not be excused by any ignorance because without being rash no one can attempt to force another in any way at all, by an oath, by penalties, threats or commands, to abjure or deny some assertion unless he is with sufficient certitude sure that it is not consistent with the truth; no one, however, can have such certitude that a catholic assertion is not consistent with catholic truth; therefore he rashly forces another to abjure or deny the same; in this case, however, rashness is equivalent to pertinacity. A person of this kind, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic.

Capitulum 27

Chapter 27

Discipulus Suntne plures modi de pertinacia quempiam convincendi?

Student Are there additional ways of convicting anyone at all of pertinacity?

Magister De pertinacia et haeretica pravitate ille convincitur necessario qui abiurat catholicam veritatem vel iurat se quamcunque assertionem quae est in rei veritate haeretica tanquam catholicam in perpetuum servaturum. Quod enim omnis talis sit pertinax et haereticus reputandus tali ratione ostenditur. Qui firmat se in proposito negandi assertionem quae est catholica vel tenendi assertionem quae est haeretica pertinax est censendus. Talis autem est ille qui abiurat veritatem quae est catholica vel iurat se servaturum assertionem quae est haeretica. Ergo pertinax est censendus.

Master That person is necessarily convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness [tenth way] who abjures a catholic truth or swears that he will forever preserve as catholic any assertion which in truth of fact is heretical. For it is shown by the following argument that such a person should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic. He who declares that he intends to deny an assertion which is catholic or to hold an assertion which is heretical should be considered pertinacious; he who abjures a truth which is catholic or swears that he will preserve an assertion which is heretical, however, is a person of this kind; he should, therefore, be considered pertinacious.

Item errans contra fidem catholicam qui non est paratus corrigi pertinax et hereticus est censendus. Huiusmodi autem abiurans catholicam veritatem et qui iurat se heresim defensurum vel quod assertioni que est heretica adhaerebit nec est paratus corrigi. Ergo pertinax et haereticus est censendus.

Again, someone who errs against the catholic faith and is not ready to be corrected should be considered pertinacious and a heretic; he who abjures a catholic truth, however, and he who swears he will defend a heresy or will cling to an assertion which is heretical is like this, and is not ready to be corrected; therefore he should be considered pertinacious and a heretic.

Discipulus Nonne potest talis aliquo modo de pertinacia excusari?

Student Is there some way a person like this can be excused of pertinacity?

Magister Respondetur quod metu mortis vel gravium tormentorum potest a pertinacia et pravitate haeretica excusari, sed non a peccato mortali.

Master The answer is that because of the fear of death or of severe torture he can be excused of pertinacity and heretical wickedness, but not of a mortal sin.

Discipulus Videtur quod ignorantia talem poterit excusare. Ignorantia enim excusat a mendacio illum qui dicit falsum quod putat esse verum, ut Augustinus asserit, prout habetur 22, q. 2, c.Is autem. Ergo consimiliter ignorantia poterit excusare illum qui abiurat veritatem catholicam quam putat haereticam et illum qui iurat se tenere assertionem haereticam quam putat catholicam.

Student It seems that ignorance will be able to excuse such a person. For ignorance excuses of lying someone who says something which is false but which he thinks is true, as Augustine asserts, as we find in 22, q. 2, c. Is autem [col.867]. In a similar way, therefore, ignorance will be able to excuse someone who abjures a catholic truth which he thinks is heretical and someone who swears that he holds an assertion which is heretical but which he thinks is catholic.

Magister Respondetur tibi quod potest excusari aliquis a mendacio qui tamen a temeritate nullatenus excusatur, teste Augustino qui, ubi allegas, ait, "Nemo mentiens iudicandus est qui dicit falsum quod putat verum, quia, quantum in ipso est, non fallit ipse sed fallitur. Non itaque mendacii sed aliquando temeritatis arguendus est qui falsa incaute credit ac pro veris habet." Sic abiurans et similiter iurans modo praedicto a mendacio poterit excusari sed a temeritate minime excusatur. Et ideo nec a pertinacia poterit excusari. Potest enim pertinacia absque mendacio reperiri, sicut in his qui sunt nescienter haeretici reperitur. Tales enim cum putent esse vera quae dicunt minime mentiuntur et tamen pertinaces censentur quia nequaquam corrigi sunt parati.

Master The answer to you is that someone can be excused of lying, without, nevertheless, being excused of rashness. Augustine attests to this when he says, in the place you just cited (22, q. 2, c. Is autem), "No one should be judged a liar who says something which is false but which he thinks is true, because as far as in him lies he does not deceive but is himself deceived. And so someone who incautiously believe falsehoods and holds them to be true should not be accused of lying but, sometimes, of rashness." [vol.1, col.868] Likewise someone abjuring and also someone swearing, in the way just described, can be excused of lying but is not excused of rashness. Nor, therefore, can he be excused of pertinacity. For pertinacity can be found without lying, as it is found in those who are unknowingly heretics. For since such people think that what they are saying is true they are not lying, and yet they are considered pertinacious because they are not ready to be corrected.

Capitulum 28

Chapter 28

Discipulus Ad alium modum de pertinacia errantem convincendi procede.

Student Go on to another way of convicting of pertinacity someone who errs.

Magister Undecimo est quis de pertinacia convincendus si errans contra fidem persequitur vel molestat aut impedit veritatem catholicam defendentes aut pravitatem haereticam impugnantes. Quod enim tales sint pertinaces et haeretici reputandi tali ratione probatur. Qui declarationem catholicae veritatis et detectionem haereticae pravitatis satagit impedire non est paratus corrigi, nec quaerit cauta sollicitudine veritatem, et per consequens pertinax et haereticus est censendus. Sed errans qui persequitur aut molestat vel impedit veritatem catholicam defendentes et pravitatem haereticam impugnantes declarationem veritatis catholicae et detectionem haereticae pravitatis satagit impedire. Ergo talis est pertinax et haereticus reputandus.

Master Someone should be convicted of pertinacity in an eleventh way if he errs against the faith and persecutes, molests or impedes those defending catholic truth or opposing heretical wickedness. For the following argument proves that such people should be regarded as pertinacious and heretics. He who tries to prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the uncovering of heretical wickedness is not ready to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with careful responsibility; as a consequence, he should be considered pertinacious and a heretic; now someone erring who persecutes, molests or impedes those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness is trying to prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the uncovering of heretical wickedness; such a person, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic.

Item, errantes contra fidem qui damnabiliter veritati resistunt sunt pertinaces et haeretici iudicandi quia reprobi circa fidem sunt inter pertinaces et haereticos computandi. Huiusmodi sunt errantes qui damnabiliter veritati resistunt, teste Apostolo 2 ad Timotheum 3, qui de talibus ait, "Quemadmodum autem Iambres et Mambres restiterunt Moysi ita et hi resistunt veritati homines corrupti mente reprobi circa fidem." Sed qui persequuntur aut molestant vel impediunt veritatem catholicam defensantes et pravitatem haereticam impugnantes damnabiliter veritati resistunt. Ergo si errant pertinaces et haeretici sunt censendi.

Again, those who err against the faith and culpably resist the truth should be judged to be pertinacious and heretics because those who are worthless in terms of faith should be counted among the pertinacious and the heretics. Those who err by culpably resisting the truth are like this, as the Apostle attests in 2 Tim. 3:[8], where he says of such people, "Now as Jannes and Mambres resisted Moses, so these also resist the truth, men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith." But those who persecute, molest or impede those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness culpably resist the truth; if they err, therefore, they should be considered heretics and pertinacious.

Confirmatur haec ratio quia magis delinquunt qui catholicae veritati resistunt quam qui resistunt publicae potestati. Sed secundum Apostolum ad Romanos 13 c. "Qui resistit potestati Dei ordinationi resistit. Qui autem resistunt ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt." Ergo multo magis qui catholicae veritati resistunt sibi damnationem acquirunt, sed non nisi per pertinaciam, quia non pertinaciter resistere veritati damnabile non videtur. Ergo tales pertinaces et haeretici sunt censendi.

[See Significant Variants, para. 22.] There is confirmation of this argument in that those who resist catholic truth are more at fault than those who resist the public power. But as the Apostle says in Romans 13[:2] "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." Much more is it the case, therefore, that those who resist catholic truth bring condemnation on themselves, but only through pertinacity, because it does not seem to be culpable to resist the truth in a way that is not pertinacious; such people, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretics.

Item, eadem ratio confirmatur quia non minus peccat qui catholicae veritati resistit et credit haereticae pravitati quam qui non acquiescit veritati et credit iniquitati. Qui autem non acquiescit veritati et credit iniquitati peccat mortaliter, teste Apostolo ad Romanos 2, qui ait, "His autem qui sunt ex contentione et qui non acquiescunt veritati credunt autem inquitati ira et indignatio, tribulatio et angustia." Ergo qui catholice veritati resistit et credit haereticae pravitati peccat mortaliter, sed non sine pertinacia. Ergo talis pertinax et haereticus est censendus.

Again, the same argument is confirmed because he who resists catholic truth and believes heretical wickedness does not sin any less than he who does not assent to the truth and believes in iniquity; he who does not assent to the truth and believes in iniquity, however, sins mortally, as the Apostle attests when he says in Romans 2:[8-9], "But to them that are contentious and who obey not the truth, but give credit to iniquity [there will come] wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish"; he who resists catholic truth and believes heretical wickedness, therefore, sins mortally, but not without pertinacity; such a person should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and a heretic.

Amplius, Christiani qui propter persecutionem quam inferunt defendentibus catholicam veritatem et impugnantibus haereticam pravitatem sunt peiores his qui carnali immundicia sunt infecti sunt pertinaces et haeretici reputandi, quia pravitas peccati eorum ad aliud genus peccati quam infidelitatis, heresis vel pertinaciae reduci non potest. Sed Christiani persequentes illos qui veritatem catholicam defensare nituntur et pravitatem haereticam satagunt impugnare sunt peiores peccatis carnalibus maculatis, quia non sunt minus mali quam illi qui praedicatores veritatis audire recusant; qui tamen recusantes veritatis praedicatores audire peiores sunt illis qui peccatis carnis sunt infecti, veritate ipsa testante, quae ait praedicatoribus evangelicae veritatis Matthaei 10 c., "Quicunque non receperit vos nec audierit sermones vestros, exeuntes foras de domo vel civitate excutite pulverem de pedibus vestris. Amen dico vobis tolerabilius erit terrae Sodomorum et Gomorreorum in die iudicii quam illi civitati." Ergo qui declarationem catholicae veritatis et detectionem haereticae pravitatis impediunt pertinaces et haeretici sunt censendi.

[See Significant Variants, para. 23.] Furthermore, Christians who are worse than those corrupted by carnal impurity because of the persecution they inflict on those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness should be regarded as pertinacious and heretics because the wickedness of their sin can not be reduced to any other kind of sin except lack of faith, heresy or pertinacity; but christians persecuting those who try to defend catholic truth and attempt to oppose heretical depravity are worse than those stained with carnal sins; this is because they are not less evil than those who refuse to listen to preachers of the truth; those who refuse to listen to preachers of the truth are in turn worse than those who have been corrupted by carnal sins. The Truth Himself testifies to this when he says, in Matthew 10:[14-5], to preachers of the Gospel truth, "And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, going forth out of that house or city shake off the dust from your feet. Amen I say to, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgement than for that city." Those who prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the uncovering of heretical depravity, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretics.

Discipulus Ista ratio non videtur apparentiam habere nisi de apostolis et praedicatoribus miracula facientibus, quia veritas ipsa apostolis facturis miracula loquebatur. Et ideo qui impugnaret veritatem catholicam defendentes et pravitatem haereticam reprobantes quorum sermones et assertiones Deus miraculis confirmaret esset peior enormibus peccatoribus iudicandus, non autem qui impugnat alios miracula minime facientes.

Student That argument does not seem to have a show of truth except in reference to apostles and preachers performing miracles, because the Truth himself was speaking to the apostles as they were going to perform miracles. Anyone who would oppose those defenders of catholic truth or disapprovers of heretical wickedness whose words and assertions God would confirm with miracles, therefore, should be judged as worse than outrageous sinners; this is not so, however, of anyone who opposes others not performing miracles.

Magister Istam obiectionem sive responsionem alii evacuare conantur, dicentes quod non minoris auctoritatis est confirmatio veritatis catholicae per Scripturam Sacram quam per operationem miraculi, ita ut qui non credit Scripturae Divinae nec operationi miraculi per fidem firmiter adhaeret, ipso Abraham attestante, qui diviti epuloni petenti operationem miraculi, scilicet mortui suscitationem, propter fratres suos ad poenitentiam inducendos, sicut Lucae 16, ait, "Si Moysen et Prophetas non audiunt neque si quis ex mortuis resurrexerit credent ei." Hoc etiam Innocentius 3 sentire videtur, qui, ut habetur Extra, De haereticis c. Cum ex iniuncto, affirmat quod sicut ad probandum invisibilem missionem a Deo sufficit operatio miraculi et ita etiam sufficit testimonium Scripturae, dicens in haec verba, "Oportet quod astruat illam invisibilem missionem per operationem miraculi vel per Scripturae testimonium speciale." Ergo consimiliter ut veritatis catholicae defensores et impugnatores haereticae pravitatis nullatenus molestentur sufficit eis suas assertiones Scripturae testimoniis confirmare absque operatione miraculi. Unde tempore Antichristi electi miracula minime sunt facturi, sed loco miraculorum Scripturae testimoniis fulcientur.

Master Others try to counter that objection or reply by saying that the confirmation of catholic truth through sacred scripture is of no less authority than [confirmation] through the performing of a miracle, so that he who does not believe divine scripture does not cling firmly in faith to the performance of a miracle either, as Abraham himself testifies. For as we read in Luke 16:[31], he said to the rich feaster who besought the performance of a miracle, namely the resurrection of one dead, in order to induce his brothers to repent, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe if one rise again from the dead." Innocent III also seems to think this since he asserts, as we read in Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto, that just as the performance of a miracle is enough to prove an invisible mission from God so also is the testimony of scripture. He uses these words: "It is necessary that he confirm that invisible mission by the performance of a miracle or by the special testimony of scripture." [col.786] In a similar way, therefore, for defenders of catholic truth and opponents of heretical wickedness not to be molested they need only confirm their assertions by testimonies from scripture without the performance of a miracle. In the time of antichrist, therefore, the elect will not perform miracles, but will be supported by testimonies of scripture in place of miracles.

Discipulus Alio modo videntur omnes rationes praedictae posse infringi. Nam catholicam veritatem defensare et pravitatem haereticam impugnare ad doctorum spectat officium, ut habetur Extra, De haereticis, c.Cum ex iniuncto. Sed ut habetur ibidem, "Cum doctorum ordo sit quasi praecipuus in ecclesia non debet sibi quisquam indifferenter praedicationis officium usurpare." Ergo licite contingit veritatem catholicam defensantes et pravitatem impugnantes haereticam impedire, et per consequens tales impedientes non sunt propter hoc pertinaces nec haeretici iudicandi

Student It seems that all the above arguments can be undermined in another way. For it is part of the duty of doctors to defend catholic truth and to oppose heretical wickedness, as we read in Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto. [col.786] But we find in that place that "Since the order of doctors is, as it were, outstanding in the church, no one else should indiscriminately usurp for himself the duty of preaching." It is possible, therefore, licitly to impede those defending catholic truth and those opposing heretical wickedness; and consequently those who do impede in this way should not for that reason be judged pertinacious and heretics.

Magister Praedictis videtur assertoribus quod rationes eorum nequaquam intelligis. Non enim intendunt ut asserunt quod quilibet possit sibi indifferenter doctoris officium assumere, sed affirmant quod nullus propter hoc quod veritatem confitetur catholicam et haereticam reprobat pravitatem est quomodolibet molestandus, licet quis possit merito molestari si ubi non debet aut quando non debet vel coram quibus non debet aut quovis alio modo quam debet confiteretur catholicam veritatem vel pravitatem haereticam impugnaret. De illis igitur persequentibus intendunt principaliter, qui ideo alios persequuntur quia suis falsis assertionibus adversantur, quia, debitis circumstantiis observatis, quilibet Christianus debet libertatem habere veritatem defendere et confiteri catholicam et pravitatem haereticam detestari. Nec propter hoc debet persecutionem aliquam a catholicis sustinere, et qui propter hoc alicui persecutionem infert esset inter haereticos computandus.

Master It seems to those who assert the above that you do not understand their arguments. For they do not intend to assert that anyone can indiscriminately assume to himself the office of doctor, but they affirm that no one should be molested in any way at all on the grounds that he confesses catholic truth and disapproves of heretical wickedness, although anyone can be molested justly if he confesses catholic truth or opposes heretical wickedness where he ought not or when he ought not or before whom he ought not or in any other way but the way he ought. They have mainly in mind, therefore, persecutors, those who persecute others because they oppose their own false assertions, since any christian ought to have the freedom, provided the due circumstances are observed, to defend and confess catholic truth and to execrate heretical wickedness. He ought not on this account endure any persecution from catholics and anyone who inflicts persecution on someone for this reason should be counted among the heretics.

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