John Scott
(This is a revised version of /pubs/dialogus/signif.html.)
For 1 Dial. 1-5 the manuscripts fall
into five classes or groups, which we call A,
B, C, D
and E (coloured thus to make it easier to
remember which manuscript belongs to which group).
The manuscripts that we believe are
closest to Ockham's text are those of group A,
i.e. AvOxVcVfWe. (For interpretation of
sigla see here.) The next closest,
we believe, are those of group B, i.e. BaDiEsTo. We has been dated to the mid-14th century; the others of
group A
belong to the 15th century; the manuscripts of group B
belong to the late 14th or the 15th century.
Passages found only in one or a few
manuscripts may be authentic survivals of the author's
original text, or they may be additions made by someone
else--a posthumous editor, an interventionist scribe, a reader
making marginal comments that have been copied into the
text. I have made an analysis of some 42 passages from
the first five books where the reading of the A
and B classes of manuscripts differ
significantly from the text as found in the other groups.
The detailed analysis can be found below. Here I will draw
attention to the main findings and their implications for the
manuscript tradition. Perhaps the most striking finding is the
clear demarcation between the AB manuscripts and the others. In
nearly all of these 42 passages A and B
agree together against the rest. With the exceptions of Va
and Fr, blended texts the scribes of which seem to
have had access to manuscripts from both these separate
streams, and Pa and Lb, E class manuscripts the scribes of
which have made marginal additions incorporating readings from
A
or B class manuscripts, the division
between the two sets of manuscripts, in respect of these 42
passages, is virtually absolute.
My analysis has led me to the
conclusion that some at least of these passages must have
been in Ockham's original text. Detailed justification of this
conclusion can be found below, but I draw particular attention
to nos 3, 10, 13, 14, 19,
25, 28 and 32, where the text found only in AB completes a reference or argument or
question referred to elsewhere in the text, and to no.16, where the incomplete text, because of
its omissions, proffers the conclusion of one argument to the
premises of the preceding one. Another significant point
is that all these examples, and others among the 42 as well,
can be explained as omissions by homoioteleuton: the not
uncommon scribal fault of omitting the body of text between
two occurrences of the same word or phrase. This is not
to say that none of the additional passages is a later
editorial 'improvement' - and I have suggested that one or two
definitely are - but I believe that we can affirm confidently
that the A
and B class manuscripts derive ultimately
from an original manuscript independent of the C,
D and E classes and closer, at least in
respect of these passages, to Ockham's original text.
However, the issue is not as simple
as early omissions by homoioteleuton. Some of the passages
analysed below show that CDE manuscripts preserve a different form
of expressing some arguments than do the AB manuscripts. Nos 2,
6 and 23 below are of
this kind. Clearly some other explanation is needed to explain
these variants. No. 33 is another
complicated series of passages where both copying traditions
contain internal contradictions. My own view is that
concerning these passages too the reading of the manuscripts
of the A
and B classes is to be preferred, although
it is not easy to envisage how the variants in the other
manuscripts came about.
Here follows the analysis of the 42
passages referred to above which contain material omitted from
or substantially different in the two printed editions and
most of the manuscripts (with some exceptions to be discussed)
of the CDE classes, but included in
most manuscripts of the AB classes. In formulating the following
analysis I have benefited greatly from the advice of my
colleagues John Kilcullen and George Knysh, although neither
of them is responsible for nor should be assumed to agree with
the conclusions I have drawn.
The variants are numbered for ease of
reference; each passage, cited in Latin and in English, is
located by book number and chapter number. Where there is
simply additional text the words found in the A and B
classes are in bold type.
An asterisk after the location of the
passage indicates a passage that could have been omitted by
homoioteleuton.
The bracketed number at the very end
of each discussion is my (JS) assessment of its genuineness
with (5) meaning 'should certainly be
accepted as genuine', (4) 'should probably
be accepted as genuine', (3) '50/50', (2)
'should probably not be accepted as genuine'.
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Verumtamen propter motiva praescripta ante huius operis consummationem mihi mentem tuam minime pandas, nec propter hoc putes te culpam aliquam incursurum, quia ut melius nosti nonnumquam licet veritatem ex causa tacere.
Nevertheless for the above reasons do not open your mind to me before the conclusion of this work, and do not think you will incur any blame for this because, as you very well know, it is sometimes permitted for a reason to be silent about the truth.
Quia ut melius ... tacere: AvOxVcWe BaDiEsToCaFrKoLaLcNaVdAx
ArPam;
Omitted: AnBbCeFi LyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVgLb.
(Note that both Ca
and Pam omit the phrase ex causa.)
The context of this is the formal
establishment by the two participants of how their dialogue
will proceed. Just as the Student had explained earlier why he
wants the Master to preserve his anonymity, so he explains why
he will not incur blame. This passage is necessary as offering
that explanation. The possibility of blame must exist, and so
the reassurance is required. There is moreover good manuscript
support for it, since it is found even in Ar.
Without the bold passage there would
be no explanation of why it would not be blameworthy on the
Master's part not to assert what he thought to be the truth
--- the statement that it would not be blameworthy would be
left as a bare assertion. There is a parallel to the bold
passage in the prologue to 3.1 Dial. 1: "non sit necesse omni
tempore ore veritatem eciam catholicam confiteri (cum cadat
sub precepto affirmativo quod semper obligat sed non pro
semper)." See also 1
Dial. 2.26.
(4)
AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsTo CaFrKoLaLcNaVdAxLbm read:
Ergo multo magis scriptis summorum pontificum et sanctorum quae pro sanis dogmatibus conscripserunt est firmiter inhaerendum; in scriptis autem eorum plures veritates quae non reperiuntur in Biblia inseruntur; ergo et tales veritates sunt firmiter credendae.
So much the more therefore should we adhere firmly to the writings composed by highest pontiffs and saints for sound doctrine; however, many truths which are not found in the Bible are introduced into their writings; therefore such truths should be firmly believed.
AnBbCeFi
ArLbLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg read:
Ergo multo magis scriptis summorum pontificum et sanctorum quae pro sanis dogmatibus conscripserunt quae non inveniuntur in biblia est firmiter inherendum.
So much the more therefore should we adhere firmly to the writings composed by highest pontiffs and saints for sound doctrine which are not found in the bible.
The key point here is that the second
(abbreviated) version omits the two references to truths
in the argument. (Note too the awkward second quae
clause in the shorter version.) But it is the issue of truth
that is required by the argument. The chapter is about truths
not found in the Bible which must nonetheless be firmly
believed. The previous four arguments all end with the
conclusion that certain non-biblical truths
must be believed. This is the nature of the conclusion
affirmed in the fuller version. The shorter version, however,
has left out the final periods so that its argument seems to
be about writings not about truth. (4)
Discipulus ... est credendum. Ideo nunc interrogo quibus auctoribus/auctoritatibus preter scriptores biblie est credendum.
Magister: Ad interrogationem tuam a diversis diversimode respondetur.
Student: (You have reported different opinions on this matter, the first of which has to say consistently that the firmest has to be offered consistently only to the writers of the bible. But the second which pleases me more has to allow that others should also be believed.) I now ask, therefore, what authors/authorities in addition to the writers/writings of the bible should be believed.
Master: Different people reply to your question in different ways.
ideo nunc interrogo ... credendum: AvOxVcVfWeBaDiEsToCaFrKoLaLcNaVd AxPamLbm;
omitted: AnBbCeFi ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVgLb.
This sentence is essential to the
meaning of the text since the Master immediately refers to the
Student's question; but this passage is the
question. Omitted by homoioteleuton. (5)
Secunda conclusio {sic probatur} quam isti ponunt est quod nec etiam omnibus sententiis quae in sanctorum opusculis iam per ecclesiam divulgatis reperiuntur est firmiter adhaerendum, quod sic probare nituntur.
The second conclusion (is proved as follows) they maintain is that not even all the opinions which are found in the works of the saints already published throughout the Church should be adhered to firmly, and this they try to prove as follows.
quam isti tenent ... nituntur: AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsToLbm;
sic probatur: AnBbCeFi
ArLbLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVgLbAx.
CaFrKoLaLcNaVd: probatur and quam
isti tenent ... nituntur.
The fuller version reminds the reader
of the conclusion to be proved, while the brief one assumes it
is remembered. Ockham seems to follow both practices at
different times, sometimes recalling the argument, sometimes
not. In this case the first conclusion was proved at some
length by citing authorities and by reason and so the
repetition of the conclusion to be proved seems appropriate.
Perhaps the most interesting point to note is the class
D
manuscripts which combine the two versions in a garbled way,
suggesting that they were both available to the
manuscript from which they derive. (3)
Ergo per talem approbationem non fit catholica, sed ante fuit catholica.
(If the fourth is granted, namely that some truth is catholic because it follows from those things or some of those things which have been divinely revealed and inserted in the divine scriptures and accepted by the universal church, it is also clear that it can not be inferred from them more because of the church's approval.) It would not be made catholic because of such approval, therefore, but it was catholic before that.
sed ante fuit catholica: AvOxVfWe
BaDiEsToFrLbm;
omitted: VcAnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaVdAx
ArLbLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg ;
This brief clause clarifies and
emphasises the point; it is not essential to the argument, but
it seems to reinforce the point appropriately. The following
paragraph ends with a similar point. It could have been
omitted by homoioteleuton, which it certainly was in Vc. (4)
At this point the two
different manuscript traditions have different versions
of the first question in the chapter.
AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsToLbm read:
Discipulus: ... dic an aliqui teneant quod aliquis inferior summo pontifice possit interdicere et praecipere assertiones aliquas non teneri, liceat eas non damnare possit.
Magister: Sunt nonnulli putantes quod licet (We BaDi only) nec aliquod collegium inferius concilio generali nec aliquis inferior summo pontifice valeat licite quamcunque assertionem non damnatam explicite tamquam haereticam excommunicare vel damnare, licet tamen collegiis aliis ...'
Student: ... Tell me whether anyone holds that someone inferior to the highest pontiff can forbid some assertions and order them not to be held, even if he can not condemn them.
Master There are some who think that although no gathering less than a general council nor anyone inferior to the highest pontiff can licitly excommunicate or condemn as heretical any assertion that has not been explicitly condemned, yet other gatherings ...'
AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg read:
Discipulus: ... dic an aliqui teneant quod aliquis inferior summo pontifice valeat licite quamcunque assertionem non damnatam explicite tamquam haereticam excommunicare vel damnare.
Magister: Ad hoc respondent quidam dicentes quod quamvis non liceat alicui inferiori papa etc, licet tamen collegiis aliis et praelatis inferioribus papa assertiones erroneas ex causa rationabili interdicere et praecipere quod nullatenus publice defendantur.'
Student: Tell me whether anyone holds that someone inferior to the highest pontiff can licitly excommunicate or condemn as heretical any assertion that has not been explicitly condemned.
Master: Some people reply to this by saying that although it is not permissible for anyone inferior to the pope nevertheless other gatherings and for prelates inferior to the pope are permitted for a reasonable cause to forbid erroneous assertions and to order that they not be defended publicly.
(Fr has a mixture: ad hoc respondent
quidam dicentes quod quamvis non liceat collegio inferiori
concilio generali nec alicui inferiori papa dampnare
assercionem non dampnatam explicite tanquam hereticam
excommunicare...)
The context of this chapter makes it
clear that the AB version is to be preferred. In
chapter 20 the Master argued that no one less than the pope or
a general council can condemn those maintaining a heresy
condemned only implicitly. The chapters that follow (21-25)
deal with objections to this by the Student, chapter 25
concluding with the Master's saying that he can't deal with
the case of Olivi (one of the Student's objections) for lack
of the right materials. Then the Student begins ch26 by
agreeing to defer the matter. Following this comes his
introduction to the topic for this chapter. In the CDE version he asks again
the question about the condemnation of opinions not
explicitly condemned which they have just finished discussing
and which is not the question discussed in
this chapter. The AB version does ask
the question that is discussed here. Then ch.27 begins with
the Student's admission of some doubts about the matter just
discussed but his determination to return to
the main issue (obviously passed over in ch.26) about the
condemnation of assertions not explicitly condemned. It
is hard to understand the genesis of the CDE version. One possibility is that the
words between the two occurrences of "summo pontifice" were
omitted in an ancestor of the CDE classes and that an early scribe
recognised that the text moved from a speech by the Student to
one by the Master. As a result he attempted to correct this by
postulating the words that now survive in the CDE traditions. (4)
Ergo absque peccato permittit papa theologos huiusmodi errores qui in veritate sunt hereses opinando tenere. Alii sentiunt quod plures summi pontifices damnabiliter peccaverunt (in hoc) permittendo haereses huiusmodi etiam opinando teneri, quod probant primo sic.
The pope is without sin, therefore, in allowing theologians to hold as their opinion errors of this kind which are in truth of fact heresies. Others think that many highest pontiffs have sinned culpably (in this) in allowing heresies of this kind to be held even as an opinion, which they prove first as follows.
permittendo haereses huiusmodi
etiam opinando teneri:
AvOxVcVfWe Ba;
in hoc:
DiEsTo AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLbLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg;
To omits, but also omits surrounding
sentences.
A brief clause which does not seem
strictly necessary since it repeats what was said at the end
of the previous sentence, although it does add the emphatic
'etiam'. Nevertheless it seems just the sort of clarification
a reviser might make and there is no obvious explanation of
why a scribe would omit it. Its absence from the early B
class manuscripts is also suggestive. (2)
There are two variants in this
chapter, the second almost immediately following the first.
They are the two highlighted passages below, but they are
discussed separately.
Tertia ratio est haec. Propter illos qui possunt contra fidem errare non est aliqua assertio neque tanquam catholica approbanda neque tanquam haeretica condemnanda. Sed omnes magistri in theologia, et etiam omnes alii a papa in generali concilio congregati, possunt contra fidem errare, quia nec magistri in theologia nec omnes alii a papa in generali concilio congregati sunt tota illa ecclesia pro qua Christus oravit ne fides eius deficeret, licet si sint catholici sint pars eiusdem ecclesiae, sicut quilibet christianus est pars illius ecclesiae. Ergo propter illos non debet papa aliquam assertionem neque tanquam catholicam approbare neque tanquam haereticam condemnare nisi aperte ostendatur papae vel per operationem miraculi vel per testimonium catholicae veritatis quod a veritate nequaquam exorbitant.
A third argument is this. No assertion should be approved as catholic or condemned as heretical on account of people who can err against the faith. But all masters in theology and even all others gathered together by (apart from) the pope in a general council can err against the faith, because neither masters in theology nor all the others gathered together by the pope in a general council make up that whole church for which Christ prayed that its faith would not fail, although if they are catholics they are part of that church just as any christian is part of that church. The pope should not, therefore, because of these approve any assertion as catholic or condemn it as heretical unless it is clearly shown to him by the working of a miracle or by the testimony of catholic truth that they are not deviating from the truth.
congregati possunt contra fidem
errare ... congregati:
OxVcVfWe
(Av omits, except for first congregati)
For this passage others substitute non:
BaDiEsTo AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg.
The fuller text in the A
class manuscripts seems to be necessary; without it the
clause 'can err against the faith', stated in the first
premise, would be lacking from this second premise and so the
proper form of the argument would not be preserved. That this
is intended to be a syllogism, thus making the passage in
question necessary, is clear from both the beginning and the
end of the argument. Moreover, without the first 'congregati'
the phrase 'omnes alii ... concilio' reads very oddly: 'a'
has to be interpreted as meaning 'apart from' (possible but
very unusual); but then why would the pope be excluded in that
context? (4)
This refers to the second of the
passages highlighted above.
sicut quilibet Christianus
est pars illius ecclesiae: BaDiEsTo AvOxVcVfWe
omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVbVg.
Not essential to the argument, but a
nice point to emphasise. It could be a later addition, of
course, but that it could have been omitted by homoioteleuton
leads one to think that it should be accepted. (4)
Assuming the authenticity of the AB
text "(licet si sint catholici sint pars eiusdem ecclesie,
sicut quilibet Christianus est pars illius ecclesie)", another
possible representation would be:
eiusdem ecclesie, sicut quilibet Christianus est pars] AB
have, CDE omit.
The omission would be triggered by two occurrences of "pars".
Va has "(licet sint catholici pars illius
ecclesie)"
Item, Stephanus papa, inter dubium pertinacem et non pertinacem non distinguens, indiffinite dicit, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. 1, �Dubius in fide infidelis est.�Ergo omnis dubitans de fide, sive pertinaciter sive non pertinaciter, infidelis, et per consequens haereticus, est censendus. Magis autem est errare quam dubitare. Ergo omnis errans contra fidem, sive pertinaciter sive non pertinaciter, hereticus est censendus.
Item, Nicholaus papa, ut habetur 24, q. 1, c. Aperte, indiffinite dicit, "Neminem deicere vel removere poterat qui, talia praedicans, in fide titubat". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod omnis titubans seu dubitans in fide omni potestate ecclesiastica est privatus, sed non nisi quia hereticus; ergo omnis talis titubans seu dubitans in fide, sive pertinaciter sive non pertinaciter, hereticus est censendus. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis errans contra fidem etiam non pertinaciter haereticus est censendus.
Also, pope Stephen, not distinguishing between perticacious and non-pertinacious doubt, says indefinitely (Extra, De hereticis, c.1), "One doubtful in faith is unfaithful". Therefore everyone who doubts about the faith, whether pertinaciously or not pertinaciously, should be considered unfaithful and consequently a heretic. But it is a bigger thing to err than to doubt; therefore everyone who errs against the faith, whether pertinaciously or not pertinaciously, should be considered a heretic.
Also, Pope Nicholas, as we read in 24, q. 1, c. Aperte, says indefinitely: "No one was able to depose or remove who, preaching such things, is unsteady in the faith". From these words we gather that everyone who is unsteady in faith is deprived of all ecclesiastical power. But this is only because he is a heretic. Therefore everyone who is unsteady or doubtful in faith, whether pertinaciously or not pertinaciously, should be considered a heretic. From this it follows that everyone who errs against the faith, even not pertinaciously, should be reckoned a heretic.
Magis autem est errare ...
haereticus est censendus: WeAvOxVcVf BaDiEsToFrPam
have this passage.
(However, Av omits �omni potestate
ecclesiastica est privatus, sed non nisi quia hereticus; ergo
omnis talis titubans seu dubitans in fide�.
Ox omits �Magis autem est errare
quam dubitare. Ergo omnis errans contra fidem, sive
pertinaciter sive non pertinaciter, hereticus est censendus.�
Fr omits: �Item, Nicholaus papa, ut
habetur 24, q. 1, c. Aperte, indiffinite dicit,
"Neminem deicere vel removere poterat qui, talia praedicans,
in fide titubat"
The following omit the passage: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg.
The passage is essential to the text.
It concludes one citation and begins another, the CDE manuscripts eliding the citation
from Pope Nicholas. When the authorities cited in ch.5 are
replied to in ch.10, there is a reply to the said text of
Nicholas. It would have been omitted by homoioteleuton. (5)
Istud non videtur bene dictum. Nam pertinax dicitur quasi impudenter tenax et qui in sententia sua nimis persistit. Sed qui metu mortis defendit errorem est impudenter tenax et in sua sententia nimis persistit. Aliter enim nequaquam peccaret mortaliter errorem contra conscientiam defendendo. Ergo talis est erroris pertinax defensator, licet propter talem pertinacem defensionem non sit haereticus iudicandus si constat fidelibus quod solummodo pro morte vitanda defendit errorem.
That does not seem to be well said. For he is said to be pertinacious who is, as it were, shamelessly tenacious and too persistent in his opinion. But he who defends an error from fear of death is shamelessly tenacious and too persistent in his opinion. For otherwise he would not sin mortally in defending an error against his conscience. Such a person is a pertinacious defender of error, therefore, although he should not be judged a heretic on account of such a pertinacious defence if believers are certain that he is defending the error only to avoid death.
Sed qui ... persistit. OxVcVfWe EsDiToFr;
Omitted: Av Ba AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg.
This sentence is required by the
argument. The conclusion refers to someone defending an error
to avoid death, which it would not without the additional
sentence having earlier appeared in the argument because its
omission would make the argument excessively informal.
Moreover, without that sentence it would make no sense to
begin the following one with 'aliter enim'. That it could have
been omitted by homoioteleuton seems to strengthen the case
for accepting it as genuine. (5)
In verbis praedictis Augustinus insinuare videtur quod non omnes errantes in ecclesia Christi pertinaciter pro hereticis sunt habendi, cum videatur innuere quod tria requiruntur ad hoc ut illi qui in ecclesia Christi morbidum aliquid pravumque quid sapiunt sint haeretici. Primum est quod correcti ut rectum sanumque sapiant resistant contumaciter, propter quod solummodo absque omni alio pro pertinacibus sunt habendi. Secundum est ...
Translation of context: [Augustine] says: 'Those in the church of Christ who are inspired by something unwholesome and perverse and contumaciously resist if they are corrected that they might be inspired by something wholesome and sound and refuse to correct their pestiferous and deadly teachings but persist in defending them are heretics.'
Augustine seems to imply in the above words that not all those in the church of Christ who err pertinaciously should be held to be heretics, since he seems to imply that three things are required for those in the church of Christ who are inspired by something unwholesome and perverse to be heretics. The first is that when corrected so that they might be inspired by what is wholesome and sound they resist contumaciously , and for this reason alone, without any other, they should be held to be pertinacious. The second is ...
propter quod ... habendi: AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsTo VaPam;
omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVbVg.
This is not an addition which can be
deduced from the text of Augustine which the Student is
expounding; on the contrary Augustine implies that the three
things are necessary. It seems to be a later editorial comment
because it adds nothing to the argument here; rather it reads
like an editor who wants to make his own point. Perhaps it was
originally a critical comment in the margin, later
incorporated into the text. (2)
(On the other hand, it helps the point that
pertinacity is not sufficient: contumacious resistence is
enough for pertinacity, but two other things are required also
to be a heretic.)
De quarto et quinto genere, scilicet de convictis et confessis coram praelatis de haeretica pravitate, distinguunt, quia ista pravitas potest attendi vel ex parte ipsorum convictorum vel confessorum vel solummodo ex parte erroris de quo sunt convicti vel confessi. Si primo modo sint convicti vel confessi de haeretica pravitate sunt haeretici manifesti quia tales de pertinacia sunt convicti vel confessi. Si autem sit pravitas solummodo ex parte erroris non ex parte convictorum vel confessorum sic non sunt haeretici manifesti. Errores enim quos tenuerunt Augustinus, Hieronymus et Cyprianus, de quibus tactum est supra et de quibus poterant convinci, pravi fuerunt, ipsi tamen non fuerunt pravi. Et ideo quamvis de illis erroribus coram praelatis convicti fuissent vel confessi haeretici nullatenus extitissent.
About the fourth and fifth kinds, that is those who before prelates have been convicted of and have confessed to heretical wickedness, they make a distinction, because that wickedness can be reckoned either on the side of those who have been convicted or have confessed or only on the side of the error of which they have been convicted or to which they have confessed. If they have been convicted of or have confessed to heretical wickedness in the first way they are manifest heretics because such people have been convicted of or have confessed to pertinacity. However if the wickedness is only on the side of error, not on the side of those who have been convicted or have confessed, they are for this reason not manifest heretics. For the errors that Augustine, Jerome and Cyprian maintained, which were touched on earlier and for which they could have been convicted, were bad, yet they themselves were not bad. And therefore even if before prelates they had been convicted of or had confessed to those errors, they would not have been heretics.
Si primo modo ... vel
confessi: In AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsToFrPam;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg.
This is necessary to the text as
being the required statement about the first part of the
distinction which the Master makes. Typically, when Ockham
makes a distinction he then considers each of the separate
distinctions he has made. The elaboration of the second part
of the distinction follows in all manuscripts. The
passage would have been omitted early in one branch of the
stemma by homoioteleuton. (5)
Discipulus Video quod isti diffiniunt "pertinacem"communius quam competat erranti in fide. Ideo appropria diffinitionem praedictam erranti in fide.
Magister Appropriatur sic. Pertinaciter errans in fide est qui persistit in heresi quam debet de necessitate salutis dimittere.
Discipulus Appropria eandem dubitanti pertinaciter contra fidem.
Magister Appropriatur sic. Pertinaciter dubitans contra fidem est qui persistit in dubitatione circa ea quae fidei sunt quam debet de necessitate salutis dimittere.
Student: I see that they define "pertinacious" more generally than would be appropriate to one erring in faith. Make the aforesaid definition then specific to one erring in faith.
Master It is made specific thus. He errs pertinaciously in faith who persists in a heresy which he ought to put aside from the necessity of salvation.
Disciple Make the same [definition] specific to one doubting the faith pertinaciously.
Master: It is made specific thus. That person pertinaciously doubts the faith who persists in doubt, which from the necessity of salvation he should put aside, about matters of faith.
Magister: Appropriatur ...
contra fidem. WeAvOxVc BaDiTo EsFr;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg
Here a short exchange between Master
and Student has slipped out of the CDE manuscripts. All
the manuscripts agree that the student ends his
immediately preceding contribution with the request that the
master make a definition specific to one erring
pertinaciously in the faith. The passage at issue contains the
Master's concise answer and the Student's request that he now
make it specific for one doubting
pertinaciously against the faith. All manuscripts agree
that there then follows the Masters specification of the
definition for one doubting pertinaciously.
The passage must have been in the original or the Master's
answer would not have corresponded to the question. Omitted by
homoioteleuton. (5)
Discipulus Quomodo quis potest scienter pertinax esse? Videtur enim quod hoc contradictionem includit. Si enim est scienter pertinax scit se esse pertinacem; sed hoc includit contradictionem, quia qui errat putat esse verum circa quod errat, eo quod errare est approbare falsum pro vero. Nullus ergo scit se errare. Et ita nullus est scienter pertinax quia nullus scit se esse pertinacem in errore.
Disciple How can someone be knowingly pertinacious? This seems to contain a contradiction, for if he is knowingly pertinacious, he knows that he is pertinacious; but this contains a contradiction, because he who errs thinks that to be true about which he is in error, in that to err is to regard the false as true. No one therefore knows that he errs; and thus no one is knowingly pertinacious because no one knows that he is pertinacious in error.
Si enim est scienter ...
includit contradictionem. WeAvOxVc BaDiToFr;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg Es.
This is a part of the argument, which
proceeds by means of reductio ad absurdum. While it
might have been left implicit, the fact that it could have
been omitted by homoioteleuton suggests that it should be
accepted as genuine. (4)
Secundo sic: omnis apostata a catholica veritate est pertinax et haereticus reputandus quia talis est apostata a fide; apostata autem a fide inter haereticos computatur; sed negans catholicam veritatem quam prius catholicam reputavit est apostata a catholica veritate, quia talis abicit catholicam veritatem; ergo est inter pertinaces et hereticos computandus.
Tertio sic: christianus infidelis inter pertinaces et haereticos computatur; sed christianus qui negat catholicam veritatem quam prius reputavit catholicam est infidelis. Ergo est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus. Maior videtur certa. Minor probatur, quia qui negat catholicam veritatem quam prius agnovit esse catholicam est peior infideli qui nunquam novit catholicam veritatem, teste Innocentio 3, qui, ut habetur Extra, De apostatis, c. Quidam, ait, "Cum minus malum existat viam Domini non agnoscere quam post agnitam retroire." Hinc beatus Petrus canonica sua 2 c. 2 ait, "Melius enim erat eis non cognoscere viam iustitiae quam post agnitionem retrorsum converti." Veritas autem catholica est via iustitiae. Ergo maius malum est post agnitam catholicam veritatem retroire quam nunquam veritatem catholicam agnovisse. Sed hoc non est maius malum nisi ratione deterioris infidelitatis. Ergo qui negat veritatem catholicam quam prius novit esse catholicam est infidelis et per consequens pertinax et haereticus est censendus.
[It is proved] secondly as follows. [Major] Every apostate from catholic truth should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic, because he is an apostate from the faith and an apostate from the faith is reckoned among the heretics; [Minor] but he who denies a catholic truth which he had previously regarded as catholic is an apostate from catholic truth because he casts aside catholic truth; he should be reckoned, therefore, among the pertinacious and the heretics.
[It is proved] thirdly as follows. [major] A faithless Christian is reckoned among the pertinacious and the heretics; [minor] but a Christian who denies a catholic truth that he had previously regarded as catholic is faithless; he should be judged, therefore, as pertinacious and a heretic. The major [premise] seems certain. The minor is proved: he who denies a catholic truth which he previously knew to be catholic is worse than a faithless person who has never known catholic truth -- Innocent III testifies to this when he says, as we find in Extra, De apostatis, c. Quidam [col. 791], "It is a lesser evil not to know the way of the Lord than to turn back after it has been known." Hence blessed Peter says in the second chapter of his second letter [2 Peter 2:21]: "For it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it to turn back." Now catholic truth is the way of justice and so it is a greater evil to go back after having known catholic truth than never to have known it. But this is only a greater evil by reason of worse faithlessness. He who denies a catholic truth that he previously knew to be catholic, therefore, is faithless and as a consequence should be considered pertinacious and a heretic.
Ergo est inter pertinaces et
haereticos computandus. Tertius sic. Christianus ... est
infidelis. AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsToFr;
omitted: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg.
Here the A
and B class manuscripts have added a
third proof to the two in the CDE manuscripts. All the proofs are
syllogisms. The final proof in all manuscripts (that is,
the third proof in the AB manuscripts and the second in the CDE manuscripts) concludes with a
proof of its minor premise. The key question, therefore, is
whether the proof is suited to the minor premise of the second
argument, to which it is attached in the CDE manuscripts, or to the third, to
which it is attached in the AB manuscripts.
And it is clearly a proof of the
argument in the AB manuscripts: the apparent
certainty of the major premise suits the third argument; and
the proof of the minor premise deals with infidelis/infidelitas
and so is a proof of the third argument which is about an infidelis
not of the second argument which is about an apostata. Similarly,
the conclusion refers to an infidelis, not an apostata.
Omitted originally by homoioteleuton. (5)
Ex hiis aliisque quampluribus patet quod qui invenitur sibi ipsi contrarius non est credendum secundo dicto ipsius. Sed qui negat veritatem catholicam quam prius putavit catholicam invenitur sibi ipsi contrarius quia dum putavit dictam veritatem esse catholicam dixit aut facto vel verbo innuit se agnoscere illam veritatem esse catholicam.
It is clear from these and very many others that what is said second by someone who is found to contradict himself should not be believed. But he who denies a catholic truth which he previously thought to be catholic is found to contradict himself because while he thought that the said truth is catholic he said or indicated by deed or word that he knew that the truth is catholic.
quam prius putavit catholicam: AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsToFr;
omitted: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg.
This brief clause is essential to the
argument since denying a catholic truth does not in itself
make one self-contradictory unless one had previously held it
as a truth. Without the clause the sentence makes every denial
of catholic truth self-contradictory, which is not the point
here. Omitted by homoioteleuton. (5)
Magister: Dicunt quod non: tum quia papa saepe est illiteratus et simplex; tum quia papa de fide potest errare contra fidem; tum quia papa de fide tenetur reddere rationem, quia, sicut notat glossa Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando, "de omnibus ratio reddi debet si potest"; tum quia in causa fidei a papa licet appellare; tum quia fides nostra non consistit in sapientia papae. Nullus enim in his quae fidei sunt tenetur credere papae nisi per regulam fidei dicti sui rationem ostendat.
Master They say, "no" [to the question: whether, that is, those who err unknowingly are bound to retract their heresies as the result of simple correction by the pope, without the sort of correction they call legitimate.] This is because (i) the pope is often unlearned and simple, because (ii) the pope can err from the faith against the faith, because (iii) the pope is bound to offer a reason for faith -- since, as the gloss on Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando [col.35] notes, "a reason ought to be offered for everything if it can be" -- because (iv) in a case concerning the faith it is licit to appeal from the pope, and because (v) our faith does not rest on the wisdom of the pope. For no one is bound to believe the pope in matters of faith unless the latter shows a reason for his statement by the rule of faith.
Tum quia papa saepe est
illiteratus et simplex. Tum quia papa de fide potest errare
contra fidem. AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEs Va;
To has the first period only;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVbVg.
Here the AB manuscripts offer 5 reasons, as
opposed to the three of the other manuscripts. In his
response the Student replies only to one of the arguments (not
one of the two additional arguments). But why would a later
reviser add these arguments? They are obvious and good
arguments, easily omitted by homoioteleuton (Tum quia).
It seems better to consider them Ockham's. (4)
Sexta ratio est haec. Qui non est paratus corrigi de haeresi quam tenet est pertinax reputandus; sed qui cogit alios ad suam haeresim pertinaciter defendendam non est paratus corrigi; ergo pertinax est censendus.
A sixth argument is this. He who is not ready to be corrected of a heresy he holds should be regarded as pertinacious; but he who forces others pertinaciously to defend his heresy is not ready to be corrected; he should, therefore, be considered pertinacious.
Sexta ratio est haec. Qui non
est paratus corrigi de haeresi quam tenet est pertinax
reputandus. In AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsTo Va;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVbVg.
This is necessary to the argument and
it is elaborated in what follows. The rest of the paragraph
would be pointless as a continuation of the fifth reason,
which had already reached its conclusion. The sixth argument
could exist without the passage in question only if it were
tacitly assumed, and in arguments stated formally (as are the
arguments to which this belongs) the major premise is always
made explicit. Omitted by homoioteleuton. (5)
(In Va the passage has been inserted in
the wrong place and material just before the insertion point
has been repeated.)
Istae rationes procedunt tantummodo de cogente alios haeresim suam pertinaciter defensare, sed contingit haeresim defensare absque pertinacia. Ergo licet aliquis cogat alios poenis, minis, praeceptis et iuramentis haeresim aliquam defensare, dummodo non cogat eos pertinaciter defensare, non est pertinax nec haereticus reputandus...
Student Those arguments are valid only of someone forcing others pertinaciously to defend his heresy, but it is possible to defend a heresy without pertinacity. Even if someone forces others by punishments, threats, commands and oaths to defend some heresy, therefore, he should not be regarded as pertinacious or a heretic as long as he does not force them to defend it pertinaciously.
sed contingit haeresim
defensare: AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsToFr Va;
omitted: AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLyPaPbPcPzSaVbVg.
A necessary clause: the previous
arguments cannot be valid only of someone forcing others to
defend without pertinacity, which is what the first sentence
says without the disputed clause. "Forcing others
pertinaciously to defend his heresy without pertinacity"
is self-contradictory. The words would have been
omitted by homoioteleuton. (5)
The final speech by the Master in
this chapter is extant in three different manuscript
traditions. Here is the whole speech, with that part common to
all in plain type; the bold portion is
omitted in BbAnCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx; the italicised
portion is omitted in those manuscripts and also in Ox
DiEsTo FrArPaPbPcLyPzSaVbVg; the whole is found in AvVcVfWeBa Va. For the purposes of this
discussion other variants have been ignored.
Magister: Dicitur quod talis per nullam potest ignorantiam excusari quia nullus valet absque temeritate quomodolibet attentare cogere alium iuramento penis minis vel preceptis aliquam assertionem abiurare vel negare nisi sit certus certitudine sufficienti quod non est consona catholice veritati. De assertione autem catholica nullus potest certitudinem habere talem quod non est consona catholicae veritati. Ergo temerarie cogit alium abiurare vel negare eandem. Temeritas autem in hoc casu pertinacie equipollet. Ergo talis est pertinax et hereticus reputandus.
Master It is said that a person of this kind can not be excused by any ignorance, because without being rash no one can attempt to force another in any way at all, by an oath, by penalties, threats or commands, to abjure or deny some assertion unless he is with sufficient certitude sure that it is not consistent with Catholic truth; no one, however, can have such certitude that a catholic assertion is not consistent with catholic truth; therefore he rashly forces another to abjure or deny the same; in this case, however, rashness is equivalent to pertinacity. A person of this kind, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic.
Here we can detect two different
omissions due to homoioteleuton. The full text is clearly
necessary to the argument. Without the first bold sentence the
Master would be saying that no one at all can force anyone to
abjure any assertion in any circumstances; without the
italicised text there would not be the reference to a catholic
assertion demanded by the context of the chapter, which deals
with forcing someone to deny a catholic assertion. It is only
in connection with catholic assertions that the
relevant certitude is not available. (5)
Confirmatur haec ratio quia magis delinquunt qui catholicae veritati resistunt quam qui resistunt publicae potestati. Sed secundum Apostolum ad Romanos 13 c. "Qui resistit potestati Dei ordinationi resistit. Qui autem resistunt ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt." Ergo multo magis qui catholicae veritati resistunt sibi damnationem acquirunt. Qui autem veritatem catholicam declarari et pravitatem hereticam reprobari impediunt catholice veritati resistunt. Ergo sibi damnationem acquirunt, sed non nisi per pertinaciam, quia non pertinaciter resistere veritati damnabile non videtur. Ergo tales pertinaces et haeretici sunt censendi.
There is confirmation of this argument in that those who resist catholic truth are more at fault than those who resist the public power. But as the Apostle says in Romans 13[:2] "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." Much more is it the case, therefore, that those who resist catholic truth bring condemnation on themselves; now those who prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the disapproval of heretical wickedness resist catholic truth; therefore they bring condemnation on themselves, but only through pertinacity, because it does not seem to be culpable to resist the truth in a way that is not pertinacious; such people, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretics.
Qui autem veritatem ...
acquirunt: AvOxVcVfWe EsBaTo Va;
Omitted: DiAnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAxArLyPaPbPcPzSaVbVg..
This seems to be a later
interpolation, added because the main thrust of the chapter
concerns those who prevent the disclosure of truth. But the
argument in which this addition is found, like the following
one which contains no mention of those who prevent the
disclosure of truth, is confirming the previous argument
dealing with those who resist the truth. Moreover, the phrase
about pertinacity which directly follows the passage at issue
is explicitly tied by the clause that follows it to 'resisting
truth' not to 'preventing disclosure': had the disputed
sentence been in the original the pertinacity should have
referred to such prevention of disclosure, to which the
concept of pertinacity does not seem relevant anyway. So
although it could have been omitted through homoioteleuton,
one must regard it as highly suspect. (2)
The paragraph beginning "Amplius
Christiani" survives in two different versions CDE vs AB. Here follow text and translation of
the paragraph (the text of the biblical quotation being
omitted here), the part in plain type being in both versions,
the bold text being the AB version and the italic text
being the CDE version.
AB: Amplius Christiani qui propter persecutionem quam inferunt defendentibus catholicam veritatem et impugnantibus hereticam pravitatem sunt peiores hiis qui carnali immundicia sunt infecti sunt pertinaces et heretici reputandi, quia pravitas peccati eorum ad aliud genus peccati quam infidelitatis heresis vel pertinacie reduci non potest. Sed Christiani persequentes illos qui veritatem catholicam defensare nituntur et pravitatem hereticam satagunt impugnare sunt peiores peccatis carnalibus maculatis, quia non sunt minus mali quam illi qui predicatores veritatis audire recusant; qui tamen recusantes veritatis predicatores audire peiores sunt illis qui peccatis carnis sunt infecti, veritate ipsa testante quae ait predicatoribus evangelice veritatis Matt 10[:14-5], ... . Ergo qui declarationem catholice veritatis et detectionem heretice pravitatis impediunt pertinaces et heretici sunt censendi.
["sunt infecti, sunt" may be confusing. Structure of the first sentence: Christiani qui...sunt peiores hiis qui... sunt infecti sunt pertinaces et heretici reputandi. Christians who (because of the persecution...) are worse than those infected with carnal uncleanness -- they are pertinacious and to be regarded as heretics. ]
Furthermore, Christians who, because of the persecution they inflict on those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness, are worse than those corrupted with carnal impurity, should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical, because the wickedness of their sin can not be reduced to any kind of sin except lack of faith, heresy or pertinacity. But Christians persecuting those who try to defend catholic truth and attempt to oppose heretical depravity are worse than those stained with carnal sins. Because they are not less evil than those who refuse to listen to preachers of truth; those who refuse to listen to preachers of the truth are, however, worse than those who have been corrupted by carnal sins. The Truth himself testifies to this when he says ... Therefore those who prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the detection of heretical depravity should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
CDE: Amplius Christiani qui propter persecutionem quam inferunt defendentibus catholicam veritatem et impugnantibus hereticam pravitatem sunt peiores hiis qui carnali invidia infecti. Illa patet, quia non sunt minus mali quam illi qui predicatores veritatis audire recusant. Qui tamen recusantes veritatis predicatores audire peiores sunt illis qui peccatis carnis sunt infecti, veritate ipsa testante quae ait predicatoribus evangelice veritatis Matt 10[:14-5], ... . Ergo qui declarationem veritatis et deceptionem heretice pravitatis impediunt pertinaces et heretici sunt censendi quia pravitas peccati eorum ad aliud genus peccati quam infidelitatis heresis vel pertinacie non poterit reduci.
[Structure of the first sentence is defective, since the "qui" clause lacks a verb].
Furthermore, [there are] Christians who (because of the persecution they inflict on those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness) are worse than those corrupted with carnal envy/impurity. This is clear because they are not less evil than those who refuse to listen to preachers of truth; those who refuse to listen to preachers of the truth are, however, worse than those who have been corrupted by carnal sins. The Truth himself testifies to this when he says ... Therefore those who prevent the disclosure of truth and the deception/detection of heretical depravity should be considered pertinacious and heretical, because the wickedness of their sin can not be reduced to any other kind of sin except lack of faith, heresy or pertinacity.
All the components of the argument (such
as it is) are present in both versions. There is no obvious
reason why the bold text would have dropped out in copying.
The CDE version is more concise, but Ockham
seems to value logical formality over conciseness. The CDE version has two drawbacks: its first
sentence is defective, and its conclusion is weakened
rhetorically by being followed by one of the premises.
That the AB version is the original seems
slightly more likely. (3)
Magister Sicut scis, praecepta affirmativa obligant semper sed non ad semper. Et ideo errans quamvis teneatur venire ad lucem iusti iudicii non tamen pro omni tempore ad hoc tenetur. Sed non impedire iudicium fieri cum sit negativum pro omni tempore obligat. Et ideo ille dicendus est venire ad lucem qui paratus est venire ad lucem quando expedit et oportet. Et ideo licet non omni tempore veniat ad lucem petendo suam assertionem discuti diligenter non est pertinax reputandus sed quandocunque ne assertio sua arguatur nititur impedire ne ad examen debitum deducatur est dicendus odire lucem et non venire ad lucem ut non arguatur assertio eius, et ideo tunc est merito pertinax iudicandus. Ex praedictis isti inferre conantur quod si papa aliquam haeresim dogmatisat et impedit generale concilium celebrari ne sua assertio discutiatur pertinax et haereticus est censendus.
Master: As you know, affirmative precepts are always binding, but not for always. Although someone who errs is bound to come into the light of a just judgement, therefore, he is nevertheless not bound to this on every occasion. But since "not to prevent judgement being made" is a negative it is binding on every occasion. He should be said to come into the light, therefore, who is ready to come into the light when it is appropriate and necessary to do so. And even if he does not on every occasion come into the light by seeking to have his assertion carefully inquired into he should not, therefore, be regarded as pertinacious; but whenever he tries to prevent his assertion being brought to due examination lest it be censured, he should be said to hate the light and not come to the light lest his assertion be reproved; and he is then, therefore, deservedly condemned as pertinacious. They try to infer from the above that if the pope teaches some heresy as doctrine and prevents the holding of a general council lest his assertion be examined, he should be considered pertinacious and a heretic.
et non venire ad lucem: added WeBaDiEsToPamLbm;
ut non arguatur assertio ...
pertinax iudicandus: AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsToPamLbm;
Both passages omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbLyPaPbPcSaVaVbVgPz.
The bold addition seems to be
necessary to the argument; it contains the crucial conclusion
that such a person should be condemned. (4)
Secundo sic. Ille qui per se vel per alios persequitur punit vel molestat catholicam veritatem confitentes et pravitatem hereticam detestantes est pertinax et hereticus reputandus. Haec in superioribus est fundata. Papa autem qui solenniter diffinit aliquam assertionem quae est heretica esse tenendam per se vel per alios quantum in ipso est persequitur punit et molestat catholicam veritatem contrariam defensantes et pravitatem hereticam detestantes cum quantum in ipso est per suam constitutionem omnes contradicentes reddat/reddit anathemate dignos.
A second argument is as follows. He who himself or through others persecutes, punishes or molests those confessing catholic truth and denouncing heretical wickedness should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic. This is based on what was said above. A pope who solemnly pronounces that some assertion which is heretical should be held, however, is, as far as in him lies, by himself or through others persecuting, punishing and molesting those defending the opposing catholic truth and those denouncing heretical wickedness, since, as far as in him lies, by his statute he makes all those who contradict him worthy of anathema.
persequitur ... ipso est: AvVcVfWe
BaDiEsTo VaLbm.
Omitted: BbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbSaVbVg.
This seems an essential addition
which must have been in Ockham's original. Without the added
passage the argument makes no sense since the crucial
reference back to the first sentence would be lacking. Talking
of making someone worthy of anathema is irrelevant unless it
is linked by the 'cum' clause to his persecution. Moreover,
without the addition there are three 'per' phrases together
including 'per se' and per suam constitutionem'. (5)
Quarto sic qui in aliqua assertione haereticali se firmaverit ultimate pertinax et haereticus est censendus, quia talis irrevocabiliter assertionem affirmat haereticam, et per consequens paratus corrigi non existit. Sed gerens se pro papa et solleniter assertionem hereticam diffiniens esse tenendam in eadem assertione per ultimatam deliberationem se firmat. Igitur pertinax et haereticus est censendus.
A fourth [argument is] as follows. Whoever has finally confirmed his [adherence to] some heretical assertion should be considered pertinacious and a heretic because such a person is affirming the heretical assertion irrevocably and, consequently, is not ready to be corrected; but in presenting himself as pope and solemnly pronouncing that a heretical assertion should be held, he affirms by this final decree his [adherence] to that assertion. He should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and a heretic.
et per consequens paratus ...
haereticam: WeBaDiEsTo PamLbm;
omitted: AvOxVcVfAnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLbLyPaPbPcPzSaVaVbVg .
The three previous arguments all
referred to one presenting himself as pope, as does this
addition. The following (5th) argument, however, does not
refer to one presenting himself as pope. The argument seems
awkwardly phrased without the addition; in particular, the
clause beginning 'diffiniens' would not be linked to what
precedes it. Although it is preserved mainly in the B
class manuscripts the fact that it could have been
omitted by homoioteleuton suggests that it should be accepted
as original. (4)
Item prima ad Corinthios decimo c. Apostolus generaliter ammonet omnes in gracia minime confirmatos dicens, "Qui se existimat stare videat ne cadat." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod omnis homo in gracia minime confirmatus potest cadere in peccatum et per consequens potest errare contra fidem. Papa igitur sicut et alii potest errare contra fidem.
Again, in 1 Corinthians 10[:12] the Apostle utters a general warning to everyone not confirmed in grace when he says, "Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall." We are given to understand by these words that every person not confirmed in grace can fall into sin, and consequently can err against the faith. Just like others, therefore, the pope can err against the faith.
Papa igitur ... contra fidem: In AvOxVcWeBaDiEsTo;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg.
This is a necessary conclusion to the
argument which seems to have been omitted by homoioteleuton. (5)
Sextum exemplum adducitur de Leone quem convicit beatus Hilarius episcopus Pictaviensis. De isto tamen sunt opiniones, quibusdam dicentibus quod numquam fuit verus papa sed papatus invasor, aliis dicentibus quod fuit verus papa antequam in heresim laberetur.
A sixth example is brought forth concerning Leo whom blessed Hilary, bishop of Poitiers, convicted of error. There are opinions about him, nevertheless, with some people saying that he was never a true pope but only a usurper of the papacy and others saying that he was a true pope before he slipped into heresy.
numquam fuit verus papa sed
papatus invasor, aliis dicentibus quod: AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsTo VaLbmPam;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg.
This is necessary; the immediately
preceding text refers to opinions [plural]
on the subject of Pope Leo, and the passage omitted (by
homoioteleuton) contains the second opinion. Fr has an
interesting variant: its scribe obviously recognised that
another opinion was necessary but seems, at this point, not to
have had an exemplar with the original sentence in it. So he
made up his own: ('dicentibus) quod nunquam fuit verus papa
antequam laberetur in heresim. Aliis vero dicentibus quod fuit
verus papa antequam in hersim laberetur.' (5)
Magister Ad secundam racionem respondetur quod quamvis cause fidei ad hereticum sint minime deferende, ad illum tamen qui potest hereticus fieri, antequam efficiatur hereticus, sunt cause fidei deferende. Et ideo licet papa possit in pravitatem labi hereticam antequam labatur sunt cause fidei deferende ad ipsum; sed si hereticam incurrerit pravitatem extunc non est ad ipsum questio fidei deferenda. Non ergo ad istum qui errat sed qui potest errare contra fidem est causa fidei deferenda.
Master: The reply to the second argument is that although questions of faith should not be brought to a heretic, they should nevertheless be brought to someone who can become a heretic before he becomes a heretic. And therefore although a pope can fall into heretical wickedness, questions of faith should be brought to him before he so falls; but if he has incurred heretical wickedness there should from then on be no question of faith brought to him. Therefore, a question of faith should be brought not to him who does err but to him who can err against faith.
Non ergo ad istum ...
deferenda: AvOxVfWeBaDiEsToPamLbm;
Omitted: Vc AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAxArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg .
This passage is the general
conclusion of the reply to the second argument of the previous
chapter. Although the sentence that precedes it could serve as
a conclusion concerning popes, the fact that it could have
been omitted by homoioteleuton makes it desirable to consider
it as genuine. (4)
Sexto sic: sicut omnis persona que potest errare in moribus potest eciam errare contra fidem, ita omne collegium quod potest errare contra bonos mores potest errare contra fidem. Collegium autem cardinalium potest errare contra bonos mores. Si essent enim duo vel tres cardinales tantummodo non esset necesse quod aliquis eorum esset in caritate, immo posset quilibet eorum esse in peccato mortali cum constet quod nonnumquam viri sceleratissimi ad cardinalatus officium assumuntur. Ergo idem collegium cardinalium contra fidem potest errare.
[It is argued] sixthly as follows. Just as every person who can err in morals can also err against faith, so every college which can err against good morals can err against faith. The college of cardinals, however, can err against good morals. For if there were only two or three cardinals it would not be necessary for any of them to exist in charity - indeed any of them could be in mortal sin since it is certain that sometimes the most wicked men are raised to the office of cardinal. Therefore that college of cardinals can err against faith.
Collegium autem cardinalium
... contra bonos mores: AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsToLbm;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx
ArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg.
This sentence provides the minor
premise and so the necessary reference to the particular
college under discussion. Moreover, the sentence that follows
depends on a preceding reference to 'the college of
cardinals'. It is therefore necessary to the argument.
(5)
Undecimo sic: de una sola ecclesia militante dicitur quod non potest errare contra fidem; collegium autem cardinalium non est illa ecclesia, licet sit pars illius ecclesie sicut et ecclesia Parisiensis est pars illius ecclesie, quia congregacio fidelium est illa ecclesia que non potest errare. Congregacio autem cardinalium non est congregacio fidelium licet sit pars eius; ergo congregacio cardinalium potest errare contra fidem. Confirmatur hec racio quia quod competit toti ecclesie non est attribuendum parti ecclesie, eciam principali, nisi hoc possit per racionem necessariam vel auctoritatem apertam ostendi. Collegium autem cardinalium est pars ecclesie que errare non potest contra fidem; ergo non posse errare contra fidem non debet attribui collegio cardinalium, cum hoc nec per racionem necessariam nec per auctoritatem apertam possit ostendi.
An eleventh [argument is] as follows. It is said of only one church militant that it can not err against faith. The college of cardinals is not that church, however, although it is part of that church, just as the church of Paris is also part of that church, because it is the congregation of believers that is the church that can not err. The congregation of cardinals is not the congregation of believers, however, although it is part of it. Therefore the congregation of cardinals can err against faith. This argument is confirmed because what belongs to the whole church should not be attributed to part of the church, even the main part, unless this can be shown by necessary reason or by a plain authoritative text. However the college of cardinals is part of the church which can not err against faith. An inability to err against faith, therefore, should not be attributed to the college of cardinals since this can not be shown by necessary reason or by a plain authoritative text.
Quia congregacio ... licet
sit pars eius: AvOxVcVfWeBaDiEsTo VaLbm;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVd AxArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg.
This seems to be an unnecessary
addition to the argument. Ockham has told us often enough
which church it is that is inerrant and so does not need to
repeat it here. It seems to be a later 'improvement'. (2)
Magister: Respondetur quod sicut episcopi et inquisitores heretice pravitatis, de quibus non est dubium quin possint errare contra fidem, antequam in hereticam inciderint pravitatem valent de hereticis iudicare, ita et collegium cardinalium licet possit errare contra fidem si tamen non erraverit sed in fide permanserit orthodoxa potest de papa effecto heretico iudicare.
Master: It is replied that just as bishops and inquisitors into heretical wickedness, about whom there is no doubt but that they can err against faith, can judge heretics, before they themselves fall into heretical wickedness, so also although the college of cardinals can err against faith yet if it has not erred but remained in orthodox faith it can judge a pope who has become a heretic.
Antequam in hereticam ...
errare contra fidem: AvOxVcVfWeBaDiEsTo VaLbmPam;
Bold passage omitted: AnBbCeFi
CaKoLaLcNaUnVdAxArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg.
(Fr attempted correction: Magister respondetur quod
sicut episcopi et inquisitores heretice
pravitatis de quibus non est dubium quin possint errare contra
fidem si tamen
non erraverint sed in fide permanserint orthodoxa possunt effectos hereticos iudicare ita eciam collegium cardinalium licet possit errare
contra fidem
si tamen non erraverit sed in fide permanserit orthodoxa
potest de papa effecto
heretico iudicare)
The passage omitted is necessary to
the argument. Without it there would be no reference to the
college of cardinals which is what the whole chapter is about.
Moreover, there would be no subject for the singular verbs
that follow the passage in question. Omitted by
homoioteleuton. (5)
AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsToFr Va read:
Quinta est quod ecclesia Romana ante tempora Constantini super alias ecclesias non habuit principatum. Sexta est quod Romana ecclesia ab ipso Constantino imperatore super alias ecclesias primatum accepit.
The fifth is that before the time of Constantine the Roman church did not have rule over other churches. The sixth is that the Roman church obtained primacy over other churches from the emperor Constantine himself.
AnBbCeFiCaKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg read:
Quinta est quod Romana ecclesia ab ipso Constantino imperatore super alias ecclesias primatum accepit.
The fifth is that the Roman church obtained primacy over other churches from the emperor Constantine himself.
A decision about whether there should
be 5 or 6 assertions in chapter 14 involves an analysis of
chapters 16, 18 and 19 as well. At the end of chapter 16,
after the analysis of the first of the
assertions from chapter 14, we read in all
the manuscripts that there are four
more assertions to come [Ideo ad alias quattuor
assertiones de quibus fecisti mentionem procede...],
suggesting that five assertions in chapter
14 is correct. But, after assertions two, three and four are
analysed in chapter 17,
chapter 18 begins in all manuscripts by referring
to the fifth and the sixth
assertions [Quinta assertio predictorum est quod Romana
ecclesia ante tempora Constantini super alias ecclesias non
habuit principatum. Sexta vero assertio eorum est quod
Romana ecclesia a Constantino imperatore super alias
ecclesias primatum aut principatum accepit.], the same
two assertions that are the fifth and sixth
of the AB manuscripts in chapter 14. This
is immediately followed by an explanation of the method to be
pursued: Istas autem duas assertiones simul quidam sic
nituntur probare. Chapter 19 begins by referring just
to one assertion as having just been
discussed: Ista assertio de principatu/primatu Riomane
ecclesie michi non placet. So the student asks the
master to argue for the 'contrary assertion' and the latter
begins thus: Tribus modis ponitur quod Romana ecclesia
ante tempora Constantini super alias omnes ecclesias habuit
principatum/primatum.
[Note the logical relationship
between the fifth and sixth assertions. The fifth is implied
by the sixth: if (6) the primacy was established by
Constantine, then (5) it did not exist before Constantine.
This is why the fifth and sixth can be proved together, namely
by proving 6 --- whereupon 5 follows immediately. This is also
why "the opposing assertion" (not distinguishing two opposing
assertions) is proved in Chapter 19 by proving the opposite of
5: if the opposite of 5 is true, then it follows immediately
that 6 is also false --- If 6 implies 5, and 5 is false, then
6 is false.]
The CDE reading of chapter 14 could easily be
explained as omission due to homoioteleuton. What is harder to
explain is the reading of Chapter 16. Clearly there is a
contradiction in all manuscripts
between the four more assertions of chapter
16 and the fifth and sixth
assertions of chapter 18. How can it be explained? The key
seems to be the remark in chapter 18 that the defenders try to
prove the fifth and sixth assertions together; since they do
so it is legitimate in chapter 19 to refer to just one
assertion. Crucially all the manuscripts agree that the
assertion whose contrary chapter 19 tries to prove is the fifth
assertion of the AB traditions, the assertion that is omitted
from the CDE traditions. On this reading the four
assertions which are said to still require proving in chapter
16 are explained by the fact that the fifth
and sixth assertions were even then in
Ockham's mind to be proved together. It is much more difficult
to justify there being only ever five
assertions: the reference to a fifth and a
sixth assertion in chapter 16 would be hard to explain; the
fact that all the manuscripts agree that the contrary
assertion of chapter 19 is the verbal opposite of the AB traditions' fifth
assertion, which the CDE traditions omit, would also be hard
to explain. Moreover, we might note the small point that
the CDE traditions in their fifth
(equals AB's sixth) assertion
refer to 'ipso Constantino', implying the
earlier reference to him found in AB but missing from CDE. I conclude that we should accept the
reading of the AB traditions. (4)
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod ex commissione Christi sola communitas fidelium habuit potestatem corripiendi in foro ecclesie. Christus tamen non artavit communitatem fidelium ad certum modum corripiendi, quin scilicet posset per se totam, quando esset expediens, vel per aliquam singularem personam que gereret vicem communitatis corrigere delinquentes; et ideo communitas poterat potestatem corripiendi committere determinate persone, et ita dicunt beatum Paulum potestatem corrigendi accepisse a communitate fidelium unius provincie vel diversarum provinciarum.
Master: The reply to this is that by Christ's commission only the community of believers had the power of correcting in the forum of the church. Nevertheless Christ did not limit the community of believers to a fixed way of correcting, so that it could not correct those at fault itself as a whole, when it was convenient, or through some particular person who would act as the community's representative. And therefore the community could commit the power of correcting to a person it decided on, and it was in this way, they say, that blessed Paul received the power of correcting from the community of believers in one province or in various provinces.
Et ideo communitas ...
determinate persone: AvOxVcVfWeBaDiTo;
Omitted: EsAnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg.
This is not necessary to the
argument; it does look like a useful addition to it, however,
and it provides a generalisation which makes the introduction
of the specific example of Paul smoother. (4)
Magister: Per talem modum posset dici quod numquam potest deficere fides ecclesie Massiliensis, quia semper erit aliquis qui poterit creari in episcopum Massiliensem, eciam si omnes de Massilia converterentur ad Machometum, vel semper erunt aliqui qui poterunt eligere illum qui poterit creari in episcopum Massiliensem. Dicunt ergo isti quod cum ex solis Scripturis Divinis teneatur quod ecclesia numquam errabit contra fidem, quia semper erunt aliqui in ecclesia Christi fideles, et verba Scripture Divine ex quibus colligitur quod ecclesia numquam errabit contra fidem nullam de ecclesia Romana faciant penitus mencionem non plus quam de ecclesia Anciochena, sicut temerarium fuit asserere quod ecclesia Anciochena non errabit contra fidem, ita nunc temerarium est asserere quod Romana ecclesia numquam errabit contra fidem.
Master: It could be said in this way that the faith of the church of Marseilles can never fail because there will always be someone who can be created bishop of Marseilles, even if everyone from Marseilles was converted to Islam, or there will always be some people who could choose someone who could be created bishop of Marseilles. They say, therefore, that since it is maintained only on the basis of the divine scriptures that the church will never err against faith, because there will always be some believers in the church of Christ, and since the words of divine scripture by which it is inferred that the church will never err against faith do not make any mention at all of the Roman church, no more than of the church of Antioch, it is rash to affirm now that the Roman church will never err against faith just as it was rash to affirm that the church of Antioch will not err against faith.
Eciam si omnes ... episcopum
Massiliensem: AvOxVcVfWe
BaDiEsTo;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg.
This passage is an unnecessary
addition to the argument. There is no need to consider the
case in which all the people of Marseilles have lost their
faith. It is also rather awkwardly expressed and would need to
be considered a separate period. So although it could have
been omitted by homoioteleuton it must be considered a later
improvement. (2)
Et sicut temerarium est dicere quod numquam omnes Christiani expellentur de civitate Romana nequaquam amplius reversuri, ita temerarium est dicere quod si per potenciam infidelium omnes Christiani Romani preter decem vel duodecim essent expulsi de Roma numquam in perpetuum reversuri quod illi decem vel duodecem remanentes non possent contra fidem errare nec ad sectam occupancium Romam converti.
And just as it is rash to say that all the Christians will never be driven out of the city of Rome not to return again, so it is rash to say that if by the power of unbelievers all the Roman Christians except for ten or twelve were driven out of Rome never again to return, those ten or twelve who remain could not err against faith or be converted to the sect of those occupying Rome.
Nec ad sectam occupancium
Romam converti: AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsTo Va;
omitted AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg.
This is not essential to the
argument; nor is it out of place. It is, therefore, hard to
decide on its genuineness. (3)
Magister Decima racio eorum est hec. Ecclesia militans non est magis accepta a Deo quam fuerit tota multitudo angelorum ante confirmacionem bonorum et casum malorum; sed nulla pars tocius multitudinis angelorum ante confirmacionem bonorum et casum malorum sic a Deo extitit preservata quin quecumque pars illius tocius multitudinis labi potuerit in peccatum et eternaliter condemnari, licet Deus ordinaverit quod tota multitudo angelorum nullatenus laberetur. Ergo consimiliter nulla pars militantis ecclesie sic preservatur a Deo quin possit contra fidem errare, licet Deus numquam permittet totam militantem ecclesiam contra fidem errare. Romana autem ecclesia est pars militantis ecclesie. Ergo Romana ecclesia que est pars ecclesie potest contra fidem errare.
Master: Their tenth argument is this. The church militant has not been accepted by God more than was the whole multitude of angels before the confirmation of the good ones and the fall of the bad ones; but before the confirmation of the good angels and the fall of the bad, no part of the whole multitude of angels was so kept safe by God that no part of that whole multitude was unable to fall into sin and be eternally condemned, although God ordained that the whole multitude of angels would not fall. In a similar way, therefore, no part of the church militant is so kept safe by God that it can not err against faith, although God will never permit the whole church militant to err against faith. However the Roman church is part of the church militant. Therefore the Roman church that is part of the church militant can err against faith.
Licet deus ... fidem errare:
AvOxVcVfWe BaDiEsTo Va;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg.
Not essential to the argument, and a
point that has been made frequently. Nevertheless, in the
analogy made with the angels in the immediately preceding text
that same point was made about them, as is clear from the
clause in italics. It looks, therefore, as though it should be
accepted as genuine and that it was omitted by homoioteleuton.
(4)
Tercium motivum eorum est tale. Tota multitudo illorum qui sunt deteriores laicis potest contra fidem errare, quia nulla apparet racio quare Deus talem multitudinem AB errore contra fidem specialiter preservaret. Sed clerici sunt deteriores laicis, secundum quod notat glossa de penitencia dist. 1, c. Quis aliquando, dicens, "Habes ex hoc capitulo quod clerici deteriores sunt laicis [...] et supra 24, q. 3, Transferunt." Ergo tota multitudo clericorum potest contra fidem errare, sicut et tota multitudo laicorum posset contra fidem errare.
Their third reason is as follows. The whole multitude of those who are worse than the laity can err against faith, because there is no apparent reason why God would particularly preserve such a multitude from error against faith. But the clergy are worse than the laity according to what the gloss on De penitencia, dist. 1, c. Quis aliquando notes. It says, "You have it from this chapter that the clergy are worse than the laity ... and above 24, q. 3, c. Transferunt." Therefore the whole multitude of the clergy can err against faith, just as the whole multitude of the laity could err against faith.
Sicut et tota ... errare: AvOxVfWe BaDiEsTo;
Omitted: Vc
AnBbCeFi CaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAxArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg .
The preceding and following reasons
do not include this addition to their conclusions; it is more
appropriate here, however, since this reason is based on a
comparison of the clergy with the laity. Without this clause,
therefore, the comparison would not be followed up to its
necessary conclusion. Moreover it could have been omitted by
homoioteleuton. (4)
Quintum motivum eorum est tale. Domus Dei que est ecclesia militans non potest esse nulla, sicut nec ecclesia potest esse nulla (24, q. 1, c. Pudenda). Sed domus Dei que est ecclesia militans necessario sacerdotes includit, quia necessario habet potestatem ligandi atque solvendi, teste Hieronimo, qui, ut legitur 24, q. 1, c. Omnibus, ait, "Omnibus consideratis, puto me non temere dicere alios ita esse in domo Dei ut ipsi sint eadem domus Dei que dicitur edificari supra petram, que unica columba appellatur." Et parum post, "Que domus eciam claves accepit ac potestatem ligandi atque solvendi." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod domus Dei que unica columba vocatur, quam constat esse ecclesiam catholicam, claves habet atque potestatem ligandi et solvendi. Claves autem et predicta potestas in solis sacerdotibus inveniuntur. Ergo usque ad finem seculi erunt in ecclesia catholica aliqui sacerdotes, et per consequens tota multitudo clericorum numquam contra fidem errabit.
Their fifth reason is as follows. The house of God which is the church militant can not not exist, just as the church can not not exist (24, q. 1, c. Pudenda [col.978]). But the house of God which is the church militant necessarily includes priests because it necessarily has the power binding and loosing, as Jerome attests when he says, as we read in 24, q. 1, c. Omnibus [col.973], "Having taken everything into account I think that it is not rash for me to say that others are in the house of God in such a way that they are the very house of God which is said to be built on the rock, which is called the unique dove. ... This house also received the keys and the power of binding and loosing." We gather from these words that the house of God which is called the unique dove -- and which it is certain is the catholic church -- has the keys and the power of binding and loosing. However the keys and that power are found only in priests. Therefore there will be some priests in the catholic church until the end of the age, and, as a consequence, the whole multitude of the clergy will never err against faith.
Sed domus dei ... solvendi: WeBaDiEsTo Fr;
omitted AvOxVcVfAnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx ArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg.
It seems necessary to accept this
passage as genuine since it introduces the quotation of
Jerome. Without it Jerome's text would attest the
indefectibility of the church, which it does not. The bold
passage is also needed for its reference to the power of
binding and loosing - see the passage in italics. This
connects the permanent existence of the church through the
power of binding and loosing with the permanent existence in
the church of priests--which is the point of the argument, to
prove that all the clergy will not fall away. (4)
Magister: Primum omnino frivolum arbitrantur quia per equivocacionem procedit. Nam hoc nomen ecclesia habet varias significaciones. Quandoque enim accipitur pro domo materiali, et sic accipitur 1 ad Corinthios 11 cum dicit Apostolus, "Nunquid domos non habetis ad manducandum et bibendum aut ecclesiam Dei contemnitis?" Secundo accipitur hoc nomen ecclesia pro congregacione Christianorum fidelium, generali vel particulari, que tam viros quam mulieres comprehendere potest. Et sic accipitur ecclesia Actuum 20 cum dicit Apostolus maioribus natu, "Atttendite vobis et universo gregi, in quo vos Spiritus Sanctus posuit episcopos, regere ecclesiam Dei", ubi nomen ecclesie comprehendit tam viros quam mulieres, quia ad episcopos non solum spectat regere viros sed eciam mulieres. Sic eciam accipit Apostolus nomen ecclesie in epistola ad Philemonem, cum dicit "ecclesie que in domo tua est", quia in domo Philemonis erant tam viri quam mulieres, et forte nullus clericus erat in ea nisi Archippus fortassis, quia nec ipse Philemon preditus erat ecclesiastica dignitate.
Master: They think that the first one is entirely frivolous because it proceeds by ambiguity. For this word 'church' has various senses. For sometimes it is taken as the material building, and it is taken that way in 1 Corinthians 11[:22] when the Apostle says, "What, have you not have houses to eat and drink in? Or despise ye the church of God ... ?" Secondly, the word 'church' is taken as the congregation of Christian believers, general or particular, which can include both men and women. And 'church' is taken that way in Acts 20[:28] when the Apostle says to the elders, "Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the church of God", where the word 'church' includes both men and women, because it does not pertain to bishops to rule men only, but also women. The Apostle also takes the word 'church' in this sense in his letter to Philemon [v.2] where he speaks of "the church which is in thy house", because in Philemon's house there were both men and women and no cleric perhaps, except possibly Archippus, because Philemon himself was not endowed with an ecclesiastical dignity.
Quia ad episcopos ... eciam
mulieres: AvOxVcVfWe;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAx BaDiEsTo ArLbPaPbPcSaVaVbVg.
This is found only in the A
class manuscripts. It is, of course, an obvious comment,
but the same obvious point is emphasised earlier about 'the
congregation of Christian believers' and, later in the speech,
about 'collectio catholicorum' where the Master adds 'que
mulieres et laicos nequaquam excludit.' It looks then like an
explanatory clause omitted by homoioteleuton. (4)
Magister: Vis ut tibi quid sentiam de predictis aperiam?
Discipulus: Nolo ut quid tenes in mente reveles sed responsiones aliquas que cogitari et teneri poterunt a quocunque non differas recitare.
Magister: Hoc pacto ut omnia que narrabo non aliter accipiantur nisi quod aliquis questionum difficilium indagator potest dicenda putare consona veritati quomodo ad predictas instantias respondere contingat ostendam.
Discipulus: Hoc pactum feci tecum pro toto opere isto quod volo servare et tu serves exoro.
Magister: Volo eciam quod dicenda fratri M et eius sequacibus nequaquam imponas...
Discipulus: Quod istum modum teneas a principio affectavi, quia sentencias contrarias quorumcumque catholicorum ...
Master: Do you want me to reveal what I think about the foregoing?
Student: I do not want you to disclose what you think in your own mind, but would you not hesitate to recite some replies that could be thought of and maintained by someone?
Master: If we agree that everything I say will be taken only as what some investigator of difficult questions can consider should be said as harmonious with the truth, I will show how it is possible to reply to the above examples.
Student: I have made this agreement with you for the whole work and want to keep it, and I ask you to keep it.
Master: I also want you not to attribute the things to be said to brother M[ichael] and his followers ...
Student: I have wanted you to hold to this method from the start because I want you to record the opposing opinions of all catholics ...
Discipulus: Hoc pactum ...
exoro: AvOxVcVfWeBa Va;
Omitted: AnBbCeFiCaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAxArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg
DiEsTo
The question is whether this
intervention by the Student is superfluous, merely reproducing
what is said later, and so is a later editorial comment, or
whether it fits the logic of the dialogue and so was probably
in Ockham's original. The passage is preceded by a request
from the Master that they agree that the opinion be considered
only as one that an investigator might canvass; and it is
followed by a different request that the opinion not be
attributed to Michael of Cesena. Can the Student's answer to
the second request be considered an adequate answer to both
questions? It seems not; it seems that the disputed passage
ought to be considered genuine. The Master's first request
seems to require an answer; and his second request with its 'etiam'
seems to assume that there has already been agreement with the
first request, that agreement being the passage in question.
Note too that BbCaLcUn and LbPaVb
insert a 'Magister' before the speech of the Master
that immediately follows this passage, as though to indicate
that it was originally preceded by a speech from the Student;
other manuscripts, LaNa PbSa, attribute the following speech,
'Volo etiam...' to the Student, again suggesting that
the context needs a speech by the Student. (4)
Magister: ... Ergo verba Christi predicta de tribulacione que facta fuit per Romanos non debent intelligi.
Discipulus: Potestne probari aliter quod verba Christi prefata non debent intelligi de tribulacione facta per Romanos tempore Titi et Vespasiani?
Magister: Aliter ostenditur sic. Tribulacio que erit tempore antichristi maior erit quam tribulacio que fuit facta per Romanos. Ergo de tribulacione facta per Romanos non debent illa verba intelligi.
Discipulus: De qua tribulacione ergo debent intelligi?
Magister: Potest dici quod verba illa debent intelligi specialiter de tribulacione fidelium, qui scilicet rectam fidem tenent de Deo, inter quos quidam sunt electi et alii ad penam eternam sunt presciti; et non de quacumque tribulacione, sed de tribulacione que erit sub Antichristo quando tantam habebunt tribulacionem quantam rectam fidem tenentes numquam habuerunt, licet sepe infideles maiorem tribulacionem habuerint et sint forsitan habituri. ...
Master: ... The above words of Christ, therefore, should not be understood of the suffering that was brought about by the Romans.
Student: Can it be proved in another way that those words of Christ should not be understood of the suffering brought about by the Romans in the time of Titus and Vespasian?
Master: It is shown in another way as follows. The suffering that will occur at the time of anti-Christ will be greater than the suffering that was brought about by the Romans. Therefore those words should not be understood as the suffering brought about by the Romans.
Student: So, about what suffering should they be understood?
Master: It can be said that those words should be understood particularly of the suffering of the faithful, of those, that is, who maintain a right faith in God, among whom some have been chosen and others foreknown for eternal punishment; and not of any suffering at all, but the suffering that will come about under anti-Christ when they will have so great a suffering as those maintaining right faith never had [before], although often unbelievers have had greater suffering and perhaps will have in the future.
Discipulus: Potestne ...
intelligi: VcVfAvOxWe Ba Va;
Omitted: AnBbCeFi CaFrKoLaLcNaUnVdAxArLbPaPbPcSaVbVg DiEsTo.
An exchange between Student and
Master that could have been omitted by homoioteleuton. The
only difficulty about accepting this as genuine is that the
speech of the Master in dispute seems to preempt the Student's
next question: why ask what suffering is intended when the
Master has already referred to the suffering at the time of
anti-Christ? But the Master has not yet affirmed that the
suffering at the time of anti-Christ is the greatest; he
merely says that at that time the suffering will be worse than
at the time of Titus and Vespasian; that could be true without
the suffering in question being the greatest that will ever
occur.
The gist of the argument is as
follows:
In Christ's words "For there shall be then great tribulation, such as has not been from the beginning of the world until now, neither shall be", the "then" does not refer to the time of Titus and Vespasian, since it was not true that there would never be a greater suffering than that, since there will be even greater suffering in the time of AntiChrist. So what does the "then" refer to? Answer, it refers to the time of Anti-Christ.
This answer is not predetermined or superfluous.
That there will be at least one occasion,
viz. the time of anti-Christ, when the suffering will be
greater implies that he was not referring to the time of Titus
and Vespasian, but it remains possible that there might also
be (or have been) other times of greater
suffering than then. So the question remains, when will the
greatest suffering be? After being told that the suffering at
the time of Titus and Vespasian was not the greatest since the
suffering at the time of anti-Christ will be greater,
we still want to know when the greatest suffering will
be.
Since the Student's next question is
not preempted, there is no reason to deny the genuineness of
the passage. (4)
It is worth noting that in two
cases We omits a passage found in the other
members of the A group (namely variants 14 and 15); there are
two cases in which AvOxVcVf
omit a passage found in We (namely variants 26,
39). These could all (except for 39) have
been omited by homoioteleuton; any MS can thus omit a passage
found in its exemplar and in the other members of its family.
It is also worth noting that in four cases (namely 7, 21, 41
and 42) Ba disagrees with the other members of
its family and agrees with the A family. This suggests that an
ancestor of Ba may have been amended from some
member of the family. (In fact there are quite a few
agreements between Ba
and We).
The variants we have
accepted above as mostly likely to be authentic are found
in manuscripts of the A B families exclusively, except for the
first four, which are found also in the D
family. Apart from We
(which dates from the 1340s), the A B manuscripts are not among the
earliest witnesses. The other members of the
family, AvOxVcVf,
belong to the 15th century. Of the B
group, To is perhaps the earliest (late 14th
century); the others, BaDiEs, belong to the 15th century. The
variants are also found in the marginal and interlinear
amendments to Pa and Lb.
The amendments to Pa were made by Simon de Plumtot
(1371-1443) and must date from the late 14th or early 15th
century. It is not known when or by whom Lb was amended. The earliest members of
the D family, Ca
and Na, date from the late 14th century.
Some members of the C and E families are earlier than all
members of the AB families except We: Fi
dates from before 1372, Bb dates from before 1375, Pa
from 1389.
There are several possible
explanations for the presence of passages in the A B traditions that are not found in CDE. One is that none of these
passages was in Ockham's original, but that a later
editor/reviser polished up the imperfect text and that it is
from his work that the AB class manuscripts descend.
Another possibility is that the CDE class manuscripts descend from
an inferior, perhaps hastily copied, exemplar, whereas AB class derive from a better exemplar.
A third possibility is a combination of these: that the AB class manuscripts contain some
editorial interpolations and some material deriving from
Ockham's original.
The first explanation, postulating a
later editor, has to confront two problems. The first is that
it assumes Ockham published an incomplete work, that he left
out questions that he proceeded to answer, that he asked
questions which he failed to answer, that he omitted premises
or one of the parts of a distinction from some arguments and
that he failed to cite authorities which he subsequently
assumed he had cited. None of this is impossible, since
authors make mistakes and perhaps Ockham was not as committed
to logical rigour as in his philosophical works (although this
seems very unlikely to me, not least because of the quality of
his other political works). The second problem is that so many
of the passages in the AB manuscripts could have been
omitted from the exemplar of the CDE class by homoioteleuton. The first
explanation would suppose a reviser who took unusual care to
see that his additions ended with the same word or phrase as
the passage immediately preceding! Given the nature of
syllogistic reasoning there is bound to be repetition of key
words, of course, but the number of relevant examples and the
length of text involved in some cases make the existence of
such a clever reviser most unlikely. Besides, why would a
reviser bother with such refinements? It seems much more
plausible to suppose that an early scribe, perhaps copying
quickly, omitted at least most of those passages whose
omission can be explained by homoioteleuton: their number and
length suggest such a scribe.
Moreover, there is evidence that at
least some of the additions were in existence in the 14th
century not only in We, but also in manuscripts of class D.
With the exception of Va and Fr
(both late manuscripts the scribes of which seemed to have had
access to more than one manuscript) and the marginal
annotations of Lb
and Pa, the division between CDE on the one hand and AB on the other is absolute, except
for the first four variants analysed
above. In each of those four variants, CaKoLaLcNaVd share the reading of
the A and B manuscripts.
How
can this be? Ca and Na
at least are 14th century manuscripts, so we must
conclude that there was a version of the Dialogus
available fairly early with at least those four variants. They
are interesting variants too. No.1 is a
simple addition; No.2 is not an addition but
an alternative formulation of an argument; No.3
is an addition needed because of homoioteleuton; No.4 concerns two formulations of a point, one
longer than the other: CaKoLaLcNaVd
have both formulations, although only one is
needed. Leaving aside for a moment the last variant, it is
important to emphasise that these variants show that both the
errors due to homoioteleuton (No.3) and also the variants in
the formulation of arguments (No.2), the two major differences
between the two textual traditions were already to be found at
this time. We do not know enough about the manuscript
tradition yet to be able to answer two important questions
about this sub-group of manuscripts: why do they agree
with A and B
with respect only to the first four
variants? and, how can variant No.4 be explained?
The first of these questions is
certainly a puzzle, but even more troubling is the version of
variant No.4 that they share. CaKoLaLcNaVd, and also Fr,
incorporate both the AB version and
the CDE version of the variant, thus
producing a solecism. Probably they copied from an exemplar in
which the solecism was already found, but then we must ask how
it got into that manuscript. In many
circumstances it would not be hard to explain: the 'sic
probatur' could have been a marginal gloss incorporated
wrongly into the text; or a scribe could have written 'sic
probatur', then marked it as an erasure (dots under the
words or a line struck through them) before copying the
alternative text, but a copyist of that text not have noted
the erasure marks and so included both texts. But neither of
those explanations is satisfactory here. Given that both
versions of No.4 were in circulation independently, the
presence of them both in the original exemplar of CaKoLaLcNaVd can
not
be due to simple scribal error because the first scribe to
include them both must have known that they were alternatives.
Whatever may be the solution to the
puzzle posed by the readings of CaKoLaLcNaVd, the evidence
presented above presses some conclusions on me. Though in
general the CDE manuscripts are earlier than the
AB manuscripts (though We is
earlier
than any of CDE), it seems certain that the AB tradition preserves some readings
that go back to Ockham's original. Some of these have been
lost to CDE by homoioteleuton; other readings
seem to have been preserved in a garbled form in CDE. The fact that AB manuscripts contain these
authentic readings has an implication for our editorial
procedures. Although each variant needs to be assessed on its
own merits, the clear evidence that the CDE manuscripts derive from an
exemplar with significant omissions and erroneous variants
suggests that ceteris paribus the reading of the AB manuscripts should be preferred.
Not all the readings of AB should be accepted, of course, but it
seems that there should be a general presumption in their
favour, especially when an omission in the CDE manuscripts can be explained by
homoioteleuton.