Jack Hayward was Professor of Politics at Hull (1973–93 and 1999–2017) and Oxford (1993–9) universities. He contributed greatly to the professionalisation of political science in Britain through his work in the Political Studies Association of which he was Chair and later President in the 1970s. He chaired the British Academy Political Studies Section between 1991 and 1994. A specialist in French and European politics and public policy as well as French social and political thought, his *The One and Indivisible French Republic* (1973) became a standing reference for scholars and students of France in the 1970s and 1980s. His later work additionally explored broader comparative themes in European public policy and European integration. He played a significant role in the campaign for the fair treatment of civilians interned by the Japanese during the Second World War.
While this account of Jack Hayward’s intellectual work and scholarly approach will reprise the main contours of Hayward’s life and career, let me start with a puzzle. One of Hayward’s books begins with a question about Fifth Republic France: ‘Why did it take two monarchies, two empires, the Vichy regime and five republics … before France was able to reconstitute a government capable of giving democratic leadership through an elected head of state?’ The puzzle is this: how was it possible for Hayward to give a convincing answer to this question about contemporary France in the form of a book looking at six French thinkers, of whom the most recent died in 1881? This puzzle deepens when one considers that Hayward did not have any marked affection for the past and was vehemently dismissive of arguments and ideas he felt were backward-looking. One of his often-used phrases, usually said when trying to steer a colleague away from being preoccupied with defunct ideas or theories, was ‘let the dead bury the dead!’.

At first glance one might just see this enduring preoccupation with nineteenth-century social and political thought as the consequence of Hayward being a scholar who started off in political theory never quite letting go of his intellectual roots as he became a leading specialist in contemporary French and European politics and public policy. There was much more to it than this. There is a clear and consistent intertwining of empirical analysis, in the sense of examining contemporary political and social phenomena, along with social and political thought throughout all his writings. In some the empirical analysis tends to dominate, in others the political theory, but both are usually present. Both are part of a method of analysis he used to explore contemporary politics. For Hayward political and social theory was an empirical tool, and to solve the puzzle we need to understand how he used it.

Jack Hayward played a leading part in shaping the British study of political science in the post-war era, especially in its period of rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s and not only through his writings. Consequently, and because his background and experiences offer important insights into his work, this account begins with a brief outline of his life and career. Then we can go on to look in the second section at the first

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appearance of the approach to political theory as empirical methodology explicitly discussed (albeit not using the terms I use here) in his PhD thesis. While his later work in the 1960s still contained the kind of theoretical/empirical mix outlined above, these writings tended to emphasise the more empirical aspects—the description of, say, how the Economic and Social Council in France worked around the mid-1960s—even here some of the discussion points to his understanding of French politics being based on an appreciation of the sometimes diverse political traditions developed and reflected in the works of the major theorists. The earliest striking elaboration of such an understanding was published in his *The One and Indivisible French Republic* in 1973, discussed in the third part. I then go on to look in the fourth part at this approach to political theory as methodology and in the fifth to how he used it to characterise France after de Gaulle in a range of studies including his last main book on the subject, *Fragmented France*. In his later work on France the balance swung more toward empirical analysis than theory, especially his work on economic policy and policy coordination. Jack Hayward’s intellectual contribution also came in the form of a series of collective works, above all on methodology and the European Union but also including the work he did leading to the posthumous completion of Samuel Finer’s *History of Government*. I look at these in the seventh section before going on in the eighth to discuss his unpublished work arising from his treatment (and that of many others) by the UK government arising from his imprisonment by the Japanese during the Second World War. I conclude with a reflection on some of the dominant themes of his work.

**Jack Hayward’s life and career**

Jack was born in Shanghai in 1931 and brought up in a family of four sisters and two brothers. His father, Menachem Hayward, a British national orphaned at an early age and brought up by his aunt in Hong Kong, was in charge of a warehouse dealing in exports to and from the UK for the Sassoon family firm. Menachem married an Iraqi, Stella David, shortly before the outbreak of war in 1914, having earlier anglicised his surname. Jack got his first name from an uncle, an athlete living in China and mur-

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dered in training, his middle names Ernest and Shalom from his parents’ love of the Oscar Wilde play and the desire to give him a Jewish name—his mother’s uncle was Chief Rabbi of Shanghai. The concession was very British, with the children attending local English schools, becoming wolf cubs, brownies and guides and taking part in school productions of Gilbert and Sullivan. The family moved to Hong Kong in 1937 when the Japanese attacked Shanghai, returning there after six months. In 1943 the family, with the exception of the eldest sister who was in England for the duration of the Second World War, was interned by the Japanese following the invasion of Shanghai. Jack, his parents and three sisters were sent to Yangchow camp, his older brother interned in a separate and even more severe camp. The brutality, semi-starvation, malnutrition and hardship he and his family endured are briefly covered in his account of his life in the camp. 1945 brought release from internment and in January 1946, at the age of fourteen, Hayward was sent to London, was welcomed by his eldest sister whom he had not seen since 1937 and went to live with an aunt. After boarding school in Staffordshire he studied Government at the London School of Economics (LSE) between 1949 and 1952 and went on to do a doctorate there. National Service in the Royal Air Force (he became an Education Officer in it) interrupted his doctoral studies and he finished his PhD in October 1958 (awarded in 1959) with what he described as an excessively long (1,129-page) thesis on the concept of solidarity (discussed below).

Hayward linked the choices he made at the start of his academic career to his earlier experiences. He had wanted to study history at university, but his schooling did not include the necessary qualification in Latin; his school in England, unusually for the time, taught economics and he became converted to a set of beliefs he described as Thatcherism ‘avant la lettre’ … that free trade at all times … was the only sensible way of avoiding short-sighted, mutually impoverishing attempts to “beggar one’s neighbour”’. He developed an aversion to the rather insular approach to the study of politics he saw in Britain in general and the LSE in particular. He wanted to go beyond treating the study of politics in any one country as a subject in its own right and make comparisons. Since he had learned French at school and become interested in French life through contact with the French concession in Shanghai, Britain and France were to be the proposed comparators and the research was to examine how social thinkers reconciled individualism and collectivism in the two countries. However, the topic on which he actually wrote his thesis was not explicitly comparative and he hit on it by chance. A shortage of British thinkers to include in the proposed Franco-

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9 Hayward, ‘Between France and universality’, p. 143.
10 Ibid., p. 140.
British comparison and a chance reading of Léon Bourgeois’ *Solidarité* in a Parisian bookshop led him to abandon a direct comparison and concentrate on, as the title of his thesis puts it, ‘the idea of solidarity in French social and political thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’.11 Michael Oakeshott supervised his dissertation, but Hayward points out that his involvement in the thesis was ‘nominal’ and he wrote the thesis ‘with no guidance to speak of’.12 Hayward certainly does not appear to offer a glowing report on his LSE days; apart from some ‘lively lectures’ on French political institutions by William Pickles ‘[t]he only other series of lectures on France I attended were by Ralph Miliband on the French Revolution, but what I remember was a single seminar by Isaiah Berlin on Joseph de Maistre in which he had arrestingy argued that what alone kept a state intact was the Public Executioner’13—a point he reiterated in his speech on receipt of the Isaiah Berlin Prize for a Lifetime Achievement in Political Studies in 2011.

Hayward worked as an assistant lecturer, then lecturer, in Sheffield University between 1959 and 1963 during which time he produced several articles arising from his PhD thesis and an article closely linked to it,14 but also pointing to a developing concern with the study of interest groups; ‘Educational pressure groups and the indoctrination of the radical ideology of solidarism, 1895–1914’.15 He moved to Keele University in 1963 where Sammy Finer was the ‘presiding genius’.16 His work on French interest groups, economic policy and economic planning developed here. He also wrote *The One and Indivisible* while at Keele. This book covered French politics, institutions and public policy in such breadth, and in such amenable language, that it served as the main textbook on France for any politics student in the 1970s and 1980s. Its breadth is indicated by the influences on its writing he cites: Stanley Hoffmann, Catherine and Pierre Grémion, Jean-Claude Thoenig and Michel Crozier. He always regarded his work as ‘implicitly comparative’ in the sense that it is impossible to understand what is distinctive about France unless one has some point of comparison.

12 Hayward ‘Between France and universality’, p. 143.
13 Hayward ‘Beyond France’, 111.
16 Hayward, ‘Between France and universality’, p. 147.
He started to develop his interest in explicit and systematic comparative work in the 1970s, with a collaborative comparative study of planning in Europe.\textsuperscript{17}

By this time Jack Hayward had moved to a chair at Hull University where he served variously as Head of Department and Dean of Faculty at periods between his arrival in 1973 and the time he left for Oxford in 1993. He and Dr Margaret Hayward, a scholar of French literature specialising in Balzac whom he had met and married in Paris while studying for his PhD, had two children, Clare and Alan. They lived in Kirk Ella, just outside Hull’s city boundaries. Colleagues and visitors to Hull will remember happy and collegial parties there at which Jack Hayward would share some of the rare wines that he had accumulated over the years. His knowledge of wines made him the Wine Fellow who supervised the purchase, acquisition and cellaring of wines when he later moved to St Antony’s, Oxford. Hayward built up a very strong and successful department that was at the top of the early rankings for university politics departments (including an international set of rankings from \textit{Le Monde}).

During his time at Hull Hayward also spent periods teaching outside the UK, including the Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris, the universities of Paris II, Paris III, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Rennes, Bilbao and British Columbia. In 1984, he visited the University of Baroda in India (at the invitation of his close friend and Hull colleague Bhikhu Parekh who served as Baroda’s Vice Chancellor in the early 1980s) to deliver six talks in the Tagore Memorial Lecture series. These lectures formed the basis of his book \textit{After the French Revolution} from which the puzzle set out in the opening paragraph of this account is drawn.

It was in the mid-1970s that Hayward’s name became more widely known throughout the profession as he was one of the key figures in what is described as the 1975 ‘coup’, or the ‘Oxford-led insurgency’.\textsuperscript{18} Led by Brian Barry, the immediate focus of the enterprise was to replace the existing Political Studies Association (PSA) Executive Committee with a completely new team in the election in spring 1975. Hayward convinced Barry of the need for a manifesto—a programme of reform. In the election the ‘Old Guard was decisively routed by a slate of Young Turks’,\textsuperscript{19} and Hayward became chairman of the PSA in a change that was widely seen as ‘reinvigorating’ it and giving ‘the discipline [of political science] a more effective Association which was trying to think systematically about the challenges it faced and how they might be met’. He served as Chairman until 1977, as its President between 1979 and 1981, and Editor of its journal, \textit{Political Studies}, between 1987 and 1993.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17}M. Watson and J. E. S. Hayward, \textit{Planning, Politics and Public Policy} (Cambridge, 1974).
  \item \textsuperscript{18}Grant, \textit{Development of a Discipline}, Chapter 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{19}Robert Goodin, quoted in Grant, \textit{Development of a Discipline}, p. 73.
\end{itemize}
Hayward moved to Oxford in January 1993 and became the first Director of Oxford University’s European Studies Centre, formerly the West European Centre, an outfit not noted for harmonious relations among those attached to it, and Jack Hayward managed to achieve greater harmony in this respect. His intellectual work at Oxford was dominated by his collaboration with Vincent Wright on an ESRC-funded project on coordination in ‘core executives’ and through his work on the completion of the ambitious three-volume *History of Government from the Earliest Times* left unfinished by the death of its main author, Sammy Finer, in 1993.

After retirement from Oxford in 1998 he returned to Hull—the Haywards had kept their Kirk Ella house—where Hull University gave him the title of research professor and an office. He resumed his influence over the development of the Politics Department at Hull in a variety of ways. He participated actively in departmental meetings, he played an influential role in Hull’s Centre for European Union Studies (CEUS), gave lectures on France to undergraduate students and acted as informal supervisor for undergraduate dissertations on French politics until shortly before his death. Jack always had time for students as long as he was convinced that they put in their best possible effort. He took the lead on a range of projects such as his co-edited *Leaderless Europe* and *European Disunion* books, the latter co-edited with Rüdiger Wurzel, a colleague who directed CEUS and became a close friend when Jack rejoined the Hull department. In his later stint at Hull Hayward also brought to fruition the project on coordinating ‘core executives’ started at Oxford with Vincent Wright, another very close personal friend and intellectual companion whose death in 1999 affected him greatly. It was during this period that he became involved in the campaign surrounding compensation for those held prisoner by the Japanese during the war discussed in detail below. What was at stake for Hayward was a proper recognition of the suffering of those imprisoned and his understanding of ‘what it means to be British and what it means to have an identity as someone who is British. I happen to regard it as having inestimable value.’ The suggestion that he and others in his position were not properly ‘British’ because they lacked a ‘blood link’ to the United Kingdom caused ‘anger and outrage’. The muddle, mess and cover-up that ensued angered him even more. As he said, ‘The Japanese ... did not enquire of my family,  

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myself, and others like me what our blood links were with the United Kingdom.’

While enraged, the experience did not put him off his stride—he was writing, among other things, his *Fragmented France* at this stage.

Hayward’s achievements were recognised in a variety of ways. He was elected to the British Academy in 1990, given two French national honours (made a *Chevalier de l’Ordre Nationale de la Mérite* in 1980, and a *Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur* in 1996), a Lifetime Achievement Award from the Political Studies Association in 2003, and the Isaiah Berlin Prize from the Political Studies Association in 2013. A Festschrift was written in his honour in 2005, and he was awarded an honorary doctorate in 2013 from Hull where he had done so much for the department, all those who had passed through it and for the profession at large.

Jack Hayward was an active and influential Fellow of the British Academy. He chaired its Political Studies Section (S5) between 1991 and 1994. Along with Brian Barry and Archie Brown he edited for the Academy *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century*, himself contributing the opening chapter on ‘British approaches to politics: the dawn of a self-deprecating discipline’. Published in 1999, the volume was the first in the British Academy Centenary Monographs series, which aimed to demonstrate the vitality of British scholarship in the run-up to the Academy’s Centenary in 2002. Between 1998 and 2005 Hayward chaired the China Selection Panel (which oversaw the Academy’s China programmes, including exchange schemes jointly administered with the Economic and Social Research Council), and in this period he also served on the Academy’s Overseas Policy Committee, overseeing all the Academy’s international relations activities. His international roles in the Academy brought him to visit China for the first time since the end of his internment in 1945. He was in a group of leading international scholars in the social sciences and humanities invited to Beijing by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. His report on the visit for the Academy included some characteristic dry scepticism: the final meeting of the Beijing visit was filmed and shown on national television ‘persuading some participants that it indicated the high standing of our disciplines in China with the powers that be’.

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24 Ibid.
Solidarity and the relationship between thought and practice

Hayward’s PhD thesis, and especially its introduction which was published as a separate article, makes it clear that this is not a straightforward analysis of the development of ideas surrounding the notion of solidarity but a wider study of the relationship between thought and practice.

Our discussion of the role of the concept of solidarity in France is an appraisal of the social history of an idea rather than the history of a social idea. It is intended to be not merely the chronological description—or even the logical analysis—of the development of this idea; it is an attempt to elicit its social significance, its direct influence upon French society and its indirect implications for the social organization of humanity.

France was a particularly interesting place to look at this relationship between thought and political practice in large part because of the ‘notorious French addiction to deductive reasoning from first principles’ and the tendency for ‘programmes of social, political and economic reform being placed under the aegis of one or more ideas’. Solidarity was such a potentially fruitful subject because it sought to understand the ideological (in a non-Marxist sense, we would probably use the word ‘ideational’ in contemporary social science jargon) underpinnings of state intervention through economic and social policies. In particular, the concept of solidarity was an attempt to build a philosophy of state action and social intervention.

Just as the eighteenth century witnessed in France the development into a dominant position of the idea of unfettered personal liberty, coupled with the institution of civil and political justice for the defence of individual rights, the material and intellectual circumstances of the nineteenth century promoted the progressive prominence of the idea of social solidarity, associated with the establishment of economic justice for the protection of ‘social’ rights.

In exploring the construction and nature of ideas about solidarity one is examining the creation of ‘new foundations for the social and political order to replace the discredited “ancien régime” by new principles of social integration’. The variety of ambiguities involved in defining ‘solidarity’ (whether the social interdependence that underpins it is voluntary, involuntary; conscious and rational, unconscious and irrational; harmonious, disharmonious among many other

28 Hayward, ‘Solidarity: the social history’.
29 Hayward, Idea of Solidarity, p. xxiv.
30 Ibid., p. xxv.
31 Ibid., p. vii.
32 Ibid., p. iv.
possibilities) gives rise to myriad versions of the term that Hayward treats in three broad, roughly chronological, groupings (the naturalistic foundations including de Maistre, Saint-Simon, Comte and Blanqui among others; the ‘moralistic criticism’ covering Proudhon and Renouvier; the ‘neo naturalistic reformulation’ including Walras, Durkheim and Duguit, and the ‘eclectic official dogma’ of Léon Bourgeois). Hayward sees the notion of solidarity as having achieved the significant function of providing the ideological underpinnings of forms of ‘associational and legislative activity which have left an enduring mark on French social institutions, orientating them in the direction of the “Welfare State”’, and as most influential during the period of Radical ascendancy at the start of the twentieth century. The interpretation of the role of ideas so far appears fairly conventional. What marks Hayward’s approach as distinctive is his understanding of the consequences of the failure of the concept to provide a coherent vision of state intervention in social and economic life. The ‘fluidity and vagueness’ of the concept ‘concealed far too many unsolved problems for it long to withstand successfully the degeneration into political bombast to which it has largely succumbed at the present day’. After the First World War its ‘heroic phase was over’ although it continued to make its mark in, for example, the preamble to the Fourth Republic’s constitution in 1946 and the Social Security Act of the same year.

Towards the very end of his thesis Hayward quotes Alfred Fouillée, the French philosopher writing in 1900: ‘Les idées incomplètement formulées et mal pratiquées par la France prendront leur revanche dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, qui, selon toute apparence, sera un siècle d’inspiration social et de réformes sociales.’ Unlike Britain and Germany, which had developed public philosophies and practices that enabled collectivist projects on the scale of the construction of a welfare state, ‘France is characterised by economic and social institutions of a tenaciously individualist character.’ The tension between ideological aspiration and reality is especially problematic in France with its enormous ‘if somewhat baroque, efforts made to formulate principles from which could be deduced practical ways of harmoniously reorganising a society which had undergone the crises of industrial and political revolution’, and, as noted above, the ‘notorious French addiction to deductive reasoning from first principles—programmes of social, political and economic reform being placed under

33 Ibid., p. 590.
34 Ibid., p. lii.
35 Ibid., p. 621.
36 ‘Ideas that are poorly conceptualised and put into practice in France will have their revenge in the second half of the twentieth century, which looks very much like it will be a century of social inspiration and social reform’, quoted in Hayward, Idea of Solidarity, p. 630.
37 Ibid., p. xxiii.
the aegis of one or more ideas’. 38 One of the legacies of the failure is the status as bombast and the complacency that the concept of solidarity engenders in French public life; ‘regarding the intractable deviations from the juridical norm as transitory aberrations, the legally trained French politicians have been all too often content to reaffirm principles rather than embark upon the painful business of implementing them’.39

A second legacy of the failure is the inability to provide a ‘civic sense of self-discipline’. ‘[P]ersonal and group egoisms, religious, political and personal animosities, exacerbated class conflicts [and a] temperamental hostility to compromise’ render France ‘a constant prey to authoritarian coups d’état and plebiscitary dictatorship’. Third, the status of solidarity as a cherished but vacuous slogan has produced attempts to introduce what might be termed ‘solidarist’ solutions by coercive means (Hayward earlier having distinguished between Jacobin and Girondin approaches to solidarity):

France has oscillated between self-assertive liberty and coercive solidarity, feverishly inventing, establishing and demolishing a wealth of grandiose and ingenious constitutional expedients, none of which have provided more than temporary relief for this tormented nation from the inner tensions that threaten imminent rupture of its fragile political structure, based upon illusory juridical forms that merely paper over the fissures in French society.40

While such discussion of the role of ideas does not occupy a large portion of the thesis, the broad insight into the role of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ideas in shaping the French political history of the twentieth century through the legacy of what such ideas did not achieve, and what they became after they had failed to achieve their promise, formed the basis of his later writing, above all The One and Indivisible French Republic. Hayward’s bemusement at being honoured by the French state for his writing on France is understandable given that the thrust of his approach was not flattering to contemporary French politics or politicians. When he got a letter from the French government proposing he become Chevalier de l’Ordre Nationale de la Mérite he replied that he would like the designation of ‘agricultural merit, third class’ (the government office concerned wrote to refuse this request on the ground he was not qualified for it). Some years later he joked he could not even ride a horse when he was made a Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur.41

38 Ibid., p. xxiv.
39 Ibid., p. 611.
40 Ibid., p. 612.
41 Hayward, ‘Beyond France’, 114.
In *The One and Indivisible* the distinctive insights into the shortcomings that ideas might have as a basis for political action and constitutional organisation were developed in the context of an even bigger concept than solidarity: sovereignty. The development of the argument is also fundamentally different. This is not simply the difference between a 1950s PhD (with its untranslated French quotes, some of them very lengthy, and 400 pages of notes and appendices) and a 1970s textbook. This was contemporary France through the lens of the idea that both dogged and defined much of its public life. Hayward had already written a book on contemporary French government, or rather one part of it, the Economic and Social Council, which, although it included in its prologue some brief reference to some of the syndicalist views covered in the doctoral thesis, located itself in the field of interest group theory and had the more empirical aim of studying how the Council ‘works in practice, in the hope that it will shed some light on the … impact of interest group representation …’.42 In his 1973 book the blending of theory and empirical description was more consciously pursued and to even greater effect than in his earlier work.

*The One and Indivisible*’s title is an ironic joke that Hayward felt not enough people seem to have got.43 It is a joke because the central thesis is that France is highly fragmented and the notion of indivisibility is a fiction, but a fiction that has consequences for the institutional and political structures of contemporary France. Debates about the notion of sovereignty and where it is located produced two broad answers. One was that it resided in the executive or, in the caesarist-Napoleonic version, the head of the executive. The other, associated with Abbé Sieyès, was that it resided in the legislature. The ‘unresolved problem of the location of sovereign power has continued to bedevil French attempts at creating an effective and acceptable form of government’ with systems veering between ‘parliamentary omnipotence’ and ‘executive dominance’.44 The ‘attitude of the French political élite towards politics has been dominated by a belief in the need for a strong, unified, centralized authority, capable of containing the centrifugal forces that constantly threaten the integrity of the state’. This is matched by an alienation of citizens and groups from state power characterised by occasional inconclusive protest but more common mass apathy and distrust of authority. Together they produce an ‘immobilist symbiosis between the liberal-representative and the authoritarian-administrative traditions’.45

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44 Hayward, *One and Indivisible*, p. 7.
The main thesis is sustained first in the examination of the relationship between Paris and the provinces, where the doctrine of a standardised pattern of government paralyses any decentralised decision-making. The French form of centralisation encourages, as the Crozier/Thoenig school in the 1960s and 1970s set out so clearly, a collusion between prefects as representatives of the central state in the locality and mayors of towns and villages to make ‘large and irresponsible demands’ of Paris. But the power of the thesis extends throughout the system. Parliament in the Fifth Republic lost a large amount of the power that it had in the Fourth and interest groups are important mediators between state and society. Yet the executive, or more specifically the relatively closely knit group of top administrators and politicians at the top, the ‘techno-bureaucratic executive’, dominates the decision-making process. Top executive officials and politicians can select which interests they listen to and can play one part of the fragmented interest group world off against another—making such groups pressured rather than pressure groups. A strengthened executive had led to an erosion of civil liberties in France in the Fourth and Fifth Republics, although France remains at heart a liberal democracy with a stubborn libertarian tradition of resistance to authority. Its budgetary process is fragmented and chaotic, characterised by an executive dominance of the whole process with side payments to legislators for their pet projects to make sure the budget passes. The consequences of the French approach to state sovereignty specifically in the field of economic management, especially the system of economic planning, can be seen in patterns of policy-making common to those found in other policy areas. However, in economic policy-making, Hayward acknowledges ‘the political and administrative architects of public policy have served their country well’, as suggested by the high levels of economic growth since 1945. In foreign and European policy ‘alliances were seasonal, dictated by the opportunism of a government determined to preserve the sovereignty of the state in an international environment which threatened foreign penetration and domination’.

Political thought as empirical methodology

Hayward’s *The One and Indivisible* was not an argument about an unchanged or unchanging pattern of French politics. The political demise of de Gaulle as well as the

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47 Hayward, *One and Indivisible*, p. 58.

48 Ibid., p. 189.

49 Ibid., p. 228.
changing international, especially European, political and economic environment and France’s own economic modernisation feature strongly in the book. Before we go on to consider his account of change in France since the text came out in 1973 we might begin to answer the puzzle set at the beginning. Understanding how a political concept, such as sovereignty or solidarity, is handled within a country offers an important and fruitful way of understanding that country’s politics. Why the concept should generate significant debate in the first place illustrates the empirical political problems—of diversity and consent in the case of sovereignty, of a basis for state intervention in the case of solidarity—that it is supposed to address. The norms that such ideas produce have two sorts of impacts: in the observance and in the breach. In the observance they produce laws and policies that appear to conform to them—the solidarist welfare legislation of the Radicals in the early twentieth century or the centralised constitution of the Fifth Republic. They also constrain debates about options and possibilities for reform since they become limited to include only those which easily conform to the idea. In the breach they affect the form that public hypocrisy takes: the fiction that the state never listens to interest groups or that the highly individualist economic and social institutions are nevertheless solidarist. The form such hypocrisy takes is important since it cuts off some of the possibilities of addressing problems and limits the acceptable solutions to be found to them.

To some degree Hayward alludes to this methodology in his inaugural lecture at Hull when he mentions his ‘old addiction to the insights into the normative presuppositions of decision makers afforded by the history of ideas’.\(^5\) We see this methodology at work most clearly in his After the French Revolution. His assessment of the enduring impact of the French Revolution focuses on the thought and legacy of six thinkers who all died before the start of the twentieth century. Joseph de Maistre, the ultra-conservative Catholic thinker, is handled first. As already noted, de Maistre was of particular interest and furthermore occupied a key place in Jack Hayward’s writing ever since his 1958 PhD. He is the first thinker covered in his thesis and makes several appearances throughout; he is mentioned in The One and Indivisible and features prominently in his last main book on France in 2007, Fragmented France. With help from de Maistre’s criticisms of the vacuity of the claims to base a society on liberty, equality and fraternity and his Catholic authoritarianism based on the primacy of Rome, Hayward traces the origins and enduring importance of the clerical-anticlerical cleavage that remained so potent in France until the latter part of the twentieth century. The portrait of Saint-Simon underpins a culture of elitist technocracy that has long characterised the French state and the ‘appeal to knowledge rather than

\(^5\)J. E. S. Hayward, Political Inertia (Hull, 1975), p. 6.
popularity as the non-democratic source of public power in France’.\textsuperscript{51} Through Constant and de Tocqueville we can see the difficult progress of political liberalism in France since the Revolution. Through Proudhon he develops an understanding of some of the distinctive features of French trade unionism (including a syndicalist anti-statist bias) and through Blanqui he examines the organisational form of revolutionary socialism of parties of the left.

France after the Revolution

The key question of \textit{After the French Revolution} was whether the French Revolution appeared to be at last over, in the sense that the key questions of legitimacy arising from it no longer produced political instability. In response Hayward argued that now ‘the French no longer quarrel ardently over the legitimacy of their political regime and have settled for a lukewarm, liberal democratic constitutional relativism’.\textsuperscript{52} The conclusion of \textit{After the French Revolution} is that it took until the Fifth Republic and the arrival of de Gaulle, Pompidou and Mitterand to develop some sort of consensus on the issues that drove the controversies these thinkers, among others, addressed.

The wider thesis Hayward developed was that the political economy of France began to change after 1945, and the Fifth Republic appeared to give France a level of political stability that it had not enjoyed for a sustained period in its history: ‘It took the Second World War to shake France out of its economic lethargy ... and the Algerian War to give it stable institutions.’\textsuperscript{53} Yet there remained distinctive features of elite predispositions that shaped the rhetoric of its leaders and the reality of government processes and institutions. \textit{Fragmented France}, his last book-length look at the topic, highlights three main enduring features of the legacy of the conflicts arising from the ideological conflicts of the past: first, an ‘Anglo-American counter-identity’ which defines French identity in terms of its relationship with the English-speaking world,\textsuperscript{54} above all the United States; second, a lack of acceptance of its diminished role in world affairs since 1945 characterised both by ‘paralyzing self-doubt and its nostalgic illusion of selfless superiority’;\textsuperscript{55} and third, the domination of the state and its consequent crowding out of pluralist-liberal politics. Indeed, the three are somewhat

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Hayward, \textit{After the French Revolution}, p. 100.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 299.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Hayward, \textit{Fragmented France}, p. 372.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 373.
\end{itemize}
related because ‘the pluralist, Anglo-American anti-model has proved instinctively repugnant’ in France.\textsuperscript{56}

To sustain and develop this argument in the post-de Gaulle era Hayward again examines the thought of influential post-war thinkers including Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann, Michel Crozier and Pierre Rosanvallon. A renewed interest in liberal ideas coincided with a revival of interest in de Tocqueville, but this was something of a ‘false dawn’.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the efforts of politicians such as Michel Rocard, Jacques Delors and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the forces of economic liberalism did not challenge the fundamental premise among political leaders that the state must ‘protect or compensate the various losers of market competition’ and that ‘top-down state intervention’ is the dominant form of economic policy design.

Nevertheless, a common theme of Hayward’s later writing on France is a concern with a range of political changes, not least the developing European Union, experiences of cohabitation (i.e. government where the presidency and the legislative majority are held by different parties), and changing patterns of party competition, that have added to the other factors stressed in his earlier work suggesting the declining distinctiveness of the French state. This leads to a second theme that comes to the fore even more in his later works: the disjuncture between French elite perception and reality. He acknowledged how all the social, economic and cultural changes of the past forty years had served to make France less ‘exceptional’ and, in his very last published words, he writes ‘in comparative context, the French state remains somewhat exceptional in its norms and impulses, even more than in its behaviour’.\textsuperscript{58}

The pathologies Hayward identifies in the French political system are becoming increasingly matters of a dissonance between, on the one hand, elite self-perception, official ideology and constitutional thought, and, on the other, the realities of power, influence and politics in a modern industrial state. For several years, and without success, Hayward tried to convince the editors of the journal \textit{Pouvoirs} to commission a special issue not on the \textit{l’état de droit en France} (the Rechtsstaat or, more freely, the rule of law in France) but on the \textit{l’état de passe droit en France} (the state based on turning a blind eye to the law).\textsuperscript{59} This was, he argued, a characteristic and ignored feature of modern French politics. He points to some of the key areas where such dissonance can be observed and where ‘the traditional state culture’s assumptions are

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 365.
\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., p. 344.
\textsuperscript{59}Hayward served on the editorial board of \textit{Pouvoirs} for many years. He took his responsibilities as editorial board member on this and the other boards on which he served (including that of the \textit{British Journal of Political Science}) very seriously, making a point of attending their meetings.
not valid’, the belief in an economic sovereignty that is unsustainable and unsustained in an open international economy; the monomaniacal belief that the Presidency embodies the Republic, ‘trying to subject all to his fiat’ and yielding to the ‘urge to place his personal imprint upon the country and the world’; the ‘championing of the nation state’ in the European Union and other international forums; the growing adoption of forms of delegation to organisations not directly controlled by the state through ‘new public management’ processes and reforms of the territorial government system more generally marking a break from the assumed ‘one and indivisible’ traditions of French constitutional law; ‘despite lip service to equality, France has systematically institutionalized educational, cultural, social, economic and political inequality’. The distinctive features of French politics and government are present, and some of them still maintain a potent practical effect (the centrality of the state and the characteristics of the Presidency as main examples) but their effect is increasingly taking the form of giving structure to France’s official hypocrisy rather than to its policies and practices.

The (more conventional) empirical contribution

The use of political thought to explain the behaviour of political elites in France requires an understanding of French political and policy practice as well as an understanding of its political thought. This was something Hayward developed not just by maintaining and expanding his wide range of contacts with key research institutions, scholars and friends in France, by having an encyclopaedic knowledge of French history, by carefully working through the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* to which he was a subscriber since the 1950s (he only gave up his subscription to the satirical magazine *Le Canard enchaîné* a couple of years before he died) and by listening to French radio, but also by his own research.

His first book, *Private Interests and Public Policy*, was a study of the Economic and Social Council (ESC) in France, and the focus is on the ESC as a forum for interest group politics. In fact, Hayward’s first main study of the role of groups, his article on the Ligue de l’Enseignement in the development of ‘solidarist’ education policies in the Radical governments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggests this focus on interest politics may have been stimulated by his historical work.

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60 Hayward, ‘The state imperative’, p. 57.
61 Ibid., p. 55.
63 Hayward, ‘Educational pressure groups’.
Private Interests discusses the development of the Council from ‘ineffectual obscurity into influential limelight’. It draws upon his earlier theoretical work. He contrasts, for example, the Proudhonian aspiration for workers’ control with the ‘Saint-Simonian reality of expertise applied to the organization of economic growth’ as part of the dynamic explaining the behaviour of those involved in it. But most of the book was a careful study of the Council based on interview and documentary evidence. One way the ESC increased its role was through its involvement in economic planning. Hayward wrote an article on the French approach to economic planning (in French—his French was flawless) in the Revue Française de Sociologie, and a range of other contributions to the field followed. The interest in planning was sustained by his co-editorship of two books looking at planning (including wider policy and land-use planning) in other European countries.

Hayward also wrote many articles and book chapters looking at the French approach to policy-making, often focusing on economic policy-making. He contributed a chapter on France to the influential edited collection that sought to determine distinctive national ‘styles’ of policy-making. Moreover, his work in this field was brought together and developed in his State and the Market Economy: Industrial Patriotism and Economic Intervention in France. If one looks at The State and the Market Economy some of the familiar leading figures in Hayward’s developing understanding of France are there—Proudhon and Saint-Simon get a few mentions—but the distinctive contribution of the work is that it sets out the decision-making of a ‘concerted economy’ with its characteristic features framed by the broader processes he identified in earlier work, above all the role for a techno-bureaucratic state and its close relationship with business. Within this broad description he sets out the practices of government techno-bureaucratic entrepreneurialism and the political strategies of the different groups involved in economic decision-making. This account includes his

64 Hayward, Private Interests, p. 85.
65 Ibid., p. 91.
characterisation of French interests as pressured groups and thus not fitting neatly into conventional understandings of pluralist decision-making; it also covers the national and local management (and mismanagement) of economic decline, nationalisation and the policy of ‘national champions’. Here in economic policy the characteristic assumptions held by French policy elites are, as elsewhere, important explanatory factors. His judgement of French socialism, for example, is that

on the relatively rare … occasions, such as 1936 or 1968, when the Left has briefly occupied or approached power … there has been a romantic tendency to consider that ‘everything is possible’. This is one variant of an assertive and active French policy style which emphasises the will of the actor rather than the inertial constraints that inhibit innovation. Its pretensions may and often do exceed the capacity to attain its objectives, leading to humiliation when the gap between them is publicly exposed.71

His last major interview-based research project was part of a collaborative effort conducted under the auspices of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Whitehall Programme.72 It was a joint project led by Hayward and Vincent Wright. They were also to do the work on France and several other colleagues were supposed to cover Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain. Wright and Hayward published a short report covering all the countries in the project which raised many questions but actually answered few and contained little by way of empirical detail. The authors conceded they had ‘struggled to deal with rather than resolve the … major conceptual and methodological problems …’. This imposed ‘significant limitations on the general and specific findings at which we arrived’ and they suggested these findings ‘will be set out in further detail in a series of volumes both national and comparative’.73 Separate volumes on each of the countries in the project were planned (and indeed listed as published by Macmillan) along with an overview volume to be edited by Hayward and Wright. However, the only volume that appeared in print (published by Oxford University Press) was the Hayward and Wright volume on France Governing from the Centre: Core Executive Coordination in France.

The quality of this work on France leads one to regret the unfinished work of the collaborators as a sorely missed opportunity. Written effectively by Hayward after Wright’s death, the book examines the concept of coordination. It contrasts on the one hand the aspirations to, and claims of, achieving comprehensive consistency and cohesion in policy development with the reality of decision-making where competing

71 Ibid., p. 213.
power centres pull in different directions, where communication is poor and where pressures external to state institutions as well as external to France exert strong constraints. They start by setting out the ‘normative framework’ of coordination, and in many ways offer an enrichment of the thesis at the heart of *The One and Indivisible* by outlining the institutions (cabinets, inter-ministerial committees and the like) supposed to achieve singleness and indivisibility as well as the traditional forces (such as departmentalism, ministerial ambition) that have challenged it. Then, using four broad ‘case studies’ (coordination of EU policy, budget coordination, privatisation, and immigration), they examine how the normative framework and its institutions have worked in practice since 1981. The conclusions are detailed and sector specific, but they also have a strong bearing on the broader themes Hayward emphasises in his other work on France—the *dirigiste* tradition, the domination of the executive, the nature of relations with regional and local government and parliamentary weakness all shape the style of coordination; how it is attempted or not attempted, how potential conflicts are avoided and the form in which coordination, where attempted, succeeds and fails. Yet in substantive terms France is much like any other European state. Overall the ‘flattering image of an integrated state disintegrates’ and ‘to the extent that it was formerly exceptional, France has increasingly ceased to be so’ as it faces the same sorts of pressures of ‘polycentric complexity’ that face all modern states: ‘anachronistic symbolic shibboleths are being remorselessly prised apart by intrusive substantive pressures’.

**Collaborative comparisons**

Hayward described his intellectual development in an autobiographical note as a movement ‘from implicit to explicit comparison’. We have already mentioned his early conviction of the value of the comparative method of research. Comparison can, as he explicitly recognised, take a variety of different forms. His PhD was comparative, even though there were few pages devoted to experience or thought outside France, in the sense that the distinctiveness of French approaches to solidarity and their impact on policy and political development can only be appreciated with reference to patterns elsewhere (in this case mainly England but with some reference to Germany). His following books on France were all based on a recognition that French political thought, institutions and practices displayed distinctive features, which he contrasted through often brief references to other countries. More generally he argued

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75 Hayward, ‘Between France and universality’. 
against the belief that the only form of valid comparison was conducted on the basis of the identification, and preferably measurement, in several jurisdictions of an array of key independent variables with a bearing on a key dependent variable and performing some sort of regression—whether statistical, impressionistic or something in between: ‘To dismiss the historically grounded studies of foreign politics as casual and amateurish because they are inductive, qualitative, and only implicitly comparative, is to assume that the quantitative American deductive approach is the only sound one.’

His preferred style of more elaborate and explicit comparison was, he said, citing Peter Mair approvingly, ‘the bringing together of micro case-sensitive, context-sensitive groups of studies which, through team effort, and collaborative group effort, can genuinely advance comparative understanding, and can genuinely contribute to the development of comparative politics’.

Hayward had already pursued this collaborative form of comparison in a series of contributions on planning, already discussed. He used the edited book format to address questions, mainly comparative, that he did not feel were addressed in the British political science literature; he also had a very good sense for emerging issues of central political importance and used this format to explore them. He had highlighted the need for all-Europe comparisons before the Iron Curtain fell in a comparative edited collection with another Hull colleague, Bob Berki, and at Hull he edited a special issue of a journal looking at the changing role of trade unions in Europe. The 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery and his role in Hull’s celebration of Wilberforce’s part in it generated Out of Slavery. At Oxford he produced edited comparative volumes including one on industrial policy and European integration, another on populism in Europe, and with a close former Oxford colleague he edited a collection of comparative essays on contemporary European government which

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77 Ibid., p. 243.
78 When editing books Jack tried to include a mix of established and junior researchers. For such edited books he would generally organise a workshop (in Hull sometimes these were on shoe-string budgets) which, he made sure, would run exactly according to the planned timetable. Few, not even notorious latecomers, dared to be late either for the workshop sessions or in submitting draft/completed chapters. He told tardy collaborators that he would publish without them and name and shame them. He probably would have done, but I know of no case where he did.
80 In a special issue of West European Politics, 3 (1980).
82 J. E. S. Hayward (ed.), Industrial Enterprise and European Integration: from National to International Champions in Western Europe (Oxford, 1995).
became the most cited of his edited books. Shortly after the end of the division of Europe he recognised that many of the politics texts would be out of date and this led to Governing the New Europe which I had the privilege of coediting with him. He produced two books on the methodology of political research, or rather how scholars approach the study of politics.

Working on Sammy Finer’s History of Government was a different kind of collaboration. As described by Finer’s widow and Hayward himself this was a collaborative effort. Sammy Finer died in 1993 having completed most of the work on thirty-four of the projected thirty-six chapters of this monumental work that started with the Sumerian city-state in the third millennium BCE and finished with the present day. Finer had left behind a set of notes for anybody editing his work were he to die before its completion. The editing involved sending the chapters, all in varying states of incompletion, to other scholars whom Finer had consulted while working on the book. These colleagues checked, completed and corrected different chapters, while Hayward was ‘responsible for orchestrating the collective effort’. There was ‘no attempt to interfere with Finer’s own interpretation of events and developments’.

One can see why Hayward took on this large task. He begins his own account of accepting the challenge with the point that he made to all his colleagues, especially junior ones, at Hull (and probably everywhere else) quoting the nineteenth-century economist Léon Walras: ‘if you want quick results, plant lettuce; enduring results take longer’. Spending a long time on a big project that matters is infinitely more attractive than going for a speedy publication. Apart from his long-standing admiration for Finer, as well as ‘paying the intellectual debt that he owed him’, Hayward’s enthusiasm for working on his unfinished text was clear:

Who other than Sammy Finer, in this era of professional prudence in which most of us retreat into the stultifying specialization that was profoundly repugnant to him, would have had the breath-taking boldness, the exuberant breadth of sympathy and the imaginative energy to embrace government throughout recorded history as well as throughout the world?

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85 J. E. S. Hayward and E. Page (eds.), Governing the New Europe (Cambridge, 1995).
88 Ibid., pp. v–vi.
90 Hayward, ‘Between France and universality’, p. 149.
The volumes he edited in the ten years before his death reflected, perhaps more strongly than earlier ones, his disappointment and irritation with contemporary European politics, especially politics in Britain. These books also returned, in their different ways, to the concept of solidarity with which Hayward’s intellectual career began. *Leaderless Europe* seeks to address the question of the failure of the European Union to live up to its promise and initial expectations: ‘How did initial imaginative innovation give way to lacklustre, routine indecision’, amongst other things paving the way for populist appeals likely to undermine it? The conclusion was not entirely pessimistic—inertia and routine can be a way of keeping things tolerably together as long as they are done well and the prize of more ‘heroic’ leadership styles does not slip entirely away. *The Withering of the Welfare State*, which started from a despair at the reversal of solidarist values, pointed to the ‘squalid consequences of liberty without solidarity’, and expressed Hayward’s fears over the ‘headlong regression of countries that were once at the forefront of the welfare state’, ‘moving back from citizen solidarity, based upon self-respect grounded on a social recognition of equal worth, to self-serving inequality’. His last edited book offered more than a nod to his earliest academic work in its title, *European Disunion: Between Sovereignty and Solidarity*. It focuses on the question of ‘how much distrustful divergence the European Union can contain without degenerating into ineffectiveness and fragmentation’.

Reflections on British citizenship

A very great personal disappointment, one which angered and disgusted him, was the treatment of British citizens who had been imprisoned by the Japanese during the Second World War and whose Britishness was denied by a capricious and offensive administrative decision that appeared to be based initially on the mercenary motive of limiting the extent of the government’s financial liability. The episode also displayed a range of systematic problems with the British government, and Hayward, together with Ron Bridge, Chairman of the Association of British Civilian Internees Far East Region (ABCIFER), wrote this up in a book. The book highlighted the campaign by ABCIFER and others to secure recognition and compensation for internees’ suffering at the hands of the Japanese. After unsuccessful attempts to secure compensation

94 Hayward and Bridge, *Identity Theft*. Hayward approached several publishers with the manuscript, but did not manage to get it published.
from the Japanese, a quiet demonstration during the May 1998 state visit of the Japanese Emperor to London (which involved a candlelit vigil during which the protesters turned their backs to the Queen and Emperor as they drove in a carriage down the Mall) helped put the issue on the British government’s agenda and eventually, in late 2000, after more pressing and mobilising parliamentary and public support, the prisoners’ groups got a promise of ‘a single ex-gratia payment’ of £10,000 to each of the surviving ex-prisoners of the Japanese. The War Pensions Agency (WPA), part of the Ministry of Defence, in developing the details of the scheme, limited the eligibility for the payment to those British citizens at the time of imprisonment with a ‘blood-link’ to Britain. This, as interpreted by the WPA, ruled out many people, including Hayward, who held British passports at the time.

The term ‘bloodlink’ has racial connotations and those it discriminated against in practice made it a racialist policy: it disproportionately excluded from the scheme Jews, Catholics of Irish descent born outside Britain, Eurasians who could not prove having a grandparent born in the United Kingdom and women who had become British through marriage. The limitation appeared to be justified by a rather muddled argument that opening up the civilian scheme would lead to huge numbers of claims from ex-Indian army prisoners. There followed a long and hard-fought campaign, led by ABCIFER, and its chairman Ron Bridge in particular, in which Hayward played a significant role. Most notably Hayward complained to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA, often termed ‘ombudsman’) who eventually took up his case. In its report, A Debt of Honour, the PCA found maladministration, cover-up and misrepresentation stemming from the Ministry of Defence’s wilful refusal to admit its mistakes, its incompetence and its obfuscation and obstruction when faced with claims for compensation. The clear and strong PCA findings of maladministration were rejected by the Ministry of Defence, but, following further ABCIFER pressure and a parliamentary select committee’s condemnation, the Ministry changed course significantly and invented a new rule to include some of those formerly excluded (the ‘20-year rule’ by which those who had lived for twenty years in Britain up to 2000 also had a special link to the UK and were thus eligible). One of the defence ministers involved was Tom Watson, a former student in Hull’s Politics Department whom Hayward had taught. A threat of court action by ABCIFER led to some improvement in the application of the twenty-year rule, and ABCIFER decided to accept the unsatisfactory revised scheme on the ground that the longer it dragged on the fewer surviving beneficiaries would be around to benefit from the scheme. Nevertheless, the progress of assessing and awarding the

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95 Ibid., Chapters 3 and 4.
96 PCA, ‘A Debt of Honour’.
payment was very slow and still had its inconsistencies. Thus, while Hayward got his payment (which he immediately gave to a hospice) ‘of two surviving Hayward sisters, one qualified under the 20-year rule and the other did not although all three had suffered exactly the same internment’. 97

For Hayward the experience brought out the worst of British policy-making and politics. He had made implicit and less implicit comparative observations about the character of British policy-making across a range of his works, which tended to emphasise its conservatism, its passivity with respect to interest group pressure, its timidity and irresolution. 98 Where he might have been able to see some small positive elements in this in his earlier work, such considerations are hard to find here—Identity Theft concludes with a chapter entitled ‘Maladministration: the unlearned lessons of an instructive fiasco’. This was a ‘systemic failure that tells us much about the wilful amnesia of an administrative elite that had ceased to understand much less discharge what the then Prime Minister called “a debt of honour”’. Britain had retreated into a pettier form of self-identity: ‘the expansive, imagined identity of an assertive Greater Britain shrank in the second half of the twentieth century into the defensive identity of a Lesser Britain’. There was a ‘systemic incapacity of public servants to serve the public with standards of competence they are entitled to expect’, a failure to carry out policies agreed by politicians and a failure by politicians to ensure that they are carried out; a confusion of responsibilities with inconsistent procedures and ‘cultures’ across government departments suffering from very rapid turnover in ministerial incumbents. The analytical core of the book is characteristically strong, yet the insult Hayward felt for himself, his family and his fellow internees and his anger with the way parts of the British politico-administrative system handled the matter helped ensure that the book could not be a commercial proposition for an academic publisher—and it remained unpublished.

The impatience with British policy-making and administration can be seen in his later work and was confirmed and magnified by Brexit. His commitment to remaining in the EU led him to propose and help organise events at Hull University, including arranging for Alan Johnson, the leader of ‘Labour In for Britain’, to give the Jean Monnet Lecture in 2016 with the title ‘Involvement or isolation: the choice facing Britain’. Jack despaired of the referendum campaign, the vote and the political and administrative mess that followed. The title of a Hull University session arranged shortly after the referendum was unmistakeably his: ‘Britain beyond European Union: causes and consequences of self-ejection’.

97 Hayward and Bridge, Identity Theft.
98 Hayward, Political Inertia, pp. 11–12.
Conclusion: inertia

Hayward’s inaugural lecture at Hull in 1975 might at first might be taken as a specific reaction to his immediate environment. It has a characteristically jokey introduction:

> There are many sorts of chairs: bath chairs, deck chairs, electric chairs, push chairs, rocking chairs, to name but a few. Having been appointed to a second chair, it occurred to me to inquire what the holder of the first chair had spoken about at his inaugural and to choose a topic that was complementary to it. Professor Dodd … had elected to speak about political change … it seemed appropriate that I should select political inertia as my subject.99

However, the concern with inertia went deeper than gentle mockery of a colleague. Hayward often referred to inertia and his inaugural lecture; the term features explicitly in some of his writings and implicitly in almost all of them. He used it in two ways: as pluralist incrementalism or ‘muddling through’ on the one hand and on the other as political processes that never seem to be able to stop following characteristic and long-established patterns. ‘Characteristic’ did not, however, mean ‘predictable’.100 In his Beijing talk in 2000 he emphasised institutionally induced inertia and resistance to change. Because, in government, as in most other established institutions, the organisational equivalent of biological death was missing, the result was that the organisation triumphed over its function. Extrapolation from past tendencies as a basis of forecasting the future was likely to lead to futurological false prophesy.101

In his writing on planning, he makes the distinction between two different ways of making policy: a humdrum and a heroic.102 Humdrum policy-making follows the pattern of pluralistic ‘muddling through’; it is a diffuse and unstructured process where ‘unplanned decisions are arrived at by a continuous process of mutual adjustment between a plurality of autonomous policy makers operating in the context of a highly fragmented multiple flow of influence’. Planning is an heroic form of policy-making involving the ‘ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders’. Britain could never embrace effective economic planning in the postwar years because of ‘a powerful but immobilist administration and politicians preoccupied with short-term manoeuvres within a party framework’. France would seem to have been well

99 Ibid., p. 3.
101 Hayward, ‘A social scientist’s sojourn in Beijing’, 38
102 Hayward, ‘National aptitudes for planning in Britain, France, and Italy’, 399.
placed to develop economic planning, but its success in coordinating a fragmented set of institutions, albeit more marked than in Britain, has been overstated as decisions have reflected a more fragmented and piecemeal approach. The concern with this form of inertia is found in his later writing on the EU where aspirations of ‘heroic statecraft’ are swamped by concern for the ‘humdrum coordination of conflicting interests’.103

Yet his understanding of inertia did not just cover the notions of inaction and drift, but also inertia in responding to challenges and change. Thus he refers to Lampadusa’s ‘dynamic conservatism’ where change is pursued by elites so that things can remain the same. He cites Kepler’s definition of inertia as ‘that property of matter by virtue of which it continues in its existing state, whether of rest or uniform motion in a straight line, unless that state is altered by external force’.104 For Hayward it is institutions and the characteristics of the decision-making process, including its ‘institutionalised values’, that constitute the inertia shaping political decisions. Thus, in the second edition of *The One and Indivisible*, when considering the possibility for major change following the rise to power of the left for the first time in the Fifth Republic, he argues ‘prudence suggests that once the dust has settled, the traditional routines favouring centralization, incrementalism, dirigisme and managerial control will reassert themselves’.

The main theme of Hayward’s work on France is the impact of the legacy of past conflicts, as seen through the window of political and social theory, on the institutions, processes and attitudes that make up the inertial pressures of contemporary politics. In this conception of inertia, it is not ‘heroic’ forms of political leadership that bring about change, much as Hayward acknowledged the role of political-bureaucratic ‘innovators’ in French planning such as Monnet, Bloch-Lainé and Delors.106 Hayward emphasises that such inertial tendencies become modified when conditions change and they become increasingly difficult to sustain. Developments in the international economy system forced changes on France after the Second World War, but it was not until the Fifth Republic was well advanced that the legacy described in *The One and Indivisible* started to fade in the political system. Nevertheless, it remains still quite strong through the lasting impact of the fiction of indivisibility and the pre-eminence given to the state as a solver, if not preventer, of market failures. The past potency and present impact can be seen in the hypocritical contortions that

104 Hayward, *Political Inertia*, p. 7.
105 Hayward, *Governing France*, p. 279.
106 Hayward, ‘National aptitudes’, 405; see also Hayward, *The State and the Market Economy*.
French political debates go through to maintain these fictions even if the reality suggests a less distinctive pluralist liberal polity. If and when these fictions eventually fade further in France, the more generic ‘muddling through’ inertia of humdrum policy-making in pluralist systems will have nothing to hide it.

*Note on the author:* Edward C. Page is Sidney and Beatrice Webb Professor of Public Policy at the London School of Economics. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2001.

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