ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M.

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Since our last general meeting a year ago, the Academy has suffered an unusually large number of heavy losses by death. Six of our members have departed, one of them our oldest, Dr. Campbell Fraser, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. He was already well stricken in years when (in 1903) he became a Fellow, but took a keen interest in the work of the Academy, and read at one of our early meetings a paper upon John Locke, on the occasion of the bicentenary of that philosopher’s death. A worthy successor of Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, and Sir William Hamilton, he was an earnest and efficient teacher, and has enriched the literature of British philosophy by his elaborate edition of the writings of Bishop Berkeley, as well as by his elucidation of the doctrines of that illustrious thinker.

Mr. Arthur Cohen, who left us last spring, after a long illness, was one of those comparatively few practising advocates who never lost his interest in legal theory and that kind of legal learning which has little to do with professional success. For many years he stood in the forefront of the English bar, both as an arguer of points of law and as a giver of opinions; and had he accepted that offer of a place on the Bench of the High Court which he is understood to have declined out of a sense of loyalty to his political party he would, in the opinion of all who knew him, have made an admirable judge, and have been ere long raised to the Court of Appeal. He was subtle and refined in thought, clear, careful and exact in expression. His mind was eminently philosophical, always searching for a principle and applying the principle when discovered with discriminating precision. At the bar, in Parliament, and in those gatherings of learned international lawyers where he was always welcome, the dignity and sweetness of his character and the courtesy of his manners gained for him universal respect.
Lord Justice Kennedy belonged to a family which has given several distinguished names to English scholarship, and won his first fame in that field, for he was Senior Classic at Cambridge in 1867. After a successful career at the Common Law bar he was raised to the Bench in 1892, and became Lord Justice of Appeal in 1908. When elected a Fellow of the Academy, he took an active part in its work and sat on the Council, where the greatest weight was always attached to his opinions. As a judge he was excellent on the moral as well as the intellectual side, scrupulously anxious to see full justice done, and with a mind too wide to be entrapped by mere technicalities. The interest which never deserted him in the larger relations of the world led him to devote much thought to questions of international law, to which he made valuable contributions, and it added also to his social charm. He was all his life a scholar and a man of letters as well as a lawyer. The simplicity, frankness, and geniality of his character had a youthful freshness to the last; and those of us who attended the memorial service held after his death in the Chapel of Lincoln's Inn were impressed by the sincerity of the grief that was there manifested, a grief which had perhaps not been equally felt by the bar for any one of its ornaments since the death of Lord Bowen.

Mr. Ingram Bywater, whose loss we have also to mourn, was a scholar of a type more familiar to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it is to our own time. When I had the privilege of having him for a pupil at Oxford in 1862, his diligence and pains-taking accuracy already marked him out as one from whom valuable work might be expected; and his career more than justified the expectations that were then formed. He had the true qualities of the scholar—a fondness for research, an untiring industry, a love of truth which deemed no pains too great to reach it and make it certain, however small might seem to be the points that had been left in doubt by previous inquirers. His reputation, first established by his work on the fragments of Heraclitus, and enlarged by his critical edition of Priscian, went on growing during a series of years in which he laboured chiefly on the text of Aristotle, particularly of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Poetics, ground that had been assiduously cultivated before, but from which his diligence and acuteness raised a fresh crop. During the years in which he was Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford, he set an example, very fruitful to students there, of admirable skill and judgement in the criticism of texts and the skilful handling of sources, and was recognized by European and American scholars as being perhaps the highest living authority on Aristotelian questions.
Canon Cheyne, formerly Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Scripture in the University of Oxford, had devoted the whole of his long and laborious life to Biblical studies, and attained in them, many years ago, a place in the front rank of Hebrew scholars. Most of his work was done upon Isaiah and the Psalms, but the range of his knowledge included all the Old Testament, and some of his writings were devoted to the elucidation of the history of Israel after the Captivity. Unwearied in his industry, and scrupulously careful in his investigations, he was able to accomplish a great deal; and though one of the hypotheses which he put forward in his later years has been deemed fanciful by other scholars, his contributions to Semitic learning will be long remembered and valued. I may add that he was a man of a singularly simple and amiable nature.

Professor R. Y. Tyrrell, of Trinity College, Dublin, was a scholar of a type different from either of the two just mentioned. He sustained the tradition of the great Irish University which he adorned by treating the classical writers in a literary spirit, bringing to their interpretation a refined taste as well as a thorough mastery of the intricacies of Greek and Latin grammar. His editions of Aristophanes and of Cicero’s Letters bear the fullest witness to the union in him of those two gifts, without which no scholar is perfect.

The year that has passed since the last general meeting of the Academy has been an *Annus Mirabilis*, full of unexpected and terrible events. To most of us it has been also *Annus Defendens*, a year that has brought private sorrow to nearly every household as well as public sorrow to us all for the calamities in which it has involved the nation and the world. The Council has thought it better not to let these events disturb the even tenor of our way, but rather desirable that we should seek in the pursuit of our studies a measure of occasional rest and refreshment of mind from vexing anxieties and dolorous thoughts. The Academy has carried on its meetings and public lectures, making no change save one. The Council has this year proposed no foreign men of learning to be elected as Corresponding Fellows, fearing lest the judgement of their merits might be, or might possibly seem to be, influenced by the political relations in which the country stands. No suggestion has come from any quarter that we should deprive of their position as Corresponding Fellows any subjects of those foreign states who are now at war with Britain.

You will be pleased to hear that the same may be said of our illustrious elder sister the Royal Society. The general feeling has evidently been that the more all learned bodies are kept outside the passions of war the better for them and for the nations. When strife has
ended and a period has elapsed long enough to soften the bitterness of feeling which now exists, it will be for learned bodies to try to link up the bonds of personal regard and intellectual co-operation, now unhappily severed, which have in time past served to bind the great peoples to one another.

I have now to present to you a short account of what has been done by and for the Academy during the past year.

At our ordinary meetings five papers have been read. Mr. A. F. Leach gave us some interesting historical notices regarding the provision of lay education in England before the Reformation, tending to show that it was ampler than has been commonly supposed.

Professor Haverfield, one of our Fellows, presented his annual report on the exploration of Roman antiquities in Britain, a report always listened to with pleasure and with profit. Canon Charles, also a Fellow, submitted a new view of the text of chapter xx of the Apocalypse of St. John, suggesting that in our textus receptus the original order of the verses has been changed, and the view which he advanced with much learning and ingenuity gave rise to an animated discussion. Mr. G. F. Hill, Keeper of Coins in the British Museum, favoured us with an instructive discourse on the coins of Southern Arabia during the early centuries of our era, an obscure subject on which he threw much light. Mr. Ball, Reader in Assyriology at the University of Oxford, carried his audience, which included some eminent Semitic scholars not members of our own body, into a still darker field of inquiry, as unfamiliar to most philologists as the coinage of Arabia is to most historians, and indicated a new view of the relations of primitive Sumerian speech to the languages of the Northern Semites. The bearing of these relations on the ethnic affinities of the peoples of Western and Middle Asia gave to this inquiry a vivid actuality for the student of early Asiatic history.

The lectures on the foundations which are administered by the Academy were all of high interest. Conspicuous among them was the brilliant address of M. Émile Boutroux of the French Academy on Certitude et Vérité, in which we equally admired the subtlety and penetration of the thought, and that admirable grace of style and manner in which our friends in France excel all other peoples. Canon van Hoonacker of the University of Louvain, one of those distinguished scholars to whom in their exile our Universities have offered hospitality, favoured us with a valuable discourse upon the Judaco-Aramaean community in the island of Elephantine (at Syene) under the Achaemenid kings of Persia, from which we drew much instruction and an insight as well into Jewish history as into
the methods of Persian administration in Egypt. Both these lectures were on the Schweich foundation. We also listened with keen pleasure to two admirable addresses by British scholars—the annual Shakespeare lecture, delivered by Professor Gilbert Murray, on Hamlet and Orestes as traditional types in drama, and the Warton Lecture by Professor Oliver Elton of Liverpool, who took for his topic 'The English Poetic Romancers after 1850'.

Regarding the undertakings in the field of learning administered or supervised by the Academy, or in which it takes part with other bodies, there is little to report, because several of these have been interrupted by the war, which has cut us off from communication with some of the institutions of learning on the European Continent. This particularly applies to the critical edition of the Mahabharata, most of the work on which is being done in Germany and Austria. The Encyclopaedia of Islam is, however, making steady progress, the more easily because most of the foreign part of the work is being done in Holland. Dr. Snouck Hurgronje of Amsterdam has favoured me with some data regarding it. The Bibliography of British History has suffered from the fact that those engaged on it have been largely occupied with work connected with the war. The photographic reproduction of the Codex Sinaiticus of the Old Testament continues to progress, although slowly.

I am glad to be able to inform you, on the authority of Professor Vinogradoff, that the second volume of the Record Series, for the publication of which the Academy receives a grant from H.M. Treasury, is now almost ready. It embraces a XIIIth Century Survey of the Estates of the Abbey of St. Augustine at Canterbury which presents the fullest account extant of Kentish tenures, and is invaluable for supplementing the notions current regarding the population of Kent and its landholding in feudal times. It will be followed by another volume which will include Kentish deeds of Abbey property. The last volume, containing the Survey of the Honour of Denbigh, was very favourably received by competent critics, and is indeed the most important contribution to the legal and economic side of Welsh history in Anglo-Norman days made in recent years.

It would have been natural on this occasion to review and comment upon the progress made in various branches of learning since last year. There is, however, little to record. Earnest scholars continue to pursue their studies so far as they can tear their thoughts away from the too-exciting present. But they reserve for quieter times the publication of what they have written. The literature of
the last ten months has been mainly what may be called occasional. One cannot say that the Muses have been silent, for we have heard the twanging of many a lyre, but the *vates saecr* is still to seek. It is too soon to expect any epic treatment of this world conflict; and among the voices rousing the youth of Europe to war there has not yet appeared any Tyrtæus. Of the many pamphlets and articles which passing events have called forth some have been of high literary excellence, and among these may be mentioned those which have proceeded from some of our Fellows, Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr. A. C. Bradley, Dr. Prothero, Professor Vinogradoff, Vice-Chancellor H. A. L. Fisher, and ex-President Dr. Charles Eliot of Harvard University in Massachusetts.

In the absence of a record of work done in the fields which the Academy cultivates, it might be expected that I should offer to you some remarks on the war itself, the causes that produced it, the antagonisms, deeper than most people supposed, which it has revealed, and the changes it is likely to involve. But many of you will have felt, and all will admit, the dangers that surround any one who, influenced by strong emotions and possessing imperfect knowledge, should now commit to print his judgment of the events of the last eleven months. Every one among us must sometimes have had cause to regret, when reading them years afterwards, words which he wrote in the heat of the moment. Time modifies our judgments as it cools our passions. Neither the friendships nor the enmities of nations can last for ever. You remember how Ajax, in the drama of Sophocles, says that he has learnt

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*It is better that nothing should be said to-day in an address to the Academy which any one of its members, to whatever country he may belong, would feel pain in reading ten or twenty years hence. Newspapers and pamphlets will convey to posterity sufficiently, and even more than sufficiently, the notions and fancies and passions of the moment.*

What we may do, not without profit, is to note and to set down in a spirit of detachment the impressions made upon us by the events which our eyes see and watch as they pass into history. Many a pen will for centuries to come be occupied by the events of this year, and endless controversies will arise over them. It is well that whoever has gained from his studies something of an historical sense should in an historical spirit place on record from month to month
the impressions he receives. The record will be almost as useful if the impressions should turn out to be erroneous as if they should be confirmed by subsequent events, because what the historian of the future will desire to know is not only what happened but what people believed and thought at the time it was happening. That which is omitted has also its value. Fifty years hence men will be struck by the significance of things whose significance was not perceived by contemporary observers, and will seek to know why those observers failed to see or comprehend facts which will then stand out in bold relief.

So let me now try to enumerate briefly what are the facts of the present situation by which we are chiefly impressed—facts that make it novel as well as terrible.

The first fact is the immense width and range of the war. Thucydides observed that men always thought the war they were then engaged in the greatest that had ever befallen. But here we have facts which show how much the present conflict does transcend any seen in previous ages. This might have been foretold twenty years ago, assuming that Russia, Germany, and Britain were involved, seeing how vast are the possessions and claims and ambitions of all three states. Yet the reality goes far beyond every forecast. All the six great European Powers and four lesser Powers are involved. So is the whole extra-European Old World, except China and Persia and the possessions of Holland and Portugal. In the New World it is only the Dominions and Colonies of Britain that are affected—a noteworthy illustration of the severance of the Western hemisphere from the broils of the Eastern.

Secondly, there is the prodigious influence of the war upon neutral nations. This also might have been foreseen as a result of the development of world commerce and the interlockings of world finance. But here too the actual results are transcending expectation.

Thirdly, the changes in the methods and character of war have been far more extensive than in any previous period. It took much more than two centuries from the invention of gunpowder for musketry and artillery to supersede completely archery and defensive armour. The long pike, after having been used for some twenty-five centuries at least, was still in use as late as the Irish Rebellion of 1798, and to a slight extent in the abortive rising of 1848. War, however, is now a totally different thing from what it was in the campaign of 1870–71, or even in the war between Russia and Japan of 1904. Chemistry has changed everything by increasing the range and the power of missiles, while electricity, without the wire, supplies new means of communication not only along
battle lines but across hostile territory. Warfare in the air and warfare under the sea were heretofore undreamt of.

Fourthly. The cost of war is greater in proportion to the size of armies, immensely larger as these armies are, than it ever was before. The ten belligerent European Powers are estimated to be spending now more than ten millions sterling a day. At this rate their total expenditure for twelve months could not be less than 4,000 millions, and may be much more. But some competent economists put it at 5,000 millions, figures which are hardly more realizable by us than are those which express the distances of the fixed stars.

Fifthly. In each nation the whole body of the people is more fully and more hotly interested in, and united by, this war than by any it ever waged before. During the eighteenth century it was in most countries only the monarch and the ruling class that knew or cared what was happening. The great European conflict that began in 1793 brought a change. But this war is far more intensely national, in the sense that it has roused the feelings of the whole of each people from top to bottom, than any preceding conflict, and it is everywhere waged with a sterner purpose. In this respect we are reminded of the citizen wars of the small city states of ancient Greece and Italy, and of the Italian Middle Ages. There certainly never was a great war less dynastic than the present.

Sixthly. Some grave moral issues have been raised more sharply than before. Is a state above morality? Does the plea of military necessity (of which it is itself the judge) entitle it to disregard the rights of other states? (Cf. Thucydides v. 84-113, the case of Melos.)

Seventhly. The predictions that the vast interests involved, the increasing strength of defence as opposed to attack, and the growth of a general pacific sentiment, would avert strife have all proved fallacious. The wisdom of the wise, where is it now? Some twelve years ago Maurice de Bloch, in a book that made a great impression at the time, argued that the growing difficulties of conducting military operations on a very large scale would prove an effective deterrent. More recently an accomplished and persuasive English writer has shown how much more a nation has to lose by war than it can possibly gain even if victory crown its arms. Others have thought that a sense of solidarity among the workers in each industrial country would be strong enough to restrain their governments from any but a purely defensive war. Others, again, have declared that democracies are essentially peaceful, because the mass of the people pay in their blood, other classes merely in their wealth.
I do not say that these arguments are unsound, but the forces they rely upon have not proved strong enough for the occasion. For practical purposes the wisdom of the wise has been brought to naught, because the rulers of the nations have been guided by other motives than those of pure reason.

These observations relate to the palpable facts we have witnessed. Let us turn now to some of the reflections which the facts suggest. It is not easy to express these with that cold detachment at which the historian is bound to aim; but the effort must be made.

On that reflection which rose first to our minds when the war began, and which continues to be the sombre background to every aspect it presents—upon this I will not pause. After more than forty centuries of civilization and nineteen centuries of Christianity, mankind—in this case more than half mankind—is settling its disputes in the same way as mankind did in the Stone Age. The weapons are more various and more destructive. They are the latest product of highly developed science. But the spirit and the result are the same.

There has never been a time in which communications were so easy, and the means for discovering and circulating information so abundant. Yet how little is now certainly known as to the real causes which have brought about the war. The beliefs current among different peoples are altogether different, not to say contradictory. Some are almost demonstrably false. Even in some neutral nations such as Holland, Switzerland, and Spain, opinion is sharply divided not merely about the rights but also about the facts. The whole German people seem to hold just as implicitly that this is for them a defensive war as the French hold the opposite; and however clear certain points may appear to us in Britain, there are others which may remain obscure for many years to come.

How few are the persons in every state in whose hands lie the issues of war and peace! In some of the now belligerent countries the final and vital decisions were taken by four or five persons only, in others by six or seven only. Even in Britain decision rested practically with less than twenty-five, for though some few persons outside the Cabinet took a part, not all within the Cabinet are to be reckoned as effective factors. It is of course true that popular sentiment has to be considered, even in states more or less despotically governed. Against a strong and definite sentiment of the masses the ruling few would not venture to act. But the masses are virtually led by a few, and their opinion is formed,
particularly at a crisis, by the authority and the appeals of those few whom they have been accustomed to trust or to obey. And after all, the vital decision at the vital moment remains with the few. If they had decided otherwise than they did, the thing would not have happened. Something like it might have happened later, but the war would not have come then and so.

How swiftly do vast events move, how quickly are vast decisions taken! In the twelve fatal days from July 23 to August 4 there was no time for reflection. Telegrams between seven capitals flew hither and thither like swift arrows crossing one another, and it would have needed a mind of more than human amplitude and energy to grasp and correlate all the issues involved and to foresee the results that would follow the various lines of action possible in a game so complicated. Even the intellect of a Caesar or a Bonaparte would have been unequal to the task. Here the telegraph has worked for evil. Had the communications passed by written dispatches, as they would have done eighty years ago, it is probable that war might have been avoided.

Sometimes one feels as if modern states were growing too huge for the men to whom their fortunes are committed. Mankind increases in volume, and in accumulated knowledge, and in comprehension of the forces of nature; but the intellects of individual men do not grow. The power of grasping and judging in their entirety the far greater mass of facts to be dealt with, the far more abundant resources at command, the far vaster issues involving the weal or woe of masses of men—this power does not expand. The disproportion between the individual ruling men with their personal prejudices and proclivities, their selfish interests and their vanities, and the immeasurable consequences which follow their individual volitions, becomes more striking and more tragic. There were some advantages in the small city states of antiquity. A single city might decline or perish, but the nation remained; and another city blossomed forth to replace that which had withered away. But now enormous nations are concentrated under one government and its disasters affect the whole. A great modern state is like a gigantic vessel built without any watertight compartments, which, if it be unskillfully steered, may perish when it strikes a single rock.

How ignorant modern peoples, with all the abundant means of information at their disposal, may nevertheless remain of one another's character and purposes! Each of the nations now at war has evidently had a false notion of its adversaries and has been thereby misled. It has not known their inner thoughts, it has misread
their policy. It was said in the days of the American Civil War that
the misconception by the Southern States of the Northern States,
and their belief that the North cared for nothing but the dollar,
was the real cause why their differences were not peaceably settled,
and yet they were both members of the same Republic and spoke the
same language. European nations cannot be expected to have quite
so intimate a knowledge each of the other, yet both their commercial
intercourse and the activity of the press and the immensely increased
volume of private travel might have been expected to enable them
to judge better to gauge and judge one another’s minds.

Historians as far back as Thucydides have made upon the beha-
viour of nations in war time many general observations, which have
been brought out in stronger light by what passes from day to day
before us. A few of these I will mention to suggest how we may
turn to account the illustrations which Europe now furnishes.

When danger threatens a nation its habits change. Defence
becomes the supreme need. In place of the ordinary machinery
of government there starts up a dictatorship like that of early
Rome, when twenty-four licctors surrounded the magistrate and
the tribune, with the right of appeal, sank away. The plea of public interest overrides everything. The suspension of con-
stitutional guarantees is acquiesced in, and acts of arbitrary power,
even if violent, are welcomed because taken as signs of strength
in the ruler. Even the withholding of information is submitted to.
The voice of criticism is silenced. Cedit toga armis. The soldier
comes to the front, speaks with an authority greater than that of
the civilian statesman, is permitted to do whatever he declares
to be necessary for the nation’s safety. So long as that is secured,
everything else is pardoned, and success gives enormous prestige.

Whoever watches these things must see how dangerous to freedom
is war, except in those communities where long tradition has rooted
constitutional habit very deep. In old Greece seditions opened
the way to the Tyrant. Napoleon supposed that the Duke of
Wellington would, after Waterloo, have made himself master of
England. So might a victor of another quality have done who had
achieved such a triumph as Wellington’s, had not an ancient monarchy
and Parliament stood in his way. War is the bane of democracies.
If it be civil war, he who restores peace is acclaimed like Augustus.
Even a Louis Napoleon may be welcome when he promises security
for property. If it be foreign war, the man of the sword on horseback
towers over the man on foot who can only talk and administer.

So, too, those psychical phenomena which former observers have
noticed when a country is swept by war or revolution, have become vividly real to Europe now. The same passion seizes on every one simultaneously and grows hotter in each by the sense that others share it. It is said that when sheep, feeding unherded on a mountain, see the approach of a danger they all huddle together, the rams on the outside facing the foe. The flock becomes one, with one mind, one fear, one rage of fear. So in times of danger a human community feels and acts like one man. The nation realizes itself so vividly that it becomes a law to itself and recks little of the opinion of others. The man is lost in the crowd, and the crowd feels rather than thinks. Passion intensified supersedes the ordinary exercise not only of individual will but even of individual reason. Fear and anger breed suspicion and credulity. Every one is ready to believe the worst of whoever is suspected. What is called the power of suggestion rises to such a height that to denounce a man is virtually to condemn him. Lavoisier is sentenced to be guillotined; he pleads that he is a harmless chemist, but is told that the Republic does not need chemists. After the death of Julius Caesar, Cinna, the poet, is seized, and when he protests that he is not Cinna the conspirator is nevertheless killed for his name, the bystander (in Shakespeare) adding, 'Kill him for his bad verses'. A foreign name is taken to be evidence that its bearer is a spy. There is no tolerance for difference of opinion, and to advance arguments against the reigning sentiment is treason. Any tribute to the character or even to the intellectual gifts of an enemy is resented. Sentiments of humanity towards him are disapproved, unless the precaution is taken of expressing these in the exact words of Holy Scripture. The rising flame of hatred involves not merely the government and armies of the enemy but even the innocent citizens of the hostile country. These well-known phenomena are all more or less visible in Europe to-day, though in our own country the coolness of our temperament and the fact that no invader has trodden our soil have been presenting them in a comparatively mild type.

The intensification of emotions includes those of a religious kind, and these not always in their purest form. In most countries, it is only the most enlightened minds that can refrain from claiming the Deity as their peculiar protector and taking every victory as a mark of His special favour. Modern man seems at such moments to have reverted to those primitive ages when each tribe fought for its own god and expected its own god to fight for it, as Moab called on Chemosh and Tyre on Melkarth. True it is that a nation now usually argues that
DIVINE PROTECTION WILL BE EXTENDED TO IT BECAUSE ITS CAUSE IS JUST.

But as this is announced by every nation alike, the result is much the same now as it was in the days of Chemosh and Melkarth. Oddly enough, the people in whom fanaticism used to be strongest are now responding more feebly than ever before to the appeal of the Jihād. Is it because the Turkish Mussalmans have infidel Powers for allies as well as for enemies that this war seems to them less holy than those of the centuries in which their conquests were won?

Upon other symptoms indicating a return to the conditions of warfare in earlier ages I forbear (for a reason already given) to comment. It is more pleasant to note that some of the virtues which war evokes have never been seen to more advantage. Man has not under civilization degenerated in body or in will power. The valour and self-sacrifice shown by the soldiers of all the nations have been as conspicuous as ever before. The line of heroes that extends from Thermopylae to Lucknow might welcome as brothers the warriors of to-day, while among those at home who have been suffering the loss of sons and brothers dearer to them than life itself, there has been a dignity of patience and silent resignation worthy of Roman Stoics or Christian saints.

In these and other similar ways we see many a feature of human character, many a phase of political or religious life recorded by historians, verified by present experience. We can better understand what nations become at moments of extreme peril and supreme effort; and those of us who occupy ourselves with history find it profitable to note the Present for the illumination of the Past.

But the Future makes a wider appeal. Every one feels that after the war we shall see a different world, but no one can foretell what sort of a world it will be. We all have our fancies, but we know them to be no more than fancies, for the possibilities are incalculable. Nevertheless it is worth while for each of us to set down what are the questions as to the future which most occupy the public mind and his own mind.

Will the effect of this war be to inflame or to damp down the military spirit? Some there are who believe that the example of those states which had made vast preparations for war will be henceforth followed by all states, so far as their resources permit, and that everywhere armies will be larger, navies larger, artillery accumulated on a larger scale, so that whatever peace may come will be only a respite and breathing time, to be followed by further conflicts till the predominance of one state or one race is established. Other observers of a more sanguine temper conceive that the outraged sentiment of mankind will compel the rulers of nations to
find some means of averting war in the future more effective than diplomacy has proved. Each view is held by men of wide knowledge and solid judgement: and for each strong arguments can be adduced.

The effects which the war will have on the government and politics of the contending countries are equally obscure, though every one admits they are sure to be far-reaching. Those who talk of politics as a Science may well pause when they reflect how little the experience of the past enables us to forecast the future of government, let us say in Germany or in Russia, on the hypothesis either of victory or of defeat for one or other Power.

Economics approaches more nearly to the character of a science than does any other department of inquiry in the human as opposed to the physical subjects. Yet the economic problems before us are scarcely less dark than the political. How long will it take the great countries to repair the losses they are now suffering? The destruction of capital has been greater during these last eleven months than ever before in so short a period, and it goes on with increasing rapidity. It took nearly two centuries for Germany to recover from the devastations of the Thirty Years’ War, and nearly forty years from the end of the Civil War had elapsed before the wealth of the Southern States of America had come back to the figures of 1860. One may expect recovery to be much swifter in our days, but the extinction of millions of productive brains and hands cannot fail to retard the process, and each of the trading countries will suffer by the impoverishment of the others.

This suggests the gravest of all the questions that confront us. How will population be affected in quantity and in quality? The birth-rate had before 1914 been falling in Germany and Britain: it had already so fallen in France as only to equal the death-rate. Will the withdrawal of those slain or disabled in war quicken it? and how long will it take to restore the productive industrial capacity of each country? More than half the students and younger teachers in some of our Universities have gone to fight abroad: and many of these will never return. Who can estimate what is being lost to literature and learning and science, from the deaths of those whose strong and cultivated intelligence might have made great discoveries or added to the store of the world’s thought? Those who are now perishing belong to the most healthy and vigorous part of the population, from whom the strongest progeny might have been expected. Will the physical and mental progeny of the generation that will come to manhood thirty or forty years hence show a decline? The data for
a forecast are scanty, for in no previous war has the loss of life been so great over Europe as a whole, even in proportion to a population very much larger than it was a century ago. It is said, I know not with how much truth, that the stature and physical strength of the population of France took long to recover from the losses of the wars that lasted from 1793 till 1814. Niebuhr thought that the population of the Roman Empire never recovered from the great plague of the second century a. d., but where it is disease that reduces a people, it is the weaker who die, while in war it is the stronger. Our friends of the Eugenics Society are uneasy at the prospect for the belligerent nations. Some of them are trying to console themselves by dwelling on the excellent moral effects that may spring out of the stimulation which war gives to the human spirit. What the race loses in body it may—so they hope—regain in soul. This is a highly speculative anticipation, on which history casts no certain light. As to the exaltation of character which war service produces in those who fight from noble motives, inspired by faith in the justice of their cause, there can be no doubt. We see it to-day as it has often been seen before. But how far does this affect the non-combatant part of each people? and how long does the exaltation last? The instance nearest to our own time, and an instance which is in so far typical that the bulk of the combatants on both sides were animated by a true patriotic spirit, is the instance of the American War of Secession. It was felt at the time to be almost a moral rebirth of the nation. I must not venture here and now to inquire how far the hopes then expressed were verified by the result; for such an inquiry would detain you too long.

These are some of the questions which it may be interesting to set down as rising in our minds now, in order that the next generation may the better realize what were the thoughts and anxieties of those who sought, sine ira, metu, studio, to comprehend the larger issues of this fateful time. It is too soon to hope to solve the problems that are crowding upon us. But we can at least try to see clearly what the problems are, and to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary, the moral and the material causes that have plunged mankind in this abyss of calamity: and we can ask one another what are the forces that may help to deliver it therefrom. This is a time for raising questions, not for attempting to answer them. Before some of them can be answered, most of us who are met here to-day will have followed across the deep River of Forgetfulness those who are now giving their lives that Britain may live.