ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M.

July 14, 1916.

My first duty is to pay a tribute of sorrow and respect to those of our Fellows who have left this world during the past year. The oldest of these was the Rev. Henry P. Tozer, Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, born in 1829. He belonged to that long line of scholarly English travellers who have done so much for the geography and history of the Mediterranean countries. Thoroughly equipped with a knowledge of the literature of Greece, he spent many summers in exploring the less known parts of European Turkey, Albania, Macedonia, and Northern Greece, and in later years visited Armenia and Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean. All these he described in books exact and careful in their descriptions, and so replete with historical knowledge as to be invaluable to the student. He was an admirable traveller, enterprising and courageous, tactful and conciliatory; and these qualities were even more needed when he began his journeys fifty years ago than they are now, for Pindus and Thessaly were regions some parts of which, not too safe to-day, were more unsafe then. An excellent observer, alert and acute, he always saw what was best worth seeing, and knew how to describe faithfully what he saw. He was also an accomplished Italian scholar, and published in his later life a sound and judicious commentary on the Divina Commedia of Dante. It ought to be added that he was singularly kindly and helpful to others, always ready to give from his own rich stores of knowledge.

Sir James A. H. Murray will always be kept in remembrance by that great Dictionary of our language to which he devoted the later half of his long and laborious life. The amplitude of the conception he had formed of what a Dictionary ought to be was equalled only by the extraordinary diligence and accuracy with which he followed out and made real that conception, sparing no pains to ransack every source of information and unravel every difficulty. This great work
is, as you know, now very near its end, and we cannot but grieve that our colleague should not have lived a year or two longer to receive our congratulations on the accomplishment of his vast design.

Sir John Rhys, late President of Jesus College, Oxford, was one of the first, perhaps the first, among our Celtic scholars. He had a mastery not only of Welsh, his mother tongue, but of the Gaelic of Ireland and Scotland, of Manx and of Breton; and he had made contributions of the highest value to the philology of these tongues. We were favoured by him with most interesting papers on the Ogham inscriptions of Ireland and the Gaulish inscriptions of France and Northern Italy. His venerable figure and genial countenance will be sadly missed here as well as in Oxford for many a year.

Mr. A. S. Napier, first Merton Professor of the English Language and Literature at Oxford, and also Rawlinsonian Professor of Anglo-Saxon, was another scholar of great distinction. His work on Old and Middle English, his editing of some of the volumes in the Early English Text Society series and of some Old English charters in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia* are admirable pieces of work. If the total quantity of it was not large in proportion to his own learning, it was excellent in its thoroughness and critical quality. It is worth noting now, when the respective claims of natural science and linguistic teaching are being much discussed, that his first devotion was to physical science.

Mr. J. Cook Wilson, Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford, was a pupil of Thomas H. Green, and a disciple of Ingram Bywater. Like the last-mentioned great scholar, he worthily sustained the reputation of Oxford as a home of Aristotelian studies, approaching the writings of that philosopher from the logical side as Bywater approached them from the side of textual criticism. It may interest you to hear of the enthusiasm he showed in a very different field. He had ardent faith in the value of the Volunteer movement, revived it in Oxford after a period when it had been languishing, and was (I think) the first person in England to organize a Volunteer cyclist corps.

Of our Corresponding Fellows we have lost one only, but he was one who had belonged to us from the earliest days of the Academy, and enjoyed in a remarkable degree the private friendship of our members. I speak of Count Ugo Balzani, who died at Rome last February after a very short and painless illness. He was one of the first historians of Italy, learned, exact, eminently judicious and impartial. The chief achievement of his life was his edition of the great
Chronicle of the Monastery of Farfa, one of the most important of all the Italian records of the earlier Middle Age. His finished scholarship and the conscientious accuracy which was never wanting to him are conspicuous in this monumental work. Smaller books were his Early Italian Chroniclers, and a short history of the Emperors of the house of Hohenstaufen. Married to a lady of Irish extraction, and speaking our language perfectly, he came frequently to England, and is now mourned by a large circle of devoted English friends. His name is to be commemorated in Rome by an endowment for the encouragement of historical studies.

Passing to the work of the Academy during the past year, I have to mention that six papers were read on the following subjects:

Mahdism and Mahdis: by Professor Margoliouth, one of our Fellows.
The Numbered Sections in Old English Poetical MSS.: by Dr. Henry Bradley, also a Fellow.
The Academ Roiall of King James the First: by Miss Ethel Portal.
Notes on an obscure passage in the Elephantine Papyri: by Canon van Hoonacker of Louvain.
The MSS. of Pelagius: by Professor Souter of Aberdeen.
Annual Report on results of archaeological work on Roman remains in Britain: by Professor Haverfield, Fellow of the Academy.

All these papers contained matter of permanent value, which was highly appreciated by those who were present at the meetings.

Besides these communications we had the benefit of listening to the lectures delivered in connexion with the various foundations which the Academy administers.

The annual Warton Lecture on English Poetry was delivered by Mr. Edmund Gosse, C.B., who gave a very interesting account of the part played by the brothers Warton in the Romantic Revival in English Literature.

The annual Shakespeare Lecture was made a part of the Shakespeare Tercentenary celebrations, and delivered by Mr. Mackail, one of our Fellows. It was worthy of the occasion, eminently fresh and suggestive, and not least useful in this, that it challenged some commonly received opinions.

The course of lectures on Biblical Archaeology (Schweich Foundation) was delivered by M. Edouard Naville of Geneva, the distinguished Egyptologist. It expounded with much learning an ingenious hypothesis regarding the language in which the older books
of the Old Testament had been committed to writing, and led to an interesting discussion in which eminent Semitic scholars took part.

On the Henriette Hertz foundation the lectures delivered included one by Professor Burnet of St. Andrews (now one of our Fellows) on Socrates, one by Professor Fitzmaurice Kelly on Cervantes, appropriately timed to coincide with the three hundredth anniversary of the death of that great contemporary of Shakespeare, and one to which we listened two days ago by M. Maurice Barrès on the Spirit of France as displayed in old French epic poetry and again revealed in the present war. All these lectures were in their several ways productions of the highest merit, which delighted the audiences that had gathered to hear them.

Another endowment which the Academy administers is that founded by Mrs. Rose Mary Crawshay, to provide a prize for some researches throwing light on literary problems. This prize was awarded to Mrs. Stopes for work upon Shakespeare.

A few sentences will suffice to record the progress made in certain undertakings with which the Academy is associated. One of these, the new critical edition of the Mahabarata, is unfortunately suspended during the war, as some of the learned men who are prosecuting it reside in Germany. Another, the Encyclopaedia of Islam continues to advance, and may now be said to be half completed. We receive from the India Office a subvention towards its expenses of £200 a year, and trust that this sum will continue to be paid, for as a vast Musulman population is directly or indirectly ruled by Britain, it becomes a proper object for assistance out of Indian revenues. There is also the series called Social and Economic Records (i.e. of mediaeval Britain). Of this series two volumes have already been published, and the third is now on the point of appearing. Materials have been or are being collected for two other volumes, and it is hoped that these may see the light within the next few years. You will regret, but will not be surprised, to hear that His Majesty's Treasury has felt itself obliged by the need for retrenchment in public expenditure to suspend the annual grant of £200 a year which had been made towards the cost of this series. We must hope that when the present stringency has passed the grant will be restored. The volumes published, for the supervision of which we have to thank Professor Vinogradoff, one of our most learned Fellows, have been of great interest and value, and those which we hope to publish will, I believe, be no less prized by scholars and historians.
Among the other enterprises which the Academy has been called to promote four deserve special mention. You will remember that in 1914 we were called upon, in default of any other authority that could be expected to undertake the work, to set on foot an organization for the commemoration of the Tercentenary of the death of Shakespeare. This the Academy did by summoning a gathering of many eminent persons interested in letters and learning, and of delegates from a large number of universities and literary societies. The meeting thus convened formed a Committee which thereafter took charge of the arrangements for the celebration on a great scale, and with the concurrence of representatives from other countries, of an anniversary which engaged the thoughts of all the world. The outbreak of the war destroyed the hopes of participation by two of the great countries which had been expected to join, and made it necessary to reduce the celebration to somewhat less magnificent proportions. It was, however, carried out (owing no small part of its success to the zeal and energy of our Secretary) at many gatherings all over the country, including one at Stratford-on-Avon, and led to the production of various illuminative writings and addresses, bearing on Shakespeare's life and works, as well as of some interesting dramatic representations, including one of Ben Jonson's play called *The Poetaster*, in which some of the leading dramatists of the time, Shakespeare included, are supposed to have been brought upon the stage.

At the request of some eminent members of the French Academy the Council felt itself called upon to take steps to form a Committee, to act in conjunction with a French Committee, for the purpose of aiding the University of Louvain to create a new library which shall replace that which perished in 1914 at the hands of the invaders of Belgium. This Committee is now at work, and books are being collected here as well as in France to be offered to the University when the time comes for the resumption of its beneficent activities. At a like request from our illustrious Corresponding Fellow, M. Boutroux, the Academy has, in conjunction with the Royal Society, formed a Committee to co-operate with a Committee created in France, and called the *Comité des Études franco-britanniques*, for the purpose of examining a number of questions, belonging to the spheres of learning, science, and economic progress, which have an interest both for ourselves and for those French Allies whose splendid services to our common cause we gratefully recognize.

You will be glad to learn that the School of Oriental Studies, whose foundation is largely due to the exertions of the Academy, has now
been established in London, and the Academy is represented on its Governing Body.

The subject of the transliteration into our alphabet of words, and especially of proper names, belonging to the Slavonic languages and other tongues spoken in the countries of the Near East, has acquired additional importance in recent years, and has been much discussed in the newspaper press. As it is evidently desirable that there should be some uniform usage in this matter, and as there is no other body that seems called upon to deal with it, the Council has decided to appoint a Committee to draw up a scheme for the representation by the appropriate letters of our alphabet of the sounds of words in the above-mentioned languages: and it is hoped that a workable plan likely to obtain general assent may soon be produced.

You have all taken note of the controversy which has been proceeding among us for some time past regarding the respective claims in education of physical science and of what are commonly called the 'human subjects', such as languages, history, philosophy, and economics. Although the official representatives of the sciences of Nature have not (so far as I know) made any suggestions on the subject which would not command assent from most of us, there are those, professing to speak for those sciences, who have been less wise or less guarded, and have advanced demands which would, if conceded, be pernicious to the true interests of education and indeed of all intellectual progress. You will therefore be glad to hear that the Council has been watching the matter with care, and will not, I think, refrain from taking any action which it may think called for, should the studies for the promotion of which the Academy exists seem likely to be injured by the adoption of any ill-considered changes in our system of public instruction.

The last event of the year which falls to be mentioned to you here is not unconnected with this subject. One of our most distinguished living statesmen, Lord Cromer, filled with a sense of the value of those classical studies into which he has thrown himself with youthful ardour in the more leisurely days of his later life, a life long, laborious, and now crowned with the gratitude of his fellow countrymen, has made the Academy his trustee for an endowment designed to encourage the study of Greek literature and history. Entering into his feeling, and believing with him that the poetry and the philosophy of ancient Hellas are still among the most powerful stimuli to clear thinking and wise action that can inspire us today, the Academy has accepted this trust. At its last meeting the Council sealed the deed whose terms the Founder had approved, and we hope within a few days to pro-
mulgate the regulations under which the annual prize will be awarded for a piece of literature elucidating some branch or aspect of the subject. You have just elected Lord Cromer to be one of the two first members of our class of Honorary Fellows, but you ought to know that the Council had decided to propose him to you for election before it had the least idea that he contemplated this foundation which we are hereafter to administer.

A year ago, in the annual Presidential address, I mentioned and commended to your reflection a number of phenomena which the war had displayed and which deserved to be noted by historians, because they cast light on divers features of previous wars. To-day I will refer to some other such facts; and in mentioning these, will endeavour to observe that well settled rule which in this Academy forbids references to questions of current politics. It is a wholesome rule, for one who should depart from it might easily be betrayed, under the influence of a natural passion, into words that would afterwards be regretted.

One of these phenomena is the shock given to the rules of international law. Some of the principles that had been thought best established have been virtually destroyed. To use an Aeschylean phrase, they have been pierced with as many wounds as a net. It has become clear that some Governments at least see an advantage to be gained by taking a certain course, international rules forbidding that course will not stop them. Nations, and especially the Powers that are now neutral, are now asking whether there is any use in passing such rules unless some method can be devised for enforcing them. Is it worth while, when the war has ended, to attempt a reconstruction of the fabric of international law unless it can be rebuilt upon far firmer foundations? In war time, it is only the action of neutrals that can effectively punish a belligerent transgressor. Is there any reason to look for such action? One series of breaches in that law is especially deplorable. The respect for the rights of non-combatant civilians which had been consecrated by many years of practice, and which represented the greatest mitigation of the savagery inherent in war that the progress of civilization had effected, has now disappeared. We seem to have gone back to the brutality of the earlier Middle Ages. May this be partly due to the system of what is called 'The Nation in Arms'? If all the men of a country are set to fight, do they form the habit of thinking not only of all the men but also the women and children of an enemy country as enemies to whom no mercy is to be shown? With the increase of such cruelties hatred also has grown. It is fiercer between the warring peoples than ever before. In both these respects our own soldiers have (as we believe)
been so far blameless. But one must desire that the strain should not last too long.

The power of a Government to keep its subjects in ignorance of the facts of a war, political as well as military, has never seemed so complete. This is all the more wonderful in days when the means of learning facts through the press are so much more abundant than ever before. It is a regrettable fact, because it prevents the public opinion of a people from acting as it ought upon its Government. A remarkable instance of this ignorance came lately to my knowledge. No single incident of the last two years has made so great an impression as the destruction by a torpedo of the passenger ship _Lusitania_.

Now a medal was struck in Germany and has been widely distributed there—whether or no by the German Government I have been unable to ascertain—which represents the _Lusitania_ sinking in the ocean. Her fore part is piled high with cannons and aeroplanes and other war material. Here we see a warning given to the historian who has been apt to rely upon the evidence of works of art contemporaneous with the events they depict. Suppose that five centuries hence nearly all other records relating to the events of May, 1915, shall have perished, and that this medal is then dug up from some ruin. It would be appealed to as affording the best kind of proof that the _Lusitania_ was a vessel not only laden but conspicuously overladen with munitions of war.

There has never before been a conflict in which such efforts were made by belligerents to win the favour of neutrals. Able agents have been employed and immense sums expended in attempts to form public opinion through the press. Such efforts have of course been primarily directed towards inducing neutrals to take some measure either positively friendly to the belligerent Power conducting the propaganda or to dissuade it from some measure helpful to that Power’s enemies. In this, however, there is implied a tribute to the importance of the opinion of the world at large, and a recognition of the fact that there is such a thing as a moral standard which a nation, even if it deems itself absolved by the law of necessity from obedience to such a standard, knows to constitute the basis whereon the judgement of neutrals will be founded.

The ethical problems which this war has raised are not new, but in their essence and sometimes even in their form, at least as old as the fifth century B.C., when we find the discussion of them reported by Thucydides. But they have been presented on a larger scale, and in a sharper way, than perhaps ever before, and the differences between the standard recognized as applicable to the individual and that fit to
be prescribed for the State have been worked out more thoroughly as parts of a general system of doctrine. It is now asked, Have States, in their international relations, any morality at all? or are they towards one another merely like so many wild beasts, owning no obligations of honour or good faith? Is self-preservation the highest law of a State’s being, entitling it to destroy its neighbour whenever it conceives this to be the easiest way to save itself? If the State has any conscience, any morality, what is that morality? How far does it differ from the moral principles which are either embodied in the law, or recognized by the opinion, of each community as applicable to individual citizens within a State? If State morality is lower than the morality of the individual, ought it to be raised; and if so, how can it be raised?

If there has been a retrogression, can this be connected with the substitution of the State as an impersonal entity for the monarch as a person? In the sixteenth century the monarch, if he was not personally a base creature, had a certain sense of honour, and was amenable not only to the censures of the Church but to the dictates of chivalry, which (though chivalry never was quite what romancers have painted it) had still a certain influence. When the Emperor Charles the Fifth put himself in the power of Francis the First of France, who had been his enemy (and indeed his prisoner) before, and was to be his enemy again, he reckoned, and not in vain, upon that sense of chivalry. Francis himself was not the best kind of knight, but he had been the sovereign and the friend of Bayard, the pattern of all knightly virtue. Is any trace of that spirit of chivalry left in our time? Or do those who now administer a State feel themselves to be like the soulless directors of an incorporated company as compared with the individual landlord or employer of former days, who recognized a sort of quasi-feudal responsibility for those who tilled his lands or worked at his bidding?

All these are serious questions, and serious not for States only, seeing that the individual may come to think that the morality which is good enough for the State is good enough for himself.

From noting these phenomena I pass on to a still wider question.

The awful scale of the present war, both in its local extension over the globe and in the volume of ruin and suffering which it is causing, inevitably suggests the question: Is this ‘last birth of Time’ to be taken as the last result of civilization? Must we contemplate catastrophes such as that we now see as being likely from time to time to recur? Is a future of incessant hatred between peoples, or groups of peoples, disposing them to inflict economic injury on one another in
time of peace, and breaking out from time to time in efforts to destroy one another in time of war, the future to which mankind, far more numerous than ever before, and better provided than ever before with every material comfort and luxury, must henceforth look forward?

This is a question which has been constantly present to our minds for the last two years. It includes three questions:

1. What have been the chief causes of war in the past? Are they diminishing or increasing? Will they further diminish or increase?

2. Are there any and what forces discernible that may tend to counterwork the causes which lead to war; and if so, are these forces that work for peace likely to grow?

3. Can any international machinery be contrived calculated to reduce the strength of the forces that make for war and to strengthen those that make for peace?

As you have all been reflecting on these questions, it is not likely that I shall be able to suggest any new facts or thoughts which may not have already crossed your minds. All I can do is to try to construct a sort of framework into which your ideas may be fitted, or, in other words, to bring up for consideration certain specific points, so that definite issues may stand out, and thinking be so far clarified.

In following the stream of history downwards from its dim and distant sources one is surprised to find it to be a record of practically incessant fighting. War is the rule, Peace the rare exception. Plato said that war was the natural relation between states. So it had been before him, so it has been since. Tribes fought, cities fought, despotic monarchies fought, tiny republics fought, as vast empires are fighting to-day. This was so from the very beginning of our records. The monuments of Egypt and Assyria are almost entirely devoted to war and to worship—generally to both, for the warrior king is usually represented as aided by the national gods who give him victory and receive their share of the spoils. So it was down through the ancient world and through the Middle Ages.

Intervals of peace have been longer within the last two centuries, especially in Europe; but the wars that preceded and followed such intervals have been on a more terrible scale than those of earlier times. The wars of the French Revolution and those of Napoleon covered twenty-three years, with two very short respite. Since 1852 Europe has seen eight wars; and if there be added to these other wars in Asia, Africa, and America, not to speak of civil conflicts (one of which, in the United States, lasted four years), very few years can be found in which the clash of arms was not somewhere heard. Thus there is abundant material for enumerating the causes of war.
These causes may be classed as arising either out of material interests or out of sentiment. In most cases both causes have been operative, though often in unequal measure.

The causes of the former class include:

The desire for plunder, including the capture of women.

The desire for land or new settlements, as when the Teutonic tribes entered the Roman Empire in the fifth century, and the Slavonic tribes in the sixth and seventh.

Disputed successions, in which two or more claimants to a throne have dragged their subjects or followers into the strife.

Interests in the sphere of commerce and industry, as when one State desires to debar another from the trade of a region (as Spain tried to debar the English from South America), or to reduce another State to commercial vassalage, as Austria did in the case of Serbia. By a curious irony, wars of commerce were often waged in an ignorance of economic principles which made even success worthless.

To the other class, where the motive is one of passion or sentiment, may be assigned the following causes of war:

Revenge for some injury to a people or insult to a sovereign, or perhaps only for some defeat suffered in a previous conflict.

The desire of a monarch to win glory.

Religious animosity.

National animosity, due to previous quarrels, and perhaps increased by racial dislike.

Sympathy (usually grounded on religious or racial affinities) with a section of the subjects of another State who are believed to be oppressed by it.

National pride or vanity.

Fear of an attack by another State. This includes what are called Preventive Wars, where a Power which thinks (or professes to think) itself endangered by the designs of another Power seeks to anticipate those designs by striking first.

Few wars can be referred entirely to one cause, and the presence of any one ground for collision naturally tends to intensify the influence of such other grounds as may exist.

Of these causes there is only one which has been almost eliminated. This is religious (or ecclesiastical) hatred. The desire to propagate a faith by the sword is no longer strong even in Islam, though attempts have been very recently made by the European allies of the Young Turks to utilize the preaching of a Jihad against the infidel. Among the so-called Christian States, religious antagonism survives only as a secondary source of enmity, disposing to civil strife or
international hostility communities which have been permeated by the traditions of ancient persecution. The sentiment of ecclesiastical unity has, moreover, sometimes contributed to strengthen the sense of a national unity, leading a people to believe in what it calls its mission.

The old desire for territory or booty has now passed from cattle-lifting on land and Vikingry at sea into the form of a desire for more and better colonies, and for a fuller control of the means of production and of the industrial high roads of commerce. The chieftain’s thirst for fame appears in the desire to maintain the grandeur of a dynasty. But the ancient motives,—selfishness, rapacity, and vanity—are as strong as ever. In one sense they are even more formidable, because they are often shared by the masses of a nation, and inflamed by an agency more pervasive than any that existed before the telegraph had been added to the printing press.

Is there any one of these causes the disappearance whereof can be expected?

Religious passion has cooled, and ecclesiastical antagonisms may vanish, for the hold of dogmas and church organizations on men’s minds has grown weaker. Yet the sort of fervour which expressed itself through those antagonisms, the desire in bodies of men to make other men think as they do, and so to resort to persecution if persuasion fails, may pass into new forms, and in them be again terrible. Of the other causes there is none which we have not seen active in our own time, some perhaps more active than ever before. Nearly all have, as affecting one or other of the now belligerent Powers, borne a part in bringing about the present conflict. It is the gloomiest feature in the situation that to-day the interests and passions of peoples, and not merely those of monarchs or oligarchies, are engaged, for the enmities thus created are more lasting and pernicious. In the old days when philosophers used to ridicule the whims of a king who went to war to revenge a sneer or to provide an appanage for a younger son, the king might be appeased, and the war was sometimes closed by a royal wedding, but now the bitterness which conflict engenders remains to keep jealousy and suspicion alive for many a year. As Mephistopheles says in Goethe’s Faust, ‘the little god of the world bears always the same stamp’. Other things change. Knowledge increases and wealth increases, but human nature has remained, in essentials, much what it was thirty centuries ago.

It may be argued that we must not lay too much stress on the circumstances attending the outbreak of the present war, for the position was abnormal and unprecedented, and the conduct of some at
least of the belligerents is not to be construed as indicating a bellicose spirit. This argument has force, for it is not merely the action of each nation that has to be regarded, but also the temper and motives which determined that action. But after making all allowances the conclusion must be that the forces whence conflicts spring have never shown themselves stronger than in our own time. There is no sign of a diminution either in the spirit of rapacity or in the spirit of arrogance which moves those in whose hands lie the issues of war and peace, be they sovereigns or subjects. The sentiment of nationality, which in the days of Mazzini was deemed an almost unmixed good, has shown (and notably in South-Eastern Europe) that it can be darkened by national selfishness, jealousy, and pride.

So far then this brief review of the causes of war in the past gives little ground for hope.

We may now pass to the second question. Assuming, as it must be assumed, that the causes which have induced war through the whole of history are still present and potent, can we discover any forces already counterworking them, and likely to strengthen in the future the motives that make for peace?

Four such forces have at various times inspired hope.

One is Religion. Of the three great World Religions, one, Islam, is essentially warlike, for it is the duty of every Musulman ruler to propagate the Faith by the sword. The other two are nominally pacific. Into the history of Buddhism I will not enter, except to remark that its practice has in all matters of State fallen so far short of its theory that theory has virtually counted for nothing. As to Christianity, it is enough to look back over the centuries since the Emperor Constantine. *Res ipse loquitur*. What would be the thoughts of one of the Apostles, or of a martyr saint of the second century, who revisiting this planet to-day, should be told that the gospel he preached had overspread the world and was taken as their rule of life by nearly all of the nations on whose strife he looked down?

Are Christian principles more likely to influence the conduct of nations in the future than they have influenced it in the past? That question is as dark to-day as ever it was before. The lesson of ecclesiastical even more than of secular history is that the movements of thought and emotion and the changes they undergo are altogether unpredictable. Where there is an unlimited field of possibilities there is of course room for hope. Christianity is no doubt, at least in some countries, more of an influence making for peace than it was two centuries ago.
Another such force is democratic government. We are often told that so soon as the masses of the people—that is, the numerical majority of the voters—obtain in each nation the full control of its policy towards other nations, the old dynastic traditions that have so often prompted aggression will be eliminated, and the power of the military castes be destroyed. The suggestion is plausible, for the working people have in every country more to lose by war than any other class. They are the first to suffer in loss of employment as well as by slaughter in battle. That sense of class solidarity which has gone further among the wage-earners than in any other section of a nation—even if not nearly so far as had been expected—may dispose them to refrain from indulging in permanent hatred towards another people. Against this view it is urged—apart from the difficulty which no democracy has overcome, of finding a method by which the control of foreign relations may be exercised by the masses—that the multitude is just as liable to be swept away by passion, just as liable to be puffed up by national or racial pride, just as likely to covet the land or the commerce of other nations, as is any other class in the community. These things were seen in the popular governments of antiquity, and seen also in the (far less popular) republics of mediaeval Italy. The experience of modern democracy has been too short to warrant positive conclusions. The two countries most pacific in spirit are free democratic republics, but Switzerland has geographical as well as moral or philosophical reasons for keeping out of war, and the United States have been, since 1783, engaged in three wars, none of which can be called necessary, and one of which (that with Mexico in 1845) is now admitted, by Americans themselves, to have been unjustifiable. The sources of war are to be found not in constitutional arrangements but in human nature. They are ethical, not political.

A third line of argument has been used to show that the extension of commerce, unfettered by any tariffs giving an advantage to the domestic producer, must give each country a larger interest in keeping the peace, because trade is profitable both to the seller and to the purchaser. The more trade the more profit, and therefore the stronger is the motive for continuing the exchange, and the wider are the opportunities for friendly intercourse and reciprocal knowledge.

This theory also has much to recommend it. Those who realize that they will lose by war ought to desire peace. But the doctrine which favours a free interchange of products has not in fact spread or thriven of late years. It appears to be less popular now, even in its ancient British home, than it was fifty years ago, which may indeed
be said of the theory of laissez faire generally. Most peoples, even the formerly self-helpful peoples, seem disposed to look more and more to governments to take charge of their affairs and make the prosperity of individuals.

Fourthly, those who see that in some countries the increase in the functions of government and the tendency to sacrifice the individual to the State have been accompanied by the development of a martial and aggressive spirit conceive that the two things are naturally connected. When the State labours to increase the wealth of individual producers by the imposition of tariffs, and by helping its financiers to lay their grasp upon foreign countries, it is expected to go further and acquire new territories, especially if they be rich in minerals, and to open up or even create new markets outside Europe. It is only by military strength that such plans can be carried out. Hence—so the argument runs—militarism becomes popular with the great employers of labour, perhaps even with the employees. Military glory and the prosperity of the State are identified. Great armaments are advocated for business reasons; and a people proud of its military resources is naturally tempted to use them. If, therefore, this doctrine of State omnipotence could be discredited, if the masses of a nation could be induced to revolt against the dominance of State officials and the extension of State activity, the antagonism of nations would be softened, and a fertile cause of war be reduced.

This reasoning finds some support in recent experience, but there are at present few signs of any general revolt against the doctrines which it is desired to discredit. On the contrary, the range of State action tends, in almost every country, to be increased, various classes desiring it for their own special reasons, and a well-marked current of thought running strongly in that direction. This proves little as to the ultimate gain to mankind of a tendency for the moment dominant, for history furnishes instances in which such currents, strong for a while, and sweeping everything before them, have in the long run turned out to have brought more evil than good.

Lastly, there are those who believe that we may look for the growth over the civilized world of a sentiment of friendliness and goodwill for men as men, irrespective of national distinctions, and that this sentiment will ultimately draw the peoples of the earth together and make them realize the conception of a great Commonwealth embracing all mankind, to which all will owe an allegiance higher than that which they bear to their own State and country. To create such a sentiment was of course part of the message of Christianity; and the sentiment has always found its chief support in
religious belief. But as it may exist, and has in some minds existed, apart from Christianity, it deserves to be separately mentioned. Is the sentiment likely to grow till it becomes strong enough to influence national policy? Has it in fact been growing?

To those of us who can look back for sixty years, it seems to be weaker now in most, perhaps in all, countries than it was then, as it was stronger then than it had been in the days when the horrible African Slave Trade was deemed an asset in commercial prosperity. But a lifetime is far too short a period from which to draw conclusions on such a matter. Within our own time we have seen among ourselves a great advance in the sense of responsibility of those to whom Fortune has been kind for those whom she has neglected. We see a more active sympathy and, despite class antagonisms, a stronger sense of brotherhood between the members of the same people. May not such a feeling spread into the wider field of international relations? We perceive that in the English-speaking countries, of which alone we can judge, there exists already a warmer and more general pity than was ever seen before for suffering of every kind in every country; and wherever over the world a cry is raised for help to the victims of some disaster by earthquake, flood, or storm, the response is prompt and generous. That the hatreds and horrors conspicuous to-day grieve us all the more because they seem to be a reversion to a dark and cruel past, is of itself a testimony to the progress which mankind had made, and raises in some minds the hope that what we see may be transient and the next change be for the better.

After thus enumerating these natural causes, if one may so call them, which have made or are making for war or for peace, it remains only to ask what prospect there is that the nations may by a conscious and united effort succeed in establishing some machinery whereby the likelihood of future wars may be at least diminished. No one can examine the wars that have sprung from the causes I have enumerated without perceiving that in the great majority of instances peace might have been kept, without dishonour to either party, and with material advantage to both, had there been more foresight of the consequences of war, and a real desire to avoid it. Many wars have been unjust, most have been unnecessary. Can any means be devised whereby the action of nations other than those two (or more) between whom the quarrel arises can be invoked to prevent the disputants from settling it by arms?

This is a very old problem. It was debated in the fourteenth century, when two great Italians, Dante Alighieri and his younger contemporary Marsilius of Padua, both saw in the authority of the
Roman Emperor the guarantee and indeed the only guarantee for the peace of a distracted world, as others had before their time found it in the spiritual jurisdiction of the Roman Bishop. Five centuries later the problem was again discussed by Immanuel Kant, and, a generation later, a feeble attempt at its solution made by the Holy Alliance, on principles which foredoomed it to failure.

Both here and in the United States sanguine minds are now busy with plans which propose some kind of federation or league or alliance of nations charged with the duty of compelling disputant Powers to refer their disputes to arbitration or conciliation, and to abstain from violent measures, at least until these peaceful methods have had their chance. These ideas can hardly be dismissed as visionary, since they have been blessed both in this country and in the United States by the highest authorities in public life. I do not propose here to discuss them, but may properly supplement what has been said regarding the causes of war by indicating what are the difficulties which all such schemes for the prevention of war have to surmount.

I will mention a few of these.

That statesmen of the old school will dislike new methods which may withdraw from them some of the control they have hitherto enjoyed must be expected. But far more serious is the deep-rooted unwillingness of every nation, and especially of a strong and proud nation, to submit any part of what it calls its rights to the decision of an external tribunal. This has been happily overcome in some recent instances, but in none of those instances were the interests involved of great moment: and even in the countries where arbitration has won most favour there is a feeling, hard to overcome, that the cession of territory is a question on which the country itself must always have the last word. In every nation the fact that statesmen and journalists seek to please their public by constantly asserting the righteousness of its own cause makes it hard to arrange reasonable compromises. An American statesman, than whom there is none wiser anywhere, recently observed that one of the greatest difficulties the negotiator of a treaty has to encounter is the displeasure of his fellow countrymen at any concession, even when he feels his own cause to be none too strong, and believes his country would gain by the removal of friction. Nations seem to be as sensitive on what is called the ‘point of honour’ as were members of the noblesse in France and England three centuries ago. They hold out against arrangements which individual men would accept. He who suggests the dropping of a doubtful claim is accused of timidity or want of patriotism.
When a nation is invited to reduce its defensive armaments in the faith that the other States which are uniting themselves in a Peace League will join their forces with its own to repel any aggression, doubts will arise whether the parties to any alliance for the preservation of peace can be trusted to fulfil their respective obligations except when it is their obvious interest to do so. Where several allied States are alike threatened by a powerful enemy, a regard for their safety will doubtless require them to hold together. But cases may easily be imagined in which some members of the League, having at a given moment nothing direct to gain by supporting a threatened ally, may, either through unwillingness to fight or through the offer of some advantage for themselves, be induced to find a pretext for standing aside. As soon as one member thus falters, some other member is likely to follow the example, alleging that if one or more fail to stand by the obligation, the rest cannot be expected to fulfil it. The ultimate benefit to all of mutual protection, and of the repression of any disturbance of the general peace, may be admitted. But in politics the avoidance of a near evil is usually preferred to the attainment of a more remote good, for all can recognize the former, and only those of large minds and long views can appreciate the latter.

Another difficulty has received little notice, because those who start these schemes, rejoicing in the excellence of their aim, may forget to examine the means. This difficulty is that of securing persons competent to discharge the functions of Arbitration and Conciliation. Jurists versed in international law can be found fit to determine questions of a purely legal nature, such, for instance, as the interpretation of a treaty. Though there are not many such men in Europe, there may be enough for present needs. But the causes which most frequently lead to hostilities are not of a legal character. In extremely few cases out of all those in which disputes have led to war in Europe since 1815 could the judicial methods of an arbitral court have been profitably used. War usually springs from questions of wider range, questions to which no precedents are precisely applicable, questions which involve the passions of rulers or of peoples. To these questions it is Conciliation, not Arbitration, that must be applied; and the conciliators who are to deal with them must be men possessing an intimate knowledge of European politics and a long experience in international statesmanship. They must enjoy a reputation extending beyond their own country, and such as will add

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1 The controversy as to the succession to the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein which arose on the death of Frederic VII of Denmark is such an instance. In that case the parties did not wish to arbitrate.
weight to their opinions. They must moreover possess sufficient independence and courage to follow their own views of what is right and wise at the risk of displeasing their countrymen. Few are the persons in whom these qualifications will be likely to meet.

It is better to state and face these obstacles than to ignore them with the complacent optimism which mistakes its own wishes for facts, or assumes that ethical precepts will prevail against the bad habits of many generations. But the obstacles are not insuperable. If the free peoples in the world really desired permanent peace, desired it earnestly enough to make it a primary object and to forego some of their own independence of action to attain it, the thing might be tried with a fair prospect of success. What is needed is the creation, not only of a feeling of allegiance to humanity and of an interest in the welfare of other nations as well as one’s own—what in fact may be called an International Mind,—but also of an International Public Opinion, a common opinion of many peoples which shall apply moral standards to the conduct of other nations with a judgement biassed less than now by the consideration of the particular national interests which each nation conceives itself to have.

Could such a moral judicium orbis terrarum be established, it might do more than any arbitral tribunal, or Council of Conciliation, or combination of Powers, to raise the level of conduct in international relations, and restrain the selfish passions even of monarchs or demagogues. Though the nations are still some considerable way from the general diffusion of such a feeling and opinion, we need not assume that the waves of passion will continue to run so high as they do now, and we may even venture to hope that the sentiment of a common devotion to the common welfare of all mankind will, within the next few generations, gradually assert its strength.

This leads me to one more topic proper to be here referred to.

In comparison with all the other sadnesses of this time, with the sorrow and mourning that have entered every home, with the loss of those bright young spirits who would have been the leaders of the next generation, some among them minds that would have rendered incomparable services to learning and science and art—in comparison with these things the evil I am about to mention may seem small. Yet it is one that must be mentioned, for it directly affects the objects for which this Academy exists, and we, together with our friends and colleagues of the Royal Society, are those who best know how grave it is. I speak of the severance of friendly relations between the great peoples of Europe, the interruption of all personal
intercourse and of that co-operation in the extension of knowledge and the discovery of new truth from which every people has gained so much. The study of philosophy and history has done little for those of us who pursue it if it has not extended their vision beyond their own country and their own time, reminding them that human progress has been achieved by the united efforts of many races and many types of intellect and character, each profiting by the efforts of the others, and teaching them that for further advance this co-operation is essential. To restore it is at this moment impossible. But let us at least do nothing to retard its return in happier days. Those days some of us cannot hope ever to see. For the elder men among us there has come a perpetual end of that delightful and mutually helpful companionship which united us with the learned men of two other great nations, a sense of partnership between those who pursued truth which overrode all national jealousies, and was fruitful for the progress of letters and science. This partnership is gone; and the world will for years to come suffer from its departure. Yet the severance cannot last for ever. When a storm has levelled the forest or a waterspout has scarred the slopes of a valley, the eternal forces of Nature, slow and often imperceptible in their working, but restlessly active, begin to repair the ruin the storm has wrought. Young trees spring up to renew the forest, and verdure clothes once more the devastated hillsides.

Two years ago the Spirit of Sin and Strife was let loose upon the earth like a destroying whirlwind. That spirit is personified in the Iliad as Até, the Spirit of Evil that takes possession of the soul. She is the power that strides swiftly over the earth, kindling hatred and prompting men to wrong. But the poet tells us that after Até come the Litae, gentle daughters of the Almighty, who, by their entreaties, soften men’s hearts to pity. Halting are their steps and their visage withered and wrinkled, but they bring repentance and they assuage the passions which the Spirit of Wrong has kindled. Até has been afoot in the world; and we see everywhere her deathful work. But after a time the Litae, following slowly in her track, will begin to heal the wounds she has cut deep into men’s souls. Nations cannot be enemies for ever. The time must come when a knowledge of the true sources of these calamities will, even there where hatred is now strongest, enlighten men’s minds and touch their hearts. May that time come soon!

Ἀλλινοὺς ἀλλινὸν ἐλπέ, τὸ δ’ εὖ νικάτω.