

HAROLD TEMPERLEY

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1879–1939

HAROLD WILLIAM VAZEILLE TEMPERLEY was born at Cambridge on 20 April 1879. His father, a Fellow and Tutor of Queens', belonged to a north country family, and counted among his ancestors the Mrs. Vazeille who married John Wesley. He was a gifted mathematician of whom his contemporaries expected great things, but he died young. His wife was the daughter of Thomas Wildman, D.D., Episcopal Chaplain at Callander. There were four children, one of whom became Major-General Temperley.

After his school years at Sherborne, Harold Temperley entered King's College, Cambridge, in 1898. He was secretary of the Political Society founded by Oscar Browning, and a vigorous forward in the Rugby team. As an undergraduate, testifies one of his teachers, he had a good deal of cloudiness and pomposity in expression to struggle through, but he was immensely creative. He was awarded the Gladstone Memorial Prize for his work in Part II of the Historical Tripos, and the Prince Consort Prize for a dissertation on the growth of the office of Prime Minister. He tried for a Fellowship at King's. Without waiting to try again he accepted an offer from Peterhouse in 1905, and began a fruitful association which lasted till the end.

His first post was at the University of Leeds.

He was an excellent colleague [writes Professor A. J. Grant, the head of the department of history], good-tempered, cheerful, finding great interest and amusement in his work. He sought out and made friends with the less prominent among the staff and students, foreigners of all kinds, whether they were in his department or not, eccentrics, men with curious views and habits. He was especially friendly with a Czecho-Slovak. He paid special attention to the weakest of the students. Speaking exhausted him curiously. He was very strong, but when he came into my room after having

lectured for an hour he would throw himself down as though it had been a Herculean task. He took advice and was told that he produced his voice wrongly.

His first book, the *Life of Canning*, published in 1905, was a spirited performance. Our greatest Foreign Minister, as Acton described him, became and remained his hero. Important problems of policy and character required further investigation, among them the continuity of his thought and his relations with Castlereagh. The book made his name, but there was not very much research in it and there is a touch of youthful exuberance in these glowing pages. Canning, we are told, like Bentham and Adam Smith, was too completely successful in the sense that his ideas have come to be taken as a matter of course. His gospel that every nation had a right to manage its own internal affairs was so fully accepted in the century of nationalism that no one asked by whom it was framed. That some of his principles have become platitudes is no reason why honour should not be paid to the man who foresaw and promoted the growth of national liberty on the Continent.

> For Canning alone among English statesmen can we make the double claim that his own work has been permanent and indestructible, whilst his visions of the future have in some measure approached to reality. . . . The principles which he laid down, though their application may now be different, should still be the guide and polar star of our course.

The verdict on his private character is equally favourable. The whole volume is a tribute to a creative statesman, a dazzling orator, a great gentleman.

Returning to Cambridge as Lecturer and Assistant Tutor at Peterhouse after his brief sojourn at Leeds, Temperley was claimed by the *Cambridge Modern History*. The senior editor, Sir Adolphus Ward, who was also Master of the college, recognized his ability and yoked him to the team. Between 1907 and 1909 five chapters from his pen appeared in volumes v, vi, x, xi. That on 'The Revolution Settlement, 1687–1702' describes the follies of James II, the Trimmer's

triumph in 1688, and the solid achievements of William III. 'Party Government under Queen Anne' continues the story, and depicts Marlborough without adulation or invective. 'The Age of Walpole and the Pelhams', which carries us to the glories of Chatham, is the longest of his contributions. 'The safe mediocrity of the first two Georges was their salvation.' In 'Great Britain in 1815–1832' he was on familiar ground, and his enthusiasm for Canning lights up the narrative. So strongly, however, is he on the side of Parliamentary Reform that he pronounces the Prime Minister's death not inopportune either for his country or his fame. The short chapter entitled 'The New Colonial Policy 1840–1870' is a paean to the Durham Report, the inspiration of which is traced back to Bentham and Fox. Volume xi, in which it appeared, owed more to Temperley than this brief section. Owing to the illness of one of the editors he was invited to help with its production, and the Preface pays tribute to his work. 'He has discharged the task which devolved upon him with conspicuous ability and devotion, and we desire to assure him of our cordial gratitude.'

Though none of his contributions to the *Cambridge Modern History* were directly concerned with international relations, Temperley's interests extended far beyond the bounds of the British Empire. Travel was a life-long passion, and in 1905 he paid the first of seventeen visits to Serbia. In 1907 he visited Slovakia, at that time a backward and discontented province of Hungary.

> Everywhere he went [writes Professor Seton-Watson, who had just returned from his first visit to the same country] he told me he found surprise among the small group of nationally-minded Slovaks. After thirty years, without anyone from our country taking note of their existence, they suddenly received two visitors within a few weeks of each other, and began to draw the utterly false conclusion that they had been 'discovered by England' and that these were Government emissaries. In Budapest fantastically comic tales were evolved to prove 'Panslav designs' behind this imaginary interest on the part of London official circles. It was I who by a pure accident had just managed to forestall Temperley,

but we soon found ourselves in almost complete agreement. The sole difference was that I rushed into print about 'Slovak wrongs', whereas he remained silent until he had paid further visits to Hungary.

An article on 'Racial Strife in Hungary', published in the *Westminster Review*, January 1908, recorded some impressions of his visit.

A spirited article inspired by the death of Maurus Jokai, the Hungarian Scott, in 1904, published in the *Contemporary Review* (republished in the *Hungarian Quarterly*, 1939), shows how early his interest in Hungary had begun. The novelist is hailed as the greatest romanticist of his time, too little known in England, and is placed above Sienkiewicz. The article is a tribute not only to the writer but to the man, the scholar, and the patriot. In a brief memorial notice Dr. Joseph Balogh, editor of the *Hungarian Quarterly*, declares that in the years immediately preceding the World War Hungarians had great hopes of Temperley. He adds regretfully that he later transferred his affection to the Little Entente, above all Jugoslavia, though shortly before his death he turned towards Hungary again.

His greatest service to Hungary was the massive Introductory Essay of fifty pages prefixed to a translation of his friend Marczali's classical work on Hungary in the eighteenth century. He persuaded the Cambridge University Press in 1910 to undertake the burden on the double ground that the book was of first-class quality and that Hungarian history had been strangely neglected. The distinguished Professor at the University of Budapest had been invited by the Hungarian Academy of Science to write a history of his country in the time of Joseph II and Leopold II. He began by a sociological study of the problems with which they had to deal as searching as that of Tocqueville in regard to the Ancien Régime. While other writers had contented themselves with war, diplomacy, and the strife of parties, Marczali investigated the economic conditions, the stratification of society, the conception of nationality,

the status of the Church, the machinery of administration.

It was a happy inspiration to supply the background of this elaborate picture of Hungary in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and Temperley's Introduction is worthy of the work. His impressions of travel help us to visualize the life of a community differing widely from any other people in Europe.

> Even today in Hungary there are still many relics of an immemorial past. Traces of the most primitive savagery still abound in the folk-lore, the songs and the customs of the peasants. In the Eastern Carpathians bears, lynxes and wolves are still to be found, buffaloes are still to be found in the marshes of Hungary, and in Transylvania men are still living who have seen horses tread out the corn in true Biblical style. Even today a hussar stands with drawn sword before the County Assembly hall, ready if necessary to resist the King and his soldiers in the true spirit of medieval autonomy.

He goes on to describe the physical features of the country.

> The eye beholds an endless flat, now covered by reeds and marshes, at times completely inundated with water or now stretching away bare and sandy to a seemingly infinite distance. Nothing more monotonous or dismal can be conceived, though, as in the fens of England, there is a certain grandeur in its melancholy and a certain majesty in the endless sweep of its horizon. . . . Like Sparta such a land has no walls, and its strength could only lie in stout hearts and strong hands.

The aim of the Introductory Essay is to give a broad survey of the more striking facts in Hungarian history. Beginning with the arrival of the Magyars under Arpad, he passes to St. Stephen, Louis the Great, and Matthias Corvinus, 'one of those rulers of whom legend is never weary, and of whom a thousand traits are preserved in ballad and anecdote'. The Turkish victory at Mohacz brought part of the country under Hapsburg rule, and inaugurated a period of friction lasting till 1918. The Magyar loved the bigoted Hapsburgs of the seventeenth century no more than the Turks. For a brief moment the

misfortunes of Maria Theresa evoked a passionate loyalty such as no Hapsburg ruler, before or since, ever enjoyed. With the accession of Joseph II, 'that gifted and hapless ruler whose wonderful energy and enthusiasm could not save him from becoming one of the most tragic failures of history', the two countries drifted apart again.

In the same year Temperley took part for the first and last time in a domestic political controversy. The conflict over the Budget of 1909 raised the old question of the composition and powers of the House of Lords in an acute form. *Senates and Upper Chambers*, published in the autumn of 1910, was based on lectures delivered at Cambridge and elsewhere. The list of acknowledgements, which included Prime Ministers, Ambassadors, and foreign Professors, indicates how widely he cast his net. In approaching 'this vast and complex subject' his object was to attempt a general survey of the Upper Chambers of the English-speaking world and the continental states, to compare them with our own, and to discover their lessons. His sentiments, he explains, inclined to Liberalism, though he could not approve of the resolutions of the Liberal Government. Enriched by copious appendixes and a detailed bibliography, the book is still useful as a mine of information.

Looking back after thirty years the reader may feel that the gravity of the crisis is exaggerated. England, he wrote, was ringing with the cry 'the Constitution in danger', yet Englishmen remained strangely calm. 'Were it the calm of strength it would be well, but it is the calm of indolence, impassivity, worst of all of ignorance. . . . As our political system declines in credit, the popular lethargy seems to increase.' In the time of Canning, and two generations following the Reform Bill, our institutions were a byword for stability and strength. In those days other countries had turned to us for guidance: now, 'in the present abasement of our institutions', we must turn to them. 'Heavy indeed is the responsibility of those who have turned English statesmen from teachers into pupils, and have cast shame

on the Mother of Parliaments.' The note is rather shrill, and the reader is in doubt whether the lash is intended to fall on Liberals for forcing the pace or on Conservatives for blocking the way. Fortunately the position was not utterly desperate. 'Our political eminence may not, indeed, be wholly or permanently lost, so long as we reform ourselves aright and draw profit from the lessons of other countries.' In this matter we had confessedly failed, and certain other nations had admittedly succeeded. Reform was confessed by all to be a necessity, but to be permanent and final it must be based on agreement. Without such agreement we should be driven to Single Chamber Government, which is emphatically rejected on the ground that it endangers the rights of minorities. The survey of constitutions, which fills the larger part of the book, explains in each case the composition and powers of the Upper Chamber, and the methods of adjusting disputes with the Lower House. The author's ideal is a Senate with suspensory power sufficient to defend minorities without enabling them to impose their will.

It was a mark of Temperley's growing reputation that he received an invitation to lecture at Harvard during the first half of the academic year 1911–12.

> He gave a half course for graduates and undergraduates from 1688 to 1832 [writes Professor Merriman], and a seminar on topics in recent English history. He lived at the Colonial Club and entered enthusiastically into all phases of academic life. At that stage of his development his interests were mainly in the eighteenth century, and especially in the War of Jenkins' Ear. There were quite a number of undergraduate jokes and cartoons about this. I have often wished that it had been possible for him to stay a full year. He was just beginning to make his mark on the place when he was called back to England. Everybody was very fond of him, and some of his more advanced students were given a start by him on their profession for which they will never cease to be grateful.

The War of Jenkins' Ear was the subject of an elaborate address to the Royal Historical Society, published in their transactions for 1909. After exploring the dispatches from

Spain in the Record Office he pronounces that the decision for war was intelligible but not inevitable. His interest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was further illustrated between 1912 and 1914 in contributions to the *English Historical Review* on the Cabinet and Privy Council, to the *American Historical Review* on the repeal of the Stamp Act, to the *Quarterly Review* on Chatham, North, and America, with unpublished letters of Chatham, and in an address to the American Historical Association on the relations of England with Spanish America, 1720–44. Many years later he wrote a chapter on the Peace of Paris (1763) for the first volume of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, in which he said all that can be said for Bute.

Though it was not published till 1914 *Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph* was mainly written in 1911. He owed his first interest in the Prussian King to the best of his English biographers, Mr. Reddaway, with whom he tramped the Silesian battle-fields; but the occasion of the book was the discovery that unpublished dispatches from British diplomatists of the years 1776–9 were of interest and importance. There is inevitably some wearisome detail in the story of the attempt of the Emperor to seize Bavaria on the death of the childless Elector Max Joseph at the end of 1777; but the portraits of the protagonists and the picture of the sleepy old Electorate are so vivid that our interest is held to the end. 'Among the long gallery of faces, cynical or coarse, voluptuous or depraved, that confront us in the mid-eighteenth century, the womanly face of Maria Theresa exercises an indescribable fascination. The brow is broad and noble, the mouth firm yet sensitive and kind, the eyes direct, clear and true, the whole expression one of innocence, sincerity and strength.' Her son, Joseph II, with 'as warm a zeal for his people, as genuine a care of the poor and degraded and weak, and a heart as tender as ever beat in the breast of a sovereign,' always fascinated Temperley. 'The history of his devoted efforts, of his pitiful failures, are written in those passionate eyes and upon those tremulous

lips.' Frederick is much less sympathetically portrayed, and the campaign showed that as a soldier he was past his prime. The appendixes contain extracts from dispatches, with an analysis of the temperaments and sources of their writers. The book was the more welcome since Carlyle had tired of his task, and to some extent of his hero, before reaching the war in which no battles were fought.

Temperley's first visit to Serbia in 1905 was followed almost every year by a tour in the Near East. In 1908 he witnessed the Young Turk revolution. In 1909 he was present at Abdul Hamid's last public appearance at the Selamlik after the failure of the counter-revolution. In 1910 he was in Albania during the revolt against Turkey, and was shot at by Albanian Comitajis. In 1911 he sampled Macedonia at the height of the troubles and was pursued by a Greek band. In 1912 he visited Dalmatia and Bosnia. In 1913 he paid his first visit to Montenegro. Of all the countries of south-eastern Europe Serbia attracted him most. He learned the language and wrote a history of the country which was nearly finished when war began in 1914. Completed during a period of convalescence it was published in 1917. It is noticed here since it belongs in the main to the pre-War years.

The *History of Serbia*, described as the fruit of some years of travel and study in the Near East, breathes a warm admiration for the Serbian race. Serbian history, he declares, is unintelligible without reference to the splendid and tragic past, since the battle of Kossovo and the reign of Stephen Dushan awaken far more living sentiments than Waterloo for ourselves. At the moment of publication the country was in foreign occupation, but the author was confident that the storm would pass, for the soul of the people was unconquerable. 'So long as the songs of Kossovo are sung and a Serbian exists in any land to sing them, so long will there always be a Serbia.' The conflict of Serbians with other Slav races was scarcely fiercer than that between the rival dynasties at Belgrade in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries. Yet Temperley never allowed the strife and horrors of the past to weaken his conviction that 'the rugged stock' of Serbia was both destined and worthy to play the part of Piedmont in the *Risorgimento* and to become the core of a Jugoslav federation. The ink on his manuscript was scarcely dry when the dream was fulfilled.

The sketch of Serbian history is enlivened by the author's intimate knowledge of the Balkan peninsula. There are interesting chapters on the short-lived Empire of Dushan, on Serbian medieval society, and on the catastrophe of Kossovo, celebrated in the cycle of heroic lays which Goethe compared to Homer. Despite his ardent sympathy for Serbian nationalism, he is fair to the Turks who held the country for centuries in their grip. On the whole, we are told, Turkish rule was not so oppressive as a Latin conqueror might have been. The Serbians were not forced to forsake their religion, and their local government was left almost intact. The worst grievance was the tribute of Christian children for the corps of Janissaries. 'The Turk persecutes Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks or Armenians only when he believes that their religious beliefs lead them to political conspiracy against the Ottoman rule.' The story of Serbian liberation, which begins with the rugged figure of Kara George, is brought down to the eve of the Balkan war of 1912. Montenegro's part in the long struggle against the Turk is fully recognized, but arouses less admiration. 'Freedom Montenegro has, but it is primitive, savage, uncontrolled, and the stern spirit of many of her sons accords ill with modern ideas. Her task in history is really over, for she has achieved that for which she struggled, and has enabled the Serb race to be united.' Temperley's interest in Jugoslavia never failed. Professor Seton-Watson records that there were times when he spoke of a preference for being buried in Jugoslav soil. He counted King Alexander and Mestrovich among his friends.

On the outbreak of war Temperley became First Lieutenant and later Captain in the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.

He went out to the Dardanelles, but was soon compelled by illness to return. He was appointed head of the Political Sub-Section of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff, where he helped to produce a number of memoranda subsequently issued as *General Staff Papers* for the Peace Conference. In 1918 he returned to active service as Assistant and Acting Military Attaché to the Serbian army at Salonica with the rank of Major. He was on the staff during the Salonica offensive, and slept in fifty-nine different beds within seventy-six days. After the armistice he travelled through Jugoslavia and Hungary in order to stop the fighting, and was under fire on several occasions. The attempt to mediate between the rebels and the Government in Montenegro brought new perils, and one night in Old Serbia he was attacked in a block-house and had to defend himself with an axe. His official reports, testifies Professor Seton-Watson, were of very real value to the British Delegation, and his unique knowledge of actual conditions was utilized in the fixing of the new frontiers. During the Peace Conference he was a member of the Military Section of the British Delegation from April to July, and he took part in drawing the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. Both the Military Staff and the Foreign Office, testifies Professor Webster, were eminently pleased with his work. That he was present at the final scene in the Galerie des Glaces on 28 June 1919, he always reckoned as one of the memorable experiences of his life.

When the treaty was signed Temperley returned to the East as Acting Military Attaché to the Serbian army at Belgrade from July to October 1919, and again from August to December 1920. In September he went to Montenegro to rescue Mr. Baerlein, a British subject imprisoned at Scutari. He was the first Allied officer to see the new Government of Albania, and he met Zog, the future King. His report on Montenegro was printed as a Parliamentary Paper. He was twice mentioned in dispatches 'for valuable services rendered in connection with the war'. His Decorations,

apart from the 1914–15 star, the Allied and Victory Medals, were the Order of the British Empire, the Order of the Rumanian Crown, the Order of the Serbian White Eagle, the Order of Karageorge, and the Order of Polonia Restituta. Unfortunately the war years left him not only a wealth of exciting memories but also a legacy of impaired health.

One of the happy results of the Peace Conference was the foundation of the Institute of International Affairs. The British and American experts summoned to Paris formed the nucleus of a permanent organization whose first task was the compilation of an authoritative account of the Conference. A scheme was drawn up by George Louis Beer, the historian of the American Revolution, and Lord Eustace Percy. Temperley was appointed editor, and carried through the formidable enterprise with unflagging energy. That the work was planned on comprehensive lines and published in six sumptuous volumes was due to generous gifts by Mr. Thomas Lamont, the American financier, and Sir John Power. The Editor's Foreword to the first volume, dated June 1920, explained the nature of the enterprise.

> The object of this history is neither to criticise nor to defend the German or any other treaty, still less to defend or to criticise the policy of any government or nation taking part in the Conference. The aim is to produce a history at once independent and objective, to detail the facts and to sketch the opinions that prevailed at the Conference.

Against the lack of perspective must be set the advantage that the work was compiled by men with an intimate knowledge of the events they described.

The Introduction traces the origins of the struggle back to the end of the seventeenth century.

> The war was a conflict between the principles of freedom and of autocracy, between the principles of moral influence and of material force, of government by consent and government by compulsion. In one form or another the conflict is as old as

mankind, but for our purpose it began in 1688. For it was then that the British system of self-government or constitutionalism was established, and it was about that time that a new and formidable type of government arose, which was eventually to threaten not only Anglo-Saxondom but democracy itself.

After many vicissitudes, constitutionalism advanced rapidly during the nineteenth century till Bismarck 'set the pride and strength of a great nation against the rights, interest or existence of small ones. . . . To these doctrines there could ultimately be but one answer and one end.' Constitutionalism endured the strain of the war, and all parties to the Armistice agreed to substitute a League of Nations and a covenanted peace for the old unstable and perilous Balance of Power. The general principle or guiding thread in the volumes was the attempt to exhibit the Peace as a great constructive experiment.

Guilty nations have been punished, and war, which was previously regarded as justifiable, is henceforward looked on as a crime. Disarmament has begun. A League has been created to enforce peace and to repair wrong or injustice, if necessary to rewrite such parts of the treaty as seem inconsistent with justice or expediency.

Such were the ideals and illusions of 1920.

To the first volume, which describes the preliminaries of peace, the editor contributed a chapter on war aims, drawing a vital distinction between the declarations of the two sides. Secret agreements, it is true, hampered those of the Entente, but German statesmen made speeches entirely at variance with their real objects. The survey ends with a glowing tribute to Wilson. The thesis that it was on the whole a Wilson peace is developed in the Editor's Introduction to the second volume, whose theme is the settlement with Germany. Only one territorial decision, in the writer's opinion, was open to criticism, namely the refusal to permit Austria to join Germany.

The third volume contains documents and an elaborate chronological table dealing not only with events but with the opinions of the Press. The fourth, which describes the

new or enlarged States erected on the ruins of the Hapsburg Empire, is in a special sense the editor's own. A massive chapter of seventy pages, entitled 'The Treaty of London', summarizes the discussions which led to the delimitation of Italy's new frontiers. In the hot dispute between Italy and Jugoslavia his sympathies are with the latter. 'For Jugoslavia Fiume was and is vital.' He was thoroughly dissatisfied with the post-War arrangement which gave the city to Italy and Susak, its suburb, to Jugoslavia. The closing pages trace the history of Albania from its emergence as a State in 1913 to its admission to the League in 1920. 'This decision not only gives great moral support to Albania, but in case of future attack by any Power it gives her the right to appeal to the League and such protection as is afforded by Article 10 of the Covenant.'

His second contribution is entitled 'The Making of the Treaties with Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, and the Principles underlying them'. In one respect it was easier to deal with these problems on their merits than in the case of Germany, for there was less popular prejudice. On the other hand obligations to Italy had been incurred under the Treaty of London which hampered the Supreme Council. South Tyrol, for instance, despite its solidly Teutonic population was allotted to Italy. The veto on the union of Austria with Germany, except with the consent of the Council of the League, is attributed to the desire to safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia in her early days, and to the belief that a plebiscite would have been influenced by desire for food and other temporary considerations. The Bulgarian treaty was no less severe, and the Bulgarian Delegation seemed surprised that no one offered to shake hands with them when they arrived in Paris; but Temperley was never particularly interested in Bulgaria and he shed no tears over her fate. The discussions leading to the Treaty of Trianon, including the historic speech of Count Apponyi, are described with equally little sympathy. The plight of Austria, on the other hand,

arouses genuine sympathy. 'When all is said, an appalling tragedy remains—the spectacle of a land bankrupt and starving, enduring more suffering today even than the devastated areas in war-time.'

The third and last contribution to the fourth volume concerns 'The New Hungary'. Of all the enemy states she had been the loudest in her outcries. Her attitude was the result of her long history of domination and of the recent deterioration of her statesmanship. 'The Magyar policy has always been the same since 1867. An able, small and fanatically Magyar oligarchy has dominated the Parliament, the administration and the state by sheer force of character and achievement. Even before the war the burden of the subject races was becoming intolerable.' He is not greatly impressed by Hungary's territorial or other grievances. The arable land left to her was very rich and her agricultural wealth was largely indestructible. The old conservative régime was shattered in the war, and nationality problems no longer existed in any serious form. 'Hungary is today and for the first time really the Land of the Magyars, but it is, or at least it should be, the land of all the Magyars and not of the privileged few.'

The fifth volume, dealing with economics and the protection of minorities, contains a brief summary by the editor of the stages by which the new States came to be recognized by the Allies. The sixth, published in 1924, concerns the Turks and Arabs, Egypt and Persia, Poland and Russia, the British Dominions, the attitude of the American Senate to the Treaty of Versailles, the making of the Covenant with its subsidiary bodies, the International Labour Office and the Permanent Court of International Justice. It opens with a chapter by the editor on the four secret agreements concerning the Near and Middle East reached between 1915 and 1917, and revealed when the Bolshevists came into power—the Constantinople arrangement of March 1915, the Treaty of London of April 1915, the Sykes-Picot deal of May 1916, and the pact of St. Jean de Maurienne

in April 1917, by which Italy was to obtain a slice of Asia Minor. Though well aware of the sharp criticism they evoked, the writer argues that these commitments must be seen in their proper setting—the gigantic struggle for national survival which required the use of every expedient permissible in diplomacy and war. A shorter chapter on the Independence of Egypt comments on her status before the war, her transformation into a British Protectorate, the rise of Zaghlul, the Treaty of Sèvres, the Milner Mission of 1920, and the abolition of the Protectorate in 1922, combined with the announcement of a virtual Monroe Doctrine over Egypt. A thoughtful Epilogue admits certain mistakes of method and policy. The refusal of oral discussion with the Germans was unwise; the passionate eagerness to secure a general settlement at the earliest date led to hurried decisions; the conflict between Wilsonian doctrines and the secret treaties generated untenable compromises. That many high hopes were disappointed was not wholly the fault of the statesmen, for they were the spokesmen of their respective peoples. In 1926 Temperley contributed the article on the Peace Treaties to the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and he occasionally intervened in discussions of war-guilt as defined in the Treaty of Versailles. Contrary to the usual interpretation of Article 231 he denied that it contained that accusation, adding however that the charge was plainly stated elsewhere. An article in the *National Review*, December 1927, entitled 'Mr. Lloyd George as Historian of the Peace Treaties', contained a slashing attack on his inaccuracies.

The Second Year of the League, a study of the second Assembly of the League of Nations, published early in 1922, may be regarded as a postscript to the *History of the Peace Conference*. The story opens with snapshots of the principal delegates, among whom Lord Balfour receives the highest marks. The two principal themes are the Upper Silesian Award and the settlement of the Albanian question. The disagreement between England and France in regard to the

former threatened the alliance, and the writer applauds the efforts of the peace-makers. 'The Supreme Council (Temperley was present at the last meeting, when Mr. Lloyd George referred the question to the League) had failed, and had failed lamentably. Yet where it failed, the League Council succeeded.' In regard to the second he speaks with special authority, for he had been on the Albanian Boundary Commission at Paris in the previous month, and he was an official adviser to the chief of the British Delegation. Here again it was a triumph of constructive work. 'At every stage of her origin and development since the war the League has been the friend and champion of Albania, and this work has been accomplished by purely moral force.'

After the manifold distractions of the War Temperley resumed his duties at Peterhouse, which he and Sir Adolphus Ward had helped to make a busy hive of historical studies. He was particularly successful in getting the best out of advanced students, whom he always encouraged to undertake research. Among his pupils were Lord Allen of Hurtwood, Professor Adair of McGill University, Mr. Loveday, Director of the Financial Section of the League of Nations, and Mr. Butterfield, the author of the obituary in *The Times*. His first wife, Gladys Bradford, whom he married in 1913 and lost in 1923, was herself a teacher of history and author of a scholarly work on Henry VII.

In his early days at Peterhouse [writes Professor Adair] Temperley achieved his success as a tutor rather than as a lecturer. As a lecturer he often found it difficult to cultivate a fluency in wedding words to thought, but this very hesitation was all in his favour as a tutor. It inspired a feeling of friendliness; his students felt that he was weighing their views carefully, striving to understand their difficulties. And this was no mere accidental trick of the voice, for it almost unconsciously was expressing the real Temperley. No student ever came to him in vain, no trouble was too great for him to take in helping to solve a student's intellectual problems; yet it was all done with a kindliness and

a diffidence that gave the student who really had something to say every encouragement and opportunity to say it. Being a tutor was to Temperley a real labour of love, and that was no inconsiderable reason for his astonishing success.

In 1919 he was appointed University Reader in Modern History, a post which he occupied till he was chosen for the Chair of Modern History, created in 1931. In 1923 he founded the *Cambridge Historical Journal*, of which he was editor till ill-health compelled him in the year before his death to transfer the reins to younger hands. It grew out of the Cambridge Historical Society, originated by Professor Clapham, and the Editorial Board contained the names of several leading teachers of history in the University. Its main purpose was to encourage research by publication of its results, and every number contained a selection of hitherto unprinted documents. His own contributions included articles on 'Lord Acton on the Origins of the War of 1870' and on 'British Secret Diplomacy from Canning to Grey'. He was the oldest member of the 'Junior Historians', which he helped to found before the war of 1914 and on which he exerted a large influence.

Temperley catered for a wider public in several directions. He published the Treaty of Versailles with a brief commentary. He was joint editor of a series of booklets entitled 'Helps to Students of History', written in popular form and published at a popular price. From 1922 to 1928 he edited the *Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature*, published by the Historical Association, contributing the section on the latest age. His services to the Association also included a brochure on *Foreign Historical Novels* and a bibliography of modern European History in co-operation with Professor Lillian Penson. The former contained studies of Victor Hugo and Dumas, Jensen, Jokai, Sienkiewicz, Merejkowski, and Tolstoi. He developed the theme in a little book published in 1931, *Scenes from Modern History by Great Imaginative Writers*.

When the end of the *History of the Peace Conference* was in

sight Temperley returned to his first love. It was natural that the editors of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919*, should invite him to cover the years 1822–7, and a massive chapter of seventy pages appeared in the second volume, published in 1923. It is interesting to compare the judgements of the youthful biographer of Canning with those of the middle-aged scholar. If the halo of romance is gone, respect and admiration remain. Canning, we are told, was not greatly influenced by sentiment. His attitude in the liberation of Greece, for instance, was often misunderstood. He was neither Turkophobe nor Grecophil, and he once described the Greeks as a most rascally set. Frankly an opportunist, he was guided by events. If the suppression of the Greek revolt proved impossible, some new method would have to be tried. He did not believe in the modern doctrine of self-determination. In a word he was much less of a nationalist and a liberal than Palmerston.

Two years later, in 1925, Temperley published his master-piece, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827*, a massive volume of 600 pages, which won him a place in the front rank of historians. He had studied the subject for twenty years, he declared in the Preface, had read every dispatch of Canning in the Record Office, had consulted the archives of Paris and Vienna, and had been allowed to inspect a mass of private papers. 'If something of youthful enthusiasm is diminished by experience, there is nothing to suggest that Canning was not one of the greatest of our Foreign Ministers. It is certain that no greater intellect has been placed at the service of British diplomacy.' A more important difference is in regard to Castlereagh, who in the earlier work received far less than his due. He accepts the verdict of Professor Webster and Professor Alison Phillips about the respective merits of Canning and Castlereagh.

During the most crucial years of the nineteenth century these two men guided the destinies of England. If the one possessed constructive qualities, serene steadfastness and cosmopolitan

detachment, the other had infinite resources, intellectual imagination and a hitherto unexampled power of national and popular appeal. Both men, though in different ways, rendered immortal services to their country.

The volume opens with Castlereagh's resistance in 1820 to the doctrine of intervention preached and practised by Alexander and Metternich, and passes on to a preliminary analysis of Canning's political system. He was a philosophic Tory, a disciple of Burke, disliking equally despotism and democracy. The King grudgingly accepted his new Foreign Secretary, and some of his Cabinet colleagues ruefully remembered the sallies of his wit. Happily he had plenty of courage as he proceeded to show at the Congress of Verona, where Wellington was instructed to announce that England would take no part in the suppression of Spanish Constitutionalism. The second act was to limit the sway of autocracy and legitimacy by calling the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old. 'If the barrier of the Pyrenees could not be defended by a British army, the gates of the Atlantic could be held by a British fleet. If France could humble Spain on land, England could humble France on the sea.' No conflict was necessary, for the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine confirmed the British veto on interference in South America. When Canning proceeded to strike a blow at the Neo-Holy Alliance by the recognition of the revolting colonies, he gave a lead which was bound to be followed by the Powers who angrily protested at the time. If, as we are reminded, the danger from France to the New World and the importance of South America in world politics were less than he believed, that in no way diminishes our admiration for the firmness, foresight, and skill of the man who went boldly forward despite the scruples of the King and the Cabinet. A further triumph in the same field was the restoration of British influence in Portugal and the recognition of Brazilian independence.

At this point, in 1825, when 'Canning's personality

became supreme at home and powerful and triumphant abroad', the narrative is interrupted by a series of chapters entitled 'Canning and England'; for what Temperley calls the world-wide triumph of his policy and system was only rendered possible by his ascendancy at home. 'His full power was not felt abroad until he had dragged the wavering King and his reluctant colleagues with him by his influence over Parliament, the Press and the people.' The clever and perfidious monarch was a dangerous opponent, but he was conquered at last, and in 1826 he admitted that the Foreign Secretary had shown great talents. Canning was too much of a Liberal for Wellington and Eldon, and only the steady support of Liverpool, the Prime Minister, made his position reasonably secure. An instructive chapter entitled 'The Day's Work at the Foreign Office' summarizes his numerous administrative reforms, and reviews his relations with British representatives abroad. A shorter chapter explains his ceaseless and successful efforts to interest and educate public opinion in foreign affairs.

The later portion of the volume describes his share in the liberation of Greece from the Turkish yoke, which 'puts the finishing touch to his policy and marks the culmination of his fame'. Canning, like most British statesmen of his time, had been pro-Turkish, but he realized that the attempt to suppress the rebels was more dangerous than the recognition of their independence. He admired the ancient more than the modern Greeks, and condemned 'the most disgusting barbarities' perpetrated by both sides. Moreover, he wished to preserve the Turkish Empire in order to keep Russia out of Constantinople. When, however, Alexander informed Canning that he was ready to break with Metternich and to co-operate with England in regard to Greece, the Neo-Holy Alliance collapsed. For the brief remainder of his life Canning, not Metternich, was the dominating figure in Europe. France was easily won over, and when, shortly after his death, the Turkish fleet was

destroyed at Navarino, the freedom of Greece was in sight. The Hundred Days of Premiership, a period of bitter party strife, are described with deep sympathy. 'This malevolent meteor, this scourge of the world, a revolution in himself', as Metternich called him, had worn himself out at the age of fifty-seven. He had not lived in vain. 'Without Castlereagh the world might not have been saved, and without Canning it might not have been freed.' No reader of this fine work, which ranks in interest and importance with Professor Webster's study of Castlereagh, can fail to be impressed by its mastery of the materials, its insight into a complicated personality, and its grasp of the diplomacy of nineteenth-century Europe.

Among the unpublished sources utilized in the book was the diary of Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian Ambassador in London, the leader of society in England for twenty years, the friend of George IV, Castlereagh, Canning, Wellington, Grey, Aberdeen, the mistress of Metternich in early life, and the lover of Guizot when her charms were waning. The publication of her correspondence had increased the desire of historians for the journal which she was known to have kept. In 1923 a transcript covering the years 1825–30 came into Temperley's hands, and in 1925 he edited the *Diary of Princess Lieven* with some of her political sketches and letters. He was justified in describing the book as an important contribution to the social and diplomatic history of the period. The career of 'the princess of diplomacy' makes a fascinating story, though the heroine was too much of an egotistical intriguer to capture our sympathy. The gem of the journal is the story of the secret mission entrusted to her by Alexander shortly before his death in 1825, the purpose of which was to inform Canning of his resolve to break with Metternich and to co-operate with England in the policy which was to lead to the emancipation of Greece. Of scarcely less interest are the vivid pictures of George IV and of Canning's struggle for the Premiership. Other aspects of the career and the

epoch of his hero were discussed in contributions to the *English Historical Review*, the *American Historical Review*, *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, and the *Dublin Review*, before and after the appearance of his book. He wrote an Introduction to F. A. Kirkpatrick's authoritative *History of the Argentine Republic*, published in 1931.

Temperley collaborated with Professor A. J. Grant in a work which reached a wider public than any of his other writings. The elder scholar had been invited by Longmans to write a sketch of European history from 1789 to 1914. He asked Temperley to share the burden, and in particular to undertake the later years. No indication is given as to the authorship of the different portions of the book, but it may now be revealed that each wrote about half. *Europe in the Nineteenth Century (1789–1914)* won immediate success, and went through three editions. Its title was changed to *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 1789–1932*, when Temperley added supplementary chapters on the World War and the post-War years for the fourth edition. The fifth, bringing the story up to the Munich crisis, appeared in January 1939. The authors made no attempt to tell the story in full.

> At the most a sketch, a few outlines, some impressions can be given. . . . The authors offer this book as their conception of how the main threads of the period cross and interweave with one another, and of how the tapestry was composed. Their view is cosmopolitan rather than national, political and cultural rather than military or religious. Ideas rather than events are the stuff of this history.

The chapters on the last years before the war of 1914 were written by Temperley and enriched by notes. He recognizes that when England abandoned isolation she automatically encouraged Japan, France, and Russia to pursue their respective ambitions. The verdict on Russia is strikingly severe. Her internal instability, her unscrupulous diplomacy, and the fears and ambitions of her General Staff rendered her a serious danger to peace.

It is certainly true that she did not want war in 1914, because her generals knew her military weakness only too well. But it cannot be said that a Government so constituted really made ultimately for peace. It maintained and was increasing a great army, it built strategic railways menacing to Germany in Europe, it was destroying the integrity of Persia in Asia, and was perpetually intriguing in the Balkans and stretching out a greedy hand towards Constantinople.

The volume in its original form concluded with a series of essays ranging over the whole period—the growth of nationality, the development of Parliamentary institutions, the race of armaments, and the efforts to organize peace. The final paragraph welcomed the League of Nations as at once a natural development and a daring experiment. Temperley's supplements are of interest for his judgements on men and events. But for the United States, he declares, France might have been defeated and England could not have won. The chapter on the Peace Conference contains snapshots of the Big Four and an eye-witness account of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. In the chapter entitled 'Nation-making in the New Europe' he says all that can be said for the Peace settlement. He has high praise for Czechoslovakia, but he declares Poland's frontiers too advanced on the Russian side. In the chapter on the Near and Middle East he denounces 'the sickening tragedy' of Armenia. The closing chapter, 'Hitler's Drive to the East' pays homage to the moderation of Beneš throughout the Sudeten crisis.

Temperley returned to his favourite field of foreign affairs in his Inaugural Address at the Cambridge Local Lectures summer meeting in 1928 entitled *The Victorian Age in Politics, War and Diplomacy*, published by the University Press. In politics he notes the revival of the prestige of the Crown, the coming of age of the Dominions, and the democratization of Parliament. No such significant changes took place in the defence forces, for the navy remained strong and the army weak. Castlereagh and Canning are saluted the greatest figures in modern British diplomacy,

though Castlereagh's European dream was a splendid failure. He ignored public opinion and failed, while Canning lived by it and succeeded. Canning, it is added, was ready to take part in European Congresses on conditions which have been incorporated 'with almost literal exactness' into the Covenant of the League of Nations. Palmerston kept a bust of Canning in his study, but there were important differences in method and aim. 'Palmerston believed in settling each question on its individual merits, Canning in a system based on real intellectual principles.' While the master never bluffed, the disciple had to retreat when confronted with Bismarck's iron will. Salisbury's diplomacy is praised as firm and resolute, but in his later years he failed to visualize new tendencies.

In 1931 a Chair of Modern History was founded at Cambridge, and Temperley was chosen to fill it. His Inaugural Lecture, *Research and Modern History*, was published by the University Press. The increasing popular interest in history, began the new Professor, brought certain dangers. People formerly demanded that it should be a kind of pseudo-science: now they asked for a kind of pseudo-art. To such blandishments there could be only one reply. The great historian impresses, not by the evidence he reveals, but by the vast hidden wells of knowledge on which he relies. His most precious gift is not the abundance but the certainty of his information, and the best road to immortality is to produce work which need never be done again. Such models are Ranke, Mommsen, Stubbs, Gierke, Maitland, Bury, and Tout. Great historical artists, like Macaulay, Carlyle, and Froude, are untrustworthy guides. Even Vandal is placed among those who are too clear to be convincing and too certain to be credible. The aim of research is to find out how men and institutions work. For this purpose the lecturer stresses the importance of a knowledge of the countries and peoples about which we decide to write. 'It is quite impossible to understand Metternich without knowing something of Austria, or of

Kossuth without knowing something of Hungary. And the smaller and the more oriental the country, the greater the difficulty of deducing anything without first-hand knowledge.' For instance, the Serajevo murders only become fully intelligible if one has known Serbian or Bosnian students or Comitajis, who are quite unlike the students or even the burglars of the West. Similarly the Turk before the World War had to be seen to be believed. The scholar should train himself by travel and the study of men as much as by the study of books. The historical novels of Jokai and Sienkiewicz are recommended for atmosphere. Imagination and the critical sense must work hand in hand. 'There is no reward like the scholar's when after long search he suddenly sees his way into the heart of a problem.'

The same gospel of disinterested research was preached in the Introduction to a selection from Bury's essays published in the same year. Writing with personal knowledge as well as deep intellectual sympathy, Temperley explains the attitude and methods of the greatest British historical scholar of his time. When Acton's successor declared in a celebrated aphorism that history is a science, no less and no more, he meant that it must be released, not only from the temptations of rhetoric but from patriotic, pragmatic, and philosophical obsessions. If he taught any definite lesson, it was the doctrine of relativity, the sway of contingency, the illusion of finality. Progress was a fact and a hope, not a law, and things might easily have gone another way. The fall of the Roman Empire, for instance, was due to a combination of coincidences. The highest duty of universities was research, though imagination was essential to the interpretation of its results. Half the volume is devoted to Byzantine studies, in which Bury's supremacy was unchallenged; but its chief value is that his reflections on history, the most profound and suggestive in our language, are collected and rendered accessible.

In the summer of 1924 the present writer was invited by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who combined the offices of

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, to edit the proposed series of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. He consented on condition that a second editor was appointed, and suggested that Temperley should be approached. The proposal was warmly welcomed. The invitation was given and accepted, but before the arrangements were complete the Labour Government was defeated, and it was Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr. MacDonald's successor at the Foreign Office, who gave the final authorization. The decision was announced in *The Times* of 3 December 1924, in an exchange of letters between Professor Seton-Watson and the new Foreign Secretary. While a great mass of documentary evidence, wrote the former, had been made available by the German and Austrian Governments illustrating the course of events from the standpoint of the Central Powers, and the Bolshevists had also been busy, historians had no authentic first-hand material on the British side, and were in consequence gravely handicapped in dealing with the charges and insinuations directed against British policy in the period preceding the war. Sir Austen replied that Mr. MacDonald had already given instructions to this effect, and that it only remained to confirm them.

> As regards the publication of the official documents bearing on the general European situation out of which the war arose, a collection of documents will be edited by Mr. G. P. Gooch and Mr. H. W. V. Temperley, who will, I hope, be in a position to begin serious work at a very early date. The reputation of the editors offers the best guarantee of the historical accuracy and impartiality of the work.

The last sentence was our charter. How could we be impartial unless we were permitted to publish whatever we wished? Nothing was said at this stage as to our having a free hand, but it was tacitly understood that there would be no obstruction from the Foreign Office. Subsequent interviews with the Foreign Secretary proved that he was as anxious as ourselves for the whole truth to be told. Our resolve to put all the cards on the table produced protests

from several foreign Governments, for the usual practice of submitting the relevant documents to foreign Powers before publication was followed except in regard to our enemies in the World War. In every case we carried our point, and on one occasion Sir Austen personally intervened to remove the veto on a particular document. After the first difficulties had arisen we inserted a warning in the Preface to the third and all subsequent volumes. 'The Editors think it well to state, what was already implied in their preface to volume i, that they would feel compelled to resign if any attempt were made to insist on the omission of any document which is in their view vital or essential.' In maintaining this attitude to the end Temperley was a tower of strength.

It had been the intention of the Government to begin with 1904, when the treaty with France opened a new chapter in British diplomacy. We argued that a more satisfactory starting-point was 1898, when the growing perils of isolation began to alarm Joseph Chamberlain and other influential statesmen. It was finally decided to publish two introductory volumes on 1898–1904 before proceeding to cover the following decade in greater detail. We estimated that ten volumes would be required. For that reason the work on the outbreak of the War for which Sir James Headlam-Morley, the first and last Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, had already begun to collect material was issued as volume xi before any of the others appeared. We under-estimated the magnitude of the undertaking, and in consequence volumes ix and x appeared in two parts. The work, in which we received the invaluable assistance of Professor Lillian Penson, contained many thousand large and closely printed pages. Following the precedent of *Die Grosse Politik* we arranged the material in chapters on particular subjects; and though the editors of the French, Austrian, and Russian documents adopted the chronological method, we never regretted our choice. On the other hand, whereas Thimme, the chief editor of the German docu-

ments, provided notes which were of great interest but often highly controversial, we expressed no opinions in our elucidations. Temperley possessed the flair for essential documents characteristic of the born researcher, and his unflagging energy was in large measure responsible for the successful accomplishment of a formidable task.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, provided by far the fullest account of any period of British foreign policy. The work, which was translated into German, was enriched by copious extracts from the private correspondence presented to the Foreign Office by Grey and Nicolson on the conclusion of their official service; and Lord Hardinge kindly allowed us to utilize his papers. Of scarcely less importance was the publication of innumerable minutes which enable the student to reconstruct the evolution of policies and to visualize the human beings who sponsored them. No feature of the work excited more general interest than the Germanophobe memoranda of Eyre Crowe. An appendix in the final volume summarizing the chief revelations was from Temperley's pen. They included Salisbury's plan in 1898 of a delimitation of British and Russian spheres of influence in Asia, the text and date of the mysterious so-called 'Treaty of Windsor' in 1899, the English side of the secret Anglo-German alliance discussions in 1901, the making of the Japanese alliance in 1902, the reconciliation with France in 1904, the anxieties of the Tangier crisis in 1905 and the Algeciras Conference in 1906, the elaboration of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, the conversation of Sir Charles Hardinge and Iswolsky at Reval in 1908, Grey's efforts to limit the repercussions of the Bosnian crisis, the fruitless attempts from 1908 to 1912 to reach a *détente* with Germany in regard to naval competition, the nerve-racking summer of Agadir, the disappointments of the Haldane Mission, the Mediterranean agreement of 1912, the successful Bagdad railway negotiations, the Balkan wars, the friction with Russia in Persia, and the plan of an Anglo-Russian agreement in 1914. There had

been Blue Books and White Papers on atrocities in the Congo, on Macedonian reform, and on the struggles of Persian constitutionalism, but the full story of the greater crises and the major decisions was now told for the first time. After mastering the details of the picture it became possible to view it as a whole. With the conquest of the Sudan and the annexation of the Boer Republics the British Empire became a satiated state. Thus the whole story is one less of British initiatives than of reactions to the approaches and activities of other Powers. The decisive event of the period, so far as Great Britain was concerned, was the reconciliation with France.

When the *British Documents* were nearing completion Temperley embarked on the most ambitious of his enterprises.

> My plan [he wrote in the preface to *England and the Near East: the Crimea* published in 1936] is to narrate the history of England's relations with the Near East from the death of Canning until the day when Disraeli brought back 'peace with honour' from Berlin. The period begins with the British fleet's destruction of Turkish sea-power at Navarino and ends with its protection of the Turkish fleet against Russia. The aim, however, is not a study of diplomatic or naval history, but a general narrative in which these special features are found side by side with a study of Oriental institutions and Balkan nationalities.

The real problem was whether the old Turkish Empire could survive or recover its strength. This in turn depended on three factors—the ability of the Turks to set their house in order, the willingness of their Christian subjects to acquiesce in the process, and the readiness of the Great Powers to help 'the sick man of Europe'. It is a complicated drama, in which the Powers, the Turkish governing class and the subject races play their part. 'The Eastern question can only be understood if we know how Orientals intrigue, how Western diplomatists negotiate and what Balkan peasants think about.' The survey was to be made in three volumes of which only the first, bringing the story to the outbreak of the Crimean war, was completed. The second

was nearly finished, and will be published in due course. No other English scholar was so admirably fitted by research and travel to do justice to what our fathers called the Eastern Question. A wealth of fresh material from British and continental archives was utilized, and the author's visits to the scene of historic events add colour to his tale.

The story opens with an arresting picture of Sultan Mahmud, the greatest Ottoman ruler for centuries, half savage and half statesman, who strove to modernize his backward realm. If anyone could have given it a new lease of life, it was he; but his labours were in vain, for he was succeeded by lesser men. Book II describes the rude challenge of Mehemet Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, who was only beaten off with British aid. Palmerston cared nothing for the Turks, but he had no desire to see their empire crushed between Russia on the north and the ruler of Egypt on the south. The fear of Russia was growing apace in the west, and her dark shadow falls across the landscape. In resisting the rebellious vassal Palmerston risked a war with France; but, while some of his colleagues shivered at the prospect, the Foreign Minister coolly played his hazardous game and won.

> He was the greatest personality in foreign policy between Canning and Disraeli, and was the disciple of the one and the model for the other. . . . He was too daring in uttering threats of war, too ready sometimes to abandon them, too fond of lecturing foreign Powers and of provoking applause from English audiences. Yet his incorrigible gaiety disguises the seriousness and solidity of his character.

The duel between the resourceful statesman and 'the barbarian of genius' makes a thrilling story.

Book III describes the uneasy years between the collapse of Mehemet Ali in 1841 and the approach of the Crimean War. Half-hearted attempts at reform were made at Constantinople, and the commanding figure of Stratford Canning advanced to the centre of the stage. In Book IV we return to more familiar ground, and it is interesting to note the historian's verdicts on the principal actors.

Gladstone called Aberdeen the best public man with whom he had ever worked, but he was the worst possible Prime Minister when dark clouds gathered overhead. Convinced that he would never fight, the Tsar took greater risks than if Palmerston had been at the helm. Aberdeen was one of the men responsible for what is described as the tragic blunder of the Crimean War. Napoleon III was another. Stratford Canning's share, it is argued, was less than has been generally believed. The conflict was in no way inevitable. 'Had Nicholas been weak, Aberdeen strong or Mensikov tactful, there might have been no war.' Numerous studies preparing the way for his *magnum opus* appeared in English, American, and French reviews. Among them may be mentioned a series on Stratford Canning in the *English Historical Review*, two articles on the Treaty of Paris in the *Journal of Modern History*, and an address to the British Academy on the 'Bulgarian and Other Atrocities, 1875–8'.

In the summer of 1938 two handsome volumes were published by the Cambridge University Press. The larger and more important, *Foundations of British Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)*, edited by Temperley and Professor Lillian Penson, contained 200 documents and eighty-six Introductory Notes. It at once took its place not merely as a source-book containing a good deal of new material but as an authoritative guide to the principles of statesmanship. The continuity of ideas in our diplomacy is remarkable. Eyre Crowe's famous Memorandum in 1907 reproduces the teachings of Canning.

> The balance of power, the sanctity of treaties, the danger of extending guarantees, the value of non-intervention, the implications of what Castlereagh called 'a system of Government strongly popular and national in its character' were understood by all. It is true that Palmerston, in his robust vigour, was ready to interpret 'non-intervention' in a sense which would have surprised Castlereagh and Canning; that Russell glorified the revolutions which Disraeli disliked; that Salisbury hated publicity and parliamentary control; that Gladstone preferred the concert of Europe to the balance of power. But these differences do not prevent us

from seeing that there is a great similarity between the views of all these men, despite the illogicality of their methods. There are times when Castlereagh is English, when Canning is European, when Palmerston admits the superiority of moral ideas, when Gladstone relies on the British fleet, and when Salisbury finds public opinion of value. What is more remarkable is that the ideas of Pitt clearly anticipate the dangers of violent nationalism, the merits of a League to enforce peace, and the necessity for England to steer a middle course between these alternating policies.

It is a fascinating task to read the speeches, dispatches, memoranda, and private letters of our Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries on all the major issues of peace and war from the struggle against revolutionary France till the opening of the twentieth century. Here are the essential documents, such as the State Paper of 1820 on non-intervention, Russell's homage to the Garibaldians in 1860, the Grey Declaration on the Nile valley in 1895, and Salisbury's impressive reaffirmation in 1901 of the policy of avoiding continental commitments. Equally instructive are the Introductions to each document or group of documents, revealing wide acquaintance with printed and unprinted materials and a serene impartiality towards the actors who throng the stage. Castlereagh is saluted as the most 'European' of British statesmen. Canning was extremely reluctant to give guarantees, and he never gave one which he could not enforce. Palmerston's championship of constitutional States was his nearest approach to a system. Russell defined the balance of power in Europe as the independence of its several States, and the preponderance of any one Power as threatening that independence. In the same spirit Gladstone pleaded for the acknowledgement of the equal rights of all nations as the very basis of a Christian civilization. Salisbury was as ready for co-operation as he was disinclined to pledge the country in advance. With the latter's retirement in 1902 a new era began, in which the old quest for security assumed a new form.

A companion volume, *A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books*

1814–1914, appeared at the same time. The first aim was to discover the exact date of the two thousand publications and the cause of their issue, whether, as was usually the case, at the wish of the Government or in reponse to pressure from the House. The next question is how far a document or a series is complete. Total reliance on Blue Books at any period, we are warned, would be a cardinal error, for much was always omitted and the text was frequently curtailed. For the general reader the most valuable portions of the book are the Introductions on the practice of each successive Foreign Secretary from Canning, who began the system of publicity, to Grey, who, for sufficient reasons, concealed most of the negotiations which led or failed to lead to agreements with other Great Powers. Some of the results of the elaborate investigation were incorporated in an article 'British Secret Diplomacy from Canning to Grey', in the *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1939. Our diplomacy, it appears, became more secret as our constitution grew more democratic. Canning and Palmerston were less secretive than Gladstone, and Salisbury was infinitely less secretive than Lansdowne and Grey. When we were afraid of no one and could do without allies, we could dispense with secret agreements. When we were compelled to abandon our isolation—and Temperley never doubted the necessity—we had to imitate the secrecy and conform to the diplomatic ways of the continental groups. This practice, however, could be carried too far, as in the case of the secret clauses of the Anglo-French treaty of 1904, for which Lansdowne is blamed.

After the completion of the *British Documents* Temperley confided to the present writer that he did not intend to undertake any further large-scale editorial tasks, but in two instances he lent effective aid. The *Cambridge Modern History* had been completed shortly before the World War, and there was an obvious need for supplementary volumes; but the flight of time was not the only reason for scholars to bestir themselves. Owing to the opening of the archives of

all the Great European Powers except Italy we now know the political mind and face of Europe during the generation before 1914 as we know no other period of history. It was Temperley's idea to inaugurate a new series of volumes, and he explained the purpose of the first (not yet published) in a Foreword. There was no desire to rewrite the story of political, social, and economic movements described in the closing volume of the original work. Its object was to explain, in the light of the latest information and by the efforts of historians of different nationalities, the origins and causes of the catastrophe. An attempt would be made to tell the story fairly, to supply the reader with a summary of ascertained fact, and to provide the materials of judgement where the facts are still disputed or the issues still in doubt. A few pregnant pages sketch the development of the European system since the foundation of the German Empire and during the World War. He had intended to be a contributor as well. The whole work, which is being edited by Professors Lillian Penson and Bernadotte Schmitt, will bear his imprint, as the twelve volumes of the original *Cambridge Modern History* were described as planned by the late Lord Acton. The second enterprise was the *Cambridge History of Poland.* The Secretary of the University Press describes him as 'the only begetter', and the work will be dedicated to his memory. He made several suggestions as to authors, writes one of the editors, Mr. Reddaway, and he was to have contributed the chapter on the Peace Conference.

Temperley used his second sabbatical year to make a journey round the world. His main purpose at each place, writes his wife, was to visit the University, to secure new members for the International Historical Congress, and to bring teachers into touch with the historians of the West. He left Cambridge in June 1936 for California, where he lectured at the Leland Stanford University for three months and took discussion classes in place of Professor Lutz. He sailed from Vancouver to Japan, where an old Peterhouse

friend, Viscount Kato, opened many doors. Saigon and Mukden were visited on the way to Pekin, Nankin, and Shanghai. After brief halts at Penang and Rangoon he reached India in January 1937, where he found old pupils, made new friends, saw the glories of Kinchinjunga from Darjeeling and visited the historic cities between Calcutta and Bombay. After breaking the journey in Egypt, the travellers reached home in March 1937.

Temperley's travels, war service, and field of study prepared him to play a leading part in the international organization of scholarship. The first Historical Congress was held in Rome in 1903, the second in Berlin in 1908, the third in London in 1913, the fourth in Brussels in 1923. The Bureau of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, of which Temperley was a member, was founded in 1926. He headed the British Delegation at the fifth Congress at Oslo in 1928, and at Warsaw in 1933 he succeeded Professor Koht as President. He attended meetings of the executive at Cracow in 1933, Paris in 1934, and Bucharest in 1936. He presided at the seventh Congress in Zürich in 1938, where he lectured on 'England and the Dogma of Turkey's Integrity and Independence from Palmerston to Disraeli, 1865–1875'. At the close he handed over the reins to Dr. Leland. In his opening address he reported that forty-four countries or civilizations were now connected with the Congress, and that China, the Vatican City, and Ireland had applied for membership. 'It is difficult to imagine our International Committee without him', writes Professor Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister.

> He had a truly international mind. He possessed in the highest degree that quality which is found more frequently in the English than in any other nation, the power to free oneself from all national prejudice in the study of international conflicts. He was in the fullest sense what the English call fair, a man of absolute good faith and serene impartiality. You could have unlimited confidence in him.

Professor Lhéritier, the General Secretary, adds that he

inspired confidence in his collaborators, impartially arbitrating differences and developing the activity of the Committee to the maximum. 'To him above all we owe the institution of our Commissions extérieures de l'histoire régionale, and the accession of China, India, Egypt, Malta and Ireland.' He liked administrative tasks, was never too busy to attend to details, and had a great capacity for making friends. Elected to the British Academy in 1927, he served on the Council from 1932 to 1938, and acted as Chairman of the Medieval and Modern History Section from 1933 to 1938. He was a Member of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. His services to history brought him academic honours from Durham and St. Andrews, from Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Norway, Poland, and Rumania. He was among the official guests at the Sokol celebrations at Prague in July 1938.

In 1934 Temperley became the first President of the New Commonwealth Institute, the object of which was to study the fundamental principles of international relations and in particular the problems of international justice and security. 'It is by discussion and dispute that the truth emerges from darkness', he wrote in his Foreword for the first number of the *New Commonwealth Quarterly*. Justice and equity were the desire of the modern world, he declared in the Preface to one of the Institute's monographs, and research was the means of attaining them. It was only since the war that the new method of research had been perfected. 'This is to work on international lines, to get the scholars of different countries to contribute their ideas and to pool the results of their labour.' His assistance was particularly valuable, writes the Director, Professor Keeton, in the early years when the need for such an independent and international institute was not universally recognized. 'The fact that this distinguished scholar fully associated himself with the new venture, and gave his unconditional support and unsparing advice, contributed more than anything else

to lay the foundation on which the Institute is now firmly based.' From his sick-bed he steered it through a complete reorganization in 1939.

It was a tribute to Temperley's eminence that he was invited by the B.B.C. to prepare four 'radio-historical dramas' in collaboration with Mr. Lawrence Gilliam. The first and the most striking was entitled 'Twenty Years Ago, or The Outbreak of War', performed for the first time on 4 August 1934, with prominent actors taking part. The second, 'Twenty-five Years', performed on 8 May 1935 on the Jubilee of George V, summarized the events of the reign. The third, 'Kitchener, Twenty Years after his Death', was given on 3 June 1936. The fourth, 'Revolution in Russia, or Twenty Years after the Bolshevik Triumph', was given on 13 and 15 December 1937. He had no love for the Bolshevists, but he realized that the way for their coming had been prepared by the Tsarist régime. His strictures provoked protest in certain quarters, but he was sure of his ground.

Temperley seemed well enough when scholars from many lands met at the Historical Congress at Zürich in August 1938; but he sickened before he reached home. He went into a nursing home at Cambridge to be treated for a streptococcus infection and was unable to lecture till the middle of the autumn term. He appeared to make a good recovery and took full duty during the Lent term, though great care was necessary. At Easter heart weakness began to cause anxiety, and a specialist ordered several weeks in bed. 'He had the most wonderful resilience of spirit,' writes his wife, 'and never was this shown more than during his illness. His brain was perfectly clear, he wrote articles and letters, and read omnivorously.' He had, indeed, every reason to cling to life. His election as Master of Peterhouse in 1938 was the fulfilment of a cherished ambition, and a singularly happy second marriage had given him a home again. He made a gallant fight, but the end came quietly on 11 July 1939.

Temperley warmed both hands before the fire of life. His capacity for work was astonishing. Possessing an accurate mind, he insisted on accuracy and thoroughness in others. As a reviewer he was not too easy to please. No British scholar of his time knew more about European diplomacy since the fall of Napoleon, perhaps no one quite so much. His two great books, *The Foreign Policy of Canning* and *England and the Near East*, deserve the highest of all compliments, namely that the work will not have to be done again. As an editor of documents he was in the first flight. None of his contemporaries did more to encourage disinterested study and research. His travels and foreign contacts helped him to stand above the battle. A stream of articles and letters to the press revealed his intensive study of current affairs. Ardent and highly strung, he was ever ready to do battle for his ideas. Professor Ernest Barker has spoken of his rugged greatness. He threw every ounce of his energy into whatever he undertook, and he left his impress on many lives. His death at the height of his powers was felt throughout the academic world, not only as a tragic personal loss, but as a blow to the cause of historical scholarship to which he had dedicated his life.

G. P. Gooch