

BERNARD BOSANQUET

1848-1923

BERNARD BOSANQUET, born in 1848, was the youngest of the five sons of the Rev. R. W. Bosanquet, of Rock Hall, Northumberland, who belonged to the ancient family of the Bosanquets of Dingestow. This family was of Huguenot descent, having emigrated to England on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.¹ Naturally, in course of time, the French blood was mingled with English and Scottish, and Bosanquet's mother bore the name Macdowall. One of his brothers was the late Admiral Sir Day H. Bosanquet; another, Charles, was the Secretary of the Charity Organization Society at the time of its foundation.

From Harrow, to whose head-master, Montagu Butler, he was affectionately attached, Bosanquet, having gained a Balliol Scholarship, went up in 1867 to Oxford, where he took a first class both in 'Moderations' and in 'Greats'. That he was, even among the scholars, a man of exceptional ability and acquirements was recognized by his contemporaries; but he did not otherwise figure prominently in the College life, as he was not an athlete and in his younger days was somewhat shy or reserved. But he was already a man of friends, and at Balliol began his life-long friendship with C. S. Loch, his junior in standing but already deeply interested in social questions and movements.

The lecturers at Balliol who attracted and influenced him most were T. H. Green and W. L. Newman. Green had as yet published only a couple of articles in the *North British Review*; but much that, later in his lifetime and after it, appeared in print was being given in the lecture-room, and was bewildering some of his hearers and opening to others a new world; and among these others was Bosanquet. The influence of Green's teaching and example, it may be added, is probably traceable in the combination of civic and philosophical activities which is the most obvious feature of his pupil's life. What the tutor, on his side, thought of his pupil may be judged from his description

¹ The 'strict moral tradition' usual in Huguenot families is mentioned in *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 234.

of Bosanquet as 'the best-equipped man in the College', and from the fact that when, in 1872, he was obliged to interrupt for some weeks his course on Aristotle's *Ethics*, he invited his pupil (then newly elected Fellow of University) to take his place.

The influence of Newman, whose lectures on ancient history were not less famous in the University than Green's on philosophy, appears throughout Bosanquet's writings in the prominence of reflections drawn from the history of Greece, and is emphatically acknowledged in the paper entitled 'A Moral from Athenian history'.¹ It is indeed evident that he owed to his undergraduate years an enthusiasm for Greece which never diminished and which appeared in the emphasis of his considered judgements. Two of these may be quoted in illustration from a single volume.² 'Hellenism, perhaps the most splendid product of any single epoch in the world's history'; 'I do not doubt that the philosophy of Great Britain will creditably stand comparison with that of any nation in the world, excepting always, in my judgement, the ancient Greeks.' The first book that he published (1878) was a translation of a work by Schömann on Athenian Constitutional History.

1871-81

When this book appeared Bosanquet was nearing the end of the ten years which he spent as a Fellow and Tutor at University College. Here, in addition to courses on Greek history, and on the philosophical books usually studied for the Honours degree, he lectured on the History of Logic, and the History of Moral Philosophy from Locke to Kant, and left on the minds of his most competent hearers a strong conviction of the power, originality, and sincerity of his thought—a conviction not diminished by that insistence on precision and qualification of statements which to a youthful audience is apt to seem needless or super-subtle. Moreover he impressed his hearers as a man of elevated character and ideals, in which he himself fully believed—indeed in which his belief amounted to a passion, though his manner was always severely restrained, so that the white heat of his thought may not have been discovered by some of his hearers. He is remembered, too, for his interest in the life of the undergraduates outside the lecture-room; an instance of which was his membership in a little society which met about once a fortnight to read plays of Shakespeare. Among his colleagues one, F. H. Peters, was an intimate friend and, like himself, busy with philosophy.

¹ *Social and International Ideals*, p. 254.

² *Essays and Addresses*, pp. 52, 178.

Another was C. J. Faulkner, whose company he greatly enjoyed, and in whose rooms he sometimes met William Morris;¹ and it is probable that these meetings, in addition to the delight they gave, stimulated a growing interest in social work.²

This interest, however, may have tended to increase a certain dissatisfaction with his College life. The number of the undergraduates in the College who were reading for Honours and therefore studying philosophy was at that time very small, and, naturally, not all of them were keenly interested in that study, so that his official work cannot have been of an engrossing kind. At the same time, though he was thus comparatively little hindered in the development of his own thought, and was gradually becoming more and more certain of his philosophical position, it was only towards the end of his stay in Oxford that he felt ready to write on the subject.

1881-1903

Bosanquet left Oxford in 1881 and, for more than twenty years, made his home in London and, after a time, at Oxshott, in easy reach of London. These years were highly productive, and that in dissimilar ways. He wrote and published some of the most important and least 'popular' of his philosophical works; and at the same time he gave a large part of his energy to committee-work and lecturing on behalf of various movements and associations, most of which were not, at any rate distinctively, of a philosophical kind.

Nothing more than a list of the larger publications of these years is possible in the present record, but it will at least show that they deal with three distinct species of philosophy.³ After contributing, in 1882, an article on 'Logic as the Science of Knowledge' to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, edited by Seth and Haldane, he published, two years later, *Knowledge and Reality*, where he discussed the ideas in regard to which he agreed with, or dissented from, F. H. Bradley's *Principles of Logic*. This was followed in 1888 by his *Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge*, in two volumes. Between these dates he had published his translation, with a preliminary essay, of the Introduction to Hegel's *Aesthetik*; and in 1892 there appeared his own *History of Aesthetic*. Seven years later came his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, the fullest exposition of his political philosophy.

¹ References to Morris may be found in the *History of Aesthetic* and elsewhere.

² For the substance, and often for the words, of much of this paragraph I am indebted to Professor E. A. Sonnenschein, who was a Scholar of University in the earlier years of Bosanquet's residence.

³ Early in this period falls also his editorship of, and contribution to, the Oxford translation of Lotze's *Logik* and *Metaphysik*.

This might seem a sufficient output; yet within this period he also wrote many papers for the meetings of the Aristotelian Society, his services to which are fully described by Prof. Wildon Carr in the *Proceedings*, vol. 23. Among the other Societies for which he chiefly worked that for the Organization of Charity probably occupied him most constantly. He was here collaborating with his Balliol friend Loch, the organizing Secretary, and he himself became chairman of the Administrative Committee of the London Society. Another was the Ethical Society, which he helped to found; and he took part also in the activities of the University Extension Board. For all of these associations, and not by any means for these alone, he gave (usually speaking from notes) lectures or addresses, a good many of which were reproduced in the smaller volumes published in this period.¹ Some idea of the variety of his subjects may be gathered from the *Essays and Addresses* (1889), three of which deal with philosophical questions, while the rest bear the following titles: *Two Modern Philanthropists; Individual and Social Reform; Some Socialistic Features of Ancient Societies; Artistic Handwork in Education* (a lecture showing the influence of Ruskin and especially of Morris); *The Kingdom of God on Earth; How to read the New Testament*.

It will be noticed that two of these addresses deal with aspects of religion; and the prominence of this subject becomes marked in *The Civilization of Christendom* (1893) and points forward to the Gifford Lectures. At the same time, it is perhaps needless to add, neither this nor any other interest collided with, or modified, Bosanquet's devotion to Greece, or his conviction of the importance of Greek thought for the modern mind. These appear unchanged in the course of Extension lectures on the *Republic* of Plato, the substance of which is doubtless to be found, though not in lecture form, in the *Companion*. The memory of this course remains vivid in the minds of those who heard it, and to whom that volume was dedicated; and it may be permissible to interpose in this bare catalogue a record written by one of them, since it may be taken to represent fairly well the impression left by the single lectures of this period:

I attended a course of lectures on Plato's *Republic* which Dr. Bosanquet gave at Chelsea. The first lecture was open to the public and the room was crowded. Perhaps over a hundred people were

¹ Two of these are mentioned in this paragraph and the next. The others are *A Companion to Plato's Republic* (1895), *The Essentials of Logic* (1895), *Psychology of the Moral Self* (1897), *The Education of the Young in Plato's Republic* (1900).

present, many of them drawn, doubtless, not so much by interest in the subject as by the reputation of the lecturer.

Arresting and absorbing though it was, this first lecture was extraordinarily difficult; and I afterwards learnt that it was intentionally so. No help or relief was offered to tempt the neophyte. The numbers dwindled to twenty or thirty keen and enthusiastic students; and then the nature of the man, and some of his intensest faiths and enthusiasms, were gradually revealed. To an hour's lecture, crammed with matter, were added by degrees fifteen minutes, thirty minutes, another hour, of informal teaching and discussion. Students received every encouragement to express their difficulties, and even to persist until convinced or enlightened. Through all his teaching there burnt a steady glow of enthusiastic faith—a faith and an ideal that the tests and experience of a life had only fired anew.

Difficulties might remain—for he had not naturally the born expositor's gift—but he was untiring and patient in his self-forgetting zeal to hand on, to those capable of accepting them, the spiritual stuff and inspiration which had come to him from the Master.

His delicate and refined face, with its clearly cut features, so mask-like to many, glowed as he spoke—still with the careful enunciation and precise choice of words natural to him—of what Plato could be to life,—the quarry for all the riches of the mind, the wisdom which, born of Truth in another age and under different skies, could still inspire and still be applied to the difficulties and moral problems of the present day. 'More modern than the moderns, you can never get too far for Plato; we are only beginning to understand him' was said, as nearly as I can remember, in one of his rare outbursts of feeling.

To me the lecturer not only opened a new door and outlook upon thought and life, but a new understanding of the passion of service underlying the critical intellect and fastidious instincts of the man—the secret of his many-sided activities and friendships.

1903–1908¹

After 1900, for some twelve years, Bosanquet published no books; and the primary cause of this silence was that he returned to University work. In 1903, at the suggestion of Mr. Haldane, he was invited to become Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews; and he held the chair until 1908.

Much practice had made him a master of the art of lecturing, and his teaching proved to be not only characteristic but extremely effective. The best proof of this is that he had regularly an ordinary class of between thirty and forty, which is a large number for a small

¹ For the whole of this section, except the opening words and the last paragraph, I am indebted to Mr. John Burnet, Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews; and it appeared unnecessary to mark a few small additions and re-arrangements made with his sanction.

University in these days, when philosophy in the Scottish Universities has a hard struggle for existence. The class was about as numerous as when Moral Philosophy was a compulsory subject for graduation in Arts. Nor did he confine himself to his own department. He was always anxious to keep it in close touch with the Classical department, especially on the side of Greek. He lectured regularly on Plato's *Republic*, and printed for the use of his students a collection of the principal Greek texts bearing on the life and work of Socrates. In this he was reviving, though with far more knowledge, the tradition established at St. Andrews by Ferrier. Another St. Andrews tradition to which he linked his teaching on the social and economic side was that of Chalmers, who taught Political Economy rather than Moral Philosophy from his chair. I have often heard him say that it was a satisfaction to him that he held the chair of Chalmers.

Another thing which none of us who were his colleagues will ever forget is his readiness to engage in long philosophical discussions with any one who cared for such things. To these discussions junior members of the staff were freely admitted, and he often took them, and even their seniors, quite out of their depth—which was very good for them.

Bosanquet's success as a teacher, however, had been taken for granted beforehand by his colleagues. What especially impressed them was the eager way in which he threw himself into University business, and his quickness in mastering its details. Nothing seemed to be too trifling for him to give his best attention to. It had long been the custom to make the junior Professor responsible for the arrangements of the Graduation Ceremonial, and he declined to be relieved of this duty, which he performed on several occasions. He was appointed in 1904 a member of a deputation to the Prime Minister on University business, and he took a special interest in the Higher Degrees in Letters and Philosophy and also served on the Committee which dealt with the Training of Teachers. "He took an active part in the deliberations of the Senatus, and he rarely missed a meeting of the Faculty of Arts or of the United College. His practical sagacity and experience of affairs were often of great service to these bodies." These sentences are taken from the Minutes of the Senatus Academics of 15th July, 1908; and it should be understood that some of the business of the Senatus had been difficult as well as important. We were just beginning to reconstruct the Arts curriculum, and there were, of course, great differences of opinion about that. It was not till seven years later, after Bosanquet had left, that we managed to get an Ordinance through, and it was of a provisional

nature. Now that a pass degree in Science has been instituted, it has been necessary to revise the Arts regulations once more. All that was in the air when Bosanquet came, and we hardly expected that he would trouble himself about it. But we were quite wrong in this matter; for he insisted from the first on taking even more than his fair share in all these discussions, and it is certain that our present system of graduation in Arts is in large measure due to him.

Every one, it must be added, appreciated his unfailing courtesy and patience. He took sides inevitably in the occasionally stormy discussions of those days; but it is certainly true to say that he gained the respect, and even the affection, of those against whom he voted consistently, in a hardly less degree than of those with whom he usually acted.

Those who knew Bosanquet or have read his books will not need the testimony of these last words. He enjoyed discussion and much of his writings is, of necessity, controversial; but he probably never gave a moment's pain to an opponent, and Professor Carr observes, in his account of the Aristotelian Society meetings, that, while he never left his own view in doubt, he was always anxious to bring out what was true or valuable in doctrines with which he might be in complete disagreement.

1908-1923

On his return to Oxshott Bosanquet was for some time engaged in preparing his Gifford Lectures, delivered in the University of Edinburgh. Their publication¹ was succeeded by that of the following smaller works: *The Distinction between Mind and its Objects* (1913), *Three Lectures on Aesthetic* (1915), *Social and International Ideals* (1917), *Some Suggestions on Ethics* (1918), *Implication and Linear Inference* (1920), *What Religion is* (1920), *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* (1921). To this list, which witnesses to mental activities wonderful in constancy and variety, must be added *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind* (published posthumously in 1923), the opening of a large work which, from the gradual failure of his health, was left unfinished at his death. In some of these volumes will be found lectures or papers composed for various Societies, such as the Aristotelian and the Charity Organization; and in addition there remain not a few others, printed as pamphlets, or in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913.

Society, or in volumes to which a number of authors contributed, such as *The International Crisis* (1915).¹

Naturally, in other papers and in Bosanquet's independent publications subsequent to 1914, the presence of the War is obvious, and, with it, that of controversy regarding the nature and functions of the State (see especially *Social and International Ideals*, 1917). Allied with this book, but dealing more generally with Ethics, is the volume published in the next year. Problems in Logic or Metaphysics, again, are treated in the books dated 1913, 1920, 1921, 1923; and in the small volume *What Religion is* we have a supplement to the Gifford Lectures.

There remain the *Three Lectures on Aesthetics*; and here Bosanquet returned to a department of philosophy on which for many years he had seldom written, though in his younger days it was perhaps his favourite. After translating the Introduction to Hegel's lectures on Aesthetic, and dealing in the *Essays and Addresses* (1889) with 'Artistic Handwork in Education', he published in 1892 the *History of Aesthetic*, the earliest of his larger works. It is strange that, at the time of his death, little or no reference was made to this work in the obituary notices of the press. For, it is safe to say, he is the only British philosopher of the first rank who has dealt at all fully with this part of philosophy; and, besides, that volume was, and has continued to be, welcomed by many readers otherwise unconcerned with philosophy. And this welcome is, for more than one reason, fully deserved. Most of Bosanquet's books were reproductions of lectures, and in them his thought is sometimes difficult to follow owing to the absence of the emphasis and intonation which, in the lecture-room, made his meaning clear at once. But the *History of Aesthetic* was written for readers, and admirably written. And this is not all. An exposition, however lucid, of the aesthetic theories of Plotinus or Hegel may baffle this or that reader; but, if he is interested in the subject of the book, and in the successive attitudes, not only of philosophers but of generations and ages, towards the beauty of Nature and of Art, he can hardly fail to be fascinated by the moving panorama offered to him here. And, if he has not a historical mind, he may still find both enjoyment and light in frequent and full references to particular artists and poets or in a luminous comparison of Dante and Shakespeare.²

¹ In the present pamphlet all the volumes of which Bosanquet was sole author are mentioned.

² In the *Three Lectures on Aesthetic* (1915) account is taken of recent publications, and, among them, of the writings of Croce; and the main point of

Bosanquet's life was free from disasters and serious disappointments, and it may, I believe, be truly described as happy. Though he was an exceptionally strenuous worker, his friends never found him distracted or oppressed. He was devoted to reflection of an abstruse kind, and often, at the same time, busy with committee-work and semi-popular lecturing; but these diverse activities never appeared to clash, and his burden might even be said to lie on him lightly. And the reason lay, partly doubtless in his nature, but also in his unflinching faith. He was sure that he was working for the good cause of the world; and he was sure of its success. Believing in the intellect, he did not preach or exhort, but reasoned and explained; and his writings, though never rhetorical, are, because of his faith, in a peculiar way exhilarating. And this is equally true of his converse with his friends. He had many friends, and I believe I speak for those who remain when I say that a day's visit to him left them happy, not only because of his affection, but because a talk with him cleared their vision and strengthened their faith.

A few words may be added concerning his tastes and recreations. He was no great traveller, though he spent some most enjoyable months in Greece and at Rome and paid several visits to Florence. He was fond of gardening and also of botanizing. He took a manual of botany with him in a country walk in order to identify any unfamiliar flower; and the Preface to his *Logic*, together with an elaborate account in the work itself of the fertilization of the Bee Orchis, shows that, to some extent at least, he studied the subject scientifically. He did not care much for games either out of doors or at home, but was an omnivorous reader of novels. His favourite novelists were Scott and Dickens; but in the small volume *Suggestions in Ethics* may be found references, not only to *Old Mortality*, *Woodstock*, and *Redgauntlet*, but to works by Miss Edgeworth, Balzac, Miss Yonge, Zola, George Eliot, Meredith, Mallock, Miss Cholmondeley, and Galsworthy. The poets to whom he refers most frequently are Homer (especially the *Odyssey*), Dante, and Goethe. In the concluding lecture of *The Principle of Individuality and Value* he describes the mind of Dante as expressed in the *Divina Commedia* in order to illustrate by comparison his own suggestions in the preceding lecture on the nature of the Absolute. The small volume mentioned above contains quotations from, or allusions to, Dante,

difference between Bosanquet and Croce (whom he greatly admired and with whom he corresponded) is fully considered in the masterly pamphlet *Croce's Aesthetic*, written for the British Academy and printed in the *Proceedings*, vol. ix, and also as a pamphlet.

Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Shelley, Browning, Arnold, Rossetti, and Meredith; but the poet whose name appears most often is Goethe. In this volume, wherever lines of Goethe's are quoted, a metrical translation is given; and, as it happens, the larger translations published in the course of Bosanquet's life are curiously significant. The first (1878) was that of Schömann's *Athenian Constitutional History*, and reference has already been made in this paper to his enthusiasm for Greece. The second was that of the Introduction in Hegel's lectures on Aesthetic; and, if any philosopher might be said to have a disciple in Bosanquet, it would be Hegel. The third was that of some of Goethe's lyrics, published (1919) in a small volume entitled *Zoar* and containing also original poems by Bosanquet's wife.

He married in 1895 Helen Dendy, who not only shared his interests and his faith but, from 1896 onward, has been the author of valuable works on social subjects. This paper has been concerned almost wholly with Bosanquet's career as a lecturer and writer, and I can venture to add here but a single sentence. His life, as I believe, may truly be called a happy one, and from the date of his marriage it was, beyond doubt, exceptionally happy.¹

A. C. BRADLEY.

BOSANQUET was an original thinker, inspired by the most genuine passion for truth and excellence in his work. He spared himself no effort in his search for exactness in knowledge. His life was absorbed in what he had set himself to do. He was a scholar, and he had, besides, read widely in modern literature of many varieties, as well as studied closely social problems. But first and foremost he was a metaphysician. It was as a metaphysician that he wrote on logic, on psychology, and on ethics. His outlook as a metaphysical thinker has therefore always to be borne in mind in the interpretation of his language, and to learn what that outlook was it is necessary to realize the spiritual descent of the philosopher himself.

To call Bosanquet an Hegelian would be to do him as much of an injustice as it would be to use the expression of the writer to whom he stood closest in thought, F. H. Bradley. Yet both of them owed much to Hegel. In their books he is never spoken of without grateful reverence, and on the massive basis of the objective idealism of

¹ This brief record could not have been compiled without the constant help of Mrs. Bosanquet, and it is much to be hoped that she may find it possible to write a biography of her husband.

Hegel each may be said to have erected his own particular structure. In 1865 a book by Hutchison Stirling, great in its time, had constituted the first step in this country towards the unfolding of the 'Secret of Hegel' to British readers. It was followed almost immediately by a memorable essay on Aristotle's philosophy, in the 'North British Review', by T. H. Green. Then Green and Edward Caird developed at length in books the significance of this new type of idealism, Green in his own especial fashion. These two, and particularly Green, sat very loose to the systematic doctrine of Hegel. What Hegel himself pronounced to be the only thing that he held to be certainly true in his philosophy, the method of approach to the problem of reality, was what laid hold of them. The conception of knowledge and of human experience as not static, as no relation between entities outside them, but as dynamic and embracing all the forms in which reality could present itself; this was the Hegelian principle which Bradley and Bosanquet inherited. Both of them, however, subjected it to close criticism. Each in his own way came to the conclusion that knowledge was inherently confined to relations, and that neither relations nor their terms could stand by themselves or bear the burden of expressing the content of what ought in ultimate analysis to be taken as the final character of the real. That character must transcend both knowledge and bare feeling, and lie in a quality from which both were therefore abstractions. Knowledge closely bound up with feeling could account for experience, but only for an experience which disclosed contradictions, removed first when they were resolved in such experience, at higher levels. But all such levels were themselves, so far as experienced, still only appearances, in contrast to the perfect and consistent ideal to which they pointed. Such an ideal, knowledge, confined to terms and relations, could only indicate but could not express. It was an absolute which it was necessary to assume to be the foundation of reality as revealed in knowledge, but it could neither be an object apprehended as in itself, nor could it be an 'Other' existing apart from such apprehension. Still, nothing short of such an absolute reality could form the ideal background to which all that is for us must be referred for its final significance.

The absolute for Hegel was not different in kind. But he thought he could render its character in terms of knowledge and present it as a system. In this Hutchison Stirling followed him. Green was silent on the point, and may be taken not to have gone so far. Bradley and Bosanquet definitely stopped short, and each worked out the theory of the ultimate reality in his own way.

For Bradley Bosanquet had a deep regard. The two thinkers had started from points of view which were substantially the same. They began by examining the facts of experience, and found themselves impelled by the contradictions disclosed towards a larger standpoint from which experience in an ideal form would become free from such contradictions. It must finally present itself ideally as no mere appearance, only relatively true, but in a form which, while beyond the reach of relational knowledge, was yet the reality in reference to which human experience, with its character of appearance, must be interpreted. Their divergence from Hegel was not over the principle in this, which was his as much as theirs, but over the mode of its application. Hegel sought to explain from above downwards. They strove to begin with what lay at the lower level and to show how the *nisus* of thought operated upwards with transforming power. With Hegel also the actual is experience. His system really begins with his philosophy of the human mind, as readers not only of his 'Phenomenology' but of the third part of his 'Encyclopaedia' know. But he held himself unable to explain properly without exhibiting the content of mind as giving actual existence to two abstractions which had no reality excepting as ideal factors in that content, Logic as a system of ultimate abstractions, and the externality characteristic of Nature as their counterpart in experience. His absolute was just the entirety conceived no longer as relative. So is the absolute for Bradley and Bosanquet. But the form of approach is wholly different, and it results for them in, what Hegel rejected, the possibility of subjecting knowledge itself to criticism. Kant sought to do this, and Hegel replied that it was only by relying on knowledge itself that truth could be reached at all. We must simply watch, he declared, the dynamic activity of thought in transcending its own abstractions. We could no more make progress without trusting ourselves to knowledge than we could learn to swim without trusting ourselves to the water.

It was this doctrine that the two Oxford thinkers in effect challenged. Their doubts about it seem to have brought them to the view that a transformed fashion of knowledge was conceivable, freed from terms and relations and separation of immediacy from mediation, a form of apprehension which would be appropriate to the character of what was not relative but in contrast to appearance was absolute.

The important feature in both is the way in which their methods produced closer relations with schools that were not idealist than had the methods of their idealist predecessors. The controversy became one about the implications of experience, and here at least a drawing

of the combatants into full sight of each other became possible. It is noticeable in both how close has been the attention bestowed on the work of the empirical school. In what was nearly the last book that Bosanquet wrote, the 'Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy', he spares no pains in looking for points of approach, and in striving to reduce divergences. In the end there is of course always a gulf fixed between his objective idealism and the realism of those about whom he is writing. He was a keen critic, and his insistence on unrestrained truthfulness in his own statements was everywhere apparent. But not the less one of the most valuable of the several notable contributions to philosophy which Bosanquet made was his effort in the book mentioned to mediate between the extremes he fully recognizes. How far he succeeded, whether the method he chose of approaching the problem of reality was better than or as good as that of Hegel, it will have to be left to a later generation to pronounce. But this at least is certain, that he greatly advanced insight into this subject.

Perhaps the most notable piece of work he did was to write the two volumes of Gifford Lectures, published over ten years since, and called *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. Their theme is that the fragmentary and conflicting character of finite existence points to a value and a reality beyond, and implies it both theoretically and practically; an ultimate and absolute individuality which is immanent in that which is finite and signifies an ideal perfection. It is to this conception that the writings of Bosanquet always point, whether he is dealing with logic, psychology, ethics, or pure metaphysics. His treatment of the conception in each of these domains impresses as unfailing in its thoroughness and level, whatever may be thought of the result.

The two books on *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, and on *What Religion is* are of great importance as illustrations of Bosanquet's method, and of the application of his ground principle. They cannot, however, be summarized in short compass.

HALDANE.