HAROLD HENRY JOACHIM
1868–1938

HAROLD HENRY JOACHIM was born on 28 May 1868, the second child and only son of Henry Joachim and Ellen Margaret his wife, daughter of Henry Smart, the eminent organist and composer. His father had come to England some twenty-five or thirty years before, at the age of 16, from Kitsee in Hungary, without resources, to enter a wool-merchant's business belonging to some relatives. He found himself possessed of an extraordinary gift for testing by feel the quality of bales of wool; and he brought the business, of which he became the head, into a highly flourishing position. He was himself neither a musician nor a man of learning, but had great appreciation of what is best in music and art, and great interest in his children's education; and the career of his younger brother Joseph, the famous violinist, shows the presence of musical ability not only on the mother's side of Harold's ancestry, but on the father's in outstanding degree.

Harold's home was in London until his Oxford days. At about the age of 9 he went as a day-boy to Linton House School, in Holland Park Avenue. The school, now defunct, was then kept by James Hardie, a Scot, and an exceedingly good teacher; and among the boys there with Harold was Basil Williams, afterwards Professor of History at Edinburgh. The two families became intimate, and Professor Williams remembers Mrs. Joachim's kindness, and the help she used to give to young musicians.

Every spring Joseph Joachim visited his brother, and Harold, who began the violin at the age of 6, had to learn something to play to him. On one occasion, after he had played to his uncle Leclair's *Tambourin*, the latter took the little violin and began playing the tricky passages in various bowings; Harold was afraid he was finding them difficult, and whispered encouragingly, 'Try up-bow, Uncle Jo.'

From Linton House School Harold went as a boarder to Elstree School, and thence in 1882 with a scholarship to Harrow, where he was in the Headmaster's house, first under Butler and then under Welldon, becoming in his last year head of it. His short sight and consequent incapacity at games, and some general delicacy of health, precluded him from being made head of the school, but he was easily its most distinguished scholar. As head of the house he was faced by some unusual difficulties, which he met quietly, firmly, and courageously, and in the end won its universal respect. He is said to have had at that time conservative views both in politics and religion. From Harrow he proceeded to Balliol as senior scholar of his year.[1] He obtained first classes in both Classical Moderations and Literae Humaniores, and divided the Jenkyns Exhibition with Stuart Jones. It was perhaps his early absorption in the philosophical side of the 'Greats' course which prevented his winning any of the University prizes in pure scholarship. In that field Stuart Jones, with whom he was in lodgings during their last year, was the outstanding figure of their generation. The present writer, who came up to Oxford in the same term, though not to Balliol, remembers how even then Joachim had fixed for himself a studious routine, from which he could not be induced to budge.

[1] The scholars who entered Balliol with him were W. G. Gibson, who died the following year; H. Stuart Jones, afterwards successively Fellow of Trinity College, Camden Professor of Ancient History, Principal of University College, Aberystwyth, and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Wales; J. S. Tucker, who became Headmaster of Trent College; J. H. Ritson, who attained distinction in the Wesleyan Ministry; C. Raymond Beazley, also later a Fellow of Merton, for twenty-four years Professor of History in Birmingham University; G. A. Wood (of the previous year's election), afterwards Professor of History in Sydney University; and C. J. S. Howard, M.P. for Birmingham 1904–11, and later tenth Earl of Carlisle. Among the Exhibitioners were G. S. Cookson, who did well in the Ceylon Civil Service and was something of a poet, and Reginald Carter, who became Fellow of Lincoln, Rector of Edinburgh Academy, and Headmaster of Bedford School.

It was in 1886 that Jowett fetched John Farmer from Harrow to develop at Balliol the practice of music. Joachim had helped Farmer to improve the music at Harrow, and at Oxford helped him in starting the Sunday evening concerts which have been a feature of the life of the College from that day to this. He was himself always ready to take his part in the work by playing in quartets, &c. Throughout his undergraduate years he took lessons in the violin from Ludwig Straus, a very fine artist and teacher, who was closely associated with Joseph Joachim at the 'Saturday and Monday Pops' at St. James's Hall. He was President of the University Musical Club both as an undergraduate and afterwards, and took a leading part for a time in its affairs; he often played second violin at its concerts with leaders used to the highest company, such as Straus, Josef Ludwig, Gompertz, or Alfred Gibson. On these occasions he always studied his part very carefully; and indeed he was never willing to play even at a small and friendly dinner-party without trying to settle beforehand what the music should be, and to arrange a rehearsal. For many years he had an amateur quartet, playing generally on Sunday mornings, in his rooms in Merton or after marriage at his house, and he demanded of it a high standard; he had somewhat special gifts as a quartet-leader. His style was marked by a feeling for restraint, and his sense of his uncle's greatness seemed to some of his musical friends to limit his appreciation of other artists.

> Perhaps there is one thing I might say [writes one of these friends] about Harold's playing. When I accompanied his uncle, I always felt that one thought about the music and not about the way in which he played it. I felt the same when I was playing with Harold. Harold would have been intensely annoyed if any one had seemed to him to be instituting a parallel or comparison between his uncle and him. But he would not, I think, have minded being told that they gave the impression of aiming at the same thing.

Jowett was anxious that Joachim should go into the Civil Service; he himself had some thought of the bar if he

could not follow his bent for philosophy, and began eating dinners; but he would have been satisfied with no other sort of career than he actually followed, and his election to a prize Fellowship at Merton in the autumn after his final schools fortunately made the way plain. It was an additional piece of good fortune that at Merton he found himself a colleague of F. H. Bradley, as well as for a time of A. E. Taylor of New College, who gained a prize Fellowship a year after him. Bradley's was one of the strongest influences upon his mind; to him and to J. A. Smith he paid a deference in matters of philosophy which he paid to no one else. A reader of his book on *The Nature of Truth* can trace Bradleian influence throughout; it appeared in his lectures on Logic as a Professor; but towards the end of his tenure of the Chair he more and more endeavoured to come to grips with the issues on which Bradley's position did not fully satisfy him.

After two years of quiet study at Merton he was invited, at John Burnet's suggestion, to act as Assistant to William Knight, then Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews. There he remained for two years, and in the second of them was also Lecturer in Moral Philosophy; Knight's state of health at the time was such as to cast on Joachim the main responsibility for the work. He lived at first with Professor (later Sir) William McCormick and his wife, and McCormick and he together started the University Chamber Concerts which Mrs. Burnet afterwards took over; the *College Echoes* of the time contain evidence of the impression made by his playing. But later, and during most of his residence at St. Andrews, he and John Maclennan 'chummed' together. Maclennan (afterwards Rector of the High School at Dundee) had come as assistant to Burnet a little after Joachim's arrival, and at Burnet's suggestion proposed to one then a stranger their living together. He records how, 'though we had never met before', Joachim gave him ' as warm and friendly a welcome as if we had known each other all our days', and remembers

him as one of the best and kindest friends he ever had, as well as 'one of the ablest and most inspiring men intellectually' in his acquaintance. This friendship with characteristic fidelity Joachim maintained through life, visiting Maclennan, who became later a permanent invalid, often at the cost of considerable effort to himself. In his class work Joachim was popular and successful, and 'set a standard of scholarly thoroughness and clear thinking' to which one of his ablest students, Professor Norman Kemp Smith, looks back as 'precisely what we most needed'. Already he took Spinoza as one subject of lectures to Honours students, and also read with them in a class the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

But he was recalled in 1894 to be a Lecturer at Balliol, under the Mastership of Edward Caird and in daily collaboration with J. A. Smith; and at Balliol he remained until appointed to a Tutorial Fellowship at Merton in 1897, as successor to William Wallace. Wallace, who was also White's Professor of Moral Philosophy,[1] had lost his life in a bicycle accident early that year. Joachim remained Tutor in Philosophy at Merton until 1919, though for two years during the War, from Trinity Term 1917, he worked in London in connexion with propaganda. He made a bargain that he should not, like other tutors, be required to do pass teaching; and he steadfastly resisted offers of extra work, such as examining, partly perhaps because he could never afford to strain his health, but also to avoid distraction from his main studies. To this rule he made one exception, by acting as examiner in Literae Humaniores in 1917, when, owing to the War, examiners were hard to find, and numbers negligible; the candidates were only thirteen. That he lectured in 1908 for the Common University Fund was hardly an exception; it was in the line of his studies. He was very regular in his hours and his routine, as he had

[1] Wallace was succeeded in the Chair by J. A. Stewart, Student of Christ Church. The Chair, now fully endowed and attached to Corpus Christi College, is no longer tenable in combination with a post on a college teaching staff.

been when an undergraduate. He was fond of tennis, at which his service was effective, of golf and of walking, and in vacations loved to fish; his friend R. P. Hardie has a record of many fishing expeditions with him. He kept a dog, with whom in the absence of any human companion he was quite content to walk; but if he had a human companion of an afternoon, he would not on that account extend the time he allowed himself; he must return to smoke a pipe and think for three-quarters of an hour before taking any pupil's essay.

With the undergraduate community of his College at large Joachim made no effort to acquaint himself; but his actual pupils he sought to know as friends (having luncheon parties every Sunday in term), and he exercised on them, unpremeditatedly and probably unconsciously, a profound influence. One of his colleagues writes: 'I fancy that he thought himself a failure as a teacher, and that this impaired his teaching. But it only made him the more conscientious —his preparations for an essay with the stupidest of men were unbelievable; and he was always waiting for the spark.' If he did think himself a failure as a teacher, letter after letter received at the time of his death bears witness how greatly he was mistaken. It was not only that (in the words of the admirable obituary notice published in *The Times* of 2 August 1938) his 'mastery of his subject and his intense and transparent conviction of its importance compelled immediate attention', and that to hear him expound or to discuss with him was to be trained in closeness of thinking and clearness of expression. To this Mr. T. S. Eliot gave notable testimony in *The Times* of 4 August 1938, and some sentences from what he wrote there may well be quoted.

> There are other teachers [he said] to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for stimulation of thought and curiosity, and for direction of studies: to Joachim alone am I aware of any debt for instruction in the writing of English. All readers of *The Nature of Truth* will acknowledge the distinction of Joachim's own writing: only those who have been his pupils know his influence

upon the writing of others. He taught me, in the course of criticizing weekly essays with a sarcasm the more authoritative because of its gentle impersonality, and because he was concerned with clearing up confusion rather than with scoring off his victim, that one should know exactly what one meant before venturing to put words on paper, and that one should avoid metaphor wherever a plain statement can be found. To his *explication de texte* of the Posterior Analytics I owe an appreciation of the importance of punctuation; to his criticism of my papers I owe an appreciation of the fact that good writing is impossible without clear and distinct ideas.

But what also and beyond the quality of his mind attracted and impressed those who came to know him as a teacher was the quality of his character, so that these letters express affection and reverence for the man, as well as admiration of the scholar. He made his pupils realize, as one of them wrote, 'the dignity of the subject, and of a life spent in genuine cultivation of it:—a possibility which mere competence or even excellence at a subject, treated as a technical accomplishment, does not carry'. 'Intellectual honesty', 'simplicity and singleness of purpose', a sense of 'the duty of being sure of one's meaning and of not being satisfied with conventional phrases'—these things he commended to others not by precept but as exemplar. 'It was', writes another, 'no ordinary feeling that H. H. J. inspired among those of his pupils who really came to know him. He was, I think, the most integral of the philosophers of his time . . . and when you saw the character and quality of his mind, you were changed in emotion as well as in intellect.'

When F. H. Bradley died, his sister Marian de Glehn, whom he had appointed his literary executor, always refusing her request that he should associate with her some philosophic colleague, 'knowing his great esteem for H. H. J., both as a man and as a philosopher', turned to Joachim for help. This he gave in ungrudging measure.

> He flung himself [wrote Mrs. de Glehn after his death]—I can use no other word—into every question, and the extraordinary clearness and accuracy of his thinking, and his *insistence*, as well

for himself as you, in giving the smallest question the most absolute care and effort of his mind, was an education in itself. Nothing was left in a nebulous haze from a principle to the placing of a comma. After hours, perhaps, of answering questions, or studying difficulties, there was never the smallest appearance of fatigue of mind or boredom. His alertness was the same—however great the strain at times must have been—and his editing of *Relations*[1] remains a testimony of his great powers, and the generosity of his friendship for a fellow philosopher and friend. [And she continued:] To his character and generous friendship I owe a debt I can never repay. He seemed to me in his extraordinary modesty, and selfless devotion to truth, the living expression of his beliefs. . . . He was indeed to all who had the privilege of knowing him an unconscious ideal.[2]

Joachim married in 1907 his first cousin Elisabeth, daughter of the violinist. There were three children—a son and two daughters, and theirs was a singularly happy home, as those who enjoyed its hospitality could see; and in it he was able to maintain his studious routine, his friendships, and his entertainment of his pupils no less than when he lived in College. He maintained also his interest in College business. Something should be said of this side of his activity. He would have felt it his duty in any case, as a member of a governing body, to acquaint himself fully with the affairs in the decision of which he had to take part. It was characteristic in this connexion that later, when a Professor, he criticized adversely one of the changes made by the Commissioners of 1923. Until then the stipend of a Professor attached to a College consisted partly of the emoluments of an 'Ordinary Fellowship', £200 a year, partly of a sum paid by the University, but of which the whole or a part was a charge on the revenue of the College in favour of the University Chest. The Commissioners added the £200 to this charge and made the Fellowship non-stipendiary. Since all such charges rank before the

[1] See *infra*, p. 421, *ad fin.*

[2] Mrs. de Glehn died herself on 3 April 1939, while this Memoir was being written.

payment of Fellowships, and a deficiency in College revenues must be met in the first place by a rateable abatement of Fellowship emoluments, the effect of the change was to remove a financial interest which Professor-Fellows had hitherto had, like the rest, in the good husbandry of the College. Joachim opposed this; he did not wish that Professors should receive a priority which might diminish their solidarity of interest with their colleagues in College affairs.

But he was attracted to these affairs not only by a sense of duty to his College; he had also a natural aptitude for them, not on the tutorial, but on the business side. In this part of them as a Fellow of Merton he took a deep interest, and was very influential. He knew his case, and could state it excellently; he was very quick in debate, detecting and exposing at once the most speciously concealed fallacies of an opponent's argument. He never lost his temper, but was not afraid, while preserving deference, to maintain his opposition to the most formidable colleague, if he thought him mistaken. He had a good head for financial questions, and a good judgement on them.

It so happened that at New College his turn to be Subwarden fell in the year 1924, when Warden Spooner had just resigned; and he became responsible for much of the preliminary sounding of opinion among the Fellows on the question of the succession; he had also, after only four and a half years' membership of their body, to presid over several meetings of the Fellows called to discuss the problem. All this work he carried through with the utmost care, forethought, and skill in chairmanship. And in the close association of common-room life, where, as some lamentable instances have shown, daily intercourse no more necessarily makes for harmony than in a Spanish cloister, Joachim's was always a harmonious influence. He disliked ridicule, though not criticism, and resented anything in controversy that seemed to him unfair; but he readily composed a difference, if any arose, and his colleagues at Merton, and afterwards at New College, had great affection for him.

Another field of practical or administrative work in which for many years he laboured was that of the Board of Faculty of Literae Humaniores. It must be admitted that at times he seemed to most of his colleagues not to know when opposition on matters of secondary importance might well be dropped; but he was a valuable member, especially because his high standards made him a vigilant judge of the suitability of subjects proposed, or work submitted, for research degrees.

During part of the War, as has been said above, Joachim worked daily in London (under John Buchan, now Lord Tweedsmuir) in connexion with propaganda. Like others with close relatives in enemy countries, he felt acutely the divisions which the War brought; but he had no doubt of the rightness of the Allied cause, and never concealed his opinion or his sympathy. Nevertheless he was most scrupulous in dealing with German documents, such as captured soldiers' diaries, to avoid distorting the translation to a sense more favourable to the allied cause than it properly bore. In 1919, when the War was over, it became necessary for the University to fill various chairs which had become vacant during its course, and to which election, under an Emergency Statute, had meanwhile been suspended. Among these was the Wykeham Chair of Logic, the first holder of which, John Cook Wilson, had died in August 1915. Joachim was among the candidates, and it was no surprise when in July of 1919 the electors appointed him to succeed one whom in certain respects he resembled, but with whom in others he stood in sharp contrast. Wilson was a very distinguished thinker, a profound student, like Joachim, of Greek philosophy, and equally devoted to philosophical reflection; but he had for years in his lectures—unfortunately he published nothing on the subject—been criticizing the idealistic logic of which F. H. Bradley in Oxford was the leading exponent. His successor was a convinced disciple of the school which Wilson opposed. Wilson's criticisms have fortunately been rescued from oblivion in

the two volumes of his Lectures and other remains so admirably edited, under the title *Statement and Inference*, by Lt.-Col. A. S. L. Farquharson. Joachim's lectures on Logic, which were always read, and revised with scrupulous care from year to year, survive in manuscript, and it is hoped will be published; if so, they will reveal a very different doctrine.

A professor's teaching work, in Oxford, is more exclusively through lectures than that of a college tutor. Joachim was still brought into personal contact with a few students for research degrees, of whom he might be the supervisor, and with those who expressly sought or were commended to his acquaintance—some of them indeed having been drawn to Oxford by his reputation—or who chose to attend the 'informal instruction' which it is part of a professor's statutory duty to give for two hours a week in term. There was also the class or seminar in some Greek philosophical text which J. A. Smith and he conducted in most terms between 1924 and 1935. Of this, more later.[1] But his lectures drew large audiences, and on many of those who heard them they made, like the lectures which he had given as college tutor, a strong impression. He took immense pains in their preparation. Where they were expository of a text, as of the *Regulae* of Descartes, a hearer who already knew, and perhaps had reached his own conclusion on the value of, some doctrine under exposition could feel an intellectual pleasure in the skill and subtlety with which it was expounded. Moreover, the lecturer had the great advantage of a voice at once clear and soft, which made listening as easy as fine print does reading.

With the exception of two years during the War, Joachim lectured in Oxford from 1894 to 1935 inclusive. A list of the subjects he selected shows what were the directions of his interest; the same directions of interest are many of them shown in his published work. While teaching at Balliol he lectured on Plato's *Republic* and on Aristotle's

[1] See *infra*, pp. 418–19.

Nicomachean Ethics; on the latter he continued to lecture, more years than not, all the time that he was at Merton. In one term of each of the three years 1898–1900 he lectured on Spinoza, his *Study* of whose *Ethics* appeared in 1901. In ten terms at Merton, and twice as Professor, he lectured or held a class on some book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; twice at Merton and three times at New College he held a class on the *Posterior Analytics*, and once (in 1906) on the *De Lineis Insecabilibus*, his translation of which, with full foot-notes, was published in 1908. Three times between 1901 and 1904 he gave an *Introduction to Metaphysics*. On Descartes's *Meditations* he lectured seven times between 1903 and 1914, and on the *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii* six times between 1922 and 1934. In seven terms between 1906 and 1916 he lectured on some dialogue of Plato, *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*,[1] or *Sophist*; once in 1910, before he was Professor, on *Some Logical Problems*; in 1913 and 1916, and again in 1926, on Kant's *Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic*. After he became Professor, he naturally lectured principally on Logic: at first, and in almost every term down to 1927, on the *Judgement*; in 1925 and 1927 to 1929, in one term of the year, on *Universal and Individual*; and in each of the last eight academical years of his tenure of his Chair he gave a two-term course under the title *Logical Studies*. In three of these years, including the last, he lectured in the third term on Spinoza's *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. After his retirement he hesitated whether to work up these lectures or his *Logical Studies* into a book, but decided in favour of these. The book, though, like its subject, left unfinished, was so near completion as to warrant publication, and is now in the press. It is possible (as already indicated) that the *Logical Studies* will also be edited for publication.

It will be seen from the Bibliography at the end of this memoir that Joachim's published work was not of great

[1] His lecture on the *Philebus*, in Lent Term 1908, was given for the Common University Fund.

bulk. But it was all of high quality. To a considerable extent it was critical and expository. Of his books, *The Nature of Truth* is the only one in which he is primarily concerned to put forward and defend his own philosophical position. But his criticisms elsewhere often indicate the position developed there. For the unity which he believed it to be the philosopher's business to seek in things he sought to realize in his own thinking.

He accepted in general the idealist doctrine which was dominant in Oxford when he came up, and of which R. L. Nettleship, W. Wallace and F. H. Bradley were then the principal resident exponents. Of these, the last affected his thinking the most. Reality, said Bradley, is experience; not meaning that it is so many sets of psychical states in finite minds, but that what is felt is inseparable from feeling, the desired from desire, what is thought from thinking, or—he adds—'anything from anything else'.[1] So Joachim protests against the 'severance of the experienced real from the experiencing of it', but rejects the 'spiritual pluralism' which is one form that subjective idealism takes.[2] This refusal to sever experience from the experienced naturally carried with it the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth; though the rejection of that theory would not of itself compel the acceptance of the unity of experience and the experienced. For it might be said that the correspondence theory rests on the mistake of supposing that what is to be known must, in order that I may know it, be somehow reproduced or copied in my mind: in fact, that it derives from the 'representative theory of perception', to which theory it is a familiar objection that, if we perceive only the representation, we have no means of knowing there is an original which it represents. But the mind need not be viewed under the metaphor of a sheet on which representations of what is real may be imprinted, or of a cabinet in which models may be stored.

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, Clarendon Press, 1930, p. 129.

[2] *The Nature of Truth*, pp. 61, 69.

We may think rather of how a particle is shiftingly related to infinitely many others, as it and they move, and may suppose that the mind is simple, but without derogation from its simplicity comes into a certain peculiar relation to divers realities which are nevertheless independent of it—the relation called knowing or awareness of them. This kind of realism was being tried out, when Joachim wrote, by Mr. (afterwards Professor) G. E. Moore and Mr. Bertrand Russell. It went far beyond merely denying any necessary correlation between the reality to be known and the knowing of it, between what may be experienced and experience. That knowing is not making was being vehemently maintained by Joachim's predecessor in the chair of Logic at Oxford, John Cook Wilson, against Kant's account of the 'phenomena' which alone Kant thought men can really know; and long ago the Aristotelian doctrine that correlative terms can neither of them be without the other was qualified in the *Categories*, so far as ἐπιστητόν and ἐπιστήμη are concerned; facts (πράγματα) for the most part exist before we have knowledge of them.[1] Joachim himself never denied that a satisfactory account of reality must find room for admitting this 'severance between the finite thinkers and the real world, which they think about and endeavour to know'.[2]

> The 'scientific mind' is *over against* a reality to be known, and its 'concrete thinking' is *about* something other than the thought. We may speak of a judgement of science as an 'inseparable unity of thinking and the object thought': but we must interpret *object thought* as the content of the thinking, or as the *what* of which the actuality of the thinking is the *that*. The 'meaning', in short, is still adjectival. It is a predicate, which, in the judgement or system of judgements, is 'affirmed of', or 'referred to', reality. . . . The system of judgements which we have shown to be involved in the single 'true' judgements is a body of knowledge *about* reality.[3]

This, in his view, is the truth distorted in the correspondence theory. But it is very different from the doctrine which would

[1] *Cat.* 7, 7^b, 22–35. [2] *The Nature of Truth*, p. 118.
[3] Ib., p. 116.

analyse the total situation occurring in any case of knowledge into a mind or consciousness, an object of greater or less complexity, and a peculiar relation called knowing between them, into which they may enter, and out of which they may pass, without any modification of the related terms.

It is against this doctrine that the more polemical parts of Joachim's book *The Nature of Truth* are directed. He had no love of polemics for their own sake; and he carefully points out, early in his second chapter, that 'for my purposes it is irrelevant whether any philosopher actually holds the view which I am about to discuss'.[1] But the ensuing discussion was recognized by Mr. Russell as 'the best recent statement' of the view from which Mr. Moore and he wished to register dissent;[2] and Joachim's is one of the most powerful attacks that have been delivered against that which they wished to maintain. Mr. Russell's positive account of truth has indeed been more than once modified since the date of the Essay—1907—in which he criticized Joachim; but the fundamental issue between them remained. Joachim derived the view which he endeavoured to make explicit and to refute from two assumptions: that 'experiencing makes no difference to the facts',[3] and that relations are external to their terms. To this he opposed the view that 'the truth itself is one, and whole, and complete, and that all thinking and all experience moves within its recognition and subject to its manifest authority';[4] this all-embracing truth he calls—perhaps not very happily—a 'significant whole' whose elements are 'contributory features in a single concrete meaning'.[5] A critic might object to this use of the word 'meaning'; it is one which betrays the influence of F. H. Bradley; and he might object

[1] Ib., p. 33.

[2] See *The Monistic Theory of Truth*, in Russell's *Philosophical Essays*, p. 151, n. 1, and Prof. Moore's paper in *Mind*, N.S. xvi. 62, 1907, pp. 229–35.

[3] See *The Nature of Truth*, p. 33.

[4] Ib., p. 178.

[5] Ib., p. 66. See the quotation *infra*, p. 414.

also that often, where Joachim speaks of truth, he should have spoken rather of reality. But to this Joachim would have replied that reality is not ultimately to be set over against the mind, the truth of whose thinking lies in being a complete system of mutually cohering judgements; on the contrary, reality is only *for* such an adequately knowing mind, and we are wrong to suppose that the meaning which, when speaking of our imperfect efforts after knowledge, we say that we entertain, and perhaps say is 'in our minds', would, if there were complete and adequate knowledge, be only in the mind; on the contrary, it would be the reality meant.

Further, if the truth is one, there is not just an aggregate of truths, or true propositions. Pieces of knowledge, if the phrase is permissible, just because they are pieces, fall short of being knowledge. It might be thought that mathematical truth is such an aggregate; the knowledge that $2+2 = 4$ may be possessed by itself, and is not modified, for a man who once grasps it, by his subsequent discovery of other numerical equalities. But how, asks Joachim, if a number stands in determinate relations of equal, greater or less to every other number, can that not belong to its being? how is it conceivable that it would be what it is, if any one of these relations did not hold? and how, therefore, can we know it for what it is, without knowing the whole system within which the particular equality, $2+2 = 4$, falls? And what thus applies to a piece of arithmetical knowledge in relation to the whole numerical system applies to the whole numerical system in relation to other features of reality. 'The distinction between "necessary" and "contingent" truths', says Joachim, 'is not one which I should be prepared to accept.'[1] It is easy to make fun of this position; certainly we are not able to show how the knowledge that $2+2 = 4$ is itself modified with increasing grasp of the whole system of number, and what Bosanquet called the linear scheme of inference may seem to get justification from

[1] Ib., p. 67, n. 1.

the way in which we link up one piece of mathematical knowledge with another without, apparently, modifying the pieces linked. Doubtless it was his interest in this issue which led Joachim to study and lecture on the *Regulae* of Descartes, who there propounds such a view of inference. And under one form or another many philosophers have felt themselves forced to distinguish between the necessary and the contingent. But the distinction has always been found to present great difficulty, whether it appear under the guise of essence and accident, form and matter, general and special providence, laws of nature and original collocations of particles, or however else. The issue involved is that of relations and their terms; are relations 'internal' or 'external' to their terms? Professor Moore has discussed this issue, with special reference to F. H. Bradley and to Joachim, in a paper on *External Relations* included among his *Philosophical Studies*. The position he there takes up seems to require that we can justify a distinction between what is essential to any individual and what is predicable of it but not essential. Joachim thought this impossible in the last resort; herein he agreed with Spinoza; and it was probably Spinoza's insistence on the indivisible unity of the attributes in the one substance, and of the modes with one another under any attribute, that attracted him to the study of the *Ethics*. He was always resolved to press the implications of any theory that he examined; only then could it be judged. He pressed in this way the theory of 'independent entities' against which so much of his polemic was directed. It seemed to him, when worked out, to amount to saying that the universe is a loose and disconnected aggregate; and he would have agreed with Plato that τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων.[1] Equally he pressed the theory that the universe is a system: that what any one thing is depends on how it is related to, influences and is influenced by, other things. In his view this implied that the mutually influencing

[1] *Sophistes*, 259 E.

parts of the system are not prior to and component of the whole, but manifestations of its unity. He criticizes from this standpoint Spinoza's geometrical exposition in the *Ethics*, and his contention that in the chain of human action the connexion is 'geometrical' and not purposive.

> Of what nature [he asks] is this 'geometrical' coherence—the only type of causal *nexus* which Spinoza admits? . . . One property of a spatial figure 'follows from' another, because the positive character of the figure demands for its construction and maintenance precisely these spatial elements with their distinctive characters and mode of interconnexion. The conclusion 'follows from' the premises, because the positive character of the whole of significance which they express requires for its construction and maintenance precisely these elements with their distinctive significances and mode of coherence. In other words:—every connexion by content (every 'geometrical' or 'logical' *nexus*, therefore) implies a significant whole dominating significant elements. And the coherence of the elements is the expression both of the reciprocal implications of their own natures and of the character of the whole; for it is only within that character that the reciprocal implications *are*. Now, if this is so, every connexion by content implies a domination essentially *teleological* in character. For the 'significant whole' conditions the contents and reciprocal implications of the component elements *as that to which they are the indispensable means*. Its 'being' requires their 'being': and they are what they are, and are reciprocally interrelated as they are, because it is what it is. It is not a mere resultant which they happen to produce, nor an end external to them to which they lead; but an individuality which stamps them with its character. It is the immanent end, which they constitute and maintain, but which determines what they are.[1]

The above quotation exhibits the consistency which Joachim maintained in his thinking. The 'coherence-notion' of truth so carefully worked out in 1906 underlies what was here put forward in 1901. As a 'provisional and rough formulation' of the coherence-notion in *The Nature of Truth* he writes: 'Anything is true which can be conceived. It is true because, and in so far as, it can be

[1] *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 230–2.

conceived. Conceivability is the essential nature of truth.' But he adds:

> To 'conceive' means for us to think out clearly and logically, to hold many elements together in a connexion necessitated by their several contents. And to be 'conceivable' means to be a 'significant whole', or a whole possessed of meaning for thought. A 'significant whole' is such that all its elements reciprocally involve one other, or reciprocally determine one another's being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning. The elements thus cohering constitute a whole, which may be said to control the reciprocal adjustment of its elements, as an end controls its constituent means.[1]

Objection might be taken (as has already been said) to this use of the terms 'significant' and 'meaning', and also to calling the constituents of a whole means to an end; but these matters of language could be amended and the doctrine still be stated. The substantial criticism by the school which he specially opposed is, that a whole of parts presupposes the parts that compose it, and these must be the same outside as in the whole. That criticism Joachim was never prepared to concede; now and then he uses against it the instance of how a work of art is created; in conversation he was apt especially to refer to works of musical art. To concede it would be to reject all real unity in the whole. But philosophy is the search for unity; the faith of philosophy is that the universe is somehow one.

It was this faith that sustained him in the confession of failure with which he closes his essay on *The Nature of Truth*. It has been noted above that he acknowledged our thought to be about a reality other than itself; so that, if we are to justify speaking of an inseparable unity in our experience between thinking and the object thought, we must interpret 'object' as 'content' of the thinking (although in the argument of his paper *On the Platonic Distinction between 'True' and 'False' Pleasures*, published in 1911 in the *Philosophical Review*, this admission seems to have been forgotten). And he did not conceal his consciousness that he had failed to

[1] Op. cit., p. 66.

find a place for this feature of our knowledge and thinking in the coherence-notion of truth. Even that theory itself is a thinking *about* the truth of other thinking than itself. His attitude alike towards the theory which he had striven to establish and towards those which he had rejected is candidly stated in the last six lines of the book. 'I am ending with a confession of ignorance; but at least I have cleared my mind of much sham knowledge. And I am old-fashioned enough to believe that this achievement is the first requisite for any one who hopes to learn.' But this confession was still within the terms of his faith.

This attitude and this faith must be borne in mind in considering his *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*. The critical study of a philosophical text was a work eminently suited to his gifts. His careful scholarship, his patience and thoroughness, his power of marshalling in orderly fashion the parts of a complicated theory and of lucidly stating it, all found play in what he did of this sort. In his commentary, with translation, on Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione* all this is perhaps even more noticeable than in his work on Spinoza's *Ethics*; and from some points of view that commentary may be regarded as his most notable achievement. But of his study of the *Ethics* this might be said. It is excellent as a statement of Spinoza's doctrine; and it is also searching in its criticism of various points where that doctrine breaks down. But these are so fundamental, and the criticism of them so uncompromising, that it might be asked why any one making it should any longer look to Spinoza as likely to help him towards the solution of the philosophical riddle. The answer is twofold. First, the scholar in Joachim was ready to take all pains in order to make out the meaning of a great thinker, however the philosopher rejected the doctrine to be found. That zeal he often displayed at meetings of the little Aristotelian Society over which Ingram Bywater for many years presided, and where less patient members were sometimes anxious rather to consider whether it was true, than what was the exact form of

untenable doctrine intended by the Aristotelian text. But secondly, he felt that Spinoza correctly envisaged the purpose of philosophy. 'A philosophy is successful so far as it enables us to "think" experience, i.e. to take it as a coherent system, as a whole which is interconnected by an immanent necessity. This—I have assumed—was the object of Spinoza, and it is from this point of view that I propose to examine the results we have reached'.[1] In the interesting discussion of Spinoza's arguments for the existence of God he writes:[2]

> So far as anything is contingent, so far its nature is dispersed into the other things upon which its existence depends; and thus the less there is of it in its 'self', or the less real content its self includes. Now take anything which is—start from any existent fact you please—from any piece of experience, however trivial and thin its content; and think out all that its being involves. If you do so, the 'thing's' reality will expand in your hands: more and more will force itself into its being. Or, indeed, the 'thing' and 'its' being will dissolve, until you find yourself ultimately forced to conceive (as that which you are really experiencing) the whole nature of things; until you are compelled to realize that the experience with which you started was a fragment—and a fragment which involved as its context the whole. The contingency and the finiteness (or defective reality) with which you started must (in the attempt fully to experience it) vanish: and in itself you will have the self-conditioned necessity and the complete or infinite reality, which Spinoza calls God.

That is an attempt to state the basis of Spinoza's system; but also of his own. Therefore, if there were important points at which Spinoza's doctrine broke down, this was no more than a guide to where his own system might be expected most to need strengthening. He was ready to admit that he had not reconciled the coherence-notion of truth with the independence on our knowledge of it belonging to what we know; but he still believed that the coherence-notion pointed to the goal he sought. So he continued, in spite of his criticisms of Spinoza, to look to him for guidance. At any rate, truth must lie rather along the lines of the passage just quoted than along those of a theory

[1] *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 99. [2] Ib., pp. 52–3.

which resolves reality into innumerable simple things in merely accidental relations one to another.

The above may perhaps serve as a statement, however inadequate, of the main features of Joachim's philosophic thought. But Greek philosophy occupied so much of his interest, and he did so much towards maintaining the study of it in Oxford, that this memoir would be altogether incomplete without some detailed account of his work in this field. Professor J. A. Smith, with whom he collaborated in it for many years, has been good enough to contribute such an account.

From before the beginning of the present century [he writes] I was in constant touch with Joachim, and we were always taking counsel with one another on points of the interpretation of the texts on which we lectured; no one could have had fuller opportunity to know his command of the resources of scholarship. After his grounding in it at Harrow, he had assiduously bettered it at Balliol under Paravicini and Hardie. On his return to Oxford he became a regular attender at the meetings of the 'Aristotelian Society' under Bywater on Monday evenings in term, and profited (as did all the members of the group) by the generosity with which that great scholar put at the service of his juniors the immense stores of his bibliographical knowledge and his intimate acquaintance with the *Sprachgebrauch* of Aristotle.

Subsequently, Joachim did not, I think, renew, still less extend, his reading of Greek literature. In the main he confined his studies to the principal works of Greek philosophers, indeed to those of the two greatest of them, Plato and Aristotle. On several of the more important and more difficult dialogues of Plato he gave public courses of lectures. The MSS. of these he readily permitted me to read, and I cannot speak too admiringly of the impression they made upon me. But in time he desisted from further study of Plato and concentrated upon Aristotle. The published results of these studies are to be found in his translation (with notes) of the *De Lineis Insecabilibus*, his article in the *Journal of Philology* on 'Aristotle's Conception of Chemical Combination' and, above all, in his edition of the *De Generatione et Corruptione*. The first of these treatises he did much to elucidate (with the help of his mathematical colleague at Merton, A. L. Dixon); the second gives an admirably clear account of Aristotle's doctrine (based on the earlier account by Jac. Zabarella); the third contains a new

text of the treatise, in which Joachim used fresh evidence in a manner that showed a first-hand knowledge of the MSS., supplied an illuminating commentary on the work, and furnished students of it with an invaluable introduction on Aristotle's conception of a 'science', and the place of the treatise *De Gen. et Corr.* in his writings on natural philosophy. He was in the habit in his public lectures on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of giving a concise conspectus of Aristotle's system of philosophy and its articulation into its main divisions, and he followed this into closer detail in his private classes on the *Metaphysics* (especially Book Θ) and the *Posterior Analytics*. In that way his views became known to several of his pupils who afterwards became tutors in philosophy at Oxford and promulgated them somewhat more widely. For all such expositions he prepared himself most carefully, and he expressed the results of his studies with the most admirable lucidity and felicity. It is to be hoped that the manuscripts prepared for these lectures and classes may remain permanently accessible to later students.

When in 1908 Bywater resigned the Chair of Greek and ceased to reside in Oxford the Oxford 'Aristotelian Society' came to a natural end, and it looked as if therewith the oral transmission of the traditional Oxford manner of Aristotelian interpretation was henceforward to be left without an organ. Fearing the results of a total break with its past, Joachim proposed to me that we should together attempt in a humbler way to revive and continue its life. From Trinity Term 1923 to Hilary Term 1935 we each year together held a class meeting once a week for two hours in the late afternoon (5 to 7 p.m.). At these we read several of the less usually studied treatises of Aristotle, especially certain Books of the *Metaphysics* (once at my request we read *Epicuri Epist. ad Herodotum*). Those who attended were not numerous, but were in general well prepared. We endeavoured to keep up the standard set by our memories of the old Aristotelian, but especially the time of our meetings made a difference to its character, as it was obviously one not convenient for Tutors in active work. Still some of them came, and we drew several also from the new and increasing class of Advanced Students: we had further a number of undergraduates who were already looking forward to the position of teachers in philosophy at Oxford (most of them with a justified confidence). Hence we were able to work together as a band of fellow students, and to proceed without sensible relaxation of the thoroughness with which we had learned from Bywater to study the texts. We tried to avail ourselves of the MS. evidence, of the extant Greek commentaries, and of the results of the labours of

the Renaissance and modern editors and interpreters of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*: we had always on the table or close at hand for consultation such works as the commentaries of Alexander Aphrod., Simplicius and Philoponus, of Pacius and Zabarella, of Bonitz and Diels. During the vacations Joachim very carefully prepared for each class, and came to it provided with an invaluable paraphrase of the treatise to be studied, interspersed with illuminative discussions of the more difficult passages in it and frequent suggestions for the improvement of the text, especially by alterations of its traditional or accepted punctuation. Owing to the life-long care he was obliged to exercise in sparing his eyesight he was never a wide or a rapid reader. But what he had read his memory retained and at need recalled in surprisingly minute detail. He steadily insisted upon our focusing attention upon the text immediately before us, and where the precise meaning of a word or phrase was in issue, always scrutinized its occurrences, so to speak, *in situ*. But he equally insisted that on each occurrence it must be taken 'in its context', and to its context he set no circumference narrower than the whole philosophy of the author. It was our practice that one of the members of the class was responsible for producing a first translation of the portion of the text for the day's meeting; this was read first without permitted interruption, and then repeated sentence by sentence, when it was open to any one to make criticisms or to advance alternative renderings. After that Joachim generally read his own carefully prepared paraphrase. But no limit was set to the questions that might be opened, and at times the discussions ranged rather widely.

To return to my impressions of Joachim's part in all this, I should like to say that he showed no signs of suffering from the restriction of his own view at the time to the special language and habits of thought of Aristotle. He was not impatient when light or help was sought by others outside that field. But he felt that for himself it was all he could do to cultivate the narrower (but in all conscience wide enough) province with profit to himself and others. On the other hand, he was well aware that a proper interpretation of the text was impossible except in the light of all the knowledge of philosophy—and science too—that could be brought to bear upon it. For to him it was the record of arduous and persistent thinking, even if, too often, its results had not succeeded in commending themselves to subsequent speculation. For all the unsuccess that had attended much of Aristotle's attempts to advance science, he regarded his contributions to Logic and Meniphysics as of unexhausted value, and made large use of them at

framing and expounding his own speculations and doctrines. Whatever he knew, he determined to know well, and he spared no pains to realize his aim.

In May 1933 Joachim reached the age of 65, and by the Statutes of the Commissioners of 1923, under which he had elected to place himself, he became due to retire from his chair at the end of the academical year, unless his tenure were prolonged, on a recommendation of the Visitatorial Board, for five years or some lesser period. It was customary then for a Professor approaching the retiring age, if he desired a prolongation, to make application accordingly. With some hesitation he asked for, and was granted, an extension of two years. Six or seven years earlier a burst blood-vessel had rendered practically useless his better eye; it improved gradually, and more rapidly when the other eye began to develop very slow cataract; but the bursting of the vessel had revealed too high a blood-pressure, and though he felt fully equal then to continuing the duties of his professorship, he did not think he ought to ask for the full extension permissible. After his retirement in 1935 he continued, so far as possible, his studious routine. Though the growing restriction of sight made certain kinds of work more difficult for him, he still read regularly, and seemed to find after a time a happy improvement. Throughout he bore his disabilities with uncomplaining fortitude. He might be often seen meditatively walking; he enjoyed, as hitherto, listening to books read aloud, and the company of friends. He could play on his fiddle pieces that he knew by heart, and others from the score if he was already thoroughly familiar with them. In 1936 New College elected him to an Honorary Fellowship, to his great satisfaction; Merton had already done the same in 1919, and St. Andrews had made him an Honorary LL.D. in 1923. During the winter of 1937–8 he had a succession of colds, to which he would not sufficiently give in, and in February 1938 was forced to keep his bed for some days by heart trouble. This recurred in June. In July he took a house

belonging to a friend at Croyde in Devon, and went there with his family in hope of improvement. But another cold was followed by very severe heart attacks, and he died there on 30 July. The *Collected Essays* of F. H. Bradley, which he helped to edit, are dedicated 'To those who, like the author of these Essays, find "the search for truth a necessity of their nature".' He was himself one among them.[1]

H. W. B. JOSEPH

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