Cohesive Societies Literature Review

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January 2019
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How can societies remain cohesive in the face of rapid political, social, economic and technological change? Through this cross-cutting programme, the British Academy is drawing on our expertise and knowledge to enlighten these issues through debate, publication and research.

The exploratory phase of this programme, including this publication, aims to capture existing work in relation to social cohesion under five key themes: cultural memory and tradition; the social economy; meanings and mechanisms of social responsibility; identity and belonging; and care for the future.

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Contents

Executive Summary 4
Introduction 7
1.0 Meanings of social cohesion 8
2.0 Collective memory 16
3.0 Identity and belonging 22
4.0 The social economy 29
5.0 Care for the future 37
6.0 Discussion 46
7.0 Future research 49
Appendix 52

Method 52
Interactions between themes: furthering the thematic framework? 52

References 54
In August 2018 the British Academy commissioned the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations to undertake a critical review of literature relating to social cohesion. The work, which commenced in August 2018 and was completed in November 2018, is based on a detailed analysis of secondary data and was informed by regular communication with the British Academy.

The review builds on existing work being carried out by the British Academy, from which a set of five themes has been developed. These five themes, for the purposes of this review, are meanings of social cohesion; collective memory; identity and belonging; the social economy; care for the future. These themes have been slightly adapted. These adaptations are explained and critiqued in the evaluation of the thematic framework, which can be found in section 6.2. There are many overlaps between these domains, which may lead to the British Academy encouraging greater interdisciplinary activity as part of its Cohesive Societies programme.

Findings from the review demonstrate the importance of building a multi-dimensional concept of social cohesion, which incorporates the structural apparatus necessary for the social components to thrive. Such an inclusive concept has utility both practically and conceptually, by drawing attention to, and enabling analysis of, the different components of social cohesion, as well as the interactions between them.

Section one unpacks these conceptual challenges, beginning with an analysis of five definitions. It suggests that the most significant controversy is whether ‘social cohesion’ refers to purely social characteristics, such as solidarity, shared values, and a sense of belonging, or whether it also incorporates the political and economic dimensions of a society. Having traced the genealogies from which the two sides of this debate emerged, it argues that the divergence is due to whether a definition is concerned with the meaning of social cohesion, as a description of what a society looks like when it is cohesive, or whether it describes both meanings and mechanisms, as a more dynamic conceptualisation of social cohesion as political, economic and social process.

Section two illustrates the ways in which collective memories can foster a sense of group identity, through the narration of a shared past, whilst also having the potential to cause division through exclusionary narratives. It critiques the study of collective memories as static depictions of events, demonstrating that memories are produced and curated by social agents. Therefore, understanding this process of collective remembering is crucial if we are to critically examine the way in which collective memories can exclude and divide. We present approaches which have begun to enable analysis of these processes, and offer suggestions for the development and application of these approaches to address contemporary challenges.

Other than these analyses of the process of collective remembering, methodologies which enable exploration of the transfer of narratives and discourses from the public sphere to local encounters remain limited. This becomes more evident through the course of section three which examines identity and belonging, first, in the form of political belonging and the recognition of identities in national and local politics; second through an analysis of everyday experiences of multiculturalism; and third, by reviewing the literature which examines the interface of online and offline communities.

Overall, sections two and three analyse the ways in which belonging is produced, narrated, reconstructed and experienced at national and local levels. By analysing the social economy, section four explores the social processes through which belonging is fostered, reinforced or prevented. We demonstrate that networks of reciprocity and sharing can build a sense of community. However, these communities can also be exclusionary, and research is presented to evidence that inclusion is mediated through economic (inequality). In this way, section four presents a new lens through which to analyse the differentiation made in section one between conceptualisations of social cohesion which focus on the social components, and those which incorporate political and economic mechanisms. The social economy presents opportunities to engage in activities which produce the ‘social’ characteristics of social cohesion, but the capacity to participate is limited by both neighbourhood and individual deprivation.

Finally, section five addresses care for the future. Here, we examine the sustainability of society in light of environmental change, including climate change, as well as alterations in demographic composition due to increased mobility and an ageing population. It becomes apparent that social sustainability becomes inextricable from environmental sustainability. Once this future orientation is incorporated into the overall study, we are lead to question whether the broad concept of social cohesion, developed in section one, is in fact broad enough.

We conclude by re-examining the distinction set out in section one in light of the findings of subsequent sections, before critically evaluating the themes which have been used to structure this review. We discuss the possibility of developing these themes into a full thematic framework, and present an example model in the appendix.
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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Anna Bradshaw and the Cohesive Societies Working Group at the British Academy, who devised and commissioned the review. The final piece has benefited greatly from their critique and guidance throughout the process.

From the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, we would particularly like to thank Aurélie Broeckerhoff for her insightful comments on an earlier draft, as well as EJ Milne, Neil Forbes, Matt Qvortrup, and Chris Shannahan, for their input into the initial design of the project.

Introduction

This literature review was commissioned by the British Academy as part of the scoping process for its Cohesive Societies programme. The review will be structured using the five themes developed by the British Academy as a framework for engaging with the existing scholarly work on social cohesion, as well as for organising an ongoing programme of research and activities. We have adapted the order of these themes to create a structure which facilitates the logical progression of the concepts and material to be engaged with in this review. Further, we have altered the title of two themes. First, ‘meanings and mechanisms of social responsibility’ has become ‘meanings of social cohesion’ as the complexity of comparing the differing conceptualisations of social cohesion has resulted in this analysis becoming a part in its own right. Second, ‘cultural memory and tradition’, to ‘collective memory’, in order to incorporate material which adds to the discussion but which would not fit easily under the rubric of ‘culture’.

The benefits, limitations and potential for further development of both of these themes will be discussed in the evaluation of the thematic framework (section 6.2). Other than these two changes, the thematic framework remains intact, and has provided the foundation for an unusually broad and uniquely interdisciplinary exploration of social cohesion.

Engaging with such a broad range of disciplinary approaches has indicated, unsurprisingly, that some areas of study are well-developed, while others could benefit from further work. As will become apparent, some disciplines are far more visible in certain themes than in others. In general, the literature in themes one, meanings of social cohesion and two, collective memory, tends towards macro-level analysis, with historical, political and sociological theory being well represented in both. Empirical quantitative social and economic research is also present in the former, and a less voluminous but methodologically, theoretically and politically significant body of ethnographic work in the latter. Themes three, identity and belonging, and four, the social economy, include a much higher concentration of ethnographic work, from anthropology, sociology and geography departments. Theme four also includes research produced by social psychologists and business scholars (particularly those with a consumer or marketing focus). Theme five, care for the future, spans a range of disciplines and approaches, from urban planning and sustainability to gerontology and demography.

We have tried to remain vigilant of the implications of these patterns for future research, although we hope this review will prompt and facilitate much discussion on the potential for further work and interdisciplinary collaboration. The appendix indicates areas of study in which there seem to be a need for further development, both within and between themes. These suggestions are, of course, not exhaustive.

It is worth noting at the outset that our biggest challenge in working with these themes has not been finding connections between them, but preventing them from running into one another. We will indicate in the conclusion some of the ways in which these themes could interact further. We suggest that through further exploration of these interactions, the themes could evolve into a more fully developed thematic framework, and introduce one such model in the appendix.
1.0 Meanings of social cohesion

This section will provide the theoretical and conceptual context for subsequent sections. It will begin by examining a range of definitions of social cohesion, before tracing the political and theoretical development of these conceptualisations through history. By doing this at the outset, we hope to contextualise the studies reviewed in subsequent sections, most of which approach a specific element (or elements) of social cohesion. Further, we hope this will illustrate some of the ways in which the findings of these studies fit into the broader meaning of social cohesion.

1.1 Introduction

Any definition of social cohesion is shaped by the historical trajectory of political theory attributed to the development of the concept. In turn, this impacts the research designs of those studying it and, crucially, the steps policy-makers take to try to improve it. In essence, the ‘meaning’ attributed to social cohesion greatly impacts the ‘mechanisms’ thought to foster it. Therefore, definitions employed by academics influence how social cohesion is studied (within which disciplines; using which methods) just as definitions employed by policy communities influence the ways in which they attempt to enhance social cohesion (by which institutions; using what kinds of initiatives).

We will begin by identifying challenges faced when defining social cohesion, before analysing prominent definitions. We will then move on to unpack the genealogies of political thought which have influenced these differing definitions. Through this analysis, we find the most significant divergence to be whether definitions are entirely social (about solidarity, shared values, and a sense of belonging) or whether they incorporate structural conditions (deprivation, inequality, discrimination).

Analysis of the empirical evidence of the interrelationship between the social and structural elements of social cohesion leads us to argue for a differentiation between two kinds of definitions: those which offer a static description of a cohesive society, versus the dynamic conceptualisation of social cohesion as a political and economic process. Paradoxically, explicating the opposing aims of definitions could in fact provide consensus on the conceptualisations themselves: the disagreement lies in what the definitions aim to do. This will be discussed in the conclusion to this section.

1.1.2 Prominent definitions

To exemplify these challenges, below are five academic and policy definitions of social cohesion. Green, Janmaat and Han group definitions depending on the extent to which the following dimensions are incorporated in the definition (see Green et al 2009:9, drawing on Bernard, 1999): liberty (of the individual or the group), equality (relating to the economic, political representation, or opportunity), and solidarity (such as shared values or collective beliefs). We find this to be a helpful organising framework, and have further unpacked it beneath the definitions.

A. Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and horizontal interactions among members of society as characterised by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate (Chan, Po and Chan, 2006:290).

B. Social cohesion refers to the property by which whole societies, and the individuals within them, are bound together through the action of specific attitudes, behaviours, rules and institutions which rely on consensus rather than pure coercion (Green et al., 2009:19).

C. Social cohesion [...] is simply the property which keeps societies from falling apart (Janmaat, 2011:63).

D. Social cohesion involves building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same community (Maxwell, 1996:13).

E. Social cohesion [...] is society’s ability to secure the long-term well-being of its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect for human dignity with due regard for diversity, personal and collective autonomy and responsible participation (The Council of Europe, 2005:23).

By comparing these definitions, we can identify a range of components which are sometimes understood to be part of social cohesion. First, the sense of belonging to a community (definitions A and D). Related to this, second, homogeneity of values or attitudes, (B and D). Potentially in contrast to this is ‘regard for diversity’ (E) which could contradict value/attitude homogeneity. Together, we will refer to these three components as the ‘social components’ of social cohesion.

Fourth is participation or collaboration, present explicitly in definitions A and E and potentially also in D through being ‘engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges’, although this could also refer to a sense of shared community if the emphasis is on the sense of facing shared challenges, rather than on collaborating to do something about them. Related to this, fifth is the ‘rules and institutions which rely on consensus’ (B): consensus here indicating the necessity of some degree of participation in order to know that consensus has been achieved. Of this selection, definition B is the only definition which explicitly refers to the institutional mechanisms of social cohesion,
indicating the significance of legal and political institutions, although ‘participation’ could refer to political participation. Together, we will refer to dimensions four and five as the ‘political dimensions’ of social cohesion, as they refer to the political activity of either individuals as they participate in the political process, or in the political apparatus itself.

Sixth is wealth or income equality, and can be found in definition D. Seventh is ‘equal access to resources’, mentioned in definition E. This phrase is ambiguous; while it concerns equality and is broader than income/wealth equality, it does not specify what resources are being referred to. If these resources include, for example, education, this use of equality could go some way towards equality of opportunity which, in turn, could indicate an equation of the way in which inequality constrains participation (in the workforce; in political life). Other than this, the definitions tend towards a purely economic understanding of equality. Henceforth we will differentiate between ‘economic equality’, ‘equality of opportunity’ (referring to differing access to education and employment opportunities), and finally ‘political equality’ which is closely related to equality of opportunity, but here specifically referring to political representation and participation.

Finally, ‘personal and collective autonomy’ (E) is the closest we have to liberty and is, in this case, closely linked to the previous statement ‘due regard for diversity’.

The intention of presenting these example definitions at the outset of this review is to demonstrate some of the contested issues which emerge in attempts at conceptualising social cohesion. Further, this selection illustrates the broad range of dimensions which can be included in a conceptualisation of social cohesion. In this way, this analysis may help to contextualise the studies presented in subsequent sections, almost all of which address just one or two of these dimensions.

1.2 Social Cohesion: political theory through history

This section will provide an overview of two key trajectories of theorisation which have influenced these contemporary conceptualisations of social cohesion. This enables us to further unpack this relationship between genealogy and definition. The first is from Jane Jenson, who defines social cohesion as ‘shared values and commitment to community’ (Jenson, 1998:v). For Jenson, social cohesion is rooted in Durkheimian thought, and is one of three traditions which address the social order, the other two being democratic socialism/Christian democracy and (neo)liberalism, which were considered to be systems which contain within them an implicit theory of social cohesion (Green et al., 2009:22). In contrast to the Durkheimian formation, outlined above, in liberal thought it is the individual that is the basic unit of society, and the individual’s rights which are in need of protection by the state, the role of which should nevertheless be constrained so as to avoid the state’s ‘natural tendency towards tyranny’ (Green et al.:24). This line of thought can be traced to the work of John Locke, for whom man and man alone had the right to the benefits of ‘the labour of his body, and the work of his hands’ (ibid.). It was further developed in Adam Smith’s theorisation of the ‘free market’ which, if based on self-interest and with minimal state intervention, would be to the ‘benefit of all and the maximum public good’ (ibid.:25, referencing *The Wealth of Nations*). Of further relevance to this laissez-faire and individualistic formulation is the work of Tocqueville, who emphasised that society would benefit from private association rather than state intervention (Jenson, 1998:7).

For Green and colleagues, the entirety of British politics has been rooted in this individualistic genealogy in all periods since Locke, apart from the post-1945 period of Keynesian economics, which was ‘interventionist in macro-economic management but essentially liberal in its politics’ (ibid.:53). Being based on this individualism, and built on Smith’s confidence in the benefits of the free market, ‘Equality never came to be seen as a necessary condition of societal cohesion, nor has the state been seen as a necessary guarantor, beyond, at least, in its role in maintaining the basic apparatus of law and order and the welfare state’ (ibid:51). The increased equality of income distribution of the post-war period was gradually eroded through the Thatcher years, along with the ‘public realm and collective social goods’ (ibid.:54). This trajectory of social cohesion in British politics will be extended in the next section through analysis of New Labour’s Community Cohesion agenda.

In sum, the foundational difference between these two genealogies is the degree to which social cohesion is considered to consist entirely of social components and therefore based on solidarity, shared values, and a sense of community, or whether the political and economic apparatus of society are inherent. Jenson’s definition of social cohesion was firmly rooted in the Durkheimian tradition rather than economic or political systems. Her narrow conceptualisation of social cohesion was an alternative to (neoliberalism, Christian democracy or democratic socialism, which were considered to be systems for maintenance of the social order. In contrast, Green and colleagues view theories of social cohesion and theories of the social order as responding to the same question. This is because they take a broad conceptualisation of social cohesion which includes the political and economic systems of a society. They attribute the lack of the dimension of economic equality in British politics to the legacy of John Locke and Adam Smith, for whom anything more than minimal state intervention in labour or economic markets would lead to imbalance, ultimately reducing the benefits for society.
1.3 Continuity or rupture? Multiculturalism, Interculturalism and New Labour’s Post-2001 Community Cohesion Agenda

While a full analysis of the Labour government’s community cohesion agenda, which emerged in 2001, is not needed here, a brief discussion will nevertheless support our analysis in light of the genealogies of political theory presented in the previous section.

It appears that the definitional challenges of conceptualising social cohesion, and particularly the normative use of ‘social cohesion’ are as relevant to the political sphere as to the academic. As an example, policy papers produced by Labour as part of the community cohesion agenda slip between ‘social cohesion’, ‘community cohesion’ and ‘national cohesion’ without definition (Worley, 2005:485).

In his 2014 book entitled *The Politics of Social Cohesion in Germany, France and the United Kingdom*, Jan Dobbernack focuses on social cohesion as a political agenda. He uses a social imaginary approach to analyse the social and political events from which New Labour’s Community Cohesion emerged. He traces the roots predominantly to the different responses of the Labour and Conservative Parties to the 1993 James Bulger case and the broader rhetoric on crime. In particular, the Conservatives’ emphasis on punishing crime, rather than on the social or societal conditions from which crime had arisen, which many attributed to the lack of care given to the social fabric of society during the successive governments led by Margaret Thatcher from 1979-1990. Tony Blair responded with a moralistic discourse which addressed the causes of crime and community fragmentation (Dobbernack, 2014:135-138). This narrative had been emerging through the 1990s and was developed further in response to the 2001 riots in Bradford, Bury, Burnley and Oldham (ibid.:19). Following the riots, the reports commissioned to investigate foregrounded the ways in which the ‘causes of segregation needed to be tackled and how ‘parallel lives’ should become shared,’ (ibid.:133). As a result, community cohesion suggested a focus on attitudes and identities, rather than an interest in socio-structural conditions or in the experience of racial or religious discrimination (ibid.:155). The suggested remedies aimed to re-shape these ‘dispositions’ rather than achieve ‘political change’ (ibid.).

In many ways, the community cohesion framework was built on a criticism of multiculturalism. For example, the ‘Report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain’ (*The Parekh Report*) commissioned by the Runnymede Trust and published in 2000 proposed that Britain, as ‘One Nation’ needs to be ‘understood as a community of communities’ rather than an ‘oppressive uniformity’ (The Runnymede Trust, 2000:45). In doing this, the report ‘advances the idea of an inclusive and progressive national identity’ (Beider, 2015:26); one which would address racism and in particular, the idea that ‘whiteness is given as the default racial code for British identity’ (ibid.:30). Despite the progressive nature of the report, it nonetheless ‘marked an onslaught against multiculturalism led by successive governments’ (ibid.:38).

Several scholars have highlighted the way in which ‘community’ came to be used to deflect responsibility away from government and structural issues, and place it on individuals and groups. ‘It is perhaps unsurprising that, at the conceptual level, social cohesion should transpose itself into community cohesion and, in so doing, lay the difficulties of modern life at the door of race relations and failed assimilation’ (Crowley and Hickman, 2008:1232 summarising Worley, 2005). Similarly, Worley finds the use of ‘community’ by New Labour to be ‘linked to the notion of active citizenship, individual responsibilities to community and especially participation in paid work’ (2005:486).

As an attempted ‘mechanism of social cohesion’, New Labour’s Community Cohesion agenda downplayed the role of systemic economic factors such as employment and equality (of any kind) and foregrounded the responsibility of individuals and communities. Both the liberal genealogy of political theory stretching back to John Locke, and the more recent Durkheimian trajectories are relevant here. The former because of the emphasis on individual (economic) responsibility for oneself, in which the role of state institutions to facilitate economic equality is downplayed. The latter due to the emphasis on the collective, here in the form of cultural homogeneity which was viewed as being necessary once multiculturalism had ‘failed’.

For Cantle, the Community Cohesion agenda was an attempt to move beyond what he saw as the separation of multiculturalism. Reflecting in 2015, he wrote ‘While retaining a focus on tackling inequality and disadvantage, [community cohesion] suggested that it was important to find ways in which people could relate to each other across boundaries, rather than within boundaries’ (Cantle, writing in Antonsich, 2015:4). Cantle criticised academic work on multiculturalism for its lack of interdisciplinarity, and particularly its inattention to Alport’s early work on ‘contact theory’, more recently developed by Hewstone (ibid.:5). A further criticism addresses the changing nature and increasing complexity of identities, suggesting that multiculturalism, both in academic and policy form, is no longer appropriate (ibid.7). Cantle’s argument for interculturalism was built on similar foundations to the community cohesion agenda, while perhaps developing the centrality of the increasing plurality of identities further. He proposes that interculturalism should aim to break down barriers and facilitate contact, create shared spaces for encounter, where prejudice and stereotypes can be undermined, resulting in a ‘wider community narrative’ (ibid.:8).

A number of scholars have promoted the utility of interculturalism. Notably, Sarmento (2014) developed the idea of interculturalism as an epistemology; a third space which transcends opposing identities. Xu (2013) proposed that intercultural communication research should draw on both critical perspectives, enabling analysis of differential power relations, and dialogic ones, to explore the ways in which specific dialogues evolve, and individuals embody different identities depending on context. Many policy initiatives have also drawn on intercultural dialogue as a policy tool for enhancing social relations, particularly in diverse contexts, the most well-known initiative being the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities Programme, which Zapata-Barerro described as being at the ‘epicentre of this explosion in interest in Europe’ (2015:13).

However, both the academic and policy formulations of interculturalism have come under heavy criticism. The former for being vague and ambiguous (Ludwinek, 2015); for being imprecise and ambiguous, (Augustin, 2012; Näss, 2010); for diverting attention away from structural inequalities and causes of conflict (Phipps, 2014); for creating an exclusionary European identity (Aman, 2012); and for securitising intercultural dialogue thereby creating a sense of urgency whilst compromising the possibility of engaging with useful dialogue (Malvig, 2005:33).

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1. See the parallel Cohesive Societies Policy Review (Donoghue and Bourke, 2019)
2. Two-year-old James Bulger was kidnapped and murdered by two ten-year-old children in 1993; see Hay, 1993 for analysis of the discourse surrounding the case.
1.4 The economics of social cohesion

It is clear that social cohesion, and its components, is a contentious issue both in academia and in politics. We turn now to the empirical research which examines the relationship between these components. As Janmaat has noted, exploration of these components is necessary so that we may ‘know whether some proposed version of social cohesion refers to an actual real-life phenomenon or merely to a hypothetical version of affairs’ (2014:6). In particular, we hope to explore the feature which has led to the most pronounced divide between scholars of social cohesion: the relevance of equality to the purely social components.

Jenson questions whether too much attention to social cohesion as ‘shared values and commitment to a community’ (1998:v) may in fact ‘blind us to other equally important matters such as social justice and equitable outcomes’ (ibid.:vii). She cites a (1997) OECD paper which notes the following as ‘longer-term societal implications’ of neoliberal economic policies: ‘increasing income polarisation, persistently high levels of unemployment, and widespread social exclusion’ (ibid.:6). A focus on economic growth alone does not enhance equality, and seems to do the opposite without sufficient state intervention, in turn increasing economic polarisation and societal fragmentation.

In their generalisation of social trust using data from the World Values Survey (WVS) among sixty countries, Delhey and Newton examined the relationship of more than thirty independent variables to trust. The question on generalised social trust asked in the WVS is as follows:

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (Delhey and Newton, 2004:11)

The researchers found that ‘Wealthy and economically egalitarian societies are trusting societies, although wealth seems to matter more than equality, except in the wealthiest countries, where both make a contribution’ (2004:27). Interestingly, they found ethnic homogeneity and Protestantism to be the most significant predictors of social trust, the latter finding being attributed by the scholars to ‘the Protestant ethic’ having ‘an historical imprint on a culture of equality and the importance attached to persistently trustworthy behaviour’ (ibid.), thereby inadvertently attributing this finding to equality and a culture of trust rather than the overall religion.

Few studies have attempted to test causality, most being limited to correlation. Testing causality, Rothstein and Uslaner find that equality (of both income and of opportunity) causes social trust. They offer two explanations. ‘First, optimism about the future (which is a key determinant of social trust) makes less sense when there is more economic inequality’ (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005:51). ‘Second, the distribution of resources and opportunities plays a key role in establishing the belief that people share a common destiny and have similar fundamental values’ (ibid.:52). Testing the relationship between economic inequality and social cohesion, the latter being measured through participants’ perceptions of ‘familiar and supportive neighbourhood networks’ (2015:87), Colic-Peisker and Robertson (2015) find that gentrification can have a negative impact on social cohesion.

Other studies have found that social cohesion enhances economic growth. McCracken outlines evidence of a causal link ‘from social cohesion to macroeconomic performance’ (2003:218), although the author’s usage of ‘social cohesion’ is unclear and inconsistent. Also using WVS data, Knack and Keefer find that ‘trust’ and ‘economic performance’ are significant for ‘measurable economic performance’ across 29 economies (1997:1251). Dearmont and Grier find that trust ‘exerts a positive direct influence on real per-capita GDP’ and further, that it ‘enhances the efficiency of existing human and physical capital inputs’ (2009:210).

While the loss of (a non-existent) ethnic and cultural homogeneity due to immigration is regularly cited in the news media as a cause of social fragmentation, most of the evidence indicates that this is not the case, and that homogeneity of various forms in some contexts has the opposite effect. For example, Belk reviews literature on gated residences, as an example of highly homogeneous communities in terms of both wealth and class, and often also of ethnicity. Evidence indicates that people tend to feel isolated, remote from neighbours, distant, and have a low sense of community compared with those living in non-gated communities, as well as a comparable sense of security (Belk, 2017:253-4). In a meta-analysis, Meer and Tolksma find that ethnic diversity does not predict perceptions of social cohesion (2014). Further, Sturgis and colleagues (2012) found a positive correlation between diversity and perceived social cohesion in London neighbourhoods. These findings provide weight to the conclusion that economic factors may have been underplayed in some definitions of social cohesion, and that shared values and consensus may have been overplayed.

1.5 Conclusion

We have differentiated between definitions of social cohesion which describe the purely social components of a cohesive society, and the more dynamic conceptualisations which view social cohesion as a political, economic and social process. The empirical evidence presented could lead us to infer one of two things. Either, a narrow definition of social cohesion which incorporates elements such as solidarity, shared values and a sense of belonging, is the primary determinant of outcomes; or, if defining social cohesion in this narrow sense, it must be clear that this definition describes a societal state of cohesion, but that this state of societal cohesion cannot be enhanced by policy programmes which focus on the social aspects alone, but must also address the wider structural issues.

It could be that distinguishing between these two kinds of definition – the static description of a state of cohesion, versus the dynamic concept of social cohesion as political, economic and social process – might lead to some consensus between purely social definitions and those which incorporate structural elements. We urge scholars and policymakers to be mindful of this distinction, and to be specific about what they intend to achieve with their definition: a description of what cohesion might look like in social terms, or a conceptualisation of cohesion as an ongoing societal process.

Further research is needed to understand the relationship between the social and structural components of social cohesion. Empirical research has focused on social trust as an indicator of the social components, and has taken place almost entirely using cross-national comparisons. Exploration of other indicators and different levels could be highly productive. There is currently very little understanding of the mechanisms through which trust towards strangers develops (Uslaner, 2000). We suggest that investigation into such mechanisms could productively overlap with some of the social economy practices examined in part four of this review.

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2.0 Collective memory

In section one we differentiated between definitions of social cohesion which described the social elements of a cohesive society, and the more dynamic conceptualisations which incorporate the structural conditions necessary for those social components to exist. This section will explore the ways in which collective memories can strengthen the social components by creating a shared social imaginary or, conversely, they can produce division through exclusionary narratives. The theme of equality will still be relevant but here, rather than economic equality, the focus will be on power and domination; the ways in which structural inequalities can be preserved through exclusionary narratives.

2.1 Introduction

Since the study of memory was ‘liberated’ from the individual to be claimed as a social phenomenon by a range of social science disciplines, the study of collective memory has become a multifaceted and dynamic field of inquiry. We will begin, in sections 2.2 and 2.3, by identifying and unpacking the dimensions explored within this range of disciplinary spaces, before presenting case studies through which we can explore the themes of power and domination in section 2.4.

This exercise has unearthed a number of problems which it is necessary to foreground at the outset of this analysis. The first is the issue of the ‘collective’: Who is depicted as part of the ‘collective’ and who is excluded or Othered? To whom does this memory belong? Who has the platform to tell this story, and why? Who has been silenced?

While national narratives and the representation of a shared past can play a positive role in fostering social cohesion, it is imperative that these questions are interrogated. Much scholarly progress has been made over the last three decades in developing methodologies which facilitate exploration of the ways in which collective memories influence, are enacted through, and incorporated into, everyday experiences. The social processes of collective remembering will be explored in section 2.5. Ethnographic, feminist and postcolonial scholars have developed methodologies which not only examine the lived experience of macro-level political events, but also enable exploration of the nexus between individual and collective memory. Research developed in these spheres will be examined in section 2.6, thereby providing a link between the production and experience of collective memories, leading into section 3 on identity and belonging.

2.2 From individual to collective

The empirical evidence that memory is, or can be, a collective phenomenon comes mostly from studies of the intergenerational transmission of trauma. For example, Scott and Zac (1993) found that World War II was considered to be one of the most significant events of the past fifty years across age groups in their sample, despite younger generations having not lived through the experience. Similarly, 44 per cent of Paez and colleagues’ sample considered their parents to have experienced the most traumatic events within the population (Paez et al., 1997). Neither of these studies provide evidence of a collective experience, but do indicate that people consider their social group to have a shared past of which they are a part.

Zerubavel discusses the ways in which we remember through our social environment. For example, a close relative, spouse or friend might remember something from our past which we ourselves have forgotten (1996:285). Further, our memories are distorted by, and interpreted through, our social surroundings (ibid.). Rather than being entirely personal processes, remembering is ‘regulated by unmistakably social rules of remembrance that tell us quite specifically what we should remember and what we can or must forget’ (ibid.:286).

Zerubavel argues that much of what we experience as memory is second- or third-hand; passed down through stories, or other experiences through which we engage with a memory. Thus, memory does not necessarily have to relate to personal experience, but rather, ‘being social presupposes the ability to experience events that had happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before we joined them as if they were part of our own past’ (ibid.:290). He refers to this as sociobiographical memory, to which he attributes ‘the sense of pride, pain, or shame’ we experience regarding events which happened to our community but not to us personally (ibid.).

The idea of experience is also addressed in the work of Maurice Halbwachs, to whom the first investigation into memory as a collective phenomenon is attributed. Halbwachs distinguished between ‘autobiographical memory’ - that which we have directly experienced; ‘historical memory’, which we come to know through records; ‘History’ to which we have no ‘organic relation’, and ‘collective memory’ which is ‘the active past that forms our identities’ (Olick and Robbins, 1998:111). Pierre Nora has a somewhat cruder differentiation between memory and history, the former referring to the oral remembering of ‘archaic societies’, the latter to the dominant reconstruction of the past (Legg, 2004:494–495). For both Zerubavel and Halbwachs, the collective dimension of memory is not necessarily about having direct experience of the memories which are important to our collectivities, but about the ways in which memories are mediated through social context.

2.3 The desire to remember

Just as questions of social cohesion are asked more frequently and with more urgency during periods of rapid change, several scholars attribute the desire to commemorate or memorialise to phases of societal transformation. Public remembrance can create the image of a shared past, even when that past may have been experienced by different people in different ways. It depicts cohesion; bringing together different portions of the living population, as well as creating connections between generations past, present and future. Edward Said attributes the search for memory not to a ‘recoverable past’ to the rapid change of the late 20th century (2000:179). Conversely, Rajagopal tries to find the origins to the nation-state building projects of the late 19th Century. For Runia, the ‘desire to commemorate’ is the ‘prime historical phenomenon of our time’ (2007:314), although this statement falls short of explaining why commemoration might be more significant now than in earlier epochs. Pierre Nora also views the desire to create new memories as a feature of modernity, which he attributes to processes of ‘globalisation, mediatisation, democratisation, and massification’ that result in modern media being substituted for collective memory (Legg, 2004:483–4).

Despite the lack of consensus over the epoch from which the desire to create collective memories originated, the analyses of these scholars do have one feature in common. Whether it is rapid change, traumatic events, the building of the nation-state or globalisation, all are contexts in which there was a need to further understand, reformulate, or re-assert the collective identity. Engaging with the meaning of past experiences or events is part of this process. Building on Halbwachs’ approach to social and collective memory, for Paez and colleagues, ‘the function of socially shared images of the past is to allow the group to foster social cohesion, to develop and defend social identification, and to justify current attitudes and needs.’ (1997:147).

The idea that there is a societal need to articulate a shared past during periods of change arises in Marshall’s investigation into processes of remembering and forgetting in postcolonial contexts. However, for Marshalls, the change in question is of a more political nature: ‘In all societies, major economic and socio-political forces tend to be reflected in radical or gradual transformations of the public landscape of memory, as existing heritage becomes contested and the new order
attempts to legitimize itself through reference to the past (Marshall, 2008:347). In this interpretation, the act of remembering is not only a mechanism for the collective to process events, but is a political act of legitimisation. This brings us back to the question of control: who has the platform to produce and disseminate these narratives?

2.4 Collective memory and the state

By approaching the study of collective memory through the symbolic activities, events and constructions which take place in public space, these historical approaches have tended (though not exclusively) to foreground state activity and therefore national, dominant or elite narratives. A number of scholars have criticised this bias: unpacking the relationship between collective remembering, power, dominance and the reconstruction of history demonstrates that memory can be used instrumentally.

As discussed previously, history and memory can be conceptualised as different (though interrelated) phenomena. If history is a reconstruction, as Paul Connerton (1989) tells us, who does the reconstructing? Tolia-Kelly criticises those academics such as Nora and Halbwachs who have ‘engaged with a ‘collective’ but one that is a singular and post-colonial paradigm, she questions how such conceptualisations of the ‘collective’ could be relevant to mobile diasporic populations. Olick and Robbins, too, find the uncritical production of history which prioritises the national above all else to have ‘often provided political legitimation for nationalism and other more reconstructive identity struggles’ (2010:110). These critiques question the utility of such national narratives for social cohesion. Thus, the study of social memory inevitably comes around to questions of domination and the uneven access to a society’s political and economic resources (Aldermer and Hoelscher, 2004:349).

Such privileging of national stories and national identities does not only take place in the academic sphere, of course, but is embedded in political discourse and practice, indicating that such prioritisation can be used instrumentally by political elites, as well as dominant classes (cf. Hobsbawm, 1983:277). This privileging within the political arena is possible because the state controls public space and, in particular, public historical records (Olick and Robbins, 2010:126-7 drawing on Wilson et al., 1996).

For example, writing of post-colonial South Africa, Marshall analyses the ways in which the memory landscape of the public sphere is actively transformed through naming practices and the curation of important historical sites in the post-colonial space (Marshall, 2008:354). In particular, the debate over whether or not to replace the name Cape Town with Tshwane: the majority of resistance to this change coming from white South Africans, for whom ‘the cultural familiarity of the name, the continued presence of the time-honoured monument, convey a reassuring sense of stability and security in a rapidly transforming environment and society’ (ibid.). These debates are particularly complex in postcolonial contexts: as the colonial past is remembered (or forgotten), the relationship between coloniser and colonised is transformed, and the colonial past is interpreted through the lens of the present (cf. Rajagopalan, 2008:308). In the UK context, we can use the example of the cenotaph in Whitehall which, for some, a ‘memorial to the fallen’ and to others, a memorial of ‘the UK’s imperial past’ (Rigby, 2009:80).

In a study of the efforts by white ex-colonialists to preserve colonial cemeteries in the Indian sub-continent, Buettner reminds us that these physical sites of contestation are not isolated: the connections between ex-colonisers and ex-colonies live on in the ongoing relationships between people, and their continual movements and migrations. Buettner remarks that these cemeteries ‘act as a barometer that signals how the ex-colonized and ex-colonizers alike not only approach the physical relics and spaces of empire but also reassess the colonial era more generally, imparting them with a diverse range of meanings specific to a historical moment’ (2006:7). The British Association of Cemeteries in South Asia (BACSA) was founded to preserve cemeteries in the sub-continent, but have just been as influential, probably more so, in shaping discussions about colonialism in Britain, indicating one of the ways in which colonialism continues to connect the nations. BACSA members continue to voice a ‘colonial nostalgia’ in both the UK and the Indian sub-continent, which goes largely unchallenged in both.

Museums offer another important site for the analysis of the interpretation and reconstruction of history through the lens of the present. Ghosh offers a critique of the British Library exhibition of 2002 entitled Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 1600-1834 (Ghosh, 2008:101). For Ghosh, the timeframe of this exhibition enabled the curators to avoid commenting on or addressing slavery, colonial revolts and land rights, painting a nostalgic and uncritical picture of colonialism. Brockmeier offers an interesting commentary on museums as sites of cultural memory: ‘Museums do not only have histories that are closely connected to larger cultural histories (including particular concepts of history); they also represent attempts to conceal their own historical perspectivalism, that is, they ‘transform History into Nature’ (Brockmeier, 2002:19, referencing Sherman & Rogoff, 1994). Arguably this is true of many of the examples referenced above: narratives are interpretative in the same way that museum exhibitions are, and political discourse perhaps even more so, in that political discourse uses these interpretations instrumentally. This idea of presenting interpretations of history as ‘natural’ rather than constructed, could be no better demonstrated than in Alderman and Hoelscher’s reference to the debate over the use of Robben Island by the South African government planners sought to deflect growing criticism of the National Party government by publicly remembering the island’s ‘natural’ environment, a remembering that allowed for public forgetting of its political role’ (2004:347). Here the debate is not just concerned with the construction on memory in a neutral space, but in the physical location of significant political events: sites which could either be used to preserve or forget.

The temporal aspect is key in this analysis of the reinterpretation of historical events and historical relationships. As these sites of memory become sites of contestation they are debated, with contemporary generations reinterpreting the actions of past generations, to which they attribute new meaning. Multiple generations are involved in this process, but each is likely to have a different relationship to the events in question.

2.5 Social agents and the production of collective memories

While the previous section examined the ways in which powerful institutions control platforms and spaces through which collective memories are actively constructed, this section will examine the role of social agents in producing and shaping these constructions. By doing this, we continue exploring the ways in which collective memories are actively produced, but here we move beyond the state as an entity, to focus instead on the role of individuals and their actions in forming or reformulating these memories. By doing this, we begin to explore the idea of collective memory as social process (cf. Alderman and Hoelscher, 2004:352).

As an initial example through which to unpack this theme, we look at education as an arena in which the intergenerational transmission or reinterpretation of collective memories takes place. By examining the way in which history teaching was shaped by a change in education policy under Michael Gove as Minister for Education, prompting the adaptation of the curriculum and production of new textbooks, Grindel demonstrates a multi-layered process of individual action leading to a reconstructed narrative of history.
delivered to schoolchildren across the country. According to Grindel, Simon Schama, who was appointed to provide recommendations for the new curriculum, viewed the role of history education to be the enhancement of children’s knowledge of their heritage, and the strengthening of national identity (Grindel, 2013:36). Grindel articulates the dilemma faced by those designing history curricula as ‘a clash of expectations between the need for a unifying, canonical, coherent narrative whose chronological nature provides orientation in an increasingly heterogeneous society, and the urgent call for a history that recognises enough as an integral part of Britain’s national history and that does not edit out its difficult past’ (Grindel, 2013:43). Interaction is not only part of the production of collective memories, but also their performance.

Memories are not only constructed, communicated and remembered through narrative and discourse, but performed and enacted through rituals and events. Alderman and Hoelscher give the example of tourism professionals who embody and perform historical narratives (2004:322). Exploring performance both in its social and theatrical sense, Barbara Tedlock examines theatre and storytelling as processes through which communities remember the past, and are ‘often embraced as forms of political commentary, catharsis and group healing by indigenous peoples who have experienced ethnic, cultural and social displacement, grinding poverty and horrendous acts of violence’ (Tedlock, 2009:109).

These studies help us move further beyond the analysis of collective memories as the depiction of event. They indicate the need to engage with memory not just as something which is experienced socially, but which is produced by individuals with interests and motivations.

2.6 The social process of collective remembering

The boundary between individual and collective memory has become ever more blurred through the literature explored thus far. It seems that memory is something which is experienced both individually and collectively: that individual memories of direct personal experiences are mediated through social context; that collective memories are produced through individual actions as well as social interactions; and that individuals are producers and performers of memory as well as recipients and storers. While we have presented theoretical arguments for understanding memory as a collective phenomenon, and examined the way in which social agents play a role in producing or constructing these memories, so far we have not sufficiently addressed the collective experience of remembering. It is to this we now turn, and through doing so also aim to interrogate the nexus of individual and collective memory.

Scholars across the disciplinary spectrum have been working in more recent years to counter the focus on dominant or national narratives. Postcolonial and feminist scholars have been particularly innovative in creating methodologies which enable a deep exploration of the ways in which collective memories manifest in the lives of individuals.

Tolia-Kelly’s ecological approach aimed to overcome power differentials and avoid epistemic violence through participatory research (2010:4-5). Her focus is on memory-history, thereby overcoming the dichotomy between memory and history inferred by scholars such as Halbwachs and Nora. With this framework, she explores the ‘materials of home’ as a ‘source of social history in the form of material cultures’ [...] which ‘situate and refract biographies, and social narratives’ (ibid.:11). By doing this, Tolia-Kelly disrupts the link between place and memory, thereby developing a methodology for the exploration of diasporic identity and experience. This approach also disrupts the idea of ‘collective memory’ as a sphere of study relating only to the dominant or national.

While Tolia-Kelly offers an approach for studying social history through individual experience, memory and possession, Haug and colleagues offer ‘memory work’ as an approach through which a group can undergo a process of collective remembering.

Their overarching research question was of ‘the process whereby individuals construct themselves into existing social relations. [...] The “how” of lived feminine practice’ (33). They explored this question through the collective writing of stories and by doing so moved beyond individual experience to understand what they all shared: ‘As long as our experience was encased within obstinately repetitive gestures, it was impossible – since we had not yet begun to remember collectively – to say anything of any consequence about the practices of femininity, whose nature could not be deduced from any known body of laws’ (Haug et al., 1999:39).

In ‘the sense of memory’, inspired by Avtar Brah’s ‘the sent of memory’ and building on Haug’s memory work, Ali situates her approach within the feminisation of memory tradition, developed to challenge ‘masculinist forms of autobiography’ by showing ‘the importance of what might be learnt from personal, private stories’ (2012:91). Ali conducted interviews with her mother and siblings, in which they shared and discussed memories of their childhood. Through the process of the interviews, and as she and her family heard one another’s accounts, events and experiences were adjusted, reformed and re-interpreted: ‘We might see this as narrative revisioning and reality construction that relies on the accumulation of experience and, most importantly, the effects of memory work’ (ibid., 94). Together, these studies begin to develop the theorisation of collective remembering and a method for studying it. Research in this field is limited, and further work would be extremely productive.

2.7 Conclusion

As social beings, it seems that humans have a need to create, or connect with, the shared past of our social groups. However, the way in which this is done varies: from stories, rituals and performances, to national memorials and ceremonies. The social aspect of memory is multidimensional, depending on the level of analysis, and on whether the focus is on the social experience of memory, the social production of memory, or the way in which individual memories are mediated through social contexts. This has produced a very broad body of literature which engages with this array of examples and theoretical dimensions.

We have not yet interrogated the distinction between cultural and collective memory. It could be that collective memory is the more useful paradigm for exploring processes of collective remembering, but that collective memory becomes a cultural memory when it is mobilised for a specific purpose. Identity politics could be a significant dimension; as cultural memories may be transformed within the context of political struggles. As far as we are aware the distinction has not been fully theorised, as scholars tend to use the terms interchangeably. This would be a productive area to pursue, and one which we will return to in the evaluation of the thematic framework (6.2).

We have attempted in this part of the review to problematise national-level collective memories. In particular, the way in which collective memories controlled by the state, state representatives, or dominant classes can reproduce hegemonic narratives whilst relegating oppressed peoples to the peripheries of a nation’s history and identity. Educational spaces might be particularly significant as sites for studying the intergenerational transmission and reformulation of knowledge, as well as the development of national identities. We have sought to engage with approaches which offer a variety of perspectives, and view postcolonial approaches to be particularly significant in the UK context, in which there continues to be a degree of colonial amnesia. Such a critical analysis of the process of collective remembering must be central to a study of social cohesion. Without understanding the discourses, narratives and imagery through which people are and have been excluded, we cannot begin to develop initiatives to promote inclusion.
Section 3.2 will explore the nexus between conceptions of identity (both individual and collective), justice, and political processes. Once individual identity comes to be understood as constituted in and through social interactions, the concept of identity becomes stretched to incorporate collective identities. But how does this translate into political belonging? Is recognition of collective identities sufficient, or does a system need to be developed in which social and/or cultural groups have sufficient representation and power to shape the cultural landscape and political decisions? The scholarship presented touches on some of the themes explored in part one, and looks at the ways in which political participation (thus belonging to the political community) takes place locally as well as nationally.

Following this, section 3.3 will move on to explore everyday experiences of identity and belonging. Given the extent to which digital technologies mediate relationships and identities in the contemporary communicative landscape, section 3.4 will analyse literature which explores the interface between online and offline identities. The section therefore offers a grounded exploration of belonging, which will be enriched in the subsequent section on the social economy, as the processes which these networks are forged, facilitated and strengthened are further discussed.

### 3.2 Identity and belonging in political theory

Charles Taylor hypothesised that once states transformed into democracies, and identities were no longer linked to state hierarchy, the dignity of all people became prominent, rather than being attached only to the higher echelons of society. In this process, the ‘due recognition’ of all people and identities became a ‘vital human need’ rather than a ‘courtesy’ (1992:26). But this was an individualised form of recognition, articulated by Rousseau as based on an inner morality, which was to do with following one’s own voice, being true to oneself, and therefore originality and authenticity (ibid.:31). However, once it came to be understood that humans are dialogical beings, and therefore that individuality is formed through social interactions, it became apparent that these social interactions could also be damaging: ‘The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalised’ (ibid.:36).

In recognising that individuals and groups have not experienced the same conditions historically, some scholars and policy-makers have come to realise that different groups need different measures to experience the same equality. Thus, from a ‘politics of equality’ grows a ‘politics of difference’. According to Taylor, ‘reverse discrimination’ measures are one such example: they are attempts to counteract historical inequality in the contemporary context (ibid.:40).

In this account, Taylor demonstrates the interrelationship between individual and collective identities, as well as rights. Many scholars acknowledge the significance of recognising group identities, whether that be community, social or cultural groups.

Such recognition is often understood as a pre-requisite for justice and equality. For example, Devereux argues for cultural pluralism as a framework not just for acknowledging the presence of diversity, but for securing basic ‘respect and recognition to culturally diverse groups’ (2000:6). Her framework includes the right of minorities to shape the cultures of the societies in which they live, rather than merely being ‘tolerated’. This capacity to shape the political process is reached through ‘deliberative liberalism’, a thick, inclusive and participatory conception of democracy, influenced by Habermas discourse ethics.

Devereux argues that discourse ethics is compatible with liberal values, as long as group and cultural identities are recognised rather than just individual identities, and as long as justice is secured for groups not just for individuals (ibid.:11).

Both Taylor and Devereux view the recognition of group identities as a pre-requisite for group-based rights, which is itself the basis of equality, given that different social, cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups have experienced various forms of historic inequality. Devereux offers deliberative liberalism as a mechanism for incorporating a broad range of politics into a political system. Amin also views public deliberation as central to a diversity-friendly political system. He argues for emphasising a micropolitics of public deliberation and active citizenship, thereby taking a political, rather than cultural or racial, view of national belonging. He argues against a ‘fused community cohesion which is largely based on shared values, trust and social solidarity, because communities are not homogeneous, therefore there is no need for neighbourhoods to be integrated or to reach consensus (2002:972). Instead, Amin emphasises ‘Open and critical debate, mutual awareness, and a continually altering subjectivity through engagement’ (ibid.:973). This is necessary because deprivation, social exclusion and racism are longer term factors which create social divides, but local variation in social cohesion is explained through local factors (ibid.:965) and therefore national policies will not provide solutions to each context (ibid.:976). Instead, citizens must be empowered to deliberate.

Juteau and Schmitt (2003) problematise the universalism-particularism debate by arguing for the centering of historic and contemporary power relations in discussions over minority and majority relations, and the securing of group-based rights. Drawing on Bader (1995) they argue that more attention needs to be paid to the construction of difference; the way in which groups become ‘differeniated’. It then becomes apparent that minority demands are sometimes interpreted as a ‘quest for identity’ (Juteau and Schmitt, 2003:258) when in fact they are rejecting the ‘pseudo-universalism’ of the majority. In this way, ‘while majorities defend universalism as a tool for equality and lament the fracturing effects of particularism, they impose their own specific identity, close their boundaries, and reinforce their domination.’ (ibid.).

Geoffrey Levey argues that a particular form of multiculturalism, which he calls ‘The Bristol school of multiculturalism’, or BSM, has its roots in Taylor’s ‘recognition theory’ (Levey, 2018:6). The main theorists of the BSM are Tariq Modood, Bhikhu Parekh, Nasar Meer and Varun Uberoi, who collectively develop a distinctly inclusive form of multicultural thought, which ‘seeks inclusion and a sense of belonging in the national community’ (ibid.:1). It is a ‘bottom-up’ approach involving a struggle for political recognition which, if ‘rightly conceived’ establishes ‘a politics and political order that are suitably responsive in kind’ (ibid.:7).

This form of multiculturalism has been highly contested. Thomas Sealy analyses criticism of multiculturalism coming from three groups of critics: that of interculturalists, and particularly Ted Cantle; those studying ‘everyday multiculturalism’; and proponents of superdiversity. One by one, Sealy unpicks and rebuffs the criticisms coming from

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5 See also Chris Tillich (2003) on identity politics as the Other of modernity.
these three camps. In particular, he argues that Cante’s interculturalism caricatures multiculturalism, portraying it as too focused on national identities, whilst reifying categorical singularities against ‘empirical multiplicities’ (Sealy, 2018:695) and situating dialogue as only a ‘hasty revisionism’ (Sealy, 2018:698, referencing Cante, 2016). Sealy demonstrates that this portrayal is at odds with many prominent scholars of multiculturalism.

In his 2008 work, Bhikhu Parekh presents the need for a global ethics in an increasingly globalised, interdependent and therefore plural world. This framework provides a thought-provoking contribution to the discussion of national-level political systems for ensuring justice in plurality, and provokes us to think about how these national solutions might interact with one another in the global political space. Living in this global context means that what happens to people outside of our national territories matters to us both morally and practically. Furthermore, there are many challenges which we now face as a global community, such as ‘climate change, drug and human trafficking, terrorist threats, pollution, infectious disease and environmental degradation’ (Parekh, 2008:205). For Parekh, these challenges demand new ways of not only living together, but working together. The three components of Parekh’s global ethics are (1) equal worth (not rights): given that humans have capacities which are unique to them, they have ‘intrinsic value and worth’ (ibid.:217). (2) human solidarity: due to the increasing interconnectivity of people and societies, we have responsibilities to other people and to future generations, which includes a responsibility to the environmental well-being of our planet (ibid.:226). (3) respect for difference: since different communities develop different forms of life, capacities and emotions, and cherish different values and ideals, these different communities complement each other. (ibid.:226). Together, Parekh proposes that these three principles would lead to a world in which humans were equally valued, free and fostered purposeful relationships to overcome our shared challenges.

3.3 Ethnographic approaches to identity and belonging

Above, we have seen the difficulties of embedding a range of cultures and identities into political systems. A number of scholars have also highlighted the difficulties of studying identity, or identities. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) critique much social sciences research for using the term ‘identity’ in a vague and normative manner, rather than analysing it as a social construct. Others have promoted use of the term identification, rather than as a way of exploring the dynamic and processual nature of identities (Hall and du Gay, 1996; Adriaens, 2014; Benton and Gomez, 2014) and the way in which they are performative narrations of the self (Adriaens, 2015 following Giddens).

Significant work on identity has been made in the context of diasporic identity, which challenges more traditional place-based conceptions. For example, Brian Klieth Axel understands diaspora as a ‘globally mobile category of identification’ (2004:26). Speaking of the diasporic ‘I’, in which the context of diaspora is ‘generated in the moment of enunciation by a specific process, one by which collective, the anteriority, and futurity are invoked and instantiated’ (ibid.), Axel disrupts fixed notions of identity. Belonging is also used by scholars to denote a range of experiences and perceptions, as will become evident through the literature explored below. In many studies and for many participants, it is associated with place, but can also have a performative element. As Giddie, Hanson and All note, ‘Belonging includes an affective, emotional dimension – not just being but also longing’ (2018:8, italics in original, drawing on Probyn, 1996). Ethnographic methodology has enabled exploration of the sense or perception of belonging, which is central to the concept, given that social reality is constructed, and that people’s perceptions, and the behaviours which stem from these perceptions, are essential building blocks for this construction (Cottle-Peisker and Robertson, 2015:86).

3.3.1 Everyday multiculturalism

There has been a rich body of work exploring everyday multiculturalism, and particularly the concept of conviviality, a mode of analysis for engaging with everyday belonging, particularly in plural or diverse contexts. For Amin, to study conviviality is to study everyday encounters, and the way in which difference is negotiated in daily life (Amin, 2002). For Gilroy, convivial behaviours are the ‘resources for the undoing of racism’ which had ‘evolved spontaneously and were taking place at the interpersonal level and the structural level’, (Gilroy, 2006:6). It is a banal form of creative tension management. Conceptualising conviviality in this way shifts the focus from clash narratives to everyday negotiation (Gilroy, 2006; Neal et al., 2013:309). It also challenges the dominant political discourse which tends to ‘mobilise and incorporate a nostalgic vision of a homogeneous society that never existed.’ (Neal et al., 2013:318).

Wise and Velayutham (2014) explore three dimensions of convivial multicultural in Singapore and Sydney. The first is ‘spatial ordering’: the way in which the built environment ‘structures and circumscribes human interaction’ (Lofland, 1998), 80 per cent of Singaporeans live in government-built housing, which has quotas reflecting the national ethnic composition meaning that the main ethnic groups (Chinese, Malay, Indian) are represented in the same ratio in each estate, with new permanent residents being ascribed a new quota as they arrive. These estates have substantial public spaces, meaning that intercultural encounters are built into everyday life. Children begin to learn with their neighbours as soon as they enter school. In examining the ‘intercultural habitus’ in Singapore, the scholars explore the communicative mechanisms through which people interact across and between languages. They identify particular patterns of talk which facilitate this, involving humour, knowledge of words in Hokkien, Tamil and Malay, truncated speech patterns which facilitate ‘efficient and effective’ communication across languages, and ‘language switching’ to accommodate whatever languages are represented in a scenario (ibid.:421). Finally, they explore the role of key individuals who ‘seem to knit together connections between people of different backgrounds in the community’ (ibid.:415). The Singaporean context is, of course, very different to the UK context, and has political, demographic and historical characteristics which enable policies like this to be implemented. However, the study does demonstrate the extent to which interactions facilitated through environmental and educational conditions can result in a population with a strong ‘intercultural habitus’ (cf. Watson, 2006, who advocates analysis of the physical and spatial environment, rather than viewing public space in a purely Habermasian sense).

Stuart Hall’s concept of ‘multicultural drift’ is also important here, as Watson and Saha (2013) demonstrate in their article on mundane multiculturalism. Following fieldwork in two London suburbs (to counter the usual more common inner-city setting for multicultural research) they found complex and varied notions of belonging amongst the ‘Asian’ participants. The scholars found educational opportunities to be the main motivation for moving to Redbridge and Tooting, among other family-oriented reasons. There were gendered and generational differences in conceptualising attachment to spaces, with the younger generations voicing the most ‘natural’ and unquestioned belonging, while older generations who migrated have a longer and more complex journey of belonging. Some of the older participants also voiced a nostalgia for a time when Redbridge was more ethnically mixed. The scholars referenced two participants who lamented the loss of some of Redbridge’s trees, one of whom blamed the large number of Asian families who moved in and cut trees down (Watson and Saha, 2013:2026).
Cohesive Societies Literature Review

3.4 Online-offline communities

This section will outline research into identities and experiences of belonging at the interface of online and offline spaces, unpacking the potential for digital technologies to facilitate and enhance local community networks. As noted in the final project report of Foresight Future Identities, ‘People have become accustomed to switching seamlessly between the internet and the physical world, and use social media to conduct their lives in a way which dissolves the divide between online and offline identities’ (Foresight Future Identities, 2013:1). Goodspeed argues for an understanding of community which is no longer place-based, suggesting that places could be understood as ‘merely venues for social and economic exchanges primarily orchestrated through digital systems’ (Goodspeed, 2017:9). As will be indicated in the appendix, we feel that this is an area in which further research could be highly productive.

In their analysis of a Social Street, Mosconi and colleagues (2017) examined the ways in which online and offline engagement was fundamentally interwoven, as online residents’ groups resulted in material outcomes in the community. The Social Street itself, they argued, was not a community, the notion of which they found to evoke homogeneity and small-scale interaction. Rather, they prefer the term ‘networked public’ which incorporates difference and embeds the digital and place-based communities together.

Rob Cover (2016) uses an approach informed by Butlerian performativity to problematise the dichotomy between online and offline identities. Drawing on Foucault and Butler, Cover explores the ways in which the many activities engaged with on social media (in this case Facebook), are all part of the process of identity performance. In this way, social media is a highly relational form of subjectivity and therefore provides good opportunity to further Butlerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of identity construction and performance.

In their analysis of local twitter networks, Bingham-Hall and Law find that a ‘small and highly connected cluster of visible local entities such as businesses form a clique at the center’ (Bingham-Hall and Law, 2015:15) of the local network in Southeast London. The individuals in the network follow these businesses but not each other. From these findings, the scholars argue that the network is not a ‘community’ in itself, nor a ‘revival of civic life in crisis’ (cf Metzgar et al., 2011) but does, ‘through the creation of informational commons, help create a more intangible ‘sense’ of community and shared concern’ (ibid.:15). They argue that although the Twitter network, which consists of ‘geographically localised network concentrations consisting of following relationships’, may suggest a ‘community’ that is ‘created in place and through social media’, following Latour, such relationships ‘should not be seen as stable entities, but as potentialities’ (Latour, 2007, paraphrased by Bingham-Hall and Law, 2015:15). The scholars warn against viewing the network as an end in itself, but suggest it should instead be seen as ‘one tool in service of neighbourhood civic life’ (ibid.:15).

Wallace et al (2016) look at the ways in which ICT enables the development of ‘a sense of community and social cohesion’ (427) in the rural Scottish villages they studied. They follow David Lockwood’s differentiation between social integration and system integration as their theoretical framework. The former is about relations between actors and groups, the latter about different parts of a social system so, for example, the extent of division between different classes, ages and other local fractures. Through research undertaken in two rural Scottish villages, they find that some online media presence and networks related to the locality. They found that social relations and digital networks were highly intertwined, and that social networks could, on the one hand, foster social cohesion, by enabling people to communicate with others in their local, but on the other, undermine when people chose to maintain networks with people in other locations rather than embed themselves in their local community.

These studies indicate that digital communication platforms, in some contexts, facilitate offline community-building and can even, in the case of the Social Street example, lead to the development of initiatives which can benefit the wider community. The analysis of twitter networks demonstrates how digitally-enabled networks can be used to study the pathways of social systems, as well as the differing roles, access, constraints, actions and interactions of the social actors in those systems. This could usefully be related to assemblage theory in future research.

A final example looks not so much at the networking capacities of digital platforms, but at the way in which consumption of media, and the interactions which take place around that consumption, impact on social relations. Georgiou analyses the production of ethnic identities through media consumption in the Cypriot Community Centre in North London. Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities are navigated in this context through the activities which take place, and in particular the type of media which is consumed. She finds that Greek Cypriot activities, and the television channel in particular, dominate the space, reproducing ‘ethnic relations in the country of origin’ (2001:326), although Georgiou also notes that such communal spaces would not exist at all in Cyprus. In this way, the diasporic space is a more inclusive location of belonging.

3.5 Conclusion

Scholars such as Devereux, Parekh and Amin foreground the significance of public deliberation as a means not only of fostering a sense of belonging, but of creating an
inclusive politics in which multiple voices and perspectives are part of the political decision-making process. While the degree of active political participation envisioned may be ambitious, it provokes us to consider an understanding of belonging that is not prescribed by national-level discourses but forged in and through local communities, whether this is through engagement with organised local politics, or informal networks of belonging. In relation to the discussion of part one, this offers an interesting perspective, and the potential to add a further dimension to the distinction between the social and structural elements of social cohesion: perhaps local political or other community activity offers the potential to bridge this divide.

Moving forward, the research examined in section three indicates that exploration of the interface between local and national identities and experiences of belonging on the one hand, and between online and offline communities on the other will be extremely fruitful areas of research. The studies cited demonstrate the potential for these spaces to enhance our understanding of the ways in which people feel connected to those around them in contemporary contexts. This also indicates the potential for interaction between research into identity and belonging, and collective or cultural memory, by exploring, for example, the ways in which narratives of national identity influence experiences of belonging.

4.0 The social economy

Building on the exploration of experiences of identity and belonging in section three, we will now examine some of the processes through which the social components of social cohesion develop. The social economy has taken different forms in different epochs (Moulaert, 2005:2037). Space does not permit a full analysis of the history of the social economy, so we refer the reader to McMurtry (2004) and Moulaert (2005) who both provide fascinating and detailed accounts.

4.1 Introduction

Here, we will make do with a presentation of key definitions and distinctions of the social economy and related concepts in section 4.1.2 before moving on to the relevant empirical literature in the remaining sections.

Section 4.2 will examine the ways in which the social economy can build a sense of community, through analysis of reciprocity and sharing in both the experimental and ethnographic literature. It will then broaden to present literature which argues for the social economy as having the potential to be a transformative politics or alternative economic system which challenges individualist capitalism, rather than merely offering the potential to build a sense of community within the current system.

Section 4.3 will present cases in which segments of the social economy have hindered rather than helped social cohesion. There will be a particular focus on the over-use of the term ‘sharing’ in the context of digital platforms, and the social benefits of this kind of sharing will be critiqued.

4.1.1 Definitions and distinctions

As mentioned above, in place of a full analysis of the range of conceptualisations of the social economy, we will present key definitions and distinctions between concepts here. We aim to clarify the boundaries around these concepts where possible, and make explicit their overlap when not.

**The social economy.** Definitions of the social economy vary dramatically in breadth, from narrow definitions in which it is ‘Essentially [...] made up of social enterprises and voluntary organizations that are actively trading’ (Kay, 2005:168), to much broader conceptualisations, such as that of Moulaert: ‘Generally speaking, the term social economy designates the universe of practices and forms of mobilising economic resources towards the satisfaction of human needs that belong neither to for-profit enterprises, nor to the institutions of the state in the narrow sense.’ (Moulaert, 2005:2042).

We will use this broad sense of the social economy, which allows us to explore the range of concepts and practices set out in the remainder of this section.

**Sharing.** In his 2014 paper, Belk illustrates the way in which the concept of sharing has become confused in the digital age, as it is now possible for digital goods to be ‘shared or exchanged with no loss of the original’ (2014:9). Digital sharing ‘does not cost us anything; we lose nothing and potentially gain much from others’ online sharing’ (ibid.:10). Drawing on Belk (2010; 2014) Habibi and colleagues distinguish between sharing on the one hand, which is nonreciprocal and doesn’t involve money or calculation but does include social bonds, and pseudo-sharing on the other, more similar to exchange, which is reciprocal, involves money and calculation, and does not include social bonds (Habibi et al., 2017:116).

**The sharing economy.** Whilst closely related to, and built on, longer standing informal economies, much of the literature on the sharing economy explicitly focuses on post-2008
digital platforms which facilitate a variety of sharing platforms. The 2008 financial crash and subsequent need to lower consumer costs, coupled with the development of digital technologies, has resulted in the rapid expansion and availability of such platforms over the last decade. It is an umbrella construct (Acquier et al., 2017; Hamari et al., 2014:2047) which overlaps with many neighbouring concepts, such as ‘platform capitalism’, the ‘gig economy’, ‘collaborative consumption’, ‘peer-to-peer economy’, and the ‘access economy’ (Acquier et al., 2017:2-3). Activities included within this broad term are ‘swapping, bartering, trading, renting, sharing, and exchanging.’ (Fabbri et al., 2017:113). Some scholars advocate for a narrower definition of the sharing economy to enhance empirical applicability. For example, Freken and Schor define it as ‘consumers granting each other temporary access to under-utilized physical assets (‘idle capacity’), possibly for money’ (2017:4).

Collaborative consumption is defined by Hamari and colleagues as ‘sharing the consumption of goods and services through activities such as renting, swapping, or trading’ (Hamari et al., 2014:2048). Initiatives included by the scholars are Zipcar, Couchsurfing and Airbnb. The concept seems almost indistinguishable from the ‘sharing economy’, and we refer the reader to Hamari et al (2014), who elaborate on the conceptual perspective.

Reciprocity. Ekeh distinguishes between generalised and restricted reciprocity (Ekeh, 1974, cited in Papaoikonomou and Valor, 2016:1337). Group-generalised exchange involves the pooling of resources; benefits are either received collectively (group-focused) or individually (individual-focused). ‘Network-generalised’ exchange involves individuals giving goods/services to a member of a network and receiving them from another (ibid.).

Mutuality usually has a very similar meaning to that of generalised reciprocity. For example, Arnould and Rose use mutuality to describe ‘action that signals a relationship of shared sociality’; ‘it is not altruistic but socially ‘interested’; and ‘one may […] give without the intent of receiving directly’ (2016:76).

Social capital has been a hugely influential concept, developed by a number of scholars with overlapping conceptualisations. Nan Lin traces the roots of social capital theorisation to Marx’s work on capital, and amalgamates the range of usages under the conceptualisation; ‘social capital is captured from embedded resources in social networks’ (2013:3) whilst acknowledging the lack of consensus over whether such assets are acquired by the group or by individuals (ibid.7). There has been ongoing and intense debate about the rigour, coherence and measurability of the concept. This debate is too voluminous and complex to summarise here, so we will instead direct the reader to Fine (2009) for a comprehensive critique, as well as Pulkerton and Thompson (2008) for a meta-analysis of definitions.

4.2 The social economy as a mechanism for enhancing social cohesion

4.2.1 Reciprocity

While one might expect to find that practices of reciprocity enhance the purely social components of social cohesion, in fact many of the studies indicate that these practices cannot be separated from wider economic and structural forces. Whether or not a study explicitly analyses the broader context, practices of sharing and reciprocity are developed in relation to availability of resources and services in other parts of the economy. Pioneering work on reciprocity began almost a century ago with Malinowski’s (1922) monograph on gift exchange, further developed by Sahlin, who differentiated between ‘reciprocity’ (direct reciprocity between two individuals) and ‘pooling’ (the precursor to generalised reciprocity) (1974:885-896). Given the longevity of this field of inquiry, it has been studied in a range of disciplines, from anthropology and sociology, through social psychology, to business and marketing. There has been a tendency in all of these disciplines to study reciprocal behaviour, or networks of reciprocity, in apolitical vacuums. This is true of experimental, ethnographic and case study research designs. This tendency will be critiqued towards the end of this section.

The relationship between reciprocity and group identification seems to go both ways. Findings from social psychology indicate that generalised exchange structures produced higher levels of group identification (individual identification with the group) and group solidarity (positive feelings about the group) in a generalised exchange structure such as freecyle, than a direct one such as Craigslist (Willer et al, 2012). Similarly, Mol and colleagues found that generalised exchange produced higher levels of solidarity than either negotiated direct exchange, or reciprocal direct exchange (Molm et al., 2007). Whereas Anthony (2005) finds that group identity enhances collaboration by increasing in higher production of collective goods (in this case micro-finance loans). However, reciprocity enhances the longevity of this collaboration, because as soon as one person is noncompliant (ie behaves in a non-reciprocal way) others follow suit and the group disintegrates. This indicates that reciprocity may enhance group cohesion and vice versa, although it is unclear the extent to which these findings are generalisable. This is particularly the case in light of other studies which show that a monetary element in transactions can change attitudes to reciprocity. For example, the participants of Papaoikonomou and Valor’s study felt that non-monetary exchange systems were more equitable (2016:1343).

Once we move outside of these controlled and contained environments, reciprocity becomes extremely difficult to measure for two reasons. First, reciprocal relationships usually develop over a timespan longer than the longevity of most studies, and second, they often do not involve ‘like-for-like’ transactions (Nelson, 2000). For example, ‘material goods’ can be repaid ‘with gratitude, emotional support, and loyalty.’ (Nelson, 2000:204). Further, people tend to report giving more than they receive indicating that self-reports are inaccurate (Komter, 1996 cited in Nelson, 2000:296).

As indicated above, the disciplines of anthropology and sociology have long histories of studying reciprocity within the everyday social environment. Questioning whether such reciprocal relationships may enhance social inclusion, a number of studies have researched the ways in which support networks are mobilised by parents to cope with childcare needs. Bojarczuk (2017) found that strong ties (with friends and family) were mobilised by single mothers significantly more often than weak ties (cf. Demaiter and Blumer, 2009) indicating that mothers living at a distance to these kinds of networks – or those who have had children in a new location before having the time to build such networks – are vulnerable to lack of support, and may be at risk of social exclusion. In another study on childcare, Nelson found that some of her participants refer to their support network as ‘family’, based partly on the feeling that they can rely on one another (2000). This indicates that the finding from social psychology that reciprocal behaviour enhances group identification may also be true in ‘natural’ social contexts.

Studies which examine networks of reciprocity and support whilst incorporating the dimension of diversity are rare. Demaiter and Blumer (2009) in the United States found that race did not play a role in the extent to which respondents were involved in reciprocal relationships or networks, either in terms of racial homogeneity/diversity of the neighbourhood, or of the individuals’ networks, once socioeconomic variance had been accounted for. This indicates that socioeconomic position, rather than ethnicity, played the most significant role in predicting an individual’s participation in reciprocal relationships. Barwick (2015) tested the hypothesis that lack of diverse networks among ethnic-minority groups was due to their lack of social or networking skills, but found this not to be the case. In studying two neighbourhoods in Germany, one relatively ethnically homogeneous, the other more heterogeneous, the participants of this research, who all had similar language skills, had more diverse networks in the latter than the former, largely because their attempts to build relations with native Germans were not
reciprocated in the homogeneous neighbourhood. This indicates that behaviours of the majority may influence the capacity of minorities to build diverse social networks.

Social psychology offers an interesting perspective here, and evidence which perhaps has not been fully exploited in related disciplines working on social networks. In particular, the extensive research which explores the nature, mechanisms and measures of prejudice. For example, whilst acknowledging several caveats, Abrams notes that ‘Contact between members of different groups fosters positive intergroup attitudes if the contact also involves similarity, common goals, institutional support and equal status’ (Abrams, 2010:35) whilst contact ‘as friends’ is particularly productive (Abrams, 2010:36).

Knowledge of factors which both help and hinder the productivity of contact in reducing prejudice could enhance analysis of evidence from case studies examining the diversity of social networks, or the exclusion of people from networks of reciprocity. Further, detailed exploration of the ways in which discrimination towards different groups manifests, and is influenced by an individual’s own values (as in Abrams, 2016) would prove insightful in examining patterns of both discrimination and social exclusion.

4.2.2 Sharing

As indicated in section 4.1.2, the ‘sharing economy’ covers a range of activities. Acquier and colleagues suggest that the three ‘promises’ of the sharing economy are, first, environmental promises regarding the ‘sustainable use of resources’ (Acquier et al., 2017:2). Second, social promises in which the sharing economy is ‘a tool to generate non-reciprocal exchange (such as gift-giving or bartering), as well as new forms of collaboration, solidarity and social bonding among individuals’ (ibid.). Third, the economic promises, in which the sharing economy offers an ‘opportunity to break through the limitations of centralized economic and political institutions controlled by bureaucracies and professions by harnessing the power of trust, decentralized peer-to-peer networks and markets’ (ibid.).

Albinsson and Pererra’s (2012) study of sharing events, in which participants donate items they no longer need, and take others which they do, fits all three of these ‘promises’. Here, sharing events are community-building places, where the interpersonal interactions are just as important, sometimes more so, than the material items. This is also evident in the extent to which non-material items, such as entertainment, skills, and knowledge are also exchanged. People discuss ideas about social and environmental movements. Interestingly, while the literature on reciprocity discussed in the previous section tended to view reciprocity as something which could be productive for building social relations, for Albinsson and Pererra, reciprocity is less productive than sharing. For them, among sharing communities, all goods are shared, whereas reciprocity is transactional, and therefore more individualistic.

Much of the literature which researches the sharing economy through digital platforms suggests that these platforms encourage relationship-building less than one might expect given the name (to be explored in section 4.3). However, Celata and colleagues (2017) find trust and reciprocity to be essential ingredients which enable these platforms to function, by facilitating the ‘scaling up’ of sharing networks beyond relationships with known connections. The scholars focused on accommodation-sharing websites, and found that the sharing platforms often had a sense of community, etiquette and a code of conduct, as well as mechanisms for managing digital reputations so that users could choose trustworthy people with whom to engage (Celata et al., 2017). However, by demonstrating that these ‘mechanisms of trust’ had been deliberately created by the platform developers, one could question whether this type of ‘commoditised’ trust functions in a comparable way to that of trust developed through organic relationships, or whether this is a new kind of platform-specific trust.

4.2.3 The third sector and social capital

As outlined in the introduction, we have taken a broad understanding of the social economy, in order to analyse the way in which social mechanisms such as reciprocity and sharing can foster social cohesion. It is, perhaps, more common to conceptualise the social economy in a more restricted sense, as consisting of organisations such as cooperatives, mutuals and associations, sometimes also volunteering or third-sector organisations in general. Although the body of literature on this conceptualisation of the social economy is too voluminous to offer a comprehensive review here, we will highlight a few key themes which enable exploration of the relationship between economic and social inclusion offered by this type of organisation.

Evans and Syrett, measure social capital based on six characteristics: ‘trust, reciprocity, shared norms, shared commitment, social networks and information channels’ (2007:72). They found that existing social capital, measured in this way, had little influence on ‘the emergence of the social economies’, although social capital which ‘cuts across and beyond the locality was important, particularly in more urbanized locations’ (ibid.:71). They did find that social enterprises developed in clusters, which they interpreted as confirmation that ‘the social capital generated by the development of an initial social enterprise’ had been ‘facilitated the development of further social enterprises’ (ibid.). However, they qualified this interpretation by stating that the mobilisation of social capital in the development of a social enterprise did rest on ‘its ability to lever in and maximise the use of other sources of capital within the local arena’ (ibid.) meaning that social capital is inextricable in these contexts from other forms of capital.

Birch and Whittam use Woolcock’s definition of social capital, as ‘the information, trust, and networks of reciprocity inhering in social networks’ (Birch and Whittam, 2008:442, referencing Woolcock, 1998), and acknowledge that the relationship between social capital and the third sector is not easy to capture (ibid.). In their examination of the role of the third sector in the regional development of social capital, they highlight the need to develop social and material resources simultaneously. This is to avoid a ‘hiccup’ (profit leaving an organisation) which would prevent further social development within it (ibid.:443). They find that the third sector can encourage the development of two kinds of social capital: ‘bonding’ – in the form of norms and values – and ‘bridging’ – in the form of mutual and democratic processes’ (ibid.:447). Together, these studies indicate that social and economic capital may co-develop within third sector organisations, although the relationship is intricate, complex, and may be context-specific.

4.2.4 The social economy as a transformative politics

Much of the literature presents the social economy as a socially-rooted segment of the broader capitalist economic system. McMurtry offers a different conceptualisation, instead of the social economy being concerned with organising socio-economic activities in a socially conscious way whilst fitting within a broader capitalist system, in the way that cooperatives do, the roots of the social economy can be traced to alternatives to capitalism which sit outside the logic of the markets. To carry this view of the social economy forward, social economy practices would need to be situated within a broader political structure, in which the social objectives are prioritised over the economic (McMurtry, 2004). McMurtry argues that such alternatives would have to address not only ‘the life-needs of their memberships’ but, ‘very importantly, also society at large’ (ibid:376). In order to do this, we need to ‘understand the demands of life prior to their filtration as
market demands’ (ibid.). McMutry argues that the rapid growth of social movements since 2001 have in common that ‘the demands are rooted in an alternative conception of the social possibilities of existence’ (ibid.:677). To join together the social economy as an alternative economic system, and these social movements as potential alternative socio-political systems, could produce ‘a practical, community-rooted way to create life-alternatives to capitalist socio-economic and political forms here and now’ (ibid.).

Ash Amin also writes that the social economy is on a mainstreaming trajectory, as a thirst emerges for ‘post-capitalist possibility based on social participation and an explicit ethic of care.’ (2009:5). He gives the examples of ‘crèches, community farms, waste recycling projects, ethical trade and alternative finance ventures’ which are increasingly being viewed as creating work opportunities and new markets, as well as empowering ‘disadvantaged communities’ rather than being relegated to the periphery of socio-economic activity (ibid.). In contrast to McMurtry, Amin’s framing is not of an alternative to capitalism, but of its transformation to a more ‘caring’, ‘socially responsible’ and ‘needs-based’ system (ibid.). Simultaneously, the social economy remains contextualised, providing opportunities and alternatives depending on what is already provided for by state and market (ibid.:11). The potential of the social economy, either as an alternative economics or in its capacity to transform, can be conceptualised at local, national and global levels.

Two examples offer contexts in which the social economy has undergone a period of rapid expansion, and are directly connected to local social movements and transformative politics. The first in Greece, the second Spain; both in the context of the withdrawal of the state and necessity of local communities to seek and create alternative mechanisms for meeting daily needs. Blanco analyses Ciutat Meridiana; one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Barcelona. Once a site of urban crisis, Ciutat Meridiana became an arena of social innovation. The locally situated initiatives became tools which facilitated people with housing issues, but simultaneously empowered them politically by increasing awareness of the macro-forces which had produced their vulnerability. Chatzidakis and colleagues offer another fascinating account of the extent to which social economy practices, in this case gifting, sharing, co-producing and caring are rooted in political ideologies which emerge as social practices in particular socio-political contexts, as an alternative system. In this case, the neighbourhood, Exarcheia, is in Athens, and is known for its radical politics and anti-capitalist way of life. Here, sharing practices are part of a broader ethics of caring, not only for one another but for the environment as well (Chatzidakis et al., 2012).

These studies are reminders that practices of sharing and reciprocity need to be analysed within their structural and political contexts. The studies of Blanco and Chatzidakis, as well as Albinsson and Pererra, above, demonstrate that such practices can be rooted in ideologies, be they green, anti-capitalist, anti-consumerist or similar. However, most of the studies in section 4.2.2 explored practices of sharing and reciprocity as coping mechanisms used by individuals and groups to meet the daily needs of themselves and their neighbours. Some of these studies took place in contexts of increasing austerity, indicating that political agendas can create contexts which increase the necessity of developing alternative mechanisms for meeting daily needs. Thus the social economy is political in both senses, being rooted in proximate political contexts as well as having broader ideological motivations.

### 4.3 The negative impacts of the social economy on social cohesion

We have seen the potential for a range of social economy activities to build group identity or a sense of community. The development of social economy practices also seems to provide bottom-up mechanisms through which people in social networks can support one another to meet the daily needs of the community. In this section we will look at the negative impacts of the social economy on social cohesion. We will do this, first, by analysing networks of reciprocity within their local economic contexts, to see the impact of economic privilege or deprivation, as well as (in)equality, on the capacity of a community to develop a social economy. Second, we will take a closer look at the evidence from studies of the digital sharing economy, to see whether such sharing practices do enhance components of social cohesion, or whether they are in fact ‘pseudo-sharing’, as Belk (2014) suggests.

Evidence indicates that there may be a greater need for informal support in less affluent areas. For example, ‘informal social support is often necessary among low-income networks in this post-welfare reform era, when public supports [sic.] are less available’ (Radey, 2015:60). However, other studies indicate some potential for the creation and maintenance of these support networks. Furthermore, individuals with a lower income tended to face more barriers to participation in such networks than those with a higher income. In one study, it was found that lower-income respondents benefited less from reciprocal relationships, and that this was exacerbated by the degree of neighbourhood deprivation (Demaiter and Blumer, 2009). A UK-based study found that the socioeconomic context was more significant than individual socioeconomic status in influencing capacity to participate in informal support networks, with these kinds of helping relationships being less frequent in poorer neighbourhoods (Lekti, 2008). Conversely, another study found that gentrification can have a negative impact on longer-term residents who had previously built communal self-help arrangements, but that these were replaced by commercial services as the neighbourhood gentrified (Colic-Peisker and Robertson, 2015). This indicates that more deprived neighbourhoods are less likely to benefit economically and materially from support networks, but that they are also less likely to benefit from the indirect social consequences, such as increased community ties, solidarity and group identification. Further research is needed to understand why this might be the case.

Over the last decade there has been a rapid expansion in the sharing economy, facilitated by technological advances which have resulted in the development of digital platforms which can be used to coordinate sharing. However, sharing practices have evolved as people are no longer restricted to sharing with people in their face-to-face social network. In his (2014) paper, Belk differentiates between ‘sharing’ and ‘pseudo-sharing’. Examples of sharing are ‘intentional online sharing of Ephemera’ such as opinions and source code (Belk, 2014:14); ‘online-facilitated offline sharing’ such as via Freecycle (ibid.:15); ‘peer-to-peer online sharing’ such as of music files (ibid); and ‘online facilitated hospitality’ such as Couchsurfing (ibid.:16). On the other hand, examples of pseudo-sharing are ‘long-term rental; short-term rental; “sharing” of data by businesses; and online barter economies. In this new sharing environment, Habibi and colleagues differentiate between practices which fall within the sharing economy as either having ‘a high degree of sharing’, and therefore ‘better able to build on consumer co-creation and positive sharing values such as community links’ and those which have a ‘low degree of sharing (pseudo-sharing) and are more similar to exchange practices’ (Habibi et al., 2017:14). Some platforms act as mediators, thereby preventing users from coming into contact with one another (ibid.) and acting as a barrier to, rather than facilitating, the development of community bonds.

As well as preventing the development of social bonds, thereby indicating limited benefits for social cohesion, some studies have found sharing economy platforms to increase inequality. By analysing three sharing economy platforms (Airbnb, RelayRides and TaskRabbit) Schor found that inequality among the bottom 80 per cent increased because of these platforms. The majority of providers were well-educated and had full time jobs; they used these platforms to augment their incomes through participation in labour which would have otherwise been undertaken by people with fewer qualifications who therefore had access to a smaller portion of the employment market.
Conclusion

We have taken a broad approach to the social economy in order to incorporate findings from literature on a range of social practices which ultimately build the capacity of individuals and communities to help one another fulfil their daily needs. We have spent less time on the more traditional social economy literature, which looks at formal aspects of the social economy, particularly cooperatives and volunteering, but also the third sector in general. There is ample literature on these topics, and our focus here has been to understand the ways in which the social mechanisms of sharing and reciprocity impact on the social and economic components of social cohesion. In this way, the potential for these mechanisms to enhance perceptions of community belonging should be evident, and the findings from Part four are therefore closely interrelated with those in Part three.

Further, we have problematised the sometimes apolitical approach taken in the literature on the social economy, by indicating the extent to which these practices are inherently political, whether or not scholars or participants choose to engage with the socio-political context from which they emerged.

In the UK, as elsewhere, we have seen a dramatic withdrawal of the welfare state over the last decade, along with rising costs of essential services such as childcare, and increasing adult social care needs. This raises the question of how the nature of networks of reciprocity are changing within this political context. While such networks may foster a sense of social cohesion (in terms of group identity and solidarity) how is this mediated by the fact that they are increasingly necessary rather than supplementary; becoming survival behaviours rather than community-building mechanisms? Further research is needed to establish whether the positive benefits of reciprocal networks are as significant given growing inequality and the increasing necessity of these networks for low- and middle-income families.

The research presented in parts four and five demonstrates the extent to which practices such as sharing and re-using have the potential to both build community bonds and enhance environmental sustainability. There has been a lack of coordination between scholars of environmental and behavioural sciences, meaning that this is an area which has not had sufficient exploration, and one which could have significant momentum in the contemporary climate.

5.0 Care for the future

In this last of the thematic sections, we turn to the future. Here, we address the sustainability of society in the face of significant shifts like demographic and climate change, and consider how these shifts might affect obligations across generations. As will become clear throughout part five, to care for the future is to develop mechanisms through which to nurture social and environmental relations simultaneously. Preparing for, and enhancing, ongoing societal cohesion means diminishing vulnerabilities and sharing responsibility.

5.1 Introduction

Responsibility emerges as a theme in all of the perspectives and approaches of part five. First, the responsibility of the different generations to society as a whole as we undergo demographic shifts which produce varying political, economic and social privileges and challenges for different generations. Second, the responsibility of individuals across generations within their family, as they navigate the different socio-political environments in which each is embedded outside of the home. Third, the responsibility of the global community towards environmental challenges, in order to counteract the current system in which the most socially and environmentally vulnerable populations experience the greatest negative impact of environmental degradation. Finally, the responsibility of community members to one another, and to their immediate environment.

5.2 Demographic shifts and intergenerational relations

A report produced by the Government Office for Science notes that identities can be 'a positive resource for social change, building social capital, and promoting wellbeing, but they can also have a role in social unrest and antisocial behaviour' (Foresight Future Identities, 2013:1). Therefore, predicting demographic change is part of the way towards understanding what needs to be done to ensure cohesion in the future. It is also necessary to understand how those demographic shifts impact on individual and group identities and, therefore, also relationships between, and obligations to, one another and to society as a whole.

The Foresight Future Identities report makes several inferences with regards to the link between demographic change and intergenerational relations. For example, it notes the changing 'dependency ratio', in which there is an increasing number of dependents compared to working-age people in the population. This 'could lead to greater stresses upon the 'middle' generations, especially those with caring responsibilities, and increasing demands on the state for health, welfare, and social care provision' (Future Foresight Identities, 2013:16). The report also refers to the possibility of resentment among those still working 'later than they anticipated' and taking on increasing caring responsibilities for both parents and older children (ibid.). This indicates one way in which the different obligations of generations may impact on intergenerational relations. Further, intergenerational dynamics are altered through the delay and blurring of life-stages, caused by changes such as young people living with their parents for longer, as ‘younger people are likely to find achieving the experiences of adulthood more challenging than previous generations.’ (Ibid.:2).

5.2.1 Superdiversity

By analysing the literature on superdiversity, the ageing population and intergenerational relations, we hope to demonstrate the ways in which demographic shifts impact on social cohesion. Superdiversity is a framework through which we can conceptualise the
contemporary social reality in which we live. Not only are people migrating more than ever before, resulting in demographic change within particular localities, they are also themselves living in multiple locations, as more people engage in ongoing or transient migrations as well as dual residency or citizenship. Increasing diversification is likely to continue, indicating the need to further understanding of this social reality in order to protect against social fragmentation in the future.

Despite the conceptual progress made within the superdiversity framework, it could be argued that it has fallen short of the necessary methodological innovation needed to study the complexity embedded within the concept. Therefore, rather than analysing superdiversity in its entirety, the subsequent sections focus in on two key features: the ageing population and intergenerational relations.

In the introduction to their special issue, Vertovec and Meissner differentiate between a comparison of the conditions of superdiversity on the one hand, and the use or critique of superdiversity ‘descriptively, methodologically or with reference to policy and public practice’ on the other (Vertovec and Meissner, 2015:541). With regards to the second group, the core questions proposed by the scholars are ‘so what if diversification processes are multidimensional and researchers and policymakers recognize this? What actually are the implications of using a superdiversity lens to study social processes?’ In order to address these questions, the scholars propose that super-diversity needs to be addressed in terms of ‘power, politics and policy’ (ibid.) suggesting ‘that conditions and processes surrounding superdiversity both produce, and are produced by, a range of differential power relations and modes of inequality’ (ibid.:551).

In a similar vein, Raco (2018) calls for further research on the ‘movement of diversity narratives from the realms of technocratic policy language into the social and political mainstream’ (cf. Vertovec, 2012). He argues that the process through which new local social imaginaries emerge does not happen ‘unproblematically through presence, contact, and day-to-day encounters’ as is sometimes suggested in urban planning literature. Instead, ‘more inclusive imaginaries have to be systematically nurtured through careful and systematic forms of urban policy and local statecraft, that relate to a broad range of social policy fields’ (Raco, 2018:158, emphasis in original). This call ties together topics explored in previous sections: first, the analysis of political belonging in section 3.2, and second, the question in part two concerning the impact of narrations of collective memory on perceptions of belonging.

The call for further research into superdiversity as a social reality of the contemporary world has also been made by Gryzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore, who argue for a new conceptualisation of integration as a way of examining this reality. Although it has been acknowledged that integration is a two-way process, the scholars propose that there has been a lack of development as to what integration looks like in the context of superdiversity. There has been more work on the experiences of people living in diversity (eg micro-level ethnographic analysis on conviviality, cosmopolitanism etc.) than on the process of migrant settlement in superdiversity. Scholars maintain that this lack of progress is in part due to the continuing ethno-national focus in migration studies, the ongoing state essentialisation of groups as they continue to use binary distinctions such as ‘majority/minority’, ‘dominant/non-dominant’ and as they retain an assimilationist paradigm. Such approaches do not ‘permit adequate analysis of the socio-cultural and demographic complexity that underpins super-diversity – that in many areas there is no coherent majority culture and/or that populations are frequently super-mobile’ (Gryzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore, 2018:180).

The similarity between superdiversity and intersectionality has been noted. Meissner and Vertovec dismiss this comparison by stating that ‘most of the intersectionality literature focuses exclusively on the combined workings of race, gender and class’ whereas superdiversity is ‘concerned with ‘superdiversity’ – an increasingly living, important not only nationality/country of origin/ethnicity, migration channel/legal status and age as well as gender’ (Meissner and Vertovec, 2015:545). This dismissal is questionable given that scholars working with both superdiversity and intersectionality seem to be struggling to develop methodologies capable of analysing the complexity inherent in both theorisations empirically.

### 5.2 The ageing population and social cohesion

As noted above, the ageing population is one of the key demographic shifts underway in contemporary Britain. This shift is impacting not only the obligations of middle generations to wider society in terms of work, productivity and tax, but also their responsibilities to close relatives, both younger and older, through caring obligations. Older generations also face new and different challenges. They are often working at a later age than anticipated, and have extended periods of old age, changing the shape of their life trajectory. The literature in this section analyses the factors in an individual’s social environment which impact on their inclusion in wider society. The primary concern in the literature in this section, therefore, is the well-being of older adults. For example, Cramm and Neiboer researched the relationship between sense of neighbourhood belonging and social cohesion on the one hand, and frailty on the other, finding that the former seemed to protect against the latter (2012). In another paper produced from the same data, Cramm, Van Dijk and Nieboer found that ‘neighbourhood services, social capital and social cohesion’ all had a positive impact on the wellbeing of older people (2012). In a similar vein, a further study found a positive association between an individual’s social networks and their health, as well as between regional social cohesion and the health of individual older adults (Deindl, Brandt and Hank, 2016).

While care needs for older adults are generally increasing at the population level, they are not experienced equally. Some of the health variation in older age is genetically determined (about 25 per cent) while the majority is due to ‘the cumulative impact of health behaviours and inequalities across the life course, meaning that people who have lived in poorer or socially marginalised situations are likely to experience more challenging health conditions in older age’ (Beard and Bloom, 2015:658). Other factors affecting the differing resources available to individuals and communities for care provision are, first, that the mobility of the population means that older generations are increasingly living further away from their children (Beard and Bloom, 2015:658). Second, the increased participation of women in work outside of the home has resulted in them having less availability for care duties than in previous generations (ibid.).

Laaroussi’s study on intergenerational support within migrant families, both from parent to child (particularly the support given by mothers to their daughters when they have their own children) and from the younger generation to their grandparents, indicates one of the ways in which those who have difficulties accessing formal care manage health needs (Laaroussi, 2017:176). This study illustrates how demographic changes (in this case the ageing population and migration) produce alterations in intergenerational relations. It also points to the need for further research into the informal provision of care, in particular the extent to which more marginalised populations may experience greater caring responsibilities.

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8 While Meissner and Vertovec do not clarify their use of intersectionality, it can be broadly understood as the notion that subjectivity is constructed by mutually reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality, and that it is facilitated by ‘a tool designed to combat feminist hierarchy, hegemony and exclusion’ (Nash, 2008:2).

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The Age-Friendly Cities and Communities (AFCC) movement was developed by the World Health Organisation ‘to address the multiple, interacting layers of the social world that influence the degree to which older adults are integrated in their communities’ (Kelley, Darnoffel and Narweh, 2018:51, referencing WHO, 2007). Thomese and colleagues call for an updating of this approach in light of other demographic changes caused by globalisation and rising inequalities, and the need to ensure ‘older people’s integration with and sense of belonging to their neighbourhood’ (2018:39). Kelley and colleagues call for the necessity of further study into microfication and erasure in both environmental gerontology and AFCC initiatives (Kelley et al., 2018). The scholars argue that there has been too much focus on micro-level research at the expense of research into the macro-level forces affecting older people. As an example of erasure, the scholars reference Klinesberg’s (2002) study Heat Wave, which examined the 1995 heatwave that resulted in 521 deaths in Chicago, ‘73 per cent of which were among adults aged 65 or older. More than 90 per cent lived alone. The modal victims were poor, elderly, Black adults, disproportionately located in the most violent neighbourhoods of the city.’ (Kelley et al., 2018:56, referencing Klinesberg, 2002). The study commissioned by the mayor ‘paid virtually no attention to the social patterning of the victims’ (ibid.). Erasure has been studied in critical race discourse (Gilborn, 2005) and disability studies (Campbell, 2008) but as of yet has not been sufficiently explored in either environmental gerontology or AFCC initiatives.

Overall, the literature cited in this section indicates the need for an intersectional approach which examines the differing levels of needs, as well as variation in resources, experienced by different individuals and communities. It seems to be that the literature on inter-generational relations, explored below, remains preoccupied with ethnic minority groups, whilst not paying due attention to broader generational shifts. On the other hand, the literature on ageing populations, on the whole, suffers from a degree of shortsightedness with regards to diversity, inequality, and the ways in which segments of the ageing population have varying care needs, as well as different barriers to accessing care. This might suggest that collaboration between scholars in these areas would be beneficial.

5.2.3 Intergenerational relations and social cohesion

The literature on inter-generational relations is dominated by a focus on ethnic minority groups, and the post-migratory experiences of different generations, as well as the interactions between them. Nonetheless, this literature provides much insight into intra-familial, inter-generational relations, indicating some of the ways in which obligations across generations might be navigated within the household. Although these studies focus on migratory processes, they demonstrate the strategies families use to cope with the differing social environments in which different generations are embedded outside of the home.

Analysing the children of migrants as part of migrant communities is not a problem-free endeavour, as they may not identify as such (cf Heath, 2015:3). Nonetheless, this body of research does provide rich data on the heterogeneity of experience for migrants and their children in terms of identity, belonging, inclusion and participation, indicating the ways through which social cohesion is experienced differently along axes of age, as well as gender, class and ethnicity. Some of this literature was produced from within the ‘integration’ paradigm, by analysing the extent to which first, second and third generations had ‘integrated’ into ‘mainstream society’. While acknowledging that this framework has significant ethical and political problems, we will include some of the literature given its relevance to an exploration of intergenerational relations and social cohesion, without revisiting the extensive debate on the integrationist paradigm.

Benton and Gomez highlight the importance of studying migration through a generational lens, particularly because migrants and the children of migrants are often categorised as ‘minorities’ by both state and the majority population (2014:1159) despite having highly different relationships to that identity. This treatment of migrants and their children as homogeneous ‘minorities’ surfaces in ‘identity denial’ in which ‘nationals of a given country are treated as foreigners’, usually ‘in a racialised context’ (ibid.:1162), and ‘identity prescription’ in which ‘a group or an individual is consigned to a nationality not of its own choosing’ – usually an ancestral identity. (ibid.:1162). This juxtaposition, in which residents are treated as outsiders, produces tensions for some children of migrants, as they ‘are struggling to be different without compromising the right to belong’ (Attias-Donfut and Cook, 2017:126).

Generational and class based differences in the experience of migration and belonging intersect, as ‘local-born members of higher social classes are more included, while the lower classes are more alienated and most exposed to discrimination’ (Benton and Gomez, 2014:1688, drawing on their research with the Chinese diaspora). Attias-Donfut and Cook (2017) highlight the central role the children of migrants play in their families, as they become ‘mediators’ between family members and the wider social environment, due to the children’s ‘better knowledge of the language and of the social codes than their parents’ (ibid.:121). In this analysis, the children of migrants act as mediators, helping their family to experience greater inclusion in their social environment than they would otherwise. Another study examined a Schools Linking program which, at the time of Shannahan’s publication, was taking place in twenty local authorities in the UK, and drew on the capacity that children have to build relationships across demographic differences (Shannahan, 2018). By increasing the opportunities of children to interact with others with whom they might otherwise not have encountered, the programme took advantage of children’s role as mediators. As well as increasing interactions among children, the programme had a ‘ripple out’ effect, as secondary Parents Link initiatives emerged (ibid.). There may also have been an informal ripple effect, as children communicated with their parents and wider social circles about the experience.

The idea of the children of migrants being social mediators can be extended to the political sphere. Attias-Donfut and Cook identified a tendency for the children of migrants to be ‘more willing to protest, to be politically involved, and to exert an influence to bring changes so that their host countries become effectively plural’ while their parents remained ‘more respectful of the social order’ (Attias-Donfut and Cook, 2017:127). If political participation is one dimension of social cohesion, this indicates another way in which the children of migrants act as mediators; here they are political mediators; active agents creating a politics of inclusion.

It has been argued that children adapt more quickly to new socio-cultural environments following migration because of their rapid exposure to their new environment through school and the social networks that they develop there (Renzaho, Dhingra and Georgeou, 2017). Some scholars propose that this can lead to intercultural conflict, as parents become anxious about their children’s desire to spend time away from the family, and worried about them losing their ‘traditional’ values, whilst children felt that their parents were old fashioned. The scholars conceptualised these changes as the youth themselves becoming contested sites of culture (ibid.). Some scholars have critiqued over-emphasis of the inter-generational difference in adaptation rates, saying that these scholars present parents as static, while their children adapt (Cook and Waite, 2016; Pelto and al., 2017). To the contrary, Cook and Waite found that parental patterns shift over time, and are constantly negotiated. In particular, they highlight the ways in which gender relations evolve, being an issue which can cause conflict, but which is renegotiated over time. Girls sometimes have greater restrictions on them than boys, but expectations change, sometimes through girls’ resistance, women’s economic empowerment, and as gender roles are renegotiated in the family context (Cook and Waite, 2016).
Furthering the exploration of negotiation and change rather than static inter-generational differences, Peltola and colleagues take an intersectional approach which focuses on ‘agency and its constraints’ to analyse ‘intergenerational negotiations on young people’s romantic relationships’ (Peltola et al., 2017:545). Through this framework they are able to explore the ways in which ‘generation, gender, ethnicity and “race”, are “mutually constitutive and dynamic” (ibid.:535, referencing Brah and Phoenix, 2004). Further, they find these social categories, and the degree of freedom granted, to be denied and negotiated along the axes of these ‘young people’s life courses, peer relations, decision-making as well as public discourses’ (ibid.:546).

These studies demonstrate the benefit of an intersectional approach which analyses social relationships as interactions between agentic individuals who are nonetheless influenced (and constrained) by their wider social environment. Migratory journeys, as well as identities and belonging, are all experienced differently by members of the same family. These variations are influenced by the roles and expectations of individuals as they embody and resist social categories, and the way in which these roles and expectations may be different in the country of residence compared with the (parental) country of origin. These studies show that the rules for, and expectations of, young people can be the subject over which these negotiations take place, as parental strategies are adapted or reinforced, and their children resist or comply, in an ongoing process of adaptation and negotiation. A criticism of the scholarship on intergenerational conflict in migrant families is the tendency to paint a picture of successfully adapting youth versus maladaptive parents (cf. Peltola et al., 2016), largely in line with criticisms of the ‘integrationist’ paradigm more generally. Although these studies focus on post-migration families, they nonetheless provide valuable insight into the way in which demographic shifts impact on social relations, ultimately impacting on local strategies for achieving social cohesion.

5.3 Linking social and environmental sustainability

This section will address societal cohesion in light of environmental changes. We will begin in section 5.3.1 by examining efforts by researchers to study the interrelationship between social, economic and environmental sustainability at the global level. Ultimately, the models presented in this section demonstrate that social, environmental and economic sustainability are inherently entwined and must therefore be addressed together. They also highlight some of the global inequalities with regards to both the responsibility for, and experience of, environmental degradation. This research has a future orientation and is therefore productive for policy-makers. Section 5.3.2 moves to address this same interrelationship at the local level by analysing the mechanisms through which environmental and social sustainability can be fostered symbiotically, with the elements mutually enhancing one another. Much of the scholarship linking these elements in a sustainability framework aims to have a positive environmental impact by shaping social behaviour. We suggest that a dual aim adopting environmental sustainability and societal cohesion simultaneously will enhance the impact of the scholarship in both fields. Reducing the negative human impact on the environment will disproportionately benefit vulnerable communities, as it is vulnerable communities who currently experience the most extreme consequences of environmental degradation. In turn, this can also have a positive impact on their socio-political and economic situation, thus enhancing social cohesion.

6.1 The global level

People experience disasters ‘along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and age, creating uneven patterns of vulnerability that place people at “different levels of risk from the same hazard” (Willow, 2014:241, referencing Oliver-Smith, 2009). Furthermore, these patterns of experience are in many ways politically produced, as decision-makers ‘distance themselves from the consequences of their actions by “sitting hazardous activities and storing hazardous wastes in “peripheral” regions” both in the standard geographic sense of the word and in terms of the cultural distance constructed between members of empowered and disempowered groups’ (ibid., referencing Johnston 1997). Analysing ‘the cumulative stock of CO2 in the atmosphere’, Jan Gough demonstrates that the most significant contribution has been from ‘the rich industrialised world, the burning of fossil fuels has precisely been their wealth’ (ibid.:26). This unequal responsibility is exacerbated when calculating ‘consumption-based emissions’ as opposed to the emissions within national territories, because consumption-based emissions are much higher in OECD countries due to the outsourcing of production (ibid.). Conversely, it is poorer communities which experience the greatest negative impact: drawing on the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Gough summarises, ‘climate change will act as a “threat multiplier”’: poor, marginal and socially excluded groups will suffer more, with the deepest impacts likely to be felt in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia’ (ibid.:24).

Eizenberg and Jabreem have noted that the ‘social element was ‘integrated late into debates on sustainable development’ (Eizenberg and Jabreem, 2007:1). Once acknowledged, a ‘social ecology’ framework was developed, in which it became evident that the vulnerabilities of human populations to environmental damage were not experienced equally. It is now widely acknowledged that studies of sustainability must be based on three pillars: environmental, social and economic. Despite this, ‘social sustainability’ is still an underdeveloped aspect of the ‘sustainability’ discourse. The scholars define social sustainability as ‘the vision of having a safer planet; safer human and non-human societies now and in the future’ (ibid.:2). In this paper, they develop a social sustainability framework, built on four ‘social practices’ (ibid.:4), namely community, sustainable urban forms, and eco-prosumption. The scholars therefore provide a framework for protecting the environment whilst distributing the burden of responsibility across populations.

Another area of scholarly interest undergoing significant work is the development of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). These have largely emerge from collaboration between climate scientists, economists and energy systems modellers to examine the way in which ‘global society, demographics and economics might change over the next century’ (Hausfather, 2018). The first of the SSPs is SSP1, ‘Taking the green road’, in which the global community works collaboratively to manage the global commons, investing in health and education to decrease population growth, and emphasising human well-being over economic growth. Renewable energy is developed and made more accessible, and overall energy consumption decreases (O’Neill et al., 2017:172). At the other end of the spectrum is SSP5, ‘Fossil-fuelled development - taking the high way’, in which competitive markets continue to prevail, becoming more globally integrated. Strong investments in health and education continue, but fossil fuels are exploited as energy intensive lifestyles are adopted around the world. Population growth in developing countries declines, but are relatively high in high income countries, as economic outlooks are optimistic (ibid.:174).

This type of modelling could be extremely beneficial for policy-making communities with regards to agreeing achievable aims and responsibilities for different states, taking into account their social structure and degree of economic development. While the aim here is to understand the different ways in which the global community could collaborate with regards to environmental policy, and is therefore more relevant to ‘global cohesion’ than the local and state levels which are our primary concern in this review. It is arguably the case that local or national environmental initiatives must be created within a global framework. Furthermore, the local initiatives to be explored in the next section have the potential to not only develop community-level environmentally friendly practices and build social cohesion, but also to enhance understanding of the need for large-
scale change. Therefore, there is the potential for this type of practice to build social movements, in itself becoming a transformative politics.

5.3.2 Urban and local initiatives

Despite the widespread recognition that sustainability needs to be approached from social, environmental and economic perspectives simultaneously, there continues to be a lack of collaboration between scholars working in these fields. Murphy (1997) explains this void by tracing the origins of sociology, early proponents of which legitimised the emergence of the discipline by promoting the importance of the social in contrast with the natural sciences, which were already viewed as valid modes of inquiry. According to Murphy, this led to a lack of attention within the social sciences to processes of natural and social action (Murphy, 1997:3). This segregation only started to be addressed once the negative environmental impact of human behaviour became so severe it could no longer be ignored: all disciplines had to critically engage with the relationship between humans and their environment (ibid.:95). It could be argued, therefore, that methodological and theoretical development in this field is still making up for lost time.

The relationship between urban environmental initiatives and social cohesion are complex. While it is often assumed that increasing green public space will enhance wellbeing of the local population and improve social cohesion, this assumption can produce blind spots to inequalities of access and control, as well as sometimes unplanned for local economic polarisation, as residential areas around green spaces gentrify (Haase. Kabish, Haase et al., 2017). However, grassroots environmental initiatives such as the urban farming movement which arose in Detroit in response to ‘soil, water and air pollution’, disproportionately experienced in black and poor neighbourhoods (Giorda, 2016:61) have been shown to have a positive effect in ‘reshaping the urban landscape’ (ibid.:55), as neighbourhood gardens and access to fresh produce increase (ibid.:63).

Limited ethnographic research explores the social and community benefits of local community gardening initiatives. For example, Nettle’s monograph offers rich data on the social benefits of such initiatives, demonstrating the way in which care for our shared natural environment can co-develop alongside care for the social, emotional and nutritional wellbeing of its inhabitants. However, Nettle’s findings do also suggest that not everyone in a locality benefits from gardening initiatives; that it tends to be middle-class participants who are more active; and that the ‘community’ element of community gardening is sometimes used to justify its existence as a ‘public good’, even when non-gardening members of the community would prefer to use the space for other purposes (Nettle, 2014:120). Research into the impact on social cohesion of environmental initiatives at the local level is even more limited in the UK than in Australia and America. In the UK context, Holland evaluates whether community gardens offer opportunities for local sustainability, and finds that the social and environmental aspects are more developed than the economic. The scholar suggests that the potential to develop enterprising activities could be enhanced by collaboration with the business sector and, further, that policy-makers have not yet taken community gardens seriously as models of local community sustainability (Holland, 2004:303).

It is worth highlighting the overlap between the themes explored in this section, and those of the environmentally-motivated sharing practices examined in part four on the social economy. For example, Albinsson’s (2012) work on sharing events examines the interplay between the exchange of material items (for a mixture of economic, social, political and environmental reasons) and the exchange of ideas and knowledge, grounded in the interactions which take place around material exchange. For many of the participants, these interactions are not a biproduct of engaging in an environmentally-friendly activity, but one of their central motivations.

Boyko and colleagues (2017) conducted participatory research exploring local sharing practices, and asking participants to design a future city in which sharing was more prominent. This creative research promotes the idea that multiple sharing practices are already occurring in local contexts, and the best way for practitioners and policy-makers to facilitate and encourage such practices is to begin by finding out what is already happening, and how such practices are understood and engaged with by local residents. Similarly, Bridgens and colleagues (2017) propose that one way of countering consumerism would be to engage people in local ‘making communities’, through which they would learn how to fix or upcycle products instead of throwing them away, as well as simultaneously fostering community relations. They conducted an initial research project in which they explored people’s attitudes towards ‘waste’ material, but at the time of their publication had not yet set up making communities. This type of action research could create the opportunity to produce the kind of cultural shift necessary to change people’s awareness of materials and natural resources, and therefore alter patterns of consumption.

5.4 Conclusion

Much of the research exploring the interplay between environmental and social activities begins by questioning how social behaviour can be shaped to have a positive impact on the environment. The social benefits are not always made explicit, or fully analysed, indicating that collaboration between scholars working on these kinds of initiatives (often within sustainability or urban planning departments) and social scientists working on social cohesion, would be productive. Action research developed with both environmental sustainability and social cohesion in mind could therefore have impact in three areas. First, by improving local environmental sustainability. Second, by fostering social networks and a sense of community. Third, by building awareness of the necessity of state responsibility towards the environment. As academic and policy communities seek to develop mechanisms through which we can prepare for the future and enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities, this multi-level responsibility is key.
Discussion

6.1 Conceptual conclusions

In section one, we interrogated several key definitions of social cohesion, and identified what seemed to be the most pressing conceptual controversy: whether the term is purely social, or includes economic and/or political equality as well. We proposed that the reason for this controversy may be to do with the function, or scope, of specific definitions. While one definition might be concerned only with what a society looks like when it is socially cohesive; a description of a state of cohesion, another definition might be concerned also with the causes, conditions or mechanisms necessary to foster that sense of cohesion. In short, this is to differentiate between definitions which deal only with the social meaning of social cohesion, or those which incorporate the structural and institutional mechanisms as well.

In light of the findings of the subsequent four sections, we would like here to evaluate whether such a distinction still holds true and, if it does, what conclusions can be drawn regarding the utility of each kind of definition. At the outset, it seemed that section two would examine social cohesion in the purely social sense, to further understanding of the ways in which collective memories could enhance a sense of belonging or cause division. However, through the course of the analysis it became clear that political inequality as well as inequality of opportunity result in people who have a more privileged position having the platform to shape narratives which are prominent in the public sphere. Therefore, even if we aim to explore the purely social characteristics of social cohesion, such an exploration needs to engage with political inequalities in order to understand the ways in which these narratives include and exclude. A purely social conceptualisation of social cohesion may not enable us to engage with what kind of narratives and discourse are dominant in society. Therefore, we need a broader conceptualisation of social cohesion, which would be too narrow in scope to critically examine the ways in which these processes of collective remembering can perpetuate inequalities.

Section three examined identity and belonging. The majority of the literature explored everyday experiences of multiculturalism, as well as the ways in which these experiences of identity and belonging are mediated through axes of (in)equity and social economy. Therefore, the different bodies of literature did focus predominantly on the purely social characteristics of social cohesion. The section examining approaches to the recognition and participation of collective identities and groups in political systems is clearly concerned with political equality of opportunity, and would therefore be approached within the broader conceptualisation of social cohesion.

The analysis in section four indicated that a conceptualisation of social cohesion based solely on social characteristics would be inadequate for analysing the social economy. Participation in the social economy is mediated through axes of (in)equity and social economy practices arise in particular political contexts, which it is necessary to examine in a comprehensive analysis of the practices. Further, as Murphy (1997) suggests, the social economy could itself be proposed as part of an alternative socio-political and economic system, and its history can be interpreted within these much broader parameters.

In a sense, the first sub-theme of section five interacts with all of the previous themes. Demographic change will influence the production and form of collective memories, the experience of identity and belonging, and the structure of the economy, as well as intergenerational relations, which are constantly evolving as younger generations take on new characteristics and older generations adapt to their changing environment. It also seems to follow the pattern of sections two and four: a study of the social characteristics of social cohesion would be more complete if analysed within the broader conceptualisation, because economic and political (in)equity impact on the ways in which different segments of the population would experience a sense of belonging or community.
building or diminishing social cohesion, both internally (for example, among employees) and externally (among other key stakeholders and the wider community). The social responsibility of corporations is particularly poignant in our current context, in relation to both environmental factors and the ways in which corporations shape public attitudes and communication. Further, in order to study social responsibility in this way, it is also necessary to examine the legal institutions and mechanisms which regulate entities, both corporate and individual in their rights and responsibilities.

The notion of social responsibility is present implicitly in themes four and five, in the analyses of the responsibility individuals show to their social and environmental surroundings. Further research could therefore also explore the interactions between the social economy and mechanisms of social responsibility.

As mentioned above, the second theme was originally titled ‘cultural memory’. The two terms are used interchangeably by many scholars, as in the following example: ‘cultural’ (or, if you will, ‘collective,’ ‘social’) memory is certainly a multifarious notion, a term often used in an ambiguous and vague way.’ (Erll, 2008:1). In Assman’s theorisation, ‘Cultural memory is a kind of institution […] that is stored away in symbolic forms’ (ibid.). In this sense, many of the examples in section two would fall within the paradigm of cultural memory as a sub-category of collective memory as we explored, for example, monuments, cemeteries, street names and museums. However, we have not interrogated the conceptual difference between cultural and collective memory. This is an area which would benefit from further research. As far as we are aware, the distinction between them has not been fully theorised elsewhere. We also have not dealt with texts as carriers of cultural memory: this would be a highly worthwhile avenue of inquiry, and one which would, arguably, need to incorporate discourse and narrative approaches, which we have not had space to do here.

7.0 Future research

7.1 Meanings of social cohesion

A. The mechanisms through which trust towards strangers develops is not yet thoroughly understood (Ulsaner, 2000). How could this be developed?

B. Analysis of social trust has been predominantly at the national level, including cross-national comparisons. Could this body of literature be enhanced by micro-level analysis, for example, through ethnographic investigation?

C. Scholarship on the relationship between the economic components of social cohesion (growth and equality) and the social components seems to be heavily weighted towards social trust as the representative variable of the latter group. Other than social trust, what other indicators of the social components of social cohesion could be studied and how?

D. Studies of social capital have tended to emphasise face-to-face contact (Jenson, 1998) no doubt predominantly due to Putnam’s legacy. However, the communicative landscape of is no longer dominated by face-to-face contact. Could social capital be developed into a framework which is productive in the digital age?

E. What role could initiatives aimed at improving economic equality, such as basic income initiatives, play in fostering the purely social components of social cohesion?

7.2 Collective and cultural memory

F. How might educational spaces be productive for studying both the intergenerational transmission and reformulation of cultural memories, as well as the relationship between these memories and identity and belonging?

G. This could quite clearly also tie to work being undertaken by social psychologists on the language of prejudice (see Abrams, 2010:33-34). For example, the way in which language can be used to exclude people from interactions, and the finding that more simple language is used to describe more discriminated against groups (ibid.). How does this linguistic prejudice in social interactions relate to other exclusionary narratives?

H. It would be productive to further explore the differentiation between ‘collective memory’ and ‘cultural memory’. Even if one takes a very fluid and dynamic conceptualisation of ‘culture’, it is still distinguishable from ‘collective’. It could be that a collective memory becomes a cultural memory when it is mobilised for a specific purpose. In this sense, identity politics may be a significant dimension worth exploration, by analysing the ways in which cultural memories are transformed in and for political struggles.

I. There seems to be a lack of digital research on collective or cultural memory. In what ways is the production and communication of collective memories being transformed in the digital age? What is the changing nature of memory?
J. Ethnographic methodologies have been productive, not only in countering hegemonic narratives, but also in developing the theorisation of memory as a social process. How might participatory ethnography prove helpful in exploring the challenges to cohesion faced in the contemporary UK context?

7.3 Identity and belonging

K. Further research is needed to understand the changing nature of belonging and attachment to place in the contemporary world, in which our lives are increasingly being lived in a wider spatial landscape.

L. There is not yet sufficient understanding of the interface between online and offline communities. Further work is needed in this area, as well as exploring the extensive literature on communities, belonging and identities in light of contemporary digital communication practices.

M. More research is needed to understand contemporary forms of belonging, particularly in light of increasing mobility (multiple and transient) as well as increases in dual or multiple citizenship.

7.4 The social economy

N. How might studies on reciprocity engage more successfully with socio-political context, as well as political and economic drivers?

O. How might we study the relationship between diversity, reciprocity and solidarity (as in, for example, Barwick, 2015)? If reciprocal relationships build group identity and solidarity, and group identity and solidarity foster collaborative behaviour, how do the relationships between these elements change when diversity becomes a dimension of analysis?

P. McMurtry (2004) argues for the need to join the social economy and social movements. Could empirical research examine the ways in which these two spheres interact in local contexts?

Q. Much of the research being conducted into the sharing economy is biased towards large-scale corporate technology platforms, and takes place in Economics and Business departments, with little research into grassroots community initiatives. Here, there is potential for collaboration between scholars of place-based community building on the one hand, and scholars of digital connectivity through collaborative platforms on the other. How might sharing economy platforms facilitate collaboration and build community bonds at the local level?

R. Infrastructures of kindness appears to be a gap in the literature, albeit one which intersects with, and could draw on, numerous other frameworks, from the literature on reciprocity, support and mutuality explored in this section, to the work on conviviality in the previous one. Two calls for theoretical and empirical work to be pursued in this area (Brownlie and Anderson, 2017; Hall and Smith, 2015) have emerged at the interface of sociological, geographical and political inquiry. How might these calls be responded to?

7.5 Care for the future

S. There seems to be potential for collaboration between engineering scholars/practitioners, artists and social scientists (cf Bridgens and colleagues, 2017). How might we further research into the relationship between environmentally-friendly collaborative activities and social cohesion?

T. Urban green space is often assumed to foster social cohesion, despite there being evidence that not everyone in a local context benefits from these initiatives (cf Haase, Kabish, Haase et al., 2017). How might we conduct research into the impact of urban green space on social cohesion, whilst exploring sense of community and community-building practices, and engaging with a critical analysis of access, inequality and gentrification?

U. How are changing patterns of citizenship impacting on social cohesion, both in specific localities and geographically dispersed networks?
Appendix

Method

We have taken a non-systematic, or narrative, approach. This has enabled us a degree of freedom to explore the five themes with more breadth and creativity, based on our understanding of the British Academy’s needs and requirements. Our starting point for each theme has been conceptual, rather than linguistic, facilitating exploration of a range of approaches working with different terminology. This method does not come without drawbacks. It is neither replicable nor comprehensive: we have prioritised interdisciplinary connections and have avoided adding to existing debates taking place within disciplines. We hope that by doing this we have produced a review which has brought conceptual, methodological and empirical developments from across the social science and humanities disciplines into conversation, thereby highlighting areas which would benefit from further research and inter-disciplinary collaboration.

Interactions between themes: furthering the thematic framework?

Starting with the conceptual organising framework presented in theme 1: meanings of social cohesion, and proposed by Bernard (1999, referenced in Green, Janmaat and Han, 2009) who differentiates between definitions of social cohesion which emphasise various combinations of solidarity, equality and liberty, we explore the interdependencies of the five themes by taking each of these in turn. One of the most prominent mechanisms through which solidarity can be fostered (although not unproblematically) is through the narration of shared events, explored in theme 2: collective memory. There has been a bias towards the narration of national-level collective memories (to be discussed) which contributes to processes of inclusion in and exclusion from the national ‘imagined community’. Therefore, the theme of collective memory is deeply entwined with theme 3: identity and belonging. Those stories and memories narrated in public discourse shape encounters between individuals and groups: national narratives are experienced by, as well as enacted, resisted, performed and reconfigured through the interactions of social agents: by people going about their everyday lives, as well as by those in the public sphere. These processes produce different kinds of solidarity, and different kinds of shared values, in different local contexts.

Shifting from solidarity to equality, which is explored in theme 4: the social economy. Findings suggest that, while networks of support and reciprocity can enhance group identification and build solidarity, the capacity of individuals and neighbourhoods to create, maintain and benefit from these types of relationships is constrained by economic disadvantage. This demonstrates that some mechanisms which build solidarity vary along axes of (in)equality, meaning that some individuals and groups may be excluded from these solidarity-building processes. The empirical evidence presented in theme one supports this finding, by demonstrating that social trust is more prominent in more egalitarian societies.

In this way, equality is a pre-condition of an inclusive solidarity. This understanding further demonstrates the interrelationship between themes one and two: inequality of opportunity enhances inequality of wealth and of political participation. These inequalities are written into national narratives from which disadvantaged groups are excluded.

The idea that social cohesion might be affected by our interaction with, and responsibility for, our shared environment, is introduced in theme 6: care for the future. Once the environmental aspect is inserted, the equality, liberty, solidarity framework is transformed, as we can no longer understand social cohesion as something which exists in the social world independent of our natural environment. This is a necessary step, even if it is only the social we are interested in, for two reasons. First, vulnerability to environmental degradation is not experienced equally: communities with fewer material and economic resources are exposed to a disproportionate degree of environmental challenges (to be discussed in theme five). If equality is a pre-requisite for solidarity, and less advantaged communities are more likely to bear the burden of environmental damage, thereby making those communities more vulnerable, then we must address the need to care for our shared environment as a step in the processes of reducing other forms of social and economic inequality, and ultimately increasing social cohesion. Second, if we are to introduce a temporal dimension to our analysis of equality, we must care for our natural environment now in order to ensure that future generations are not burdened with our environmental damage, thereby increasing the inequality between contemporary and future generations, as well as between groups living in the future.
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