


NEW PARADIGMS IN PUBLIC POLICY

# Post-immigration 'difference' and integration

The case of Muslims in Western Europe



by Tariq Modood



# POST-IMMIGRATION ‘DIFFERENCE’ AND INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF MUSLIMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

A REPORT PREPARED FOR  
THE BRITISH ACADEMY

by Tariq Modood

NEW PARADIGMS IN PUBLIC POLICY

**Chair:** Peter Taylor-Gooby FBA

**Working group:**

Andrew Gamble FBA

Ian Gough

Tariq Modood

Anne Power

Gerry Stoker

Pat Thane FBA



POLICY  
CENTRE

THE BRITISH ACADEMY  
10–11 Carlton House Terrace  
London SW1Y 5AH  
Web site: [www.britac.ac.uk](http://www.britac.ac.uk)

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## FOREWORD

Leading politicians in the UK and elsewhere in Europe have claimed that ‘multiculturalism is dead’. In this paper Professor Tariq Modood analyses the various ways in which the British government has sought to manage the expanding black and minority ethnic communities which now form large proportions of the population in cities. He goes on to argue that government needs to appreciate that there are different modes of integration and that successful integration needs to draw on approaches that go beyond non-discrimination, important though that is. A diverse society will not flourish without a cosmopolitanism that celebrates intercultural mixing, and a multiculturalism that allows attachment to ethno-religious groups and welcomes different ways of being national citizens.

Governments face many challenges and, after all, this is what they are there for. Commentators identify problems facing public policy in the UK on many levels. Two themes are perhaps striking in the current context. One is the assumption that radical changes are needed. For a number of reasons we can’t go on as we are. The other is that we are failing to find new ways forward that offer the potential to solve our problems. Public policy is stuck and it is much easier to state the problems than to answer them.

The papers in this series, *New paradigms in public policy*, to be published throughout 2011 and 2012, review some particularly difficult issues in public policy: climate change, recession and recovery, population ageing, neighbourhood problems and the Third Sector, rebuilding democratic engagement and managing the demands of an increasingly assertive public. The series reviews current understanding of the issues, situated within academic theory-building, and discusses possible ways forward. Rather than advocating one best solution to these problems, we analyse a range of feasible scenarios. We also consider how

the framing of an issue in current debate affects the chances of success in tackling it. Some problems benefit from being approached in new and different ways. The guiding assumption is that analysing and re-framing is what academics do best, and is the most helpful contribution they can make in the policymaking process.

**Peter Taylor-Gooby FBA**

University of Kent and Chair of the *New paradigms in public policy* project  
November 2011

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*'Difference'* primarily refers to how people are identified, not necessarily unambiguously or discretely, but in categories of 'race', ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality. The policy problem is how to integrate difference so that it ceases to be problematic.

### *European urban diversity*

- A high degree of racial, ethnic and religious mix in its principal cities will be the norm in twenty-first century Europe, and will characterise its national economic, cultural and political life.
- We should expect continuing migration flows. The existing fear and hostility aimed at immigrants, and specifically at Muslims and Islam, may get worse if there is a prolonged economic recession.
- Britain and the various western European countries have tried, or at least discussed, various approaches to minority-majority relations or integration, but none have gained stable widespread acceptance or are considered successful.

### *Paradigms and biases*

- In Britain, until at least the 1990s, there were two biases in study and policymaking to do with post-immigration 'difference':
  1. A trans-Atlantic bias which perpetuated the idea that the issues were best understood in terms of race relations – meaning the black-white relations in the North Atlantic world. US cities, especially inner cities, were taken as paradigms and the focus was on issues such as colour-racism, poverty, educational underachievement, drugs, crime, and children brought up by single mothers.
  2. Until the 1990s, few social scientists or policymakers foresaw that the issues conceptualised by 'race', 'ethnicity'

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and ‘multiculturalism’ were going to be dominated by aspects of religion.

It is now clear that the dominant frame is neither Atlantocentric black-white nor religion-blind but perhaps some version of Europe-Islam (Caldwell 2009) and/or civic integrationism (Joppke 2010).

- We find ourselves at a point where models of analysis and policy have failed, but there is uncertainty and disagreement about how they should be replaced. The task is not so much speculating about the future, as urgently identifying a viable and acceptable framework for analysis and policy.

### *Identifying and responding to ‘difference’*

- The need for integration arises when an established society is faced with people whom it perceives, and therefore treats, unfavourably by comparison with other members.
- The object of integration is equality of opportunity in a society, where membership of any sector of society – employment, education, and so on – is not based on criteria such as ‘race’ and ethnicity.
- Even if members of ethnic minorities are fully integrated in terms of legal rights, access to employment or education, it does not mean they have achieved full social integration. Integration requires some degree of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole.
- The problem then, is how to integrate difference, by which I mean: ‘how can difference cease to be problematic?’
- There are four modes of integration discussed here: assimilation, individualist-integration and two versions of multiculturalism, one of which I will call cosmopolitanism.

### *Modes of integration*

*Assimilation:* the processes affecting change and the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way, and the preferred

result is one in which the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible.

*Individualist-integration:* only sees any institutional adjustments for migrants or minorities as those of individual claimants and bearers of rights as equal citizens. Minority communities may exist as private associations but are not recognised or supported in the public sphere.

*Multiculturalism:* the processes of integration are seen both as two-way and as involving groups as well as individuals and working differently for different groups. The concept of equality is central. Multicultural accommodation of minorities, then, is different from individualist-integration and cosmopolitanism because it explicitly recognises the social significance of groups, not just of individuals and organisations.

*Cosmopolitanism:* ‘Difference’ is positively appreciated (or pragmatically accepted) but it is denied that groups exist or, alternatively, accepted that they exist but should not be given political recognition. Cosmopolitanism is maximum freedom, for minority as well as majority individuals, to mix with, borrow and learn from all.

### *Ways in which multiculturalism is not dead*

- Angela Merkel and David Cameron may claim that multiculturalism has failed, or is even dead. However their policies acknowledge and sometimes reinforce the social behaviour and structures of group difference, sustaining multiculturalism in practice.
- While deploying an anti-multiculturalist discourse they may enact multiculturalist policies, such as the creation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003 to represent

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- all Muslims to the French government in matters of worship and ritual, which formalises contacts between stakeholders.
- Many who defend multiculturalism point to its success in their neighbourhoods, which they describe as multi-ethnic and where people do not just live peaceably side by side but mix freely. Yet such views do not imply support for strong group identities and related policies – what we call multiculturalism here – but instead refer to ‘cosmopolitanism’.
  - The idea of group-based multiculturalism tends to be much less popular, but it may be part of the future in an unintended way. It corresponds in some ways to the vision of a ‘Big Society’ in which civil society associations based on locality and faith, including inter-faith groups, take over some of the responsibilities currently falling to state agencies.
  - The recent emphasis on cohesion and citizenship is a rebalancing of the political multiculturalism of the 1990s, which largely took the form of accommodation of groups while being ambivalent about national identity and taking cohesion at a local level for granted. While not yet fully accepted, it may be that hyphenated nationalities (e.g. African-American) will become the norm in the UK.

### *What kind of integration for Europe?*

There are several important questions about what to expect as we look to the future:

1. *Models of integration:* Will Europe insist on assimilation, the dominant historical pattern; or allow some space for private cultural difference within a model of civic integration; or some degree of multicultural integration?

And at what level(s) is integration to take place (especially in relation to identity-building): city/region or national or European? Taking on a local identity may be less

problematic than a national identity. Equality and ‘difference’ have to be expressed at different levels and woven together into a sense of commonality strong enough to encompass and counter-balance other identities that matter to people.

2. *Dividing lines*: Where will the major dividing line in Europe be in relation to post-immigration social formations? Will it, for example, be a colour-line? ‘Race’ may not just refer to physical appearance, but also its combination with cultural motifs such as language, religion, family structures, exotic dress, cuisine and art forms. Long-term, it is likely to be a white/non-white divide, or one based on cultural-racism, combining ‘race’ and ‘culture’.
3. *Religion and secularism*: Which trend in religion or secularism will become dominant?

Secularism today enjoys an increasing dominance in western Europe, but varies substantially between countries and is moderate rather than radical. There are three visible trends:

- a. Institutional accommodation of Muslims and/or religious pluralism generally;
- b. A renewal of Christian cultural identities;
- c. A more radical secularism, characteristic of but not confined to the left, which interprets political secularism to mean that religious beliefs and discourse should be excluded from the public sphere and/or politics and certainly from activities endorsed or funded by the state.

That some people are developing cultural Christianity and/or secularism as an ideology to oppose Islam and its public recognition is a challenge both to pluralism and equality, and thus to some of the bases of contemporary democracy. This is not just a risk to democracy as such but,

in the present context of high levels of fear of and hostility to Muslims and Islam, it threatens to create a long-term racialised-religious division in Europe.

### *Conclusion*

- All the attempted models of integration, especially national models, are perceived to be in crisis.
- We can, however, have a better sense of what the issues are and so what needs to be done if we recognise that discourses of integration and multiculturalism are exercises in conceptualising post-immigration difference and as such operate at three distinct levels: as an (implicit) understanding of the relationship between individuals and groups in society; as a political response; and as a vision of the whole in which difference is to be integrated.
- Four distinct political responses (assimilation, individualist-integration, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism) are laid out here. Each approach is only of value if it is chosen by, rather than imposed on, the groups or individuals in question. No one approach fits all, and none should be dismissed.
- Multiculturalism may currently be viewed as undesirable by European publics and policymakers, but Muslims are now so central to the question of integration that it is unlikely that they can integrate without some sort of multiculturalist approach.
- Lastly, the enlargement, hyphenation and internal pluralising of national identities is essential to an integration in which all citizens have not just rights but a sense of belonging to the whole, as well as to their own group.

# 1

## EUROPEAN URBAN DIVERSITY

Currently most of the largest, especially the capital, cities of north-west Europe are about 20–35 % non-white (i.e. people of non-European descent, including Turks). The non-white groups are relatively young. Even without further large-scale immigration, they will continue to expand for at least one generation before they stabilize in size, reaching or exceeding 50 % in some cities in the next few decades or sooner. The trend will include some of the larger urban centres of southern Europe. A high degree of racial, ethnic and religious mix in its principal cities will be the norm in twenty-first century Europe, and will characterise its national economic, cultural and political life, as it has done in twentieth (and will do so in twenty-first) century USA. Of course there will be important differences between Western Europe and the USA. Amongst these is that the majority of non-whites in the countries of Europe are Muslims; the UK, where Muslims form about a third of non-whites or ethnic minorities, is one of the exceptions. With estimates of 12 to over 17 million Muslims in Western Europe today, the Muslim population in the former EU-15 is only about 3–5 % and is relatively evenly distributed across the larger states (Peach 2007; Pew Forum 2010). However, in the larger cities the proportion which is Muslim is several times larger and growing at a faster rate than most of the population (Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa 2007; Kaufman, Goujon and Skirbekk 2011).

The riots in the banlieues of Paris and elsewhere in 2005, the Danish cartoon affair and other issues about offence and freedom of speech and the proliferating bans on various forms of female Muslim dress are just some in a series of conflicts focused on minority-majority relations. In this context, questions about integration, equality, racism and Islam have become central to European politics. In the USA race and ethnicity have been a strong factor in the granting of citizenship

and the organisation of politics. The contexts of Britain and the rest of Europe differ in important ways (Brubaker 1992; Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer 2011). Moreover, continuing migration flows are very likely as the West European population ages. With a very low birth rate, it will be difficult for the continent to meet its labour needs (see Pat Thane’s paper in this series). Alongside Eastern Europe and Russia, North Africa, with its burgeoning population, unemployed youth, and a source and conduit of illegal migration flows, may be a major contributor to Europe’s future population, as may be Turkey. Transcontinental extended families are also likely to contribute workers. Such families usually become of less importance over time but can remain significant for several generations in some groups. For example, estimates suggest that about 50 % of marriages of British Pakistanis are with Pakistani nationals coming to Britain as spouses (Dale 2008).

Fear of and hostility towards immigrants, and to Muslims specifically, are exacerbated by concerns about security, both in terms of international relations and transnational Islamist terrorist causes and in terms of networks that can be attractive to some second generation Muslims and converts, and that have actual and potential recruits in Europe. In addition, Islam is seen as culturally threatening and/or illiberal and undemocratic in its values. This is strongly reflected in opinion polls and in the rise of extreme right parties across western Europe, leading mainstream parties to take into account, if not actually tap into, such sentiments. Fear, polarisation and conflict are likely to get worse if there is a prolonged economic recession as both ethnic minorities and those whites most likely to swing to extreme right views are most vulnerable to job losses and cuts in public services and welfare budgets (Searchlight Educational Trust 2011).

While all these considerations are relevant to thinking about current trends and future scenarios, there is a more fundamental analytical and political issue, which I will call ‘minority-majority

relations' or 'integration'. The political problem is that Britain and the various west European countries have tried, or at least discussed, different approaches but no one approach has gained stable and widespread acceptance or is considered successful. This is partly due to a limited realization of how the ethnic mix is changing in European societies. For example, between the 1950s and early 1970s Germany brought in large numbers of temporary overseas workers (*Gastarbeiter*) and allowed them to stay on renewed contracts, rather than rotating the migrants as they had originally planned. The migrants were allowed to bring their families to join them in Germany (in accordance with international conventions on rights to family life) and their children were often given a segregated Turkish-based education. Societal expectations were allowed to persist that this population was not settling in Germany, and that 'Germany was not a country of immigration'.<sup>1</sup> In short, collective denial meant that integration was not addressed. Some social scientists spoke of 'the myth of return' (the mistaken belief that immigrants would return to countries of origin). They urged the country to wake up to the facts and think constructively about minority-majority relations rather than allow the pattern of exclusion to grow through neglect (Schmitter Heisler 1986: 79–80). They also took the lead in Germany and elsewhere in speaking up against the rise of discourses that hold migrants and the second generation responsible for lack of integration when, for decades, the majority society and its institutions practised formal or informal discrimination and exclusion.

Yet, intellectuals themselves can also be mistaken about issues and trends, and therefore about the important political questions. This has been the case with British social scientists in relation to post-immigration 'difference'.

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1 This was prominently stated in the coalition agreement between Christian Democrats and Liberals in 1982 and became the conservative credo towards immigration in the following decades.



## PARADIGMS AND BIASES

In Britain, until at least the 1990s, the study of and policymaking about post-immigration ‘difference’ suffered from two serious biases. One was a trans-Atlantic bias which perpetuated the idea that the issues were best understood in terms of race relations – meaning the black-white relations in the North Atlantic world. US cities, especially inner cities, were taken as paradigms and it was often assumed that whatever the US does today, the UK will do tomorrow. The focus was on issues such as colour-racism, poverty, educational underachievement, drugs, crime, and children brought up by single mothers. Having now seen the development of tight, patriarchal kinship networks, educational overachievement amongst South Asians (though there is simultaneous educational underachievement amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, especially males) and the upward social mobility of Indians and Chinese, not to mention a disproportionate number of millionaires and billionaires from those ethnic groups, we see how flawed the original taken-for-granted paradigm was in relation to Britain. This is related to the second bias.

The British secularist bias is more European than American.<sup>2</sup> Until the 1990s, few social scientists or policymakers foresaw that the issues conceptualised by ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘multiculturalism’ were going to be dominated by aspects of religion. Nor did they foresee that this would be brought about by the power of British ethnic minority agency and its transnational connections. Despite those social scientists who always see power in top-down ways (through class and/or racism

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2 Foner and Alba (2008) argue that negative perceptions of Muslims in western European social science compared to its US counterpart is due to the fact that religion is more positively valued in the US in general and as an integrative vehicle. They may, however, underestimate the growing hostility to Muslims in the US (as evidenced in the ‘Ground Zero mosque’ controversy) even if it has not yet reached European proportions.

analyses), no British politician ever wished religion to have the political salience that it has acquired and now will have for at least some time; rather, some minorities rejected certain racial identities as self-identities in favour of religious ones and set the terms of a new agenda (Modood 1990; 2005). It is now clear that the dominant frame is neither Atlantocentric black-white nor religion-blind but perhaps some version of Europe-Islam (Caldwell 2009) and/or civic integrationism (Joppke 2010).

The issue of immigrant integration illustrates how problems and the way in which they are framed can shift in unexpected ways, from cheap labour and ‘race’, to public religion, secularism and international conflict. Both theorists and policymakers are running to catch up with events and social movements, both at grass-roots and at transnational levels. We find ourselves at a point where models of analysis and policy have failed, but there is uncertainty and disagreement about how they should be replaced. Each of the paradigms that has been nationally dominant – for example, the multiculturalism of the Netherlands with its separate ‘pillars’ for Catholic, protestant and social-democratic groupings<sup>3</sup> or the more integrationist British version, the *Gastarbeiter* approach in Germany, and the republican *laïcité* in France – is thought to have failed or at least become outdated (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). The Netherlands probably took multiculturalism furthest in Europe but it has also experienced the most visible retreat (Joppke 2004). In Britain, the riots in the northern English towns in 2001, soon followed by the terrorist attacks of 11th September in the US, led to a perception that multiculturalism created separate and hostile communities (Cantle 2001; McGhee 2008). France experienced

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3 The consociational model of separate, parallel civic institutions ('pillars') for Catholics and Protestants that emerged in the nineteenth century declined sharply in the middle of the twentieth century, but its formalised institutional structure persisted and opened opportunities for the organisation and representation of ethnic and religious minorities in the latter part of the twentieth century (Bader 2011).

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riots daily for twenty two days in more than 250 localities in the autumn of 2005, leading President Chirac to speak of a ‘crisis of identity’ (Simon and Sala Pala 2010), a theme that President Sarkozy has made central to his politics. In Germany, a book that declares that Turkish immigrants are ruining the country had unprecedented sales figures of over a million copies in less than a year (Fekete 2011). While most discourses appeal to common values and/or national integration and eschew separatism, there is no clear agreement on an approach that identifies the issues in a way consistent with the basic principles of European democracies. The task is not so much speculating about the future, as urgently identifying a viable and acceptable framework for analysis and policy. In what follows I seek to clarify concepts and discuss existing trends and possible scenarios.



# 3

## IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING TO 'DIFFERENCE'

The need for integration arises when an established society is faced with people whom it perceives, and therefore treats, unfavourably by comparison with other members. Typically these outsiders also perceive themselves as 'different' though not necessarily in a negative way. This challenge may relate to different areas or sectors of society and policy, such as employment, education and housing. For example, someone is integrated into the labour market when s/he is able to enjoy equality of opportunity in accessing jobs and careers, as well as the education and training necessary to compete for such jobs; and when the labour market is not segmented into different parts with radically different monetary rewards and working conditions for those with broadly similar qualifications and experience. This is particularly relevant where the segmentation is not, formally or informally, based on the categories of 'difference' such as race, ethnicity, religion and so on. What is true of labour markets can be applied more generally.

The purpose of integration is equality of opportunity in a society, where membership of any sector of society – employment, education, and so on – is not based on criteria such as race and ethnicity. Integration has a number of components based on opportunities to participate which are context-specific and need to be secured by law and policy initiatives. It also has a subjective and symbolic dimension, which has some context-specific features, but which also has a more general or 'macro' character: how a minority is perceived by the rest of the country and how members of a minority perceive their relationship to society as a whole. Even if members of ethnic minorities are fully integrated in terms of legal rights, access to employment or education that does not mean they have achieved full social integration. This

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also requires some degree of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole – what the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain called ‘a sense of belonging’ (CMEB 2000: Introduction) – and acceptance from the majority population that the minority persons are full members of society and have the right to feel that they belong.

Sectoral integration and the general sense of integration can happen at an individual level. An individual may choose to integrate or not, and may be given opportunities to participate or not. The interest here is not in individual choices and opportunities themselves, but in examining their impact at the level of groups or society as a whole. A sense of belonging is dependent on how others perceive and treat you, not just as an individual but also as a member of a racial group or ethno-religious community. Each policy area will have its own imperatives and difficulties, for example in the areas of qualification levels or residential segregation<sup>4</sup>, but there is also a general understanding that we as members of society have about what our society is and what it is to be a member. This informs popular understanding as well as political ideas and the general terms of policy paradigms. As the Quebec Consultative Commission put it: ‘the symbolic framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the other, collective memory, and so on) is no less important than its functional or material framework’ (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; see also Bouchard 2011). This is particularly relevant because the sense of ‘crisis’ about multiculturalism and integration operates at this general and societal level. This is evident when one considers how few are the policies directed at integration or how small the funds involved are, compared to the headline importance that the issues regularly achieve. In thinking about policy paradigms – of

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4 Different groups may integrate to different degrees across sectors. For example, Jews in Britain are highly integrated in relation to employment but are the most segregated religious minority (Peach 2006).

a general ethos or orientation at a national level – it is therefore important to engage at this broader societal level.<sup>5</sup>

I consider this larger, macro-symbolic sense of integration and the policy paradigms or framings it implies when I discuss four modes of integration: assimilation, individualist-integration and two versions of multiculturalism, one of which I will call cosmopolitanism.<sup>6</sup> Each mode offers its own distinctive interpretation of the core values of European democracy (freedom, equality and civic unity, or ‘fraternity’), and is a developing model. The issue or ‘problem’ these paradigms are addressing is post-immigration ‘difference’ (Modood 2007).

Large-scale immigration into Europe has been by people marked by ‘difference’. The ‘difference’ is not confined to the fact of migration, or how long the migrants and their families have been in Europe, or the fact that they come from less economically developed parts of the world. ‘Difference’ primarily refers to how people are identified: how they identify themselves (for example as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Muslim’ etc.), how they identify others (again as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Muslim’ etc.) and how they are identified by others ('white' etc.).

These identities fall (not necessarily unambiguously or discretely) within the fields of ‘race’, ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality as various forms of difference. They will no doubt be classed or gendered in specific or generalisable ways but the important point from which everything else follows is that these identities are not reducible to, or stronger still,

5 For an alternative view that at a moment when general conceptions are confused, we can best grasp what the real issues are by focusing on ‘the everyday’, see Fox and Miller-Idris (2008).

6 The concern here is not primarily in relation to socio-economic integration, for which see Loury, Modood and Teles (2005) and Heath and Cheung (2007). The bigger challenge, for another occasion, is to connect the socio-economic with the issues discussed in this paper. The issues of ‘difference’, however, are as important as the socio-economic in relation to equal citizenship and have to be understood in their own terms.

are not primarily socio-economic or ‘objective’ in classical sociological terms. The identities involve subjectivity and agency. The relationship between migrants and the ‘hosts’, or more accurately, given that the migrations in question took place mainly in the third quarter of the twentieth century, the minority-majority relations, cannot be understood without the forms of difference. The relevant interactions cannot be explained, the position of different actors cannot be predicted (or even guessed at), and political preferences cannot be expressed without the explicit or implicit use of the idea of difference. The concepts I analyse below are normative and policy-oriented but they presuppose an understanding of what the social phenomenon is that demands a political response. The problem then, is how to integrate difference, by which I mean: ‘how can difference cease to be problematic?’ I shall consider four modes of integration (summarised in Table 1).

## MODES OF INTEGRATION

Assimilation is the term used to describe a situation when the processes affecting change and the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way. The preferred result is one where the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible.<sup>7</sup> We may think of it as one-way integration. This may simply be a laissez-faire approach with few policies but the state can play an active role in bringing about the desired outcome, as in early twentieth century ‘Americanisation’ policies towards European migrants in the United States. The desired outcome for society as a whole is seen as involving least change in the ways of doing

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<sup>7</sup> When US sociologists use the term ‘assimilation’, they usually mean what is meant by integration in the UK, as in the ‘segmented assimilation’ proposed by Portes and Zhou (1993).

things for the majority of the country and its institutional policies. Assimilation seeks to erase difference so that the occasions for discrimination and conflict are not allowed to take root. From the 1960s onwards, beginning with anglophone countries and spreading to others, assimilation as a policy has come to be seen as impractical (especially for those who stand out in terms of physical appearance), illiberal (requiring too much state intervention) and inegalitarian (treating indigenous citizens as a norm to which others must approximate). It was as early as 1966 that Roy Jenkins, the then UK home secretary, declared that in the view of the British government integration is 'not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Jenkins 1967: 267). 'Assimilation' as a term has come to be dropped in favour of 'integration'. Even today, when some politicians use the term 'integration', they actually, consciously or not, mean what here has been defined as assimilation (Fekete 2008: 8-19). The use of these terms in public discourse cannot be taken at their face value but should be critically inspected.

In the three modes of integration that go beyond assimilation, processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing to, or not trying to, integrate. Assimilation – in policy terms, not merely as reference to personal choices – has recently come to the fore most often in relation to naturalisation, with the introduction of language requirements and tests of national knowledge. The established society is the site of institutions, including employment, civil society and the state, in which integration has to take place. The prospective citizens' rights and opportunities must be made effective through the anti-discrimination laws and policies that regulate these institutions. At this point we should distinguish between the two-way modes *individualist-*

*integration* and *multiculturalism*. The former sees the institutional adjustments in relation to migrants or minorities as only relevant to claimants as individuals and bearers of rights as equal citizens (Barry 2001). Minority communities may exist as private associations but are not recognised or supported in the public sphere.

*Multiculturalism* is where processes of integration are seen as two-way, as involving groups as well as individuals, and as working differently for different groups (CMEB 2000; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the ‘multi’). ‘Culturalism’ refers to the fact that the groups in question are likely not just to be marked by newness or phenotype or socio-economic location but by certain forms of group identity. The integration of groups is in addition to, not as an alternative to, the integration of individuals, anti-discrimination measures and a robust framework of individual rights. Multiculturalism, like most concepts, takes different forms in different contexts and at different times. For example, it has been differently understood in the Netherlands and in Britain (Joppke 2004, Koopmans *et al.* 2005). It is also understood differently in Quebec compared to in anglophone Canada (Bouchard and Taylor 2008: 115–7). The meaning of any mode of integration is subject to debate and contestation. Those who originate the policy may start with one meaning, as for example, Roy Jenkins did in relation to race and culture. Then others, including latecomers to the debate, may push it or extend it in other directions by, for example, making religion central, as Muslims in Britain have done (Modood 2005).

Equality is central to multiculturalism, as it is to other conceptions of integration. The key difference between individualist-integration and multiculturalism is that the concepts of group and of the equal status of different kinds of

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groups (racial, ethnic, religious etc.) are essential to the latter. Post-immigration minorities are groups differentiated from the majority society or the norm in society by two factors: on the one hand, negative 'difference', alienness, inferiorisation, stigmatisation, stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination and racism, on the other, by the senses of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves. The two together are the key data for multiculturalism. The differences at issue are those perceived both by outsiders or group members – from the outside in and from the inside out – to constitute not just some form of distinctness but a form of alienness or inferiority that diminishes or makes difficult equal membership in the wider society or polity.

Multiculturalism has recently been defined as 'where ethno-cultural-religious minorities are, or are thought of, as rather distinct communities, and where public policy encourages this distinctiveness' (Emmerson 2011). This, however, is only part of it. Multiculturalism allows those who wish to encourage such distinctiveness to do so; but it also seeks forms of social unity that are compatible with this, what Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) call 'new conceptions of solidarity', grounded in a concept of equality (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Each mode of integration must be understood in terms of its interpretation of free choice, equality and fraternity (as displayed in Table 1). Characterisations of multiculturalism that omit unity as a key component are extremely common but incomplete.



## FURTHER UNPACKING MULTICULTURALISM AND INTEGRATION

Multicultural accommodation of minorities, then, is different from individualist-integration because it explicitly recognises the social reality of groups, not just of individuals and organisations. There may, however, be considerable complexity about what is meant by the social reality of groups. Ideas of groups as discrete, homogeneous, unchanging, bounded populations are not realistic when we are thinking of multicultural recognition (Modood 2007: 93–7).<sup>8</sup> Disagreement about the extent to which post-immigration groups exist and/or ought to exist and be given political status means that there are two kinds of multiculturalism (Modood 1998; Meer and Modood 2009a). I shall use ‘multiculturalism’ to refer to the view that group membership is a central feature of people’s identity in our society.<sup>9</sup> I shall use ‘cosmopolitanism’ to refer to the view that ‘difference’ is perceived as valuable (or pragmatically accepted) but that group-identity is not of importance or, if it exists, that it should not be politically recognised (Waldron 1991). The contention is that in the early stages of migration and settlement, especially in the context of a legacy of racism, colonialism and European supremacism, processes of social exclusion created or reinforced certain forms of ‘groupness’ such as white and black. However, as a result of social mixing, cultural sharing and globalisation in which the dominant identities of

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8 Cf. ‘The ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social form’ (Glazer and Moynihan 1963: xvii). To emphasise the point that one needs to be using the concept of groups but not in its most simplest traditional meaning, perhaps one should use the term ‘groupness’.

9 This is how the term has been used by the leading political theorists such as Taylor (1994), Kymlicka (1995) and Parekh (2000) and, by the Canadian government; it is also consistent with CMEB (2000) and other exponents of multiculturalism – see Modood (2007: 14–20) for details.

modernity (such as of race and nation) are dissolving, people have much more fluid and multiple identities, combine them in individual ways and use them in context-sensitive ways (Hall 1992a). For example, the ways that Caribbean-origin Britons have socially blended into a ‘multiculture’ and have sought conviviality and sociability rather than separate communities may perhaps not be fully captured as a form of individualistic integration (Gilroy 2000). While remaining economically marginal and over-represented in relation to the social problems associated with deprived inner city areas, they have become a feature of popular culture in terms of music, dance, youth styles and sport, in all of which they have become significantly over-represented (Hall 1998). To the extent that football teams, Olympiads and television programmes such as *The X Factor* are central to popular and national identities, Caribbean-origin people are placed at the centre of British national imaginaries. Moreover, Britain and most other countries in Western Europe have recently experienced and are experiencing a new wave of immigration and will continue to do so, including that from within the European Union. Given the diversity of the locations from which migrants are coming, the result, it is argued, is not communities, but a churning mass of languages, ethnicities and religions, all cutting across each other and creating a ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007). This may be setting a pattern for the future, and it may be allied to a further argument that globalisation, migration and telecommunications have created populations dispersed across countries that interact more with each other, and have a greater sense of loyalty to each other, than they might to their fellow citizens.

Table 1: Four modes of integration\*

	<b>Assimilation</b>	<b>Individualist-Integration</b>	<b>Cosmopolitanism</b>	<b>Multiculturalism</b>
<b>Objects of Policy</b>	Individuals and groups marked by 'difference'.	Individuals marked by 'difference', especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society.	Individuals marked by 'difference', especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society, and societal ideas, especially of 'us' and 'them'.	Individuals and groups marked by 'difference', especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society, and societal ideas, especially of 'us' and 'them'.
<b>Liberty</b>	Minorities must be encouraged to conform to the dominant cultural pattern.	Minorities are free to assimilate or cultivate their identities in private but are discouraged from thinking of themselves as minority, but rather as individuals.	Neither minority nor majority individuals should think of themselves as belonging to a single identity but be free to mix and match.	Members of minorities should be free to assimilate, to mix and match or to cultivate group membership in proportions of their own choice.
<b>Equality</b>	Presence of difference provokes discrimination and so is to be avoided.	Discriminatory treatment must be actively eliminated so everyone is treated as an individual and not on the basis of difference.	Anti-discrimination must be accompanied by the dethroning of the dominant culture.	In addition to anti-discrimination the public sphere must accommodate the presence of new group identities and norms.
<b>Fraternity</b>	A strong, homogeneous national identity.	Absence of discrimination and nurturing of individual autonomy within a national, liberal democratic citizenship.	People should be free to unite across communal and national boundaries and should think of themselves as global citizens.	Citizenship and national identity must be remade to include group identities that are important to minorities as well as majorities; the relationship between groups should be dialogical rather than one of domination or uniformity.

\* In all cases it is assumed that a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values operate. The features highlighted here are in addition or interaction with them.

In what ways does cosmopolitanism go beyond individualist-integration? Its distinctive ethos is that we should value diversity and create the conditions where it is individually chosen. We should oppose all forms of imposition of group identities on individuals and therefore the ideas, images and prejudices by which individuals are rendered inferior or portrayed as threatening, and so excluded from full membership of society. We should not require assimilation or conformity to dominant group norms. Inherited or ascribed identities which slot people into pigeonholes not of their choosing, giving them a script to live by, should be refused: they not only reduce the options of the kind of person one can be but divide society up into antagonistic groups (Appiah 1994).<sup>10</sup> Cosmopolitanism is a conception of multiculturalism as maximum freedom, for minority as well as majority individuals, to mix with, borrow and learn from all, whether they are of your group or not. Individual identities are personal amalgams of bits from various groups and heritages and there is no one dominant social identity to which all must conform. The result will be a society composed of a blend of cultures: a ‘multiculture’.

While this is an attractive image of contemporary society and links easily with the ideas of liberal democracy, it has only a partial fit with even, say, London today, let alone many parts of Britain and continental Europe. In some towns and cities in northern England there is not a range of groups but often just two, for example Asian Muslims and whites. Minority individuals do not float across identities, mixing and matching, but have a strong attachment to one or few identities. Most British Muslims seem to think of themselves as ‘Muslim’ and/or ‘British’ (usually both) (Travis 2002). The fact of super-

<sup>10</sup> British exponents of this view tend, however, to put some communal identities in a normative, privileged position. This particularly applies to political blackness and to some extent to non-cultural and non-religious political identities generally (Modood 1994).

diversity is emerging alongside rather than displacing the fact of settled, especially postcolonial, communities, who have a particular historical relationship with Britain and a particular political significance. Similarly, there are communities in other European countries with their own historical significance such as Maghrebians in France and the Turks in Germany. Some groups continue to be much larger than others, and stand out as groups, in their own eyes and those of others, and are at the centre of public policy and debate, especially if they are thought to be failing to integrate. Muslims, for example, seem to be in this category across much of Western Europe, even when there are high levels of conviviality or diversity.

That is not to say that such minority identities are exclusive. Successive surveys have shown that most Muslims in Britain strongly identify with being Muslim but the majority also identify as British; indeed they are more likely to identify as 'British' and say they have trust in key British institutions than non-Muslims (Heath and Roberts 2008). Gallup (2009) found the same in Germany, but less so in France, although Pew (2006) found much higher levels of national identification in general in France than in other western European countries. Post-immigration hyphenated identities, such as British-Indian, have become as commonplace in Britain as they have been in the USA for decades. Similarly, diasporic links as described above certainly exist, and are likely to increase, but the net result is not an inevitable erosion of national citizenship – British African-Caribbeans and South Asians have families in their countries of origin and in the US and Canada, but there is little evidence that most branches of those families do not feel British, American or Canadian. Indeed, studies show that the more multiculturalist countries achieve higher levels of national identity (Esses *et al.* 2006; Wright and Bloemraad forthcoming).

An important point of difference, then, between the concepts of individualist-integration and multiculturalism

proper is in the understanding of what constitutes a group. In multiculturalism, the groups formed of post-immigration minorities are not of one kind but are several – a ‘multi’. However, neither multiculturalism nor cosmopolitanism provides a comprehensive sociological or political model because our society includes both people whose identities are based on group membership, as Sikhs or Muslims for example, and people who are not committed to or identified by a single core identity. For the latter, one of a range of different identities may be relevant in different contexts, sometimes as a worker, or a woman, or a Londoner, or a Briton. From the cosmopolitan perspective, these identities should be viewed as complementary (CMEB 2000; Modood and Dobbernack 2011). Moreover, while recognition of ethnic or religious groups may have a legal dimension, for the most part it will be at the level of civic consultations, political participation, institutional policies (for example, in relation to schools and hospitals), discursive representations, especially in relation to the changing discourses of societal unity or national identity, and their remaking. For these reasons both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism can be helpful in understanding different aspects of ethnic relations in our society.

Regardless of the extent to which recognition of minority identities in this way is formal or informal, led by the state or by the semi-autonomous institutions of civil society, individual rights and the shared dimensions of citizenship are not challenged. There may however be genuine concern that some groups at a particular time and in some areas are becoming too inward-looking. Where the concern is primarily about a lack of positive mixing and interaction between groups at a local level, community cohesion measures, for example, a Christian school offering places to non-Christians or twinning with a non-Christian school, may be an appropriate response (Cantle 2001). Where the concern is about self-conceptions and

discourses more generally, the issue will be about the national or societal identity. Whilst such inwardness has never been part of any theory or policy of multiculturalism, it is clear that it is a fundamental anxiety of the critics of multiculturalism, many of whom go as far as to define multiculturalism in terms of such separatism.<sup>11</sup> It is therefore important to emphasise that multiculturalism is a mode of integration. Attempts to promote multiculturalism should be examined for their success in achieving this, in the same way that hostility to minorities or other modes of integration are assessed. (Banting and Kymlicka 2008)

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11 A review of the American social science literature found that '[t]he most common conception of multiculturalism in both scholarly circles and popular discourse is a negative one, having to do with what multiculturalism is not or what it stands in opposition to. Multiculturalism in this usage represents heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity, diversity as a counterpoint to unity' (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005: 219). They found that if they looked at exponents, as opposed to critics, of multiculturalism, such simplistic dichotomies were unsustainable and they concluded: 'multiculturalism is best understood as a critical-theoretical project, an exercise in cultivating new conceptions of solidarity in the context of dealing with the realities of pervasive and increasing diversity in contemporary societies' (221–222).



## 5

## WAYS IN WHICH MULTICULTURALISM IS NOT DEAD

This unpacking of what is meant by ‘multiculturalism’ is also helpful in understanding those who say that multiculturalism has failed (Weldon 1989; and see Presseurop 2010 for Angela Merkel’s speech on the failure of *multikulti*) or that multiculturalism is dead (Cameron 2011). They may mean to endorse assimilation, individualistic integration or cosmopolitanism. At the same time they are acknowledging and possibly reinforcing the social behaviour and structures of group difference because their lament is that some groups (especially Muslims) are clearly visible as distinct groups when they should not be; they attribute this fact to a separatist tendency in the groups, encouraged by allegedly multiculturalist policies. Hence, paradoxical as it may sound, fierce critics of multiculturalism are usually accepting certain assumptions of multiculturalism even while rejecting its political implications. If they thought these groups were merely the product of stereotypes and exclusion (in the sense that ‘racial’ groups are a product of racism) or were primarily socio-economic in character (perhaps a working class ‘fraction’), then that would be a sociological disagreement with the multiculturalists. The irony is, of course, that the accusatory discourse of ‘some groups are not integrating’ may actually be reinforcing group identities and therefore contributing to the social conditions that gives multiculturalism a sociological pertinence. On the other hand, a sociology that marginalised ethnicity in favour of say, individuals, class and gender, would have a better fit with anti-multiculturalist politics but might be unable to explain or predict the relevant social reality. Our normative orientation, individualist or multiculturalist, suggests to us an ideal sociology but also recommends itself to us as feasible politics because we think that our view of how groups

and individuals interact in society is more accurate than not.

Moreover, it is not just at the level of sociology that anti-multiculturalists may find themselves using multiculturalist ideas; even while deploying an anti-multiculturalist discourse they may enact multiculturalist policies.<sup>12</sup> For example, they may continue with group consultations, representation and accommodation. The British government has found it necessary to increase the scale and level of consultations with Muslims in Britain since 9/11, and, dissatisfied with existing organisations, has sought to increase the number of organised interlocutors and the channels of communication. Avowedly anti-multiculturalist countries and governments have worked to increase corporatism in practice, for example with the creation by Nicholas Sarkozy of the Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman in 2003 to represent all Muslims to the French government in matters of worship and ritual; and in the creation of the Islamkonferenz in Germany in 2005, an exploratory body, yet with an extensive political agenda. These bodies are partly top-down efforts to control Muslims or to channel them in certain directions and away from others; nevertheless, such institutional processes can only be understood as multiculturalist as they do not fall within the conceptual framework of assimilation, individualist integration or cosmopolitanism.

There is indeed a new intolerance in relation to certain Muslim practices (for example, the niqab) and this is leading to some new laws or policies in parts of Europe (though not yet in Britain). We do not yet seem to be witnessing a paradigm shift, a fundamental change in the models or interpretations

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12 While the popular belief is that multiculturalism died in years following 9/11, analysis of policies in twenty one countries shows that, whilst the growth of multicultural policies between 1980 and 2000 was modest, yet far from halting or retreating it accelerated between 2000–2010, with only three countries having a lower score in 2010 than 2000 (MCP Index: [http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant\\_Minorities\\_Table\\_2.pdf](http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant_Minorities_Table_2.pdf)).

used to explain events, for example, from pluralistic integration to individualist integration. The anti-multiculturalist may not just be pointing to the visibility of groups like Muslims, but expressing the view that there is an insufficient participation of such groups into a common life or sharing of common values. My point is that some of the measures are not consistent with assimilation or individualism but acknowledge the social reality and political significance of groups. It may be thought that I am here obscuring the central difference between multiculturalism and its political critics. Namely, that the latter but not the former emphasise integration into a common life. I am, however, disputing this: the multiculturalism in the writings of key theorists such as, Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh and Anne Phillips, and in the relevant documents, laws and policies of Canada, Australia and Britain are all aimed at integration (see Modood 2007: 14–20 for details). The difference between the pro- and anti-multiculturalists lies not in the goal of integration but, firstly, in the normative understanding of integration. I have tried to bring this out by reference to the alternative interpretations and prioritizing of the normative concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity (summarized in Table 1). Secondly, there are different judgements about contexts and about what will deliver results and more generally how society works or what I have been calling implicit sociologies.

This analytical framework helps us also to understand those who say they welcome diversity but seem to be in agreement with critics of multiculturalism. Critics of multiculturalism are usually pointing to the public assertion of strong group identities, by people within that group, in order to mobilise a group to achieve certain policies and/or to demand differential treatment. One response is from those who point to the success of multiculturalism in their neighbourhoods, which they describe as multi-ethnic and where people do not just live peaceably side by side but mix freely and where that mixing

is valued above monoculturalism. Yet such views do not imply support for strong group identities and related policies; on the contrary, their success may be seen to be dependent on the absence of the latter.<sup>13</sup> While this is a reasonable response in its own terms it does not meet the criticism of multiculturalism and in fact may share it. Group-based multiculturalism has become unpopular and is what critics have in mind, though this is obscured by the fact that what I call ‘cosmopolitanism’ is often referred to by its advocates as ‘multiculturalism’.

An example of this tendency is the way in which the majority of Australians welcome multiculturalism, and indeed see it as part of the country’s identity, but see it ‘in terms of a mix of individuals rather than an ensemble of groups’ (Brett and Moran 2011: 203; see also Fenton and Mann 2011 and Searchlight Educational Trust 2011 for a related discussion in relation to England). A group-based multiculturalism is much less popular than cosmopolitanism. The question we have to consider is whether the integration of all post-immigration formations can be achieved without cosmopolitanism. Moreover, a group-based multiculturalism, where group membership is voluntary, may be part of the future in an unintended way as it is highly compatible with the Prime Minister Cameron’s vision of a ‘Big Society’ in which civil society associations based on locality and faith, including inter-faith groups, take over some of the responsibilities currently falling to state agencies. If it is the case that groups such as Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims are to be civil society partners of government, and to be delegated resources as such, it is difficult to see how the new Big Society represents a break with what is rejected as ‘state multiculturalism’ (Cameron 2011).

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13 Hence the irony that anti-multiculturalists like President Sarkozy are trying to create corporate representations for Muslims in France; while pro-diversity authors call for the cessation of government meetings with Muslim community leaders (Sen 2006; Malik 2011).

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The analysis offered here of related ideas about society and policy paradigms, each of which consists of a model of society and normative political ideas, includes a sense of unity or fraternity. For modes of integration are not just about how society is organised, or about politics, but include ideas, however rudimentary or undeveloped, of ourselves as a social unity (as displayed at the bottom of Table 1). For assimilationists, this consists of a strong, homogeneous national identity. Individualist-integration emphasises the liberal and democratic character of the national polity. Cosmopolitanism is uneasy with the national, an identity that demands allegiance from all citizens, whilst creating boundaries between ourselves and the rest of the world. With multiculturalism comes a positive vision of the whole remade so as to include the previously excluded or marginalised on the basis of equality and sense of belonging. It is at this level that we may fully speak of multicultural integration or multicultural citizenship (Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). This third level of multiculturalism, incorporating the sociological fact of diversity, groupness and exclusion, but going beyond individual rights and political accommodation, is perhaps the level that has been least emphasised. That is how it seems to many whose understanding of multiculturalism, sometimes polemical but sometimes sincere, is that multiculturalism is about encouraging minority difference without a counterbalancing emphasis on cross-cutting commonalities and a vision of a greater good. This has led many commentators and politicians to talk of multiculturalism as divisive and productive of segregation.

Theorists of multiculturalism such as Taylor (1994) and Parekh (2000), related policy documents such as the report of the CMEB (2000), and enactments such as those in Canada and Australia, universally regarded as pioneers and exemplars of state multiculturalism, all appealed to and built on an idea of national citizenship. Hence, from a multiculturalist point of view, though

not from that of its critics, the recent emphasis on cohesion and citizenship, sometimes called ‘the civic turn’ (Mouritsen 2008), is a necessary rebalancing of the political multiculturalism of the 1990s. This largely took the form of accommodation of groups while being ambivalent about national identity (Meer and Modood 2009a).<sup>14,15</sup> This does not invalidate the analysis offered here that integration without some degree of institutional accommodation is unlikely to be successful. Indeed, for multiculturalists, a renewing of national identity has to be distinctly plural and hospitable to the minority identities. It involves ‘rethinking the national story’ with the minorities as important characters; not obscuring difference but weaving it into a common identity in which all can see themselves, and that gives everyone a sense of belonging to each other (CMEB 2000: 54–6; Modood 2007: 145–154). Minority politics are common in the US, but most groups, while honouring their origins, seek inclusion in the American dream. They seek to be and have come to be accepted as hyphenated Americans (for example, as Italian-Americans, or Asian-Americans). The trend is present in parts of Western Europe. While not yet fully accepted, it may be that hyphenated nationalities will become the norm here too.

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14 In doing so I follow Charles Taylor’s treatment of the concept of secularism (Taylor 2009), though without claiming that he would wish to use it as I do in relation to integration.

15 In the 1990s cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism in Britain began to be linked to a national identity and its modernisation, to, for example, ‘Cool Britannia’ and ‘rebranding Britain’ (Leonard 1997) but others welcomed globalisation as an era of the ‘post-national’ (Hall 1992b; Soysal 1994).

## 6

## WHAT KIND OF INTEGRATION IN EUROPE?

The above discussion raises three important questions about what to expect as we look to the future. They are profound questions of public philosophy and policy but also require social science inquiry in relation to trends, possibilities and feasibilities, and are ranked from least to most challenging. They are questions about integration and identities; about long-term cleavages; and about religion and secularism.

Europe is a large and diverse continent, incorporating a number of different religious and cultural identities and traditions of citizenship. Here we focus on the larger and more economically dominant nations, most important among them Germany and France. Will these countries insist on assimilation, the dominant historical pattern, or allow some space for private cultural difference within a model of civic integration (the current French ideology but not comprehensive practice) or some degree of multicultural integration (found to some degree for example in the Netherlands and Sweden)? The latter was becoming influential in the English-speaking world until 9/11, but since then the perception has grown that unassimilated migrants, especially if Muslim, are a potential security threat, adding an extra column to our table. A recent European study of seven countries (but not including the Netherlands and Sweden) concluded that only Britain and to a lesser extent Belgium could be said to approximate to multiculturalism, with the others not so much retreating from multiculturalism but having never got there in the first place (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer forthcoming 2011).<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the theme of cultural identity is powerful, for example, in relation to sexuality and to historically

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16 As stated in footnote 12 the scarcity of multiculturalism does not indicate a retreat from previous more extensive coverage. These seven countries were Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, Spain and Greece.

squashed nationalisms (such as the Catalonian, Scottish, Flemish and so on). It is unlikely to fade in the current context of globalisation. This seems to foster identity movements in reaction to perceptions of global, currently Americanised, cultural homogeneity (Castells 1997).

Migration-based second and third generations who breathe this atmosphere may continue to mobilise around identities of cultural difference and demand equality of respect, especially when those identities are the basis of discrimination and structural inequalities. Of course, one may wish that these minority identities were not held in such a way that they become the dominant identities of the individual and groups involved. This is not a matter that can be decided by wishful thinking. Much depends upon the pressure certain minorities feel they are under, and the extent they feel able to pursue their lives as members of a minority. If the media are constantly talking about a particular group in alarmist and stereotyping ways, and if individuals feel highly ‘visible’, thinking that everyone is identifying them primarily in terms of their group membership, then it is difficult to have a relaxed identity. Nevertheless, there are recent examples of how monopolising identities can become secure and pluralised. In the 1970s and 1980s many black Britons, especially young men, felt that society could only think of them as black and as a problem, indeed as an object of fear. Yet, as stated above, through their participation and leadership in popular culture, black people came to be seen in the media and in social interactions as talented and entertaining, as attractive and fashionable, and as champions of the nation on the sports field, alongside the negative representations.

A further aspect of this question concerns the level at which integration is to take place, especially in relation to identity-building: city/region or national or European? Another way of posing the question is to ask what hyphenation is on offer, or what will work? In the USA, the hyphenation always refers to

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America (not Texas, California and so on), but in contemporary Europe, integration policies are directed to developing a sufficiently strong sense of national citizenship. Indeed, in countries such as France and Britain a (hyphenated) national identification is quite strong amongst the second generation (and thus a basis for complaints of unequal treatment as co-nationals), but identification with Europe is much weaker than amongst white peers. European identity as a platform for equality/belonging and lever for equality/belonging at the national level may or may not be helpful in some countries. Faas (2010) argues that young Turks in Germany prefer to think of themselves as 'Europeans' and it is probably the case that ethnic minority identification with the city one lives in (for example, Liverpool or Rotterdam) may be easier than 'British' or 'Dutch' because of all the national, cultural, historical and political baggage that go with the latter. For example, one can say one is proud to be a Liverpudlian without feeling that this implicates you in the US-UK occupation of Iraq. Moreover, co-citizens may say of you 'you are not really Dutch' even if you were born in the Netherlands but are less likely to say 'you are not a Rotterdamer' if you are a long-term resident of that city. Some current social science and policy thinking stresses the importance of urban and regional identities as a way of bypassing more emotive and divisive debates about national identities (Cantle 2001; Keith 2005; Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007). This kind of localism has actually been part of the British race relations tradition in which 'race' was regarded as too 'hot' for the national state, and funds and powers were given to local authorities in the hope that breaking the problems down would limit the scope for conflict. This kind of local identification also seems to be consonant with the idea of the Big Society favoured by the Prime Minister, Mr. Cameron, even though for many young people and not just ethnic minorities, it is favoured because of alienation from a national identity.

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Strong minority identities, however, especially when mobilised at a national and trans-national level (as has been the case with some Muslim controversies such as the Rushdie and the Danish cartoon affair, not to mention militant Islamism), are unlikely to be counterbalanced without sufficiently imaginative and affective strong national, inclusive narratives. Indeed it is unlikely that majority-minority relations can achieve new forms of cross-cutting alliances and solidarities without both task-oriented cooperation in a multitude of localities and the ‘re-thinking of the national story’ (CMEB 2000: 14). Integration should be thought of as a multi-level process. It must tackle discrimination and the related issues of socio-economic disadvantage but, at the same time, offer inclusion in an identity of which people can be proud. Respect for ‘difference’ is essential for many minority individuals. In order to ensure that is not divisive, minority ‘difference’ must be grounded in a suitably pluralised conception of equal citizenship. For most people equal citizenship is too abstract a concept unless it is part of something more experiential and imaginative. Hence, equality and ‘difference’ have to be expressed at different levels and woven together into a sense of commonality strong enough to encompass and counter-balance, without stigmatising, other identities.

## 7

## DIVIDING LINES

A second question is ‘where will the major dividing line in Europe be in relation to post-immigration social formations?’ Will it, for example, be a colour-line? In Britain we have come to approach issues to do with integration through what used to be called (in other countries the language will not always have a natural resonance) ‘race-relations’, itself an American term. People saw the issue as primarily one of racial discrimination or colour-racism, which of course had a historical legacy through slavery, colonialism and empire. The issues to do with Muslims, which dominate the headlines today, only became a feature of majority-minority relations from the early 1990s. In Britain virtually nobody, policymakers, the media, or academics, talked about Muslims until the late 1980s, the time of the Salman Rushdie affair. In France, where Muslims and Islam are even more central to national post-immigration debates, the first ‘headscarf affair’ was contemporaneous. Since then hostility to Muslims has grown considerably and Islamic symbols such as dress and mosques have become targets of populist politicians and objects of legal control across Western Europe.

In the Anglo-American or Atlantocentric version of racism, which is certainly one of the classical and enduring versions, it is the combination of genetics and social conditioning which is alleged to explain the existence of certain, mainly negative cultural traits (Miles 1989: 71–72). Yet while these racists present people of African descent as a ‘race’ drawing on their perceptions of African physical appearance, as, for example, strong, sensual, rhythmical and unintelligent, the racialised image of South Asians and Arabs is not so extensively linked to physical appearance. It emerged in relation to cultural motifs such as language, religion, family structures, exotic dress, cuisine and art forms (Modood 2005: 6–18 and chapter one; Meer and Modood 2009b). Such motifs are appealed to in excluding,

harassing or discriminating against Asians, Arabs and Muslims, both constituting them as a group and justifying negative treatment of them. Through these motifs Muslims are currently stereotyped or ‘racialised’ in Europe and elsewhere. For the most part they are visually identified by a phenotype (primarily Arab or South Asian appearance) though also by dress and name and sometimes by accent. Attached to this identification, or image, are stereotypes about religious fanaticism, separatism, not wanting to integrate, lack of national feeling or even disloyalty and association with or sympathy for terrorism (Malik 2010; Sayyid and Vakil 2010).

One should perhaps also note the presence of a more general xenophobia, which can include white victims, as recent East European and South American labour migrants have discovered. There is little evidence so far that the long-term fault line will be here (perhaps because it is too early to tell). The likely candidates, therefore, are a white/non-white divide, or one based on ‘cultural-racism’, combining ‘race’ and ‘culture’, especially in the form of an anti-Muslim racism. Or, relatedly, a Muslim/non-Muslim divide, in which amongst Muslims are included those of European phenotype, and amongst non-Muslims are Jews, Hindus, black Christians and so on. Multiple lines of division may emerge, perhaps with one predominating, as in the USA.

## RELIGION AND SECULARISM

In most if not all European countries there are points of symbolic, institutional, policy and fiscal linkage between the state and aspects of Christianity. Secularism has increasingly grown in power and scope, but a historically evolved and evolving compromise with religion is the defining feature of western European secularism, rather than the absolute separation of religion and politics. Secularism today enjoys an increasing dominance in western Europe, but it is a moderate rather than a radical secularism (Modood 2010). The presence of Muslims and Islamic claims-making upon European societies and states, however, has resulted in a perhaps temporary reversal of aspects of secularization and the decline of collective religion. In reaction there are increased assertions of Enlightenment secularism and of (cultural) Christianity. Hence there seem to be three visible trends.

Firstly, there is the trend of institutional accommodation, in which regard the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman and the Islamkonferenz have already been mentioned. The development of a religious equality agenda, the incorporation of some Muslim schools on the same basis as schools of religions with an established presence, the inclusion of a religion question in the 2001 UK Census for the first time since its removal in 1851, and the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords (2000) to pluralise religious representation in that House are some British examples (for more on these European cases see Cesari 2004; Modood and Kastoryano 2006; Bowen 2010).

Secondly, there is a renewal of Christian cultural identities. For example, the voluntary religion question in the 2001 UK Census elicited a much higher 'Christian' response than most surveys. While in the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey of 1992, 31 % did not profess a belief in god(s) and in the latest

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BSA survey 43 % self-identified as non-religious (indeed 59 % did not describe themselves as religious: Park *et al.* 2010), in the 2001 Census 72 % identified themselves as Christians and less than 16 % as without a religion. It seems that the presence and salience of Muslims may have been a factor in stimulating a Christian identity (Voas and Bruce 2004). The emergence of a new, sometimes politically assertive, cultural identification with Christianity has been noted in Denmark (Mouritsen 2006). In Germany, Chancellor Merkel has asserted that ‘[t]hose who don’t accept [Christian values] don’t have a place here’ (cited in Presseurop 2010; see also Fekete 2011: 45–46). Similar sentiments were voiced in the European Union constitution debate and are apparent in the ongoing debate about Turkey as a future Union member (Casanova 2009). These assertions of Christian values are not necessarily accompanied by any increase in expressions of faith or church attendance, which continues to decline across Europe. Giscard d’Estaing, the former President of France, who chaired the Convention on the Future of Europe, the body which drafted the (abortive) EU constitution, expresses this assertiveness nicely ‘I never go to Church, but Europe is a Christian continent’. It has to be said, however, that such political views about Europe are held not just by cultural Christian identarians but also by many practising Christians including members of the Catholic Church. It has been argued that Pope John Paul II ‘looked at the essential cleavage in the world as being between religion and unbelief. Devout Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists had more in common with each other than with atheists’ (Caldwell 2009: 151). Pope Benedict XVI, it is said, ‘thinks that, within societies, believers and unbelievers exist in symbiosis. Secular Westerners, he implies, have a lot in common with their religious fellows’ (*ibid*: 151). The suggestion is that secularists and Christians in Europe have more in common with each other than they do with Muslims. That many secularists do not share Pope

Benedict's view is evident from the fact that the proposed clause about Christianity was absent from the final draft of the abortive EU constitution. While there is little sign of a Christian right in Europe of the kind that is strong in the USA, there is to some degree a reinforcing or renewing of a sense that Europe is 'secular Christian', analogous to the term 'secular Jew' to describe someone of Jewish descent who has a sense of Jewish identity but does not practise the religion and may even be an atheist.

Thirdly, besides this secular assertion of Christian identity which is to be found, although not exclusively, on the centre-right, there is also a more radical secularism which is more characteristic of the left. It is a tradition that goes back to the Enlightenment (though more the French than the British or German Enlightenments) and is often anti-religious. It has been most epigrammatically captured by Karl Marx's famous 'religion is the opium of the masses' and Nietzsche's 'God is dead'. Post-9/11 has seen the emergence of a radical discourse referred to as 'the new atheism' (see Beattie (2007) who has authors such as Dawkins (2006), Harris (2004) and Hitchens (2007) in mind). Its political manifestation is found amongst intellectuals and political commentators such as A.C. Grayling, Kenan Malik and Polly Toynbee, and in organisations such as the National Secular Society and the European Humanist Association. They interpret political secularism to mean that religious beliefs and discourse should be excluded from the public sphere and/or politics and certainly from activities endorsed or funded by the state. Thus they argue, for example, for the disestablishment of the Church of England, the removal of the Anglican bishops from the House of Lords, the withdrawal of state support for faith schools, and the removal of symbols such as crucifixes from state schools (an Italian case recently having been lost in the European Court). With groups like Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus pressing to have some of these benefits extended to themselves

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(as to some extent has already happened in the case of the Jews), and religious groups more involved in the delivery of welfare and urban renewal, it is clear that this radical political secularism is not only a break with the inherited status quo secularism in most parts of Western Europe, with France being something of an exception (although see Bowen 2010), but is at odds with the current institutionalisation of religious pluralism.

Which of these will become dominant, or how these trends may develop and interact, is not clear. The critical issue of principle is not how but *whether* religious groups, especially those that are marginal and under-represented in public life, ought to be included. If Christians and Jews are already recognised by European states, why should this not be pluralised to include Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and others? Similarly, if race, ethnicity and gender can be the basis of public policy and actions to redress under-representation in public institutions, why should groups who prioritise religious identity be excluded from these initiatives? The New Labour government took an inclusionary path by including ‘religion and belief’ as a strand within the new UK Equality and Human Rights Commission, as it is in the European Convention, on a par with all other strands in the Equality Act 2010. In the light of European historical experience of religion as a source of prejudice and conflict it is understandable that the presence of militant Muslims, not to mention networks of terrorists, is creating anxieties. It must, however, be a matter of concern that this fear of Muslims is strengthening intolerant, exclusionary politics across Europe. The fact that some people are today developing cultural Christianity and/or secularism as an ideology to oppose Islam and its public recognition is a challenge both to pluralism and equality, and thus to some of the bases of contemporary democracy. In the present context of high levels of fear of, and hostility to, Muslims and Islam, this threatens to create a long-term racialised-religious division in Europe.

It may be the case that all the attempted models of integration, especially national models, are in crisis. They are certainly perceived as such. We can, however, have a better sense of what the issues are and so what needs to be done if we recognise that discourses of integration and multiculturalism are exercises in conceptualising post-immigration difference and as such operate at three distinct levels: as an (implicit) understanding of the relationship between individuals and groups in society; as a political response; and as a vision of the whole in which difference is to be integrated. Depending upon the understanding in question, certain political responses are more or less possible. The sociological and political assumptions are thus mutually dependent.

In this paper I have offered a framework in which four distinct political responses (assimilation, individualist-integration, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism) illuminate each other and where each successive position attempts to include what is thought to be missing from the predecessor. Each position can in principle be attractive from different perspectives: some ethnic minorities may wish to assimilate, some to have the equal rights of integrated citizens, some to maintain the cultural differences of their group identities, and some to be free to choose cosmopolitan mixed identities suiting the roles they take on in a more diverse society. Equally host communities may look on different groups of migrants in all these different ways. Each approach has a particular conception of equal citizenship but the value of each can only be realised if it is not imposed but is the preferred choice of minority individuals and groups, who of course, being a ‘multi’, are bound to choose differently. Thus no singular model is likely to be suitable for all groups. To have a reasonable chance of integrating the maximum number of members of minorities, none of these political responses should be dismissed.

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Multiculturalism may currently be viewed as undesirable by European publics and policymakers. Given how central Muslims have become to the prospects of integration on a number of fronts, it is unlikely that integration can be achieved without some element of this approach, which is being practised even by those politicians who are making anti-multiculturalist speeches. Perceptions of Muslims as groups, by themselves and by non-Muslim majorities, are hardening. The key question is whether Muslims are to be stigmatised as outsiders or recognised as integral to the polity. Finally, we must not overlook the third analytical level, which in many ways is not primarily about minorities but about the majority. The enlargement, hyphenation and internal pluralising of national identities is essential to an integration in which all citizens have not just rights but a sense of belonging to the whole, as well as to their own ‘little platoon’ (Burke 1986: 135).<sup>17</sup>

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17 ‘To be attached to the subdivision, to love the *little platoon* we belong to in ... we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind’ (Burke 1986: 135).

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## ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

### **The author: Tariq Modood**

Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol and is also the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship. He has held over 40 grants and consultancies (UK, European and US), has over 30 (co-)authored and (co-)edited books and reports and over 150 articles or chapters in political philosophy, sociology and public policy.

Professor Tariq Modood is strongly committed to public engagement and is a regular contributor to the media and policy debates in Britain. He was awarded an MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001 and was elected a member of the Academy of Social Sciences in 2004. Professor Tariq Modood served on the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, the IPPR Commission on National Security and on the National Equality Panel, which reported to the UK Deputy Prime Minister in 2010.

### **The chair: Peter Taylor-Gooby FBA**

Peter Taylor-Gooby is Professor of Social Policy at the University of Kent and is chair of the British Academy’s *New Paradigms in Public Policy* project. He is also a Founding Academician at ALSiSS, a fellow of the RSA, and co-director of the Risk Research Institute at Beijing Normal University. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2009. He chairs the Research Assessment Exercise Social Work and Social Policy and Administration panel.

Previous roles have included State-appointed Visiting Foreign Expert to China (2008–2011), President of the Sociology and Social Policy section of the British Association of American Studies (2005–2006), and chair of the Social Policy and Social Work Research Assessment Exercise Panel (2005–2008). He has also published 22 books, 114 articles and 110 book chapters, and has advised governments in the UK and abroad.

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Twenty-first century Europe is home to a mixture of ethnicities, religions and cultures. Alongside this diversity is a fear of and hostility towards immigrants – to Muslims in particular – and an unresolved debate on how and to what extent the individuals and groups in question should integrate within society.

Here Tariq Modood presents four different options for integration and equality of opportunity for all citizens. Some ethnic minorities may wish to assimilate; some to have the equal rights of integrated citizens; some to maintain the cultural differences of their group identities; and some to be free to choose cosmopolitan mixed identities. Professor Modood argues that all of these approaches have value, and if citizens are to have not just rights but a sense of belonging to society the government should not seek to impose one particular option. No one approach fits all and none should be dismissed.

The new and evolving political, economic and societal challenges in twenty-first century Britain require policymakers to adapt and change the way they consider their craft. *New paradigms in public policy*, a series of reports published by the British Academy Policy Centre, examines a range of policy issues, explaining the current approaches, and making suggestions as to why and how concepts should be adapted, reformed or reinvented.

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10–11 Carlton House Terrace  
London SW1Y 5AH  
Telephone: +44 (0)207 969 5200  
Fax: +44 (0)207 969 5300  
Registered Charity: Number 233176