LECTURE ON A MASTER MIND

DR. BERNARD MANDEVILLE

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IT is to be feared that not only would most of Bernard Mandeville’s contemporaries turn in their graves if they could know that he is today presented as a master mind to this august body, but that even now there may have been some raising of eyebrows about the appropriateness of such a choice. The author who achieved such a succès de scandale almost 250 years ago is still not quite reputable. Though there can be no doubt that his works had an enormous circulation and that they set many people thinking on important problems, it is less easy to explain what precisely he has contributed to our understanding.

Let me say at once, to dispel a natural apprehension, that I am not going to represent him as a great economist. Although we owe to him both the term ‘division of labour’ and a clearer view of the nature of this phenomenon, and although no less an authority than Lord Keynes has given him high praise for other parts of his economic work, it will not be on this ground that I shall claim any eminence for him. With the exception I have mentioned—which is a big one—what Mandeville has to say on technical economics seems to me to be rather mediocre, or at least unoriginal—ideas widely current in his time which he uses merely to illustrate conceptions of a much wider bearing.

1 Any serious work done today on Mandeville must be deeply indebted to the splendid edition of The Fable of the Bees which the late Professor F. B. Kaye published in 1924 through the Oxford University Press. All information about Mandeville and his work used in this lecture is taken from this edition and references to its two volumes will be simply ‘i’ and ‘ii’. Though my opinion of Mandeville’s importance is based on earlier acquaintance with most of his works, when I came to write this lecture I had access only to this edition of the Fable and two modern reprints of the Letter to Dinm; all quotations from other works are taken from Kaye’s Introduction and Notes to his edition. At least Mandeville’s Origin of Honour (1732) and his Free Thoughts on Religion etc. (1720), and probably also some of his other works, would, however, deserve to be made more accessible; it would be a great boon if the Oxford University Press could be persuaded to expand its magnificent production of the Fable into an edition of Mandeville’s collected works.
Even less do I intend to stress Mandeville's contributions to the theory of ethics, in the history of which he has his well-established place. But though a contribution to our understanding of the genesis of moral rules is part of his achievement, it appears to me that the fact that he is regarded as primarily a moralist has been the chief obstacle to an appreciation of his main achievement.

I should be much more inclined to praise him as a really great psychologist,¹ if this is not too weak a term for a great student of human nature; but even this is not my main aim, though it brings me nearer to my contention. The Dutch doctor, who about 1696, in his late twenties, started to practise in London as a specialist in the diseases of the nerves and the stomach, that is, as a psychiatrist,² and continued to do so for the following thirty-seven years, clearly acquired in the course of time an insight into the working of the human mind which is very remarkable and sometimes strikingly modern. He clearly prided himself on this understanding of human nature more than on anything else. That we do not know why we do what we do, and that the consequences of our decisions are often very different from what we imagine them to be, are the two foundations of that satire on the conceits of a rationalist age which was his initial aim.

What I do mean to claim for Mandeville is that the speculations to which that *jeu d'esprit* led him mark the definite breakthrough in modern thought of the twin ideas of evolution and of the spontaneous formation of an order, conceptions which had long been in coming, which had often been closely approached, but which just then needed emphatic statement because seventeenth-century rationalism had largely submerged earlier progress in this direction. Though Mandeville may have contributed little to the answers of particular questions of social and economic

¹ Professor Kaye has duly drawn attention to the more remarkable of Mandeville's psychological insights, especially to his modern conception of an *ex post* rationalization of actions directed by emotions (see i, p. lxxviii and cf. pp. bxi–bxiv), to which I would like to add references to his observations of the manner in which a man born blind would, after gaining sight, learn to judge distances (i, p. 227), and to his interesting conception of the structure and function of the brain (ii, p. 165).

² Mandeville's work on psychiatry seems to have had a considerable reputation. A Treatise on Hypochondrias and Hysterical Passions which he published in 1711 had to be reprinted in the same year and was republished in an enlarged version in 1730 with the word 'Diseases' substituted for 'Passions' in the title.
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theory, he did, by asking the right questions, show that there was an object for a theory in this field. Perhaps in no case did he precisely show how an order formed itself without design, but he made it abundantly clear that it did, and thereby raised the questions to which theoretical analysis, first in the social sciences and later in biology, could address itself.¹

2

Mandeville is perhaps himself a good illustration of one of his main contentions in that he probably never fully understood what was his main discovery. He had begun by laughing about the foibles and pretences of his contemporaries, and that poem in Hudibrastic verse which he published in 1705 as The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest, was probably little more than an exercise in the new language he had come to love and of which in so short a time he had acquired a remarkable mastery. Yet though this poem is all that most people today know about him, it gives yet little indication of his important ideas. It also seems at first to have attracted no attention among serious people. The idea that

The worst of all the multitude
Did something for the common good

was but the seed from which his later thought sprang. It was not until nine years later when he republished the original poem with an elaborate and wholly serious prose commentary, that the trend of his thought became more clearly visible; and only a further nine years later, with a second edition of the Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits, a book about twenty times as long as the original poem, that his ideas suddenly attracted wide attention and caused a public scandal. Finally, it was really only after yet another six years, when in 1728, at the age of 58, he added a second volume to it, that the bearing of his thought became quite clear. By that time, however, he had become a bogey man, a name with which to frighten the godly and respectable, an author whom one might read in secret to enjoy a paradox, but whom everybody knew to be a moral monster by whose ideas one must not be infected.

¹ Cf. Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the 18th Century, 2nd ed., London, 1881, i, p. 40: 'Mandeville anticipates, in many respects, the views of modern philosophers. He gives a kind of conjectural history describing the struggle for existence by which man gradually elevated himself above the wild beasts, and formed societies for mutual protection.'
Yet almost everybody read him 1 and few escaped infection. Though the very title of the book, as the modern editor observes, 2 was apt 'to throw many good people into a kind of philosophical hysteric which left them no wit to grasp what he was driving at', the more the outraged thundered, the more the young read the book. If Dr. Hutchinson could give no lecture without attacking The Fable of the Bees, we may be sure that his student Adam Smith very soon turned to it. Even half a century later Dr. Samuel Johnson is said to have described it as a book that every young man had on his shelves in the mistaken belief that it was a wicked book. 3 Yet by then it had done its work and its chief contributions had become the basis of the approach to social philosophy of David Hume and his successors.

But does even the modern reader quite see what Mandeville was driving at? And how far did Mandeville himself? His main general thesis emerges only gradually and indirectly, as it were as a by-product of defending his initial paradox that what are private vices are often public benefits. By treating as vicious everything done for selfish purposes, and admitting as virtuous only what was done in order to obey moral commands, he had little difficulty in showing that we owed most benefits of society to what on such a rigoristic standard must be called vicious. This was no new discovery but as old almost as any reflection on these problems. Had not even Thomas Aquinas had to admit that multae utilitates impediuntur si omnia pecata distrirecte prohibenterur— that much that is useful would be prevented if all sins were strictly prohibited? 4 The whole idea was so familiar to the literature of the preceding century, particularly through the work of La Rochefoucauld and Bayle, that it was not difficult for a witty and somewhat cynical mind, steeped from early youth in the ideas of Erasmus and Montaigne, to develop it into a grotesque of society. Yet by making his starting-point the particular moral

1 There is perhaps no other comparable work of which one can be equally confident that all contemporary writers in the field knew it, whether they explicitly refer to it or not. Alfred Espinas ('La troisième phase de la dissolution du mercantilisme', Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 1962, p. 162) calls it 'un livre dont nous nous sommes assurés que la plupart des hommes du XVIIIe siècle ont pris connaissance'.
2 F. B. Kaye in ib, p. xxxix.
3 I borrow this quotation which I have not been able to trace from Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy, London, 1963, p. 15.
4 Summa Theologiae, ii, ii, q. 78 i.
contrast between the selfishness of the motives and the benefits which the resulting actions conferred on others, Mandeville saddled himself with an incubus of which neither he nor his successors to the present day could ever quite free themselves.

But as in his successive prose works Mandeville defends and develops the initial paradox, it becomes increasingly evident that it was but a special case of a much more general principle for which the particular contrast which had provoked all the moral indignation was almost irrelevant. His main contention became simply that in the complex order of society the results of men’s actions were very different from what they had intended, and that the individuals, in pursuing their own ends, whether selfish or altruistic, produced useful results for others which they did not anticipate or perhaps even know; and, finally, that the whole order of society, and even all that we call culture, was the result of individual strivings which had no such end in view, but which were channelled to serve such ends by institutions, practices, and rules which also had never been deliberately invented but had grown up by the survival of what proved successful.

It was in the elaboration of this wider thesis that Mandeville for the first time developed all the classical paradigmata of the spontaneous growth of orderly social structures: of law and morals, of language, the market, and of money, and also of the growth of technological knowledge. To understand the significance of this it is necessary to be aware of the conceptual scheme into which these phenomena had somewhat uneasily been fitted during the preceding 2,000 years.

4

The ancient Greeks, of course, had not been unaware of the problem which the existence of such phenomena raised; but they had tried to cope with it with a dichotomy which by its ambiguity produced endless confusion, yet became so firm a tradition that it acted like a prison from which Mandeville at last showed the way of escape.

The Greek dichotomy which had governed thinking so long, and which still has not lost all its power, is that between what is natural (physēi) and that which is artificial or conventional (thesis or nomā). It was obvious that the order of nature, the

1 Cf. F. Heinemann, Nomai and Physis, Basel 1945, and my essay “The Result of Human Action but not of Human Design” in Le Fondement philosophique
kosmos, was given independently of the will and actions of men, but that there existed also other kinds of order (for which they had a distinct word, taxis, for which we may envy them) which were the result of the deliberate arrangements of men. But if everything that was clearly independent of men’s will and their actions was in this sense obviously ‘natural’, and everything that was the intended result of men’s action ‘artificial’, this left no distinct place for any order which was the result of human actions but not of human design. That there existed among the pheno-
mena of society such spontaneous orders was often perceived. But as men were not aware of the ambiguity of the established natural/artificial terminology, they endeavoured to express what they perceived in terms of it, and inevitably produced confusion: one would describe a social institution as ‘natural’ because it had never been deliberately designed, while another would describe the same institution as ‘artificial’ because it resulted from human actions.

It is remarkable how close, nevertheless, some of the ancient thinkers came to an understanding of the evolutionary processes that produced social institutions. There appears to have existed in all free countries a belief that a special providence watched over their affairs which turned their unsystematic efforts to their benefit. Aristophanes refers to this when he mentions that

There is a legend of the olden times
That all our foolish plans and vain conceits
Are overruled to work the public good.1

—a sentiment not wholly unfamiliar in this country. And at least the Roman lawyers of classical times were very much aware that the Roman legal order was superior to others because, as Cato is reported to have said, it was based upon the genius, not of one man, but of many: it was founded, not in one generation, but in a long period of several centuries and many ages of men. For, said he, there never has lived a man possessed of so great a genius that nothing could escape him, nor could the combined powers of all men living at one time possibly make all the provisions for the future without the aid of actual experience and the test of time.2


1 Ecclesiasticus, 473; the translation is that by B. B. Rogers in the Loeb edition, iii, p. 289.
2 M. Tullius Cicero, De re publica ii, 1, 2, Loeb ed. by C. W. Keyes, p. 113. Cf. also the Attic orator Antipho, On the Characters, par. 2 (in Minor Attic
This tradition was handed on, chiefly through the theories of the law of nature; and it is startling how far the older theorists of the law of nature, before they were displaced by the altogether rationalist natural law school of the seventeenth century, penetrated into the secrets of the spontaneous development of social orders in spite of the handicap of the term 'natural'. Gradually even this unfortunate word became almost a technical term for referring to human institutions which had never been invented or designed by men, but had been shaped by the force of circumstances. Especially in the works of the last of the Schoolmen, the Spanish Jesuits of the sixteenth century, it led to a systematic questioning of how things would have ordered themselves if they had not otherwise been arranged by the deliberate efforts of government; they thus produced what I should call the first modern theories of society if their teaching had not been submerged by the rationalist tide of the following century.¹

5

Because, however great an advance the work of a Descartes, a Hobbes, and a Leibniz may have meant in other fields, for the understanding of social growth processes it was simply disastrous. That to Descartes Sparta seemed eminent among Greek nations because its laws were the product of design and, 'originated by a single individual, they all tended to a single end',² is characteristic of that constructivist rationalism which came to rule. It came to be thought that not only all cultural institutions were the product of deliberate construction, but that all that was so designed was necessarily superior to all mere growth. Under this influence the traditional conception of the law of nature was transformed from the idea of something which had formed itself by gradual adaptation to the 'nature of things', into the idea of something which a natural reason with which man had been originally endowed would enable him to design.

I do not know how much of the older tradition was preserved through this intellectual turmoil, and particularly how much of it may still have reached Mandeville. This would require an Oration, Loeb ed. by K. J. Maidment, p. 247), where he speaks of laws having 'the distinction of being the oldest in this country, ... and that is the surest token of good laws, as time and experience show mankind what is imperfect'.

¹ On Luis Molina, from this angle the most important of these sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuits, and some of his predecessors see my essay cited on p. 129, n. 1, above.
intimate knowledge of the seventeenth-century Dutch discussion of legal and social problems which is still largely inaccessible to one who does not read Dutch. There are many other reasons why a thorough study of this period of Dutch thought, which probably had great influence on English intellectual development at the end of that and the beginning of the next century, has long seemed to me one of the great desiderata of intellectual history. But until that gap is filled I can, so far as my particular problem is concerned, only surmise that a closer study would probably show that there are some threads connecting Mandeville with that group of late Schoolmen and particularly its Flemish member, Leonard Lessius of Louvain.

Apart from this likely connexion with the older continental theorists of the law of nature, another probable source of inspiration for Mandeville was the English theorists of the common law, particularly Sir Mathew Hale. Their work had in some respects preserved, and in other respects made unnecessary in England, a conception of what the natural law theorists had been aiming at; and in the work of Hale Mandeville could have found much that would have helped him in the speculations about the growth of cultural institutions which increasingly became his central problem.2

Yet all these were merely survivals of an older tradition which had been swamped by the constructivist rationalism of the time, the most powerful expositor of which in the social field was the chief target of Hale’s argument, Thomas Hobbes. How ready men still were, under the influence of a powerful philosophy flattering to the human mind, to return to the naive design theories of human institutions, much more in accord with the ingrained propensity of our thinking to interpret everything anthropomorphically, we will understand better when we remember that distinguished renaissance scholars could still as a matter of course search for personal inventors of all the institutions of culture.3 The renewed efforts to trace the political

1 Leonard Lessius, De justitia et jure, 1606.
2 On Sir Mathew Hale see now particularly J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, Cambridge, 1957, esp. pp. 171 et seq. I would like to make amends here for inadvertently not referring to this excellent book in The Constitution of Liberty, 1960, for the final revision of which I had much profited from Mr. Pocock’s work.
3 Cf. J. G. A. Pocock, op. cit., p. 19: “This was the period in which Polydore Vergil wrote his De inventorisibus rerum on the assumption that every invention could be traced to an individual discoverer; and in the field of legal history Macchiavelli would write with what seems singular naivety of the
order to some deliberate act, an original agreement or contract, was much more congenial to this view than the more sophisticated accounts of their evolution which had been attempted earlier.

6

To his contemporaries 'Mandeville's reduction of all action to open or disguised selfishness' may indeed have seemed little more than another version of Hobbes, and to have disguised the fact that it led to wholly different conclusions. His initial stress on selfishness still carried a suggestion that man's actions were guided by wholly rational considerations, while the tenor of his argument becomes increasingly that it is not insight but restraints imposed upon men by the institutions and traditions of society which make their actions appear rational. While he still seems most concerned to show that it is merely pride (or 'self-liking') which determines men's actions, he becomes in fact much more interested in the origin of the rules of conduct which pride makes men obey but whose origin and rationale they do not understand. After he has convinced himself that the reasons for which men observe rules are very different from the reasons which made these rules prevail, he gets increasingly intrigued about the origin of these rules whose significance for the orderly process of society is quite unconnected with the motives which make individual men obey them.

This begins to show itself already in the prose commentary on the poem and the other pieces which make up Part I of the *Fable*, but blossoms forth in full only in Part II. In Part I Mandeville draws his illustrations largely from economic affairs because, as he thinks, 'the sociableness of man arises from those two things, viz., the multiplicity of his desires, and the continuous opposition he meets with in his endeavours to satisfy them.' But this leads him merely to those mercantilist considerations about the beneficial effects of luxury which caused the enthusiasm of Lord Keynes. We find here also that magnificent man "chi ordinò" so complex a creation of history as the monarchy of France' —with footnote references to Denys Hay, *Polydore Vergil*, Oxford, 1953, Ch. III, Machiavelli, *Discorsi* i, xvi, and Pierre Messard, *L'Esco de la philosophie politique au XVII: siècle*, Paris, 1951, p. 83.

1 F. B. Kaye, i, p. ixiii.


3 i, p. 344.
description of all the activities spread over the whole earth that go to the making of a piece of crimson cloth\(^1\) which so clearly inspired Adam Smith and provided the basis for the explicit introduction of the division of labour in Part II.\(^2\) Already underlying this discussion there is clearly an awareness of the spontaneous order which the market produces.

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I would not wish to dwell on this at any length, however, if it were not for the fact that Mandeville's long recognized position as an anticipator of Adam Smith's argument for economic liberty has recently been challenged by Professor Jacob Viner,\(^3\) than whom there is no greater authority on such matters. With all due respect, however, it seems to me that Professor Viner has been misled by a phrase which Mandeville repeatedly uses, namely his allusions to the 'dextrous management by which the skilful politician might turn private vices into public benefits'.\(^4\) Professor Viner interprets this to mean that Mandeville favours what we now call government interference or intervention, that is, a specific direction of men's economic activities by government.

This, however, is certainly not what Mandeville meant. His aim comes out fairly unmistakably already in the little noticed subtitle to the second 1714 printing of the Fable, which describes it as containing 'Several Discourses, to demonstrate, that Human Frailties, ... may be turned to the Advantage of the Civil Society, and made to supply the Place of Moral Virtues'.\(^5\) What I believe he wants to say by this is precisely what Josiah Tucker expressed more clearly forty years later when he wrote that 'that universal mover in human nature, self-love,

\(^1\) i, p. 356. Already Dugald Stewart in his Lectures on Political Economy (Collected Works, vii, p. 323) suggests that this passage in Mandeville 'clearly suggested to Adam Smith one of the finest passages of The Wealth of Nations'.

\(^2\) ii, p. 284.

\(^3\) Introduction to Bernard Mandeville, A Letter to Dion (1732), edited for The Augustan Reprint Society, Los Angeles, University of California, 1953, and reprinted in Professor Viner's The Long View and the Short, Giencoe, Ill., 1958, pp. 330-49. For the predominant and, I believe, truer opinion, cf. Albert Schatz, L'Individualisme économique et social, Paris, 1907, p. 62, who describes the Fable as 'l'ouvrage capital où se trouvent tous les germes essentiels de la philosophie économique et sociale de l'individualisme'.

\(^4\) i, pp. 51, 369, ii, p. 319; also Letter to Dion, p. 36.

\(^5\) Cf. the title-page reproduced in ii, p. 393. It is not described as a second edition, which term was reserved to the edition of 1723.
may receive such a direction in this case (as in all others) as to promote the public interest by those efforts it shall make towards pursuing its own. The means through which in the opinion of Mandeville and Tucker individual efforts are given such a direction, however, are by no means any particular commands of government but institutions and particularly general rules of just conduct. It seems to me that Mr. Nathan Rosenberg is wholly right when, in his reply to Professor Viner, he argues that in Mandeville's view, just as in Adam Smith's, the proper function of government is 'to establish the rules of the game by the creation of a framework of wise laws', and that Mandeville is searching for a system where 'arbitrary exertions of government power would be minimized'. Clearly an author who could argue, as Mandeville had already in Part I of the Fable, that 'this proportion as to numbers in every trade finds itself, and is never better kept than when nobody meddles or interferes with it', and who in conclusion of Part II speaks about 'how the short-sighted wisdom, of perhaps well-meaning people, may rob us of a felicity, that would flow spontaneously from the nature of every large society, if none were to divert or interrupt this stream', was quite as much (or as little) an advocate of laissez-faire as Adam Smith.

I do not attach much importance to this question and would have relegated it to a footnote if in connexion with it the baneful effect of the old dichotomy of the 'natural' and the 'artificial' had not once again made an appearance. It was Élie Halévy who had first suggested that Mandeville and Adam Smith had based their argument on a 'natural identity of interests', while Helvetius (who undoubtedly was greatly indebted to Mandev-

2 Nathan Rosenberg, 'Mandeville and Laissez Faire', Journal of the History of Ideas, xxiv, 1963, pp. 190, 193. Cf. ii, p. 335, where Mandeville argues that, though it would be preferable to have all power in the hands of the good, 'the best of all then not being to be had, let us look out for the next best, and we shall find, that of all possible means to secure and perpetuate to nations their establishment, and whatever they value, there is no better method than with wise laws to guard and entrench their constitution and to contrive such forms of administration, that the common-weal can receive no great detri-

1 i, pp. 299–300.
2 ii, p. 333.
ville and Hume), and, following Helvetius, Jeremy Bentham, were thinking of an 'artificial identification of interests';¹ and Professor Viner suggests that Helvetius had derived this conception of an artificial identification of interests from Mandeville.² I am afraid this seems to me the kind of muddle to which the natural/artificial dichotomy inevitably leads. What Mandeville was concerned with was that institutions which man had not deliberately made—though it is the task of the legislator to improve them—bring it about that the divergent interests of the individuals are reconciled. The identity of interests was thus neither 'natural' in the sense that it was independent of institutions which had been formed by men's actions, nor 'artificial' in the sense that it was brought about by deliberate arrangement, but the result of spontaneously grown institutions which had developed because they made those societies prosper which tumbled upon them.

8

It is not surprising that from this angle Mandeville's interest became increasingly directed to the question of how those institutions grew up which bring it about that men's divergent interests are reconciled. Indeed his theory of the growth of law, not through the design of some wise legislator but through a long process of trial and error, is probably the most remarkable of those sketches of the evolution of institutions which make his investigation into the origin of society which constitutes Part II of the Fable so remarkable a work. His central thesis becomes 'that we often ascribe to the excellency of man's genius, and the depth of his penetration, what is in reality owing to the length of time, and the experience of many generations, all of them very little differing from one another in natural parts and sagacity'.³ He develops it with reference to laws by saying that 'there are very few, that are the work of one man, or of one generation; the greatest part of them are the product, the joint labour of several ages. . . . The wisdom I speak of, is not the offspring of a fine understanding, or intense thinking, but of sound and deliberate judgment, acquired from a long experience in business, and a multiplicity of observations. By this sort of wisdom, and length of time, it may be brought about, that there may be no greater difficulty in governing a large city, than (pardon the lowness of the simile) there is in weaving of

² The Long View and the Short, p. 342.
³ ii, p. 142.
stockings." When by this process the laws are brought to as much perfection, as art and human wisdom can carry them, the whole machinery can be made to play of itself, with as little skill, as is required to wind up a clock."

Of course Mandeville is not fully aware of how long would be the time required for the development of the various institutions—or of the length of time actually at his disposal for accounting for it. He is often tempted to telescope this process of adaptation to circumstances, and does not pull himself up to say explicitly, as Hume later did in a similar context, that 'I here only suppose those reflections to be formed at once, which in fact arise insensibly and by degrees'. He still vacillates between the then predominant pragmatic-rationalist and his new genetic or evolutionary view. But what makes the latter so much more significant in his work than it was in the application to particular topics by Mathew Hale or John Law, who probably did it better in their particular fields, is that he applies it to society at large and extends it to new topics. He still struggles to free himself from the constructivist preconceptions. The burden of his argument is throughout that most of the institutions of society are not the result of design, but how 'a most beautiful superstructure may be raised upon a rotten and despicable foundation', namely men's pursuit of their selfish interests, and how, as 'the order, oeconomy, and the very existence of civil society . . . is entirely built upon the variety of our wants . . . so the whole superstructure is made up of the reciprocal services which men do to each other'.

9

It is never wise to overload a lecture with quotations which, taken out of their context, rarely convey to the listener what they

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1 ii, p. 322. 2 ii, p. 323. 3 N. Rosenberg, loc. cit., p. 194. 4 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, ii, p. 274. 5 Cf. Paul Sakmann, Bernard de Mandeville und die Bienensabel-Controverse, Freiburg i. B., 1897, p. 141. Although partly superseded by Kaye's edition, this is still the most comprehensive study of Mandeville. 6 In his Money and Trade Considered with a Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money, Edinburgh, 1705, which thus appeared in the same year as Mandeville's original poem, John Law gave what Carl Menger rightly described as the first adequate account of the development of money. There is no ground for believing that Mandeville knew it, but the date is interesting as showing that the evolutionary idea was somehow 'in the air'. 7 ii, p. 64. 8 ii, p. 349.
suggest to the reader of the consecutive exposition. So I will merely briefly mention the further chief applications to which Mandeville puts these ideas. Starting from the observation of how the skills of sport involve movements the purpose of which the acting person does not know,¹ and how similarly the skills of the arts and trades have been raised to 'prodigious height . . . by the uninterrupted labour and joint experience of many generations, though none but men of ordinary capacity should ever be employed in them',² he maintains that manners in speaking, writing, and ordering actions are generally followed by what we regard as 'rational creatures . . . without thinking and knowing what they are about'.³ The most remarkable application of this, in which Mandeville appears to have been wholly a pioneer, is to the evolution of language which, he maintains, has also come into the world 'by slow degrees, as all other arts and sciences'.⁴ When we remember that not long before even John Locke had regarded words as arbitrarily 'invented',⁵ it would seem that Mandeville is the chief source of that rich speculation on the growth of language which we find in the second half of the eighteenth century.

All this is part of an increasing preoccupation with the process which we would now call cultural transmission, especially through education. He explicitly distinguishes what is 'adventitious and acquired by culture'⁶ from what is innate, and makes his spokesman in the dialogue of Part II stress that 'what you call natural, is evidently artificial and acquired by education'.⁷ All this leads him in the end to argue that 'it was with our thought as it is with speech'⁸ and that 'human wisdom is the child of time. It was not the contrivance of one man, nor could it have been the business of a few years, to establish a notion, by which a rational creature is kept in awe for fear of itself, and an idol is set up, that shall be its own worshipper'.⁹

Here the anti-rationalism, to use for once the misleading term which has been widely used for Mandeville and Hume, and which we had now better drop in favour of Sir Karl Popper's 'critical rationalism', comes out most clearly. With it Mandeville seems to me to have provided the foundations on which David Hume was able to build. Already in Part II of the Fable we meet more and more frequently terms which are familiar

to us through Hume, as when Mandeville speaks of 'the narrow bounds of human knowledge' and says that 'we are convinced, that human understanding is limited; and by the help of very little reflection, we may be as certain, that the narrowness of its bounds, its being so limited, is the very thing, the sole cause, which palpably hinders us from diving into our origins by dint of penetration'. And in The Origin of Honour, which came out when Hume was 21 and according to his own testimony was 'planning' the Treatise on Human Nature, but had not yet started 'composing' it, we find the wholly Humean passage that 'all human creatures are swayed and wholly governed by their passions, whatever fine notions we may flatter ourselves with; even those who act suitably to their knowledge, and strictly follow the dictates of their reason, are not less compelled to do so by some passion or other, that sets them to work, than others, who bid defiance and act contrary to both, and whom we call slaves to their passions'.

I do not intend to pitch my claim on behalf of Mandeville higher than to say that he made Hume possible. It is indeed my estimate of Hume as perhaps the greatest of all modern students of mind and society which makes Mandeville appear to me so important. It is only in Hume's work that the significance of Mandeville's efforts becomes wholly clear, and it was through Hume that he exercised his most lasting influence. Yet to have given Hume some of his leading conceptions seems to me sufficient title for Mandeville to qualify as a master mind.

1 ii, p. 104. Cf. David Hume, Enquiry, in Essays, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Groose, ii, p. 6: 'Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or security of his acquisitions.'

2 ii, p. 315.


4 The Origin of Honour, p. 31, quoted, i, p. lxxix.

5 Cf. Simon N. Patten, The Development of English Thought, New York, 1910, pp. 212–13: 'Mandeville's immediate successor was Hume. . . . If my interpretation is correct, the starting-point of Hume's development lay in the writings of Mandeville.' Also O. Bobertag's observation in his German translation of Mandeville's Bienenfabel, München, 1914, p. xxv: 'Im 18. Jahrhundert gibt es nur einen Mann, der etwas gleich Großes—und Größeres—geleistet hat, David Hume.'

6 The same may also be true concerning Montesquieu. See on this Joseph Delieu, Montesquieu et la tradition politique anglaise, Paris, 1909, pp. 260–1, and 367 n.
How much Mandeville’s contribution meant we recognize when we look at the further development of those conceptions which Hume was the first and greatest to take up and elaborate. This development includes, of course, the great Scottish moral philosophers of the second half of the century, above all Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, the latter of whom, with his phrase about the ‘results of human action but not of human design’,¹ has provided not only the best brief statement of Mandeville’s central problem but also the best definition of the task of all social theory. I will not claim in favour of Mandeville that his work also led via Helvétius to Bentham’s particularistic utilitarianism which, though the claim is true enough, meant a relapse into that constructivist rationalism which it was Mandeville’s main achievement to have overcome. But the tradition which Mandeville started includes also Edmund Burke, and, largely through Burke, all those ‘historical schools’ which, chiefly on the Continent, and through men like Herder² and Savigny,³ made the idea of evolution a commonplace.

¹ Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Edinburgh, 1767, p. 187: ‘Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design. If Cromwell said, That a man never mounts higher than when he knows not wither he is going; it may with more reason be affirmed of communities, that they admit of the greatest revolutions where no change is intended, and that the most refined politicians do not always know wither they are leading the state by their projects.’

² It may deserve notice that J. G. Herder seems to have been the earliest instance where the influence of Mandeville joined with that of the somewhat similar ideas of G. Vico.

³ It would seem as if it had been largely by way of Savigny that those ideas of Mandeville and Hume eventually reached Carl Menger and thus returned to economic theory. It was in the sociological parts of his Untersuchungen über die Methode (1883, translated as Problems of Economics and Sociology, ed. Louis Schneider, Urbana, Ill., 1963) that Carl Menger not only restated the general theory of the formation of law, morals, money, and the market in a manner which, I believe, had never again been attempted since Hume, but that he also expressed the fundamental insight that (p. 94 of the translation): ‘This genetic insight is inseparable from the idea of theoretical science.’ Perhaps it also deserves notice here, since this seems not to be generally known, that through his pupil Richard Thurnwald Menger exercised some influence on the rise of modern cultural anthropology, the discipline which more than any other has in our day concentrated on what were the central problems of the Mandeville–Hume–Smith–Ferguson tradition. Cf. also the long extracts from Mandeville now given in J. S. Slotkin (ed.), Readings in Early Anthropology, London, 1965.
in the social sciences of the nineteenth century long before Darwin. And it was in this atmosphere of evolutionary thought in the study of society, where ‘Darwinians before Darwin’ had long thought in terms of the prevailing of more effective habits and practices, that Charles Darwin at last applied the idea systematically to biological organisms. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that Mandeville had any direct influence on Darwin (though David Hume probably had). But it seems to me that in many respects Darwin is the culmination of a development which Mandeville more than any other single man had started.

Yet Mandeville and Darwin still have one thing in common: the scandal they caused had ultimately the same source, and Darwin in this respect finished what Mandeville had begun. It is difficult to remember now, perhaps most difficult for those who hold religious views in their now prevailing form, how closely religion was not long ago still associated with the ‘argument from design’. The discovery of an astounding order which no man had designed was for most men the chief evidence for the existence of a personal creator. In the moral and political sphere Mandeville and Hume did show that the sense of justice and probity on which the order in this sphere rested, was not originally implanted in man’s mind but had, like that mind itself, grown in a process of gradual evolution which at least in principle we might learn to understand. The revulsion against this suggestion was quite as great as that caused more than a century later when it was shown that the marvels of the organism could no longer be adduced as proof of special design. Perhaps I should have said that the process began with Kepler and Newton. But if it began and ended with a growing insight into what determined the kosmos of nature, it seems that the shock caused by the discovery that the moral and political kosmos was also the result of a process of evolution and not of design, contributed no less to produce what we call the modern mind.

On the influence on Charles Darwin of conceptions derived from social theory see E. Radl, Geschicht der biologischen Theorie, ii, Leipzig, 1909, especially p. 121.