



TONY LLOYD

## Antony Charles Lloyd 1916–1994

TONY LLOYD was born on 15 July 1916 into a Hampstead family that was part of the Fabian circle. His brother and sister survive him. He would have hated to mention any connections, but it will prove relevant that Tawney was a sort of uncle, G. D. H. Cole lived next door and the Fabians holidayed together: the Lloyds and Bernard Shaw might be found staying with the Webbs. H. G. Wells and Maynard Keynes were visitors. Later Tony's mother would talk of the Bloomsbury set in the same kind of hilarious terms that Tony used in his own story-telling. There is a tale that in 1919–20, Sydney Webb, told his two assistants, one of whom was Tony's father, the political scientist Charles Mostyn Lloyd, that one or other of them must stand for Parliament. Both refused, so the matter was decided by the toss of a coin. C. M. Lloyd stayed where he was. The loser, who stood for Parliament, was Clement Attlee. C. M. Lloyd was a colleague of Laski and Beveridge in the London School of Economics. He was foreign editor and, later, temporary editor of the *New Statesman*. He did not however forget his classical scholarship, but reviewed translations from the Loeb Classical Library for that journal. The Latin spelling of his son's name, Antony, was due to his insistence.

Tony Lloyd would also not have drawn attention to the fact that he had a private schooling. After The Hall in Hampstead, he went on to Shrewsbury, celebrated at the time for its production of classical scholars. According to one story, the choice of private schooling was due to his mother, who is remembered by some as a strong and independent character in her own right. But it was his father, not his mother who influenced Tony.

He went on to Balliol with an exhibition, to read the combination of Classics and Philosophy known as Greats. At his first tutorial, he was told to read a book in German for the next tutorial. The young Lloyd replied, 'But I don't read German.' His tutor looked at him in astonishment and said, 'But

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there is a fortnight until the next tutorial, Mr Lloyd.' Lloyd thoroughly approved of this attitude and his resulting command of German was to stand him in good stead more than once. He obtained a half-blue for chess, coxed the Balliol second boat, and later engaged in fencing and squash.

After Oxford, he was appointed Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy at Edinburgh, a post which he held until 1946. But his tenure was interrupted by the war. He joined the Queen's Own Hussars, but again the social prestige of the regiment cannot have weighed with him enough to prevent him missing dinner with his Colonel by falling asleep in the bath. He was subsequently transferred. The Italian campaign, in which he was a tank commander, enabled him to learn Italian and his German became useful at a time when German troops were surrendering. He claimed that one captive had been too polite to evade capture, because the signorina had served the spaghetti.

With the war over, in 1946 he was appointed Lecturer in the Department of Logic at St Andrews. His mother was now widowed. After a while, she came to join him and he cooked for her. Cooking eventually became an enthusiasm, but in early days guests have differing memories, one recalling a formal meal, served, slightly cold, by a maid in full attire.

His young colleagues in St Andrews very much admired him. One remembers him as a living Socrates, a challenger of the status quo and a rebel. It was scholastic logic that was being taught when he arrived. He headed a campaign, along with Pat Henderson, who had translated Tarski, and other young Turks including Jonathan Cohen (later FBA), to get Bertrand Russell's logic onto the syllabus. In this, after an initial rebuff, he succeeded.

He persuaded Ian Kidd (now FBA) to deliver his first paper, which Lloyd then tore to shreds. Kidd said, 'I'm sorry you didn't like my paper.' Lloyd looked uncomprehending and replied, 'I liked it very much.' He liked nothing so much as a paper which he thought merited vigorous attack. This could be intimidating to those who did not know him and it sometimes intimidated even his seniors. Beginning with hesitations, he would wind himself up into a torrent of criticism, with quick turns of the head, sometimes finishing with loud bursts of laughter. Some misconstrued this as anger, but in fact it was excitability. If anyone pointed out a mistake in his own reasoning, he would stop at once and acknowledge it with a perfect equanimity which had been missing a moment earlier. His vigorous manner animated his private conversations, as well as his public performances, and his friends were never bored.

His teaching manner at St Andrews was entirely different. One former student, later a colleague, remembers him with gratitude as his best teacher there. He lectured on Logic and on Plato, speaking slowly and clearly, leaving no gaps in explanation, but encouraging interruption and discussion. He once said he would like to be remembered as a teacher.

In 1957, he moved to become Professor in the Liverpool Philosophy Department. He stayed first in a hotel, or, as he would say, *an* hotel, then with his mother in a large, dark, and draughty Victorian house, full of old furniture not unlike his later retirement flat. At times there were festoons of electric cables. Neither of them seemed to notice the Spartan character of the surroundings.

He was a hands off professor, not an organiser of the department. Still less was he willing to take part in University business. He once replied to a University questionnaire that he had no staff members, but he did have five colleagues, and that is how he saw his role. It was his policy to put straight into the waste-paper basket any letters from the University starting with the word 'if'. Letters after 1979 at many universities, of course, would start, 'if we were to implement a 25% cut, . . .'. Other letters from the University administration would survive unanswered until out of date. This was a principled neglect, not a matter of accident; he regarded it as good administration. The University did not penalise him or his department, but, on the contrary, admired his other intellectual gifts. Examiners' meetings were equally innocent of organisation, and not because of any lack of interest on his part in the exact mark each student should receive. This approach did not stop him being in demand as an external examiner because of his unusual range of knowledge.

He did not consider Ethics to be a philosophical subject, as he informed the colleague he appointed to teach the subject before interviewing him. Nor did he have any interest in Philosophy of Religion, or in religion itself, despite his mother's strong religious commitment. But he nonetheless supported these two subjects in his own department. He once advocated a double increment in pay for one of these colleagues with the line, 'although he does not do a proper academic subject, . . .' Extreme differences in views on ethics, religion, or politics did not necessarily stand in the way of close friendship with him. His philosophical interests were clearly circumscribed, but at the same time they extended into areas far outside those of his philosophical contemporaries. He enjoyed reading Hegel as others might enjoy reading poetry and he was interested in Sartre and Existentialism. The most striking and fruitful example was his concern with Neoplatonism.

He had already published his blockbusting two-part article on Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic in 1955–6, two years before his translation to Liverpool. But once in Liverpool, he collaborated with a major Neoplatonist scholar of a very different stripe, who was head of the Classics Department, A. H. Armstrong. Hilary Armstrong, who was elected a Fellow of the Academy in 1970, is known for the best English translation of Plotinus to date. His interest in Neoplatonism was utterly different from Lloyd's, being scholarly and devotional, not that of an analytic philosopher. But he very much appreciated the cooperation Lloyd offered from an uncompromisingly different viewpoint and

he persuaded Lloyd to contribute a major article on the later Neoplatonists to the volume he was editing, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (1967). This volume was largely written by members of the Liverpool Faculty.

Liverpool was then, and has remained, an important centre for the study of Ancient Philosophy. During Lloyd's time, the Classics Department had H. J. Blumenthal and, as Armstrong's successor, A. A. Long, the History Department H. Liebeschuetz and another subsequent Fellow of the Academy, R. A. Markus, the Philosophy Department Pamela Huby and Howard Robinson. Lloyd also employed as an assistant lecturer from time to time a future President of the British Academy, Anthony Kenny. Gillian and Stephen Clark came after Lloyd left. In 1982, Lloyd started with Blumenthal a series of international conferences at Liverpool on Neoplatonism, which has continued.

He used to invite a small selection of his colleagues for philosophical discussion to his home, where he would serve an excellent wine in beautiful glasses. Sometimes the author chosen for discussion was a classic, for example Spinoza, but often a modern philosopher, Mackie, Wiggins, or Davidson. He had a gift for reducing complex argument to essentials and he reacted vehemently to anything he took to be rhetoric disguising a lack of supporting argument.

There were also fortnightly meetings on Ancient Philosophy with the Manchester departments of Greek and Philosophy, which included for a time C. Lejewski and later George Kerferd and Gordon Neal. The meetings of 1980–1 under Kerferd and Long led to an edition and translation of a work familiar, when it was first suggested, only to Lloyd, Ptolemy *On the Kriterion*.

In the 1980s, he started visiting seminars at the Institute of Classical Studies in London, especially those on the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle, and he was accompanied by up to four members of the Liverpool group. Already at the end of the 1960s, he had visited an Institute seminar in London on Stoicism given by the young A. A. Long. Now in the 1980s, Lloyd encouraged the relevant member of his own department to come and made that financially possible. He would arrive with a set of handwritten exercise books from which he could reel off references to exactly which Neoplatonists had said what and where. He was very diffident, however about inflicting information on colleagues. Some of the most abstruse information was prefaced with an, 'as you know'. More often, he would make rapid allusions to diverse material, as if it was well known to everybody. To get the benefit of his encyclopaedic knowledge, it was necessary to insist on ignorance and then the exercise books would be deployed and the full set of references given. Someone should have been there while he was writing too, to insist on their own ignorance. Not always, but too often, in his writing, one can see that he does not want to tire the reader with information that everyone, in his view, must surely have and the references become fewer as the paragraphs

progress towards their end. At his home, besides the exercise books he had a drum of index cards with further handwriting. These records will shortly be available in the Archives of King's College, London. After his retirement to Hove, Lloyd continued to come to London seminars, including now Mario Mignucci's seminars at King's College on Ancient Logic.

After the seminars, he liked a good drink in a pub before proceeding to a convivial restaurant. He probably liked the pub the better of the two. These occasions were much enjoyed by all, but being a bachelor himself, he probably spent most time with fellow bachelors. In conversation he had a rich supply of anecdotes, told often at his own expense. He was a notable raconteur. His willingness to celebrate his own mistakes may have encouraged him in pursuing some hobbies at which he was less than expert. His interest in gardening and in electrical repairs were combined, when in mowing the lawn, he severed the television cables for his and the other flats in the house and sought to repair them with Sellotape. Among other exploits, he bought a lawnmower that didn't work, but on taking it back to the shop where he believed he had bought it, found the owner denied all knowledge of him. (In another version, on reporting his new lawnmower stolen, he returned to find it in his shed.) While trying to repair a light fixture in his flat, he accidentally poked a hole through the ceiling into the WC of the flat upstairs and was threatened with a call to the police. When he went away for any period of time, he would leave his silver with the bank, but often on return had great difficulty in establishing his identity. He was asked to leave a wine-tasting at Woolworths for spitting out the wine into the washing up liquid. To his friends he would have a different story to tell almost every evening they met.

Philosophy and Ancient Philosophy were by no means his only interest. His hobbies were many and various. He started in childhood with a huge butterfly collection. Another thing he collected was Victorian watercolours. He came eventually to love both opera and cooking and compared the two, saying he could read recipes as musicians read scores. He collected French wines and the quality of his wine and cooking is remembered as compensating for the coldness of the rooms. He was widely read in English, French, and Russian fiction of the nineteenth century, although he knew the Russian only in translation, and he had a large collection of nineteenth-century novels, including first editions. He liked French literature best, especially Flaubert and Stendahl. His favourite novel in German was Fontane's *Effi Briest*, his favourite English novelist Trollope. Two professors of English thought he could well have held a chair in their subject. He enjoyed long visits, either alone or staying with his brother, to Italy, France, and Austria, being fluent in all the relevant languages. He also enjoyed, in the spirit of exploration, two academic visits to the USA, one in the 1960s to Lawrence, Kansas, and one to join A. A. Long, after Long had left Liverpool for Berkeley.

Two very different enthusiasms were chatting in working men's pubs and

watching soccer. He always went into the public bar, never the lounge or the saloon, and that in the days when entry into the wrong bar could, in some pubs, produce total silence. But he was very well known and liked. A televised soccer match could bring a philosophical conversation to an end almost in mid-sentence. His reputation as a scholar was not the centre of his own perspective and it may have pleased him that the last two hobbies he shared with the common man, although he himself was a very uncommon man. In some ways, he seemed rather old fashioned, with his formal dress and his nineteenth-century pronunciation of Latin.

For all his sociability, he avoided discussing emotional matters, even with close friends, being rather a private man. Music was a great solace to him. One of his friends conjectures that this deterred him from indulging his great love of music in company, lest his reaction should be on public display. For the same reason, he left his own retirement party early, leaving the guests to finish the eating and drinking. He was not a self-publicist, nor a publicist of any kind. When the main annual UK philosophy conference was held in Liverpool in 1968, it was not at Lloyd's instigation, but at the Vice-Chancellor's. Lloyd gave the shortest Presidential address ever and left the stage. He was probably pleased to be elected a Senior Fellow of the British Academy in 1992, but he could not bring himself to tell his brother what the letter was to which he was replying with an acceptance. He did, however react appreciatively to the celebration in Balliol of a then forthcoming Festschrift of 1991, *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (suppl. vol., ed. Henry Blumenthal and Howard Robinson). This contains a bibliography of his writings on Ancient Philosophy.

He has been described as a Labour Party Leninist in the mould of the Webbs. Among his papers there are some lectures of a syndicalist stripe, but there is no hint of where or when he might have delivered them. Apart from this and from some canvassing for the Labour Party, described in the usual hilarious terms, his political views seem to have influenced his private, rather than his public life. His preference for the working man's bar has been mentioned. He was also against property ownership and that influenced his choice of Hove as a place to retire, because there was a lot of property to rent. He believed in the redistribution of wealth and he also held that the University should play a role in regard to the plight of poor people in Liverpool, considering itself part of the working-class community within which it was located. Yet he confided these intensely held views only to his closest friends and appears not to have tried to persuade the University itself. He was perhaps too private a person and there may be a further key to his inaction in a remark made to a friend that it was no use trying to live up to the life that his father had lived. Certainly, he spoke of his father and his father's work only in a serious tone, never with the high frivolity with which he described much of his own experience. And he regarded his academic life (a life very different from

that of today's academic, or of most academics then) as, politically, a self-indulgence.

He made close friendships with people of extremely different political views from his own and he thought it important not to influence the political thinking of students. One student with similar views to his own only discovered this link long after he had ceased being a student.

He found writing difficult and some of his writing is elliptical. This is not so much true of earlier writing, but it is true of the last book, which sums up his insights into Neoplatonism, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (1990). The book contains most valuable insights and would have to be read by all specialists at the graduate level or above, but could not be recommended to those not already well versed in the subject.

In his articles, Lloyd had a gift for drawing attention to topics that had been neglected by recent Philosophy: the idea of individuals as bundles of qualities, the idea of self-awareness, the idea of thought that does not involve propositions, the character of tenses in verbs and the idea that the cause is greater than the effect. His articles on the last four subjects appeared in 1964, 1969–70, 1970, and 1976 and are much more readable than the later book. The first topic was covered only in passing in his densely packed two-part article of 1955–6, but was very well documented.

He contributed articles also in Modern Philosophy, but his work in Ancient Philosophy started with three articles on Plato in 1952–3. He was able in 1955 to take on the daunting task of reviewing a History of Ancient Logic. In 1955–6, he made his name with his two-part article in the first volume of the new journal *Phronesis*, 'Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic'. His fluency in German was already proving its value. Not only was Neoplatonism not being studied by English-speaking philosophers, but neither was the German literature. He knew the work of Heinze and Faust and was able to correct the views of Praechter, Prantl, and Erdmann. In his 1955–6 article, he gave an account *inter alia* of the Neoplatonist Porphyry, who in opposition to his own teacher Plotinus, made Aristotle's Logic an indispensable part of Western philosophical education. Lloyd's has been called the best attempt to reconstruct a coherent Porphyry.

But Lloyd had what has been called a love–hate relationship with Neoplatonism. He was more at home with analytical minds like his own: the Stoics, Aristotle and the Aristotelian, Alexander of Aphrodisias, or Porphyry, insofar as Porphyry revived Aristotle's Logic. In Plato he felt there was a lack of argued substantiation. In 1970–1, Lloyd published two articles partly or wholly on Stoic grammatical theory. In one, delivered to the Academy, he drew attention to the Stoic treatment of the tenses and aspects of verbs. In the other, he showed how the Stoics' parts of speech related to their metaphysical categories. In 1978, he published an article that must have pleased him particularly, because it brought some of his closest interests together. He drew attention to a fascinating debate between the Stoics and their Aristotelian



adversary, Alexander, on a subject that was made prominent in the twentieth century by Bertrand Russell. The question is what is meant by a statement like, 'Socrates walks'. Does it imply the present existence of Socrates? If so, what are we to make of, 'Socrates is dead'? The question has wider implications for the meaning of declarative statements and of names in general. The moves of the rival ancient Schools are highly ingenious, but the report of them is tucked away where others had not noticed it in Alexander's *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics* (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. 2, part 1, p. 402, lines 1–405, 16). Lloyd's article, 'Definite propositions and the concept of reference', appeared in J. Brunschwig, ed. *Les Stoiciens et leur logique* and it shows, perhaps better than any other, what Lloyd found so interesting about later Greek Logic.

In 1981, Lloyd published a short, but important monograph, *Form and Universal in Aristotle*. He showed that the ancient commentators on Aristotle took him to believe in individual, as opposed to universal, forms. Moreover, repeating a claim already made in *Mind* in 1970, he argued, convincingly, against the then current orthodoxy, that this was indeed Aristotle's view. More controversially, he argued that Aristotle was interpreted, and interpreted rightly, as thinking universals are never objective things, as forms are, but exist only in the mind. And he took Aristotelian individual forms to be individuals in their own right, rather than owing their individuality to something else.

So far Lloyd's interest in ancient Grammar and Logic involved him in no particular conflict, but the later Neoplatonists were harder for him to stomach. Curiously, in his *Cambridge History* chapter of 1970, he doubted (p. 276) whether the Neoplatonists would have anything interesting to say on the Philosophy of Physics and he never investigated this subject. Yet he might have found it less uncongenial than some of the Neoplatonists' attempts to combine Logic with their higher Metaphysics or what he found still more infuriating, their misunderstanding of certain logical matters. He further explains in his *Phronesis* article of 1955 (p. 58) that one cannot look to the Neoplatonists, as one can to the Stoics, for advances in Formal Logic. They cannot be credited with a single theorem. What one can investigate is their Logic in a wider sense, sometimes called Philosophical Logic. But even this was a strain for Lloyd, when he came to later figures. He does not think very highly in his *Anatomy* of Proclus, for example, even though he is willing here and elsewhere patiently to expound him. But he is not always complimentary about the earlier Aristotelian School either. At one point (p. 23), he says: 'It is perhaps an unexpected pleasure to be able to report that this inept tale initiated by the two leading Peripatetics since Theophrastus was not repeated by any Neoplatonist known to us on this subject.' (For these purposes Lloyd was counting Themistius as well as Alexander as a Peripatetic.)

Lloyd's coming to terms with the Neoplatonists is marked by his changed attitude to their mysticism. In 1970, in the *Cambridge History*, he discussed the highest kind of mystical union, which for Neoplatonists is a negation of

thought and consciousness. He comments: 'this seems to belong to some Indian mysticism but to have no place in what counts as philosophy in Europe'. By the time of *Anatomy*, he sees the mysticism as very relevant to the Logic after all. Admittedly, he is talking about a lower level of mystical experience, but its relevance had not previously been acknowledged. He describes (p. 126) Neoplatonism as idealist and says that the Neoplatonist hypostases, or levels of reality, are experiences, or types of consciousness. So the element of personal experience is needed to complement the philosophical system. The Neoplatonic genus (p. 166), in striking contrast to Aristotle's, is a mystical experience. Logical structure thus requires mystical support, but also mysticism would lose its philosophical interest were it not for the logical structure. Every real thing (p. 182–3) is a thinking. Accordingly, Lloyd is scholar enough to devote two chapters of the book to a mysticism which he surely found deeply uncongenial. He would not have wanted a Neoplatonist heaven of serene non-propositional contemplation, much less one that lay beyond all thinking, but rather a heaven which included fierce argumentation about propositions, alongside many other delights and distractions.

Curiously enough, he did in conversation appeal to Neoplatonist ideas in attacking Wittgenstein's treatment of thought as closely tied to language. Uncongenial as Neoplatonism may have been in some ways, he used it as a corrective to what he saw as superficial in Wittgensteinianism. Lloyd found in Plotinus, though not in Proclus, a distinction between thought which involved whole propositions and thought which involved only a single concept. Plotinus also talked of grasping the entire intelligible world as a whole. He considered that the highest mystical experience was beyond words and thinking. It would involve silence; words would be useless. Better for the portrayal of some experience would be the Egyptian hieroglyphs, which were not words, but pictorial symbols. The Wittgensteinians, he complained (though this would not have been true of many of them), ignored thinking by means of images and also ignored the idea of grasping something whole.

His written output was more important than its volume might suggest. His lasting legacy resides in the large number of interesting topics from later Greek Philosophy, which had been ignored because they were buried in texts which other philosophers were not reading. Again and again, he unearthed them and revealed their true interest.

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